This paper surveys recent experimental and field evidence on the impact of concerns for fairness, reciprocity and altruism on economic decision making. It also reviews some new theoretical attempts to model the observed behavior.Behavioural Economics; Other-regarding Preferences; Fairness; Reciprocity; Altruism; Experiments; Incentives; Contracts; Competition

Fehr, Ernst

Schmidt, Klaus M.

English

Research Papers in Economics

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The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories

http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/726/1/Fehr-Schmidt_Handbook_2005-Munichecon.pdf

The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories

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