A model of air transport passenger incidents and rights

This paper describes a representation of the legal framework in the air transport passenger's rights domain and the foremost incidents that trigger the top of consumer complaints ranking in the EU. It comprises the development of a small network of three ontologies, formalisation of scenarios, specification of properties and identification of relations. The approach is illustrated by means of a case study based in the context of a real life cancelled flight incident. This is part of an intended support-system that aims to provide both consumers and companies with relevant legal information to enhance the decision-making process

Defining “Accidents” in the Air: Why Tort Law Principles Are Essential to Interpret the Montreal Convention’s “Accident” Requirement

This Note examines the history of, and the reasons for, the Montreal Convention, which in part forces airlines to indemnify passengers for injuries resulting from “accidents”—a term undefined in the treaty. The Montreal Convention and the subsequent case law interpreting it demonstrate how, to qualify as an “accident,” the injury-producing incident must be causally connected to the plane’s operation. Importantly, the causal connection’s adequacy should be evaluated according to American tort jurisprudence even though the accident requirement itself is an exception to general tort law. This Note focuses on a particular type of injury-producing event, a copassenger tort, because of its interesting causal nature that exemplifies the contrast between decisions using tort law and those rendered under the Convention

Ontology-driven legal support-system in air transport passenger domain

This paper aims to present a preliminary version of asupport-system in the air transport passenger domain. This system relies upon an underlying on-tological structure representing a normative framework to facilitatethe provision of contextualized relevant legal information.This information includes the pas-senger's rights and itenhances self-litigation and the decision-making process of passengers.Our contribution is based in the attempt of rendering a user-centric-legal informationgroundedon case-scenarios of the most pronounced incidents related to the consumer complaints in the EU.A number ofadvantages with re-spect to the current state-of-the-art services are discussed and a case study illu-strates a possible technological application

Formulating a Strategy for Securing High-Speed Rail in the United States, Research Report 12-03

This report presents an analysis of information relating to attacks, attempted attacks, and plots against high-speed rail (HSR) systems. It draws upon empirical data from MTI’s Database of Terrorist and Serious Criminal Attacks Against Public Surface Transportation and from reviews of selected HSR systems, including onsite observations. The report also examines the history of safety accidents and other HSR incidents that resulted in fatalities, injuries, or extensive asset damage to examine the inherent vulnerabilities (and strengths) of HSR systems and how these might affect the consequences of terrorist attacks. The study is divided into three parts: (1) an examination of security principles and measures; (2) an empirical examination of 33 attacks against HSR targets and a comparison of attacks against HSR targets with those against non-HSR targets; and (3) an examination of 73 safety incidents on 12 HRS systems. The purpose of this study is to develop an overall strategy for HSR security and to identify measures that could be applied to HSR systems currently under development in the United States. It is hoped that the report will provide useful guidance to both governmental authorities and transportation operators of current and future HSR systems

MONALISA 2.0 and the sea traffic management - a concept creating the need for new maritime information standards and software solutions

Postprint (published version

Designing and Operating Safe and Secure Transit Systems: Assessing Current Practices in the United States and Abroad, MTI Report 04-05

Public transit systems around the world have for decades served as a principal venue for terrorist acts. Today, transit security is widely viewed as an important public policy issue and is a high priority at most large transit systems and at smaller systems operating in large metropolitan areas. Research on transit security in the United States has mushroomed since 9/11; this study is part of that new wave of research. This study contributes to our understanding of transit security by (1) reviewing and synthesizing nearly all previously published research on transit terrorism; (2) conducting detailed case studies of transit systems in London, Madrid, New York, Paris, Tokyo, and Washington, D.C.; (3) interviewing federal officials here in the United States responsible for overseeing transit security and transit industry representatives both here and abroad to learn about efforts to coordinate and finance transit security planning; and (4) surveying 113 of the largest transit operators in the United States. Our major findings include: (1) the threat of transit terrorism is probably not universal—most major attacks in the developed world have been on the largest systems in the largest cities; (2) this asymmetry of risk does not square with fiscal politics that seek to spread security funding among many jurisdictions; (3) transit managers are struggling to balance the costs and (uncertain) benefits of increased security against the costs and (certain) benefits of attracting passengers; (4) coordination and cooperation between security and transit agencies is improving, but far from complete; (5) enlisting passengers in surveillance has benefits, but fearful passengers may stop using public transit; (6) the role of crime prevention through environmental design in security planning is waxing; and (7) given the uncertain effectiveness of antitransit terrorism efforts, the most tangible benefits of increased attention to and spending on transit security may be a reduction in transit-related person and property crimes

The Empowerment of Hate

CAIR provides legal and advocacy services to people who have been targeted by bias.The organization employs 35 staff attorneys and has a presence in 22 states. These attorneys are tasked to assist every client in obtaining a just and fair resolution to their case, free of charge.While CAIR's focus is to win justice for each client, processing these cases provides the organization with a wealth of data. During the 2014-2016 period, CAIR staff processed a total of 11,427 incidents of potential bias.This report assembles this data to offer a larger and more comprehensive reflection of the civil rights implications of Islamophobic bias in the United States.CAIR is committed to protecting the civil rights of all Americans, regardless of faith. We do so with gratitude for the protections already established through the long, and often ugly, struggles of other targeted communities. As we work to help our clients, our broader goal is to set legal precedent, pass laws, and shape a social environment in which every American enjoys the basic right to be free from unequal treatment

A Comparison of the Social Costs of Air and Highway

This paper provides a comprehensive survey of the literature on the measures of social costs, providing an indication of the state of engineering and economic literature. We operationalize the new thinking about which externalities seem appropriate to consider in an analysis of the transportation system. We construct measures of each externality: noise, air pollution, accidents, and congestion for the highway and air transportation modes, where possible as a function of the amount of output or use, rather than as simple unit costs. We find that noise is the dominant cost of air travel, followed by congestion, air pollution and accidents. For highway travel, accidents are the most significant cost, followed by congestion, noise, and air pollution. The social costs of highway travel are about 15 percent of the full cost of a highway trip, while the smaller social costs of air travel are only 5 percent of the full cost of an air trip. A highway trip generates four to five times as much externality as an air trip. .

