Automated Negotiations Under Uncertain Preferences

Automated Negotiation is an emerging field of electronic markets and multi-agent system research. Market engineers are faced in this connection with computational as well as economic issues, such as individual rationality and incentive compatibility. Most literature is focused on autonomous agents and negotiation protocols regarding these issues. However, common protocols show two deficiencies: (1) neglected consideration of agents’ incentives to strive for social welfare, (2) underemphasised acknowledgement that agents build their decision upon preference information delivered by human principals. Since human beings make use of heuristics for preference elicitation, their preferences are subject to informational uncertainty. The contribution of this paper is the proposition of a research agenda that aims at overcoming these research deficiencies. Our research agenda draws theoretically and methodologically on auctions, iterative bargaining, and fuzzy set theory. We complement our agenda with simulation-based preliminary results regarding differences in the application of auctions and iterative bargaining

Theoretical and Computational Basis for CATNETS - Annual Report Year 3

In this document the developments in defining the computational and theoretical framework for economical resource allocation are described. Accordingly the formal specification of the market mechanisms, bidding strategies of the involved agents and the integration of the market mechanisms into the simulator were refined. --Grid Computing

Theoretical and Computational Basis for CATNETS - Annual Report Year 2

In this work the self-organising potential of the CATNETS allocation mechanism is described to provide a more comprehensive view on the research done in this project. The formal description of either the centralised and decentralised approach is presented. Furthermore the agents' bidding model is described and a comprehensive overview on how the catallactic mechanism is incorporated into the middleware and simulator environments is given. --Decentralized Market Mechanisms,Centralized Market Mechanisms,Catallaxy,Market Engineering,Simulator Integration,Prototype Integration

Applying autonomy to distributed satellite systems: Trends, challenges, and future prospects

While monolithic satellite missions still pose significant advantages in terms of accuracy and operations, novel distributed architectures are promising improved flexibility, responsiveness, and adaptability to structural and functional changes. Large satellite swarms, opportunistic satellite networks or heterogeneous constellations hybridizing small-spacecraft nodes with highperformance satellites are becoming feasible and advantageous alternatives requiring the adoption of new operation paradigms that enhance their autonomy. While autonomy is a notion that is gaining acceptance in monolithic satellite missions, it can also be deemed an integral characteristic in Distributed Satellite Systems (DSS). In this context, this paper focuses on the motivations for system-level autonomy in DSS and justifies its need as an enabler of system qualities. Autonomy is also presented as a necessary feature to bring new distributed Earth observation functions (which require coordination and collaboration mechanisms) and to allow for novel structural functions (e.g., opportunistic coalitions, exchange of resources, or in-orbit data services). Mission Planning and Scheduling (MPS) frameworks are then presented as a key component to implement autonomous operations in satellite missions. An exhaustive knowledge classification explores the design aspects of MPS for DSS, and conceptually groups them into: components and organizational paradigms; problem modeling and representation; optimization techniques and metaheuristics; execution and runtime characteristics and the notions of tasks, resources, and constraints. This paper concludes by proposing future strands of work devoted to study the trade-offs of autonomy in large-scale, highly dynamic and heterogeneous networks through frameworks that consider some of the limitations of small spacecraft technologies.Postprint (author's final draft

Scheduling Algorithms: Challenges Towards Smart Manufacturing

Collecting, processing, analyzing, and driving knowledge from large-scale real-time data is now realized with the emergence of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Deep Learning (DL). The breakthrough of Industry 4.0 lays a foundation for intelligent manufacturing. However, implementation challenges of scheduling algorithms in the context of smart manufacturing are not yet comprehensively studied. The purpose of this study is to show the scheduling No.s that need to be considered in the smart manufacturing paradigm. To attain this objective, the literature review is conducted in five stages using publish or perish tools from different sources such as Scopus, Pubmed, Crossref, and Google Scholar. As a result, the first contribution of this study is a critical analysis of existing production scheduling algorithms\u27 characteristics and limitations from the viewpoint of smart manufacturing. The other contribution is to suggest the best strategies for selecting scheduling algorithms in a real-world scenario

Addressing stability issues in mediated complex contract negotiations for constraint-based, non-monotonic utility spaces

Negotiating contracts with multiple interdependent issues may yield non- monotonic, highly uncorrelated preference spaces for the participating agents. These scenarios are specially challenging because the complexity of the agents’ utility functions makes traditional negotiation mechanisms not applicable. There is a number of recent research lines addressing complex negotiations in uncorrelated utility spaces. However, most of them focus on overcoming the problems imposed by the complexity of the scenario, without analyzing the potential consequences of the strategic behavior of the negotiating agents in the models they propose. Analyzing the dynamics of the negotiation process when agents with different strategies interact is necessary to apply these models to real, competitive environments. Specially problematic are high price of anarchy situations, which imply that individual rationality drives the agents towards strategies which yield low individual and social welfares. In scenarios involving highly uncorrelated utility spaces, “low social welfare” usually means that the negotiations fail, and therefore high price of anarchy situations should be avoided in the negotiation mechanisms. In our previous work, we proposed an auction-based negotiation model designed for negotiations about complex contracts when highly uncorrelated, constraint-based utility spaces are involved. This paper performs a strategy analysis of this model, revealing that the approach raises stability concerns, leading to situations with a high (or even infinite) price of anarchy. In addition, a set of techniques to solve this problem are proposed, and an experimental evaluation is performed to validate the adequacy of the proposed approaches to improve the strategic stability of the negotiation process. Finally, incentive-compatibility of the model is studied.Spain. Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (grant TIN2008-06739-C04-04