Reciprocity towards groups

People exhibit group reciprocity when they retaliate, not against a person who harmed them, but against another person in that person's group. We tested for group reciprocity in laboratory experiments. Subjects played a Prisoner's Dilemma with partners from different groups. They then allocated money between themselves and other participants. In punishment games, subjects whose partner had defected punished participants from the partner's group more, compared to their punishment of participants from a third group. In dictator-style games, subjects did not exhibit group reciprocity. We examine possible correlates of group reciprocity, including group identification and cooperativeness

Non-Markovian Quantum Optics with Three-Dimensional State-Dependent Optical Lattices

Quantum emitters coupled to structured photonic reservoirs experience unconventional individual and collective dynamics emerging from the interplay between dimensionality and non-trivial photon energy dispersions. In this work, we systematically study several paradigmatic three dimensional structured baths with qualitative differences in their bath spectral density. We discover non-Markovian individual and collective effects absent in simplified descriptions, such as perfect subradiant states or long-range anisotropic interactions. Furthermore, we show how to implement these models using only cold atoms in state-dependent optical lattices and show how this unconventional dynamics can be observed with these systems.Comment: 39 pages, 17 figures. Accepted versio

Active Particle Condensation by Nonreciprocal and Time-delayed Interactions

We consider flocking of self-propelling agents in two dimensions, each of which communicates with its neighbors within a limited vision cone. Also, the communication occurs with some delay. The communication among the agents are modeled by Vicsek rules. In this study we explore the effect of non-reciprocal interaction among the agents, induced by their vision cone, together with the delayed interactions on the dynamical pattern formation within the flock. We find that under these two influences and without any position based attractive interactions or confining boundaries, the agents can spontaneously condense into drops. Though the agents are in motion within the drop, the drop as whole is virtually pinned in space. We also find that this novel state of the flock has a well defined order stabilized by the noise present in the system.Comment: Accepted In EPJ

The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories

This paper surveys recent experimental and field evidence on the impact of concerns for fairness, reciprocity and altruism on economic decision making. It also reviews some new theoretical attempts to model the observed behavior.Behavioural Economics; Other-regarding Preferences; Fairness; Reciprocity; Altruism; Experiments; Incentives; Contracts; Competition

The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories

Chapter written for the Handbook of Reciprocity, Gift-Giving and AltruismBehavioural Economics; Other-regarding Preferences; Fairness; Reciprocity; Altruism; Experiments; Incentives; Contracts; Competition

Psychological Foundations of Incentives

During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understanding incentives, contracts and organisations. Yet, they constrained their attention to a very narrow and empirically questionable view of human motivation. The purpose of this paper is to show that this narrow view of human motivation may severely limit understanding the determinants and effects of incentives. Economists may fail to understand the levels and the changes in behaviour if they neglect motives like the desire to reciprocate or the desire to avoid social disapproval. We show that monetary incentives may backfire and reduce the performance of agents or their compliance with rules. In addition, these motives may generate very powerful incentives themselves.incentives, contracts, reciprocity, social approval, social norms, intrinsic motivation.

Psychological Foundations of Incentives

Psychological Foundations, Incentives

Rational design and dynamics of self-propelled colloidal bead chains: from rotators to flagella

The quest for designing new self-propelled colloids is fuelled by the demand for simple experimental models to study the collective behaviour of their more complex natural counterparts. Most synthetic self-propelled particles move by converting the input energy into translational motion. In this work we address the question if simple self-propelled spheres can assemble into more complex structures that exhibit rotational motion, possibly coupled with translational motion as in flagella. We exploit a combination of induced dipolar interactions and a bonding step to create permanent linear bead chains, composed of self-propelled Janus spheres, with a well-controlled internal structure. Next, we study how flexibility between individual swimmers in a chain can affect its swimming behaviour. Permanent rigid chains showed only active rotational or spinning motion, whereas longer semi-flexible chains showed both translational and rotational motion resembling flagella like-motion, in the presence of the fuel. Moreover, we are able to reproduce our experimental results using numerical calculations with a minimal model, which includes full hydrodynamic interactions with the fluid. Our method is general and opens a new way to design novel self-propelled colloids with complex swimming behaviours, using different complex starting building blocks in combination with the flexibility between them.Comment: 27 pages, 10 figure