Nuclear Deterrence and the Space and Cyber domains

NPS NRP Technical ReportThe space and cyber domains are becoming increasingly intertwined in both conventional and theoretical nuclear conflicts. Deterrence strategies involving aggression, escalation, and deterrence must evolve with ever changing reality of the world situation. The space and cyber domains are unique from other domains since actions taken in these domains may be unattributable to a state actor and damage that occurs may be non-kinetic yet severe at the same time. In the past the U.S. has clearly defined nuclear redlines and communicated these to potential adversaries to help them understand actions which could be interpreted by the U.S. as precursor to nuclear aggression. Clearly communicated nuclear redlines seem to have been effective strategy at deterring the actions defined by the redline. In many cases potential adversaries have protested some of the redlines, but regardless of their protest in practically every case they still abided by them. It is vitally important that nuclear redlines evolve as the world situation and technology progress. This is not a simple task. Many space and cyber assets are dual tasked with conventional and nuclear missions. This project will help define which events in these domains is significant enough to warrant a kinetic response from the U.S., and which may justified crossing the nuclear threshold. With this understanding, recommendations will be made to improve or modify U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy if necessary. Keywords: Nuclear Deterrence, Strategic Deterrence, Space domain, cyber domain, crossdomainN3/N5 - Plans & StrategyThis research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrpChief of Naval Operations (CNO)Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Cyber Power Restrained: How Strategic Culture Inhibits the Integration of Cyber Weapons by the United States Military

This article seeks to reconcile the support status of cyber power in the United States military with the seriousness of the cyber threat confronting the nation. It rejects the argument that cyber weapons are not useful and are not traditional “weapons” by drawing parallels between cyber power and military force in the physical domains, as well as revealing how some of the most prominent issues in cybersecurity are political and not technological in nature. The article proposes strategic culture as an alternative explanation for U.S. cyber power’s current status. By studying the case studies of American air and space power, the analysis arrives at four factors that characterize the U.S. military’s integration of new technologies: 1) the initial use of new technologies to provide support to the services, 2) the importance of public interest in driving or constraining integration, 3) the effect a national crisis can have on helping the military overcome constraints against integration, and 4) the influence of external conflict on the military’s integration of new technologies. These findings together constitute a model which attributes the current status of cyber power to a history of dependence, public ignorance and lack of concern, and the absence of a “Cyber Pearl Harbor.” Acknowledging this, a cyber attack or cyber war against the United States has the best chance of changing the current status of American cyber power

Ten Years In: Implementing Strategic Approaches to Cyberspace

This book represents a look beyond theories and analogies to examine the challenges of strategy implementation. In the essays that follow, practitioners who are building cyberspace forces at-scale join scholars who study power and force in this new domain to collectively offer a unique perspective on the evolution and future of cyber strategy and operations.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/usnwc-newport-papers/1044/thumbnail.jp

A Small State’s Cyber Posture: Deterrence by Punishment and Beyond

This study explores a small-state’s offensive cyber capabilities as a deterrent against great-power cyber hostilities. More specifically, it poses the question: Could Norway successfully deter hostile cyber operations of greater powers, notably China and Russia, by signaling a resolve to retaliate within the same domain? The study reviews literature on the small state’s prospects of acquiring relevant offensive cyber capabilities; successfully signaling a deterrence-by-punishment posture; and, more generally, on the intricacies of retaliating against a greater power. The study concludes that most small states would enter the cyber battlefield with non-strategic and surreptitious capabilities, be inclined to signal their resolve with considerable ambiguity, and be compelled to respond with deniable means. It finds that such obscure features – the hallmarks of murky clandestine operations rather than a strategic posture – do not provide efficacious deterrence. Hence, to Norway and similar small states, deterrence by punishment may be an elusive, if not altogether vain, cyber posture

Cyber deterrence is overrated: analysis of the deterrent potential of the new cyber doctrine and lessons for Germany's "active cyper defence"

Proponents of active, offensive cyber operations argue that they could have a deter­rent effect on potential cyber attackers. The latter would think twice about attacking if a digital counter-attack might be the consequence. The idea that offensive cyber capabilities should have a deterrent effect was one reason why the new US cyber doctrine was adopted in 2018. The same assumption is implicit in the debate about cyber counterattacks ("hack backs") in Germany. Yet these assessments are based on a superficial understanding of deterrence. Cyber deterrence by the threat of retaliation works differently than that of nuclear deterrence. Problems of attribution, displays of power, controllability and the credibility of digital capabilities increase the risk of deterrence failure. Thus, the German cyber security policy would be well advised to increase its "deterrence by denial", cyber security and the resilience of its systems. (Autorenreferat

Mitigating Cyber Warfare through Deterrence and Diplomacy

Nation states are increasingly bolstering their defensive and offensive cyber capabilities to launch and deter politically motivated cyber attacks. This does not only affect political processes, institutions, and election outcomes, but also a state’s critical infrastructure, economy, and society. Recent escalations and cyber attacks on power grids, parliaments, electoral campaigns, and financial institutions have made governments more aware of the double-edged sword presented by emerging cyber capabilities wielded by nation states. A new layer has been added to conflict prevention between states, i.e. international diplomacy, confidence-building measures and deterrence in cyber space. In this paper, we argue that stand-alone deterrence and stand-alone appeasement cannot solve the arising cross-national cyber conflict and prevent a cyber arms race. Only a concerted effort to combine diplomatic and deterring strategies can lead to an acceptable status quo in international cyber relations

Russian and Chinese conceptions of deterrence: a comparative study of revisionism and the status-quo

The study of deterrence provides a unique and insightful alternative for the evaluation of state revisionism and status-quo adherence. This thesis provides an innovate method and proof-of-concept for the categorization of state revisionism, through operationalization of state deterrence strategies, using two of the most topical and relevant rising powers as cases: the Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China, during the so-called period of the ‘Rise of the Rest’ and the ‘Return of Geopolitics’. Through the use of data-driven qualitative content analysis, areas of interest are determined; from which key events are identified and evaluated by comparing the empirical results to the theoretical frameworks of deterrence and the long-established definition of revisionism. Through this methodology, this thesis finds that both the Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China are revisionist states, with the Russian Federation being significantly more revisionist than China; due to the differing security environments, historical and territorial context, and deterrence conceptions. By using the study of deterrence as an explanatory framework, this thesis provides a proof-of-concept and model for future research, and is the first holistic study on state revisionism in over 15 years, as well as it is the first comparative measurement-based study of its class.https://www.ester.ee/record=b5242312*es

United States deterrence policy: 1944 – present

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