Bowtie models as preventive models in maritime safety

Aquest treball ha sorgit d’una proposta del Dr. Rodrigo de Larrucea que ha acabat de publicar un llibre ambiciós sobre Seguretat Marítima. Com ell mateix diu, el tema “excedeix amb molt les potencialitats de l’autor”, així que en el meu cas això és més cert. Es pot aspirar, però, a fer una modesta contribució a l’estudi i difusió de la seguretat de la cultura marítima, que només apareix a les notícies quan tenen lloc desastres molt puntuals. En qualsevol cas, el professor em va proposar que em centrés en els Bowtie Models, models en corbatí, que integren l’arbre de causes y el de conseqüències (en anglès el Fault Tree Analysis, FTA, i l’Event Tree Analysis, ETA). Certament, existeixen altres metodologies i aproximacions (i en el seu llibre en presenta vàries, resumides), però per la seva senzillesa conceptual i possibilitat de generalització i integració dels resultats era una bona aposta. Així, després d’una fase de meditació i recopilació de informació, em vaig decidir a presentar un model en corbatí molt general on caben les principals causes d’accidents (factores ambientals, error humà i fallada mecànica), comptant també que pot existir una combinació de causes. De tota manera, a l’hora d’explotar aquest model existeix la gran dificultat de donar una probabilitat de ocurrència, un nombre entre 0 i 1, a cada branca. Normalment les probabilitats d’ocurrència són petites i degut a això difícils d’estimar. Cada accident és diferent, de grans catàstrofes n’hi ha poques, i cada accident ja és estudiat de manera exhaustiva (més exhaustiva quan més greu és). Un altre factor que dificulta l’estima de la probabilitat de fallada és l’evolució constant del món marítim, tant des del punt de vista tècnic, de formació, legal i fins i tot generacional doncs cada generació de marins és diferent. Els esforços estan doncs enfocats a augmentar la seguretat, encara que sempre amb un ull posat sobre els costs. Així, he presentat un model en corbatí pel seu valor didàctic i gràfic però sense entrar en detalls numèrics, que si s’escau ja aniré afinant i interioritzant en l’exercici de la professió. En aquest treball també he intentat no mantenir-me totalment al costat de la teoria (ja se sap que si tot es fa bé, tot surt perfecte, etc…) sinó presentar amb cert detall 2 casos ben coneguts d’accidents marítims: el petroler Exxon Valdez, el 1989 i el ferry Estonia en 1994, entre altres esmentats. Són casos ja una mica vells però que van contribuir a augmentar la cultura de la seguretat, fins a arribar al nivell del que gaudim actualment, al menys als països occidentals. Doncs la seguretat, com esmenta Rodrigo de Larrucea “és una actitud i mai és fortuïta; sempre és el resultat d’una voluntat decidida, un esforç sincer, una direcció intel·ligent i una execució acurada. Sens lloc a dubtes, sempre suposa la millor alternativa”. The work has been inspired in its initial aspects by the book of my tutor Jaime Rodrigo de Larrucea, that presents a state of the art of all the maritime aspects related to safety. Evidently, since it covers all the topics, it cannot deepen on every topic. It was my opportunity to deepen in the Bowtie Model but finally I have also covered a wide variety of topics. Later, when I began to study the topics, I realized that the people in the maritime world usually do not understand to a great extent statistics. Everybody is concerned about safety but few nautical students take a probabilistic approach to the accidents. For this it is extremely important to study the population that is going to be studied: in our case the SOLAS ships Also, during my time at Riga, I have been very concerned with the most diverse accidents, some of them studied during the courses at Barcelona. I have seen that it is difficult to model mathematically the accidents, since each one has different characteristics, angles, and surely there are not 2 equal. Finally, it was accorded that I should concentrate on the Bowtie Model, which is not very complex from a statistical point of view. It is simply a fault tree of events model and a tree of effects. I present some examples in this Chapter 2. The difficulty I point out is to try to estimate the probabilities of occurrence of events that are unusual. We concentrated at major accidents, those that may cause victims or heavy losses. Then, for the sake of generality, at Chapter 4, I have divided the causes in 4 great classes: Natural hazards, human factor, mechanical failure and attacks (piracy and terrorism). The last concern maybe should not be included beside the others since terrorism and piracy acts are not accidents, but since there is an important code dedicated to prevent security threats, ISPS, it is example of design of barriers to prevent an undesired event (although it gives mainly guidelines to follow by the States, Port Terminals and Shipping Companies). I have presented a detailed study of the tragedy of the Estonia, showing how a mechanical failure triggered the failure of the ferry, by its nature a delicate ship, but there were other factors such as poor maintenance and heavy seas. At the next Chapter, certain characteristics of error chains are analyzed. Finally, the conclusions are drawn, offering a pretty optimistic view of the safety (and security) culture at the Western World but that may not easily permeate the entire World, due to the associated costs