Ceteris Paribus Structure in Logics of Game Forms

National audienceThe article introduces a ceteris paribus modal logic interpreted on the equivalence classes induced by sets of propositional atoms. This logic is used to embed two logics of agency and games, namely atemporal STIT and the coalition logic of propositional control (CL−PC). The embeddings highlight a common ceteris paribus structure underpinning the key modal operators of both logics, they clarify the relationship between STIT and CL−PC, and enable the transfer of complexity results to the ceteris paribus logi

Game semantics for first-order logic

We refine HO/N game semantics with an additional notion of pointer (mu-pointers) and extend it to first-order classical logic with completeness results. We use a Church style extension of Parigot's lambda-mu-calculus to represent proofs of first-order classical logic. We present some relations with Krivine's classical realizability and applications to type isomorphisms

Blameworthiness in Strategic Games

There are multiple notions of coalitional responsibility. The focus of this paper is on the blameworthiness defined through the principle of alternative possibilities: a coalition is blamable for a statement if the statement is true, but the coalition had a strategy to prevent it. The main technical result is a sound and complete bimodal logical system that describes properties of blameworthiness in one-shot games

LTLf and LDLf Synthesis under Partial Observability

In this paper, we study synthesis under partial observability for logical specifications over finite traces expressed in LTLf/LDLf. This form of synthesis can be seen as a generalization of planning under partial observability in nondeterministic domains, which is known to be 2EXPTIME-complete. We start by showing that the usual "belief-state construction" used in planning under partial observability works also for general LTLf/LDLf synthesis, though with a jump in computational complexity from 2EXPTIME to 3EXPTIME. Then we show that the belief-state construction can be avoided in favor of a direct automata construction which exploits projection to hide unobservable propositions. This allow us to prove that the problem remains 2EXPTIME-complete. The new synthesis technique proposed is effective and readily implementable

Boolean Hedonic Games

We study hedonic games with dichotomous preferences. Hedonic games are cooperative games in which players desire to form coalitions, but only care about the makeup of the coalitions of which they are members; they are indifferent about the makeup of other coalitions. The assumption of dichotomous preferences means that, additionally, each player's preference relation partitions the set of coalitions of which that player is a member into just two equivalence classes: satisfactory and unsatisfactory. A player is indifferent between satisfactory coalitions, and is indifferent between unsatisfactory coalitions, but strictly prefers any satisfactory coalition over any unsatisfactory coalition. We develop