Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size

We study the equilibria of the standard pivotal-voter participation game between two groups of voters of asymmetric sizes (majority and minority), as originally proposed by Palfrey and Rosenthal (Public Choice 41(1):7–53, 1983). We find a unique equilibrium wherein the minority votes with certainty and the majority votes with probability in (0,1); we prove that this is the only equilibrium in which voters of only one group play a pure strategy, and we provide sufficient conditions for its existence. Equilibria where voters of both groups vote with probability in (0, 1) are analyzed numerically

Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size

We study the equilibria of the standard pivotal-voter participation game between two groups of voters of asymmetric sizes (majority and minority), as originally proposed by Palfrey and Rosenthal (Public Choice 41(1):7–53, 1983). We find a unique equilibrium wherein the minority votes with certainty and the majority votes with probability in (0,1); we prove that this is the only equilibrium in which voters of only one group play a pure strategy, and we provide sufficient conditions for its existence. Equilibria where voters of both groups vote with probability in (0, 1) are analyzed numerically

Smooth Politicians and Paternalistic Voters: A Theory of Large Elections

We propose a new game theoretic approach to modeling large elections that overcomes the “paradox of voting” in a costly voting framework, without reliance on the assumption of ad hoc preferences for voting. The key innovation that we propose is the adoption of a “smooth” policy rule under which the degree to which parties favor their own interests is increasing in their margin of victory. In other words, mandates matter. We argue that this approach is an improvement over the existing literature as it is consistent with the empirical evidence. Incorporating this policy rule into a costly voting model with paternalistic voters yields a parsimonious model with attractive properties. Specifically, the model predicts that when the size of the electorate grows without bound, limiting turnout is strictly positive both in terms of numbers and proportions. Further, the model preserves the typical comparative statics predictions that have been identified in the extant costly voting models such as the underdog effect and the competition effect. Finally, under the case of selfish agents, we are able to extend Palfrey and Rosenthal’s (1985) zero turnout result to a general class of smooth policy rules. Thus, this new approach reconciles the predictions of standard costly voting, both in terms of positive turnout and comparative statics predictions with the assumption of a large electorate environment.

Group Incentives and Rational Voting

Our model describes competition between groups driven by the choices of self-interested voters within groups. Within a Poisson voting environment, parties observe aggregate support from groups and can allocate prizes or punishments to them. In a tournament style analysis, the model characterizes how contingent allocation of prizes based on relative levels of support affects equilibrium voting behavior. In addition to standard notions of pivotality, voters influence the distribution of prizes across groups. Such prize pivotality supports positive voter turnout even in non-competitive electoral settings. The analysis shows that competition for a prize awarded to the most supportive group is only stable when two groups actively support a party. However, competition among groups to avoid punishment is stable in environments with any number of groups. We conclude by examining implications for endogenous group formation and how politicians structure the allocation of rewards and punishments.Comment: 34 pages, 1 figur

A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs

We provide a unified analysis of the canonical rational voting model with privately known political preferences and costs of voting. Focusing on type-symmetric equilibrium, we show that for small electorates, members of the minority group vote with a strictly higher probability than do those in the majority, but the majority is strictly more likely to win the election. As the electorate size grows without bound, equilibrium outcome is completely determined by the individuals possessing the lowest cost of voting in each political group. We relate our equilibrium characterization to Myerson's Poisson games, and examine the potential uniqueness of equilibrium.Costly voting Free-riding incentive Coordination problem Underdog effect

COSTLY COMMUNICATION IN GROUPS: THEORY AND AN EXPERIMENT

ABSTRACT. I develop a novel model of group-based communication in which group members communicate with one another. Communication is costly in the sense that group members who choose to send or listen to messages incur costs. Equilibrium strategies have an intuitive characterization-those with the best information send, those with the worst information receive. Free-riding leads to less information exchange than is optimal, but a simple system of transfers and subsidies can correct this. Examining the model's predictions with an experiment I find that subjects over-communicate when costs are high, but fail to benefit from this as much as they should. Additionally, I find that listening costs are more harmful to welfare, in contrast with the theory which indicates sending costs. Keywords: Group Communication, Information transmission, Information public goods People provide information to one another: Teams meet to exchange expertise on joint projects. Boards convene to obtain consensus on the best strategy for their firms. Friends and colleagues share movie and restaurant recommendations. Anonymous internet users provide feedback on products they purchased, and New Yorkers sometimes take the time to give directions to tourists. In each case, information is provided freely, even where the individuals proffering and receiving the information incur costs, for example, their time, effort or attentiveness. So there must be some benefit to the social exchange of information that can offset these costs. This preference for others' accurate choices might be the result of structural factors aligning interests (the joint project or common employer), or the product of a repeated game, where cooperation with others is driven by the stick of exclusion or the carrot of reciprocity (colleagues sharing information). It might be driven by explicit social preferences, where information providers derive pleasure from helping others (anonymous product raters, strangers giving directions). Regardless of the motive, when the provision of information i

Correlated Equilibria in Voter Turnout Games

Communication is fundamental to elections. This paper extends canonical voter turnout models to include any form of communication, and characterizes the resulting set of correlated equilibria. In contrast to previous research, high-turnout equilibria exist in large electorates and uncertain environments. This difference arises because communication can be used to coordinate behavior in such a way that voters find it incentive compatible to always follow their signals past the communication stage. The equilibria have expected turnout of at least twice the size of the minority for a wide range of positive voting costs, and show intuitive comparative statics on turnout: it varies with the relative sizes of diff t groups, and decreases with the cost of voting. This research provides a general micro foundation for group-based theories of voter mobilization, or voting driven by communication on a network