Ernst Fehr

English

Research Papers in Economics

1759. Theory of Moral Sentiments. Liberty Classics,

A depressed labor market as explained by participants.

A meta-analytic review of experiments examining the e ect of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation.

A meta-analytic study of the e ects of goal setting on task performance:

A ne is a price.

A theory of conformity.

A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation.

A theory of reciprocity. Working

A theory of sequential reciprocity. Discussion paper,

A theory of social custom, of which unemployment may be one consequence.

An economic model of welfare stigma.

An experimental investigation of social norms. Working paper,

Anonymity and the voluntary provision of public goods.

Anonymity versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining.

Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment.

Choice and procrastination.

Collective action as a social exchange.

Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptibility.

Dictator game giving: Fairness versus random acts of kindness.

Do high stakes remove reciprocal fairness? – evidence from Russia. Working paper,

Do incentive contracts crowd out voluntary cooperation? Working

Do You Swear to Love, Honor and Cherish? Then Sign Here. Hoover Digest, Hoover Institution.

Does fairness prevent market clearing? An experimental investigation.

Estimating the e ects of incentives on mail survey response rates: A meta-analysis.

Expressive law and economics.

Expressive law: Framing or equilibrium selection. Mimeo., Kennedy School of Government,

Fairness, incentives and contractual incompleteness. Working Paper No. 72, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics,

Foundations of Social Theory.

Goal setting: A meta-analytic examination of the empirical evidence.

Honesty in managerial reporting.

Incentive contracts and performance measurement.

Incentives and social norms in household behavior.

Incentives for procrastinators.

Incomplete contracts and the nature of market interactions.

Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics.

Intrinsic motivation and norms about payment. Working paper,

Intrinsic Motivation and Self-Determination in Human Behavior.

Japanese transplants: After the honeymoon. Business Horizons,

Labor supply of New York city cab drivers: One day at a time.

Large monetary incentives and their e ects on mail survey response rates.

Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments.

Monetary and non-monetary punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism. Discussion paper,

More order with less law: On contract enforcement, trust, and crowding.

Motivation crowding theory: A survey of empirical evidence.

Motivational e ects of knowledge of results: Knowledge or goal setting?

Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design.

Multitasking and explicit incentives. Working paper,

Non-reciprocal altruism in dictator games.

Not Just for the Money. An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation. Edward Elgar,

On the folly of rewarding A, while hoping for B.

On the regulation of social norms.

Pay enough or don’t pay at all.

Pay equality and industrial politics.

Peer pressure and partnerships.

Physician response to a mailed survey: An experiment in timing of payment.

Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games.

Preferences, property right, and anonymity in bargaining games.

Punishing free-riders: How group size a ects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods. Mimeo.,

Rational choice models of political behavior vs. functionalist and conformist theories.

Rational cooperation in the nitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma.

Rational irrationality: Some economics of self-management. Presidential Address, European Economic Association Meeting,

Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device – experimental evidence.

Reciprocity, trust, and payo privacy in extensive form bargaining.

Reinforcement, reward, and intrinsic motivation: A meta-analysis.

Reputation and reciprocity: Consequences for the labour relations.

Responsibility and e ort in an experimental labor market.

Sabotage and loss aversion as sources of wage compression. Working paper,

Self-centered inequality aversion versus reciprocity and altruism. Discussion paper, Europa-Universit at Viadrina,

Self-con dence and social interactions.

Self-perception: An alternative interpretation of cognitive dissonance phenomena.

Self-perception: The dependent variable of human performance.

Social capital, corporate culture and incentive intensity.

Social norms and economic incentives in the welfare state.

Social Norms and Moral Hazard.

Social norms and optimal incentives in rms, Working paper,

Social preferences and reciprocity.

Social preferences: Some simple tests and a new model.

Stigma in income-tested programs. Paper Delivered at Conference on Universal vs. Income Tested Programs,

Strikes, scabs and tread separations: Labor strife and the production of defective bridgestone= restone tyres.

The cost of price incentives: An empirical analysis of motivation crowding out.

The e ects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation.

The e ects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation: A meta-analysis.

The empirical exploration of intrinsic motivational processes.

The hidden cost of economic incentives. Working paper,

The Human Group.

The moonlighting game. An experimental study on reciprocity and retribution.

The old lady visits your backyard: A tale of morals and markets.

Theories of altruism and reciprocity: Evidence from linear public goods games.

Theories of fairness and reciprocity – evidence and economic applications. In:

Tit for tat: Foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings.

Trust, reciprocity, and social history.

Undermining children’s intrinsic interest with extrinsic rewards: A test of the “over justi cation” hypothesis.

Understanding welfare stigma: Taxpayer resentment and statistical discrimination.

Wage rigidity in a competitive incomplete contract market.

Welfare-state disincentives with endogenous habits and norms.

What do alternative sanctions mean?

Why social preferences matter – the impact of non-sel sh motives on competition, cooperation, and incentives,

Why Wages Don’t Fall During a Recession.

Work incentives, hierarchy, and internal labour markets.

Psychological Foundations of Incentives

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Psychological Foundations of Incentives

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Research Papers in Economics