Decoding images in the mind's eye : the temporal dynamics of visual imagery

Mental imagery is the ability to generate images in the mind in the absence of sensory input. Both perceptual visual processing and internally generated imagery engage large, overlapping networks of brain regions. However, it is unclear whether they are characterized by similar temporal dynamics. Recent magnetoencephalography work has shown that object category information was decodable from brain activity during mental imagery, but the timing was delayed relative to perception. The current study builds on these findings, using electroencephalography to investigate the dynamics of mental imagery. Sixteen participants viewed two images of the Sydney Harbour Bridge and two images of Santa Claus. On each trial, they viewed a sequence of the four images and were asked to imagine one of them, which was cued retroactively by its temporal location in the sequence. Time-resolved multivariate pattern analysis was used to decode the viewed and imagined stimuli. Although category and exemplar information was decodable for viewed stimuli, there were no informative patterns of activity during mental imagery. The current findings suggest stimulus complexity, task design and individual differences may influence the ability to successfully decode imagined images. We discuss the implications of these results in the context of prior findings of mental imagery

The Visualizer's Fallacy: Why Aphantasia Skepticism Underestimates the Dynamics of Cognition

Aphantasia, namely the inability to voluntarily form visual mental imagery, does not, counterintuitively, impair the affected from successfully performing mental imagery tasks. One way of explaining this finding is to posit that aphantasics, despite their claim to the contrary, can form visual imagery, a position here referred to as aphantasia skepticism. This article outlines and rejects two types of aphantasia skepticism and argues that the position results from what is coined the visualizer’s fallacy, namely the false belief that visual mental imagery is necessary to carry out mental imagery tasks. Furthermore, it is argued that the visualizer’s fallacy and the resulting aphantasia skepticism are not only potentially harmful to aphantasics but may also lead to an impoverished view of the dynamics of cognition in general

Visuospatial coding as ubiquitous scaffolding for human cognition

For more than 100 years we have known that the visual field is mapped onto the surface of visual cortex, imposing an inherently spatial reference frame on visual information processing. Recent studies highlight visuospatial coding not only throughout visual cortex, but also brain areas not typically considered visual. Such widespread access to visuospatial coding raises important questions about its role in wider cognitive functioning. Here, we synthesise these recent developments and propose that visuospatial coding scaffolds human cognition by providing a reference frame through which neural computations interface with environmental statistics and task demands via perception–action loops

Reconstructing the Mind's Eye: fMRI-to-Image with Contrastive Learning and Diffusion Priors

We present MindEye, a novel fMRI-to-image approach to retrieve and reconstruct viewed images from brain activity. Our model comprises two parallel submodules that are specialized for retrieval (using contrastive learning) and reconstruction (using a diffusion prior). MindEye can map fMRI brain activity to any high dimensional multimodal latent space, like CLIP image space, enabling image reconstruction using generative models that accept embeddings from this latent space. We comprehensively compare our approach with other existing methods, using both qualitative side-by-side comparisons and quantitative evaluations, and show that MindEye achieves state-of-the-art performance in both reconstruction and retrieval tasks. In particular, MindEye can retrieve the exact original image even among highly similar candidates indicating that its brain embeddings retain fine-grained image-specific information. This allows us to accurately retrieve images even from large-scale databases like LAION-5B. We demonstrate through ablations that MindEye's performance improvements over previous methods result from specialized submodules for retrieval and reconstruction, improved training techniques, and training models with orders of magnitude more parameters. Furthermore, we show that MindEye can better preserve low-level image features in the reconstructions by using img2img, with outputs from a separate autoencoder. All code is available on GitHub.Comment: Project Page at https://medarc-ai.github.io/mindeye-website/. Code at https://github.com/MedARC-AI/fMRI-reconstruction-NSD

A voxel-wise encoding model for early visual areas decodes mental images of remembered scenes

Recent multi-voxel pattern classification (MVPC) studies have shown that in early visual cortex patterns of brain activity generated during mental imagery are similar to patterns of activity generated during perception. This finding implies that low-level visual features (e.g., space, spatial frequency, and orientation) are encoded during mental imagery. However, the specific hypothesis that low-level visual features are encoded during mental imagery is difficult to directly test using MVPC. The difficulty is especially acute when considering the representation of complex, multi-object scenes that can evoke multiple sources of variation that are distinct from low-level visual features. Therefore, we used a voxel-wise modeling and decoding approach to directly test the hypothesis that low-level visual features are encoded in activity generated during mental imagery of complex scenes. Using fMRI measurements of cortical activity evoked by viewing photographs, we constructed voxel-wise encoding models of tuning to low-level visual features. We also measured activity as subjects imagined previously memorized works of art. We then used the encoding models to determine if putative low-level visual features encoded in this activity could pick out the imagined artwork from among thousands of other randomly selected images. We show that mental images can be accurately identified in this way; moreover, mental image identification accuracy depends upon the degree of tuning to low-level visual features in the voxels selected for decoding. These results directly confirm the hypothesis that low-level visual features are encoded during mental imagery of complex scenes. Our work also points to novel forms of brain-machine interaction: we provide a proof-of-concept demonstration of an internet image search guided by mental imagery

A voxel-wise encoding model for early visual areas decodes mental images of remembered scenes

Recent multi-voxel pattern classification (MVPC) studies have shown that in early visual cortex patterns of brain activity generated during mental imagery are similar to patterns of activity generated during perception. This finding implies that low-level visual features (e.g., space, spatial frequency, and orientation) are encoded during mental imagery. However, the specific hypothesis that low-level visual features are encoded during mental imagery is difficult to directly test using MVPC. The difficulty is especially acute when considering the representation of complex, multi-object scenes that can evoke multiple sources of variation that are distinct from low-level visual features. Therefore, we used a voxel-wise modeling and decoding approach to directly test the hypothesis that low-level visual features are encoded in activity generated during mental imagery of complex scenes. Using fMRI measurements of cortical activity evoked by viewing photographs, we constructed voxel-wise encoding models of tuning to low-level visual features. We also measured activity as subjects imagined previously memorized works of art. We then used the encoding models to determine if putative low-level visual features encoded in this activity could pick out the imagined artwork from among thousands of other randomly selected images. We show that mental images can be accurately identified in this way; moreover, mental image identification accuracy depends upon the degree of tuning to low-level visual features in the voxels selected for decoding. These results directly confirm the hypothesis that low-level visual features are encoded during mental imagery of complex scenes. Our work also points to novel forms of brain-machine interaction: we provide a proof-of-concept demonstration of an internet image search guided by mental imagery

The Somatotopy of Mental Tactile Imagery

To what degree mental imagery (MI) bears on the same neuronal processes as perception has been a central question in the neurophysiological study of imagery. Sensory-recruitment models suggest that imagery of sensory material heavily relies on the involvement of sensory cortices. Empirical evidence mainly stems from the study of visual imagery and suggests that it depends on the mentally imagined material whether hierarchically lower regions are recruited. However, evidence from other modalities is necessary to infer generalized principles. In this fMRI study we used the somatotopic organization of the primary somatosensory cortex (SI) to test in how far MI of tactile sensations activates topographically sensory brain areas. Participants (N = 19) either perceived or imagined vibrotactile stimuli on their left or right thumbs or big toes. The direct comparison to a corresponding perception condition revealed that SI was somatotopically recruited during imagery. While stimulus driven bottom-up processing induced activity throughout all SI subareas, i.e., BA1, BA3a, BA3b, and BA2 defined by probabilistic cytoarchitectonic maps, top-down recruitment during imagery was limited to the hierarchically highest subarea BA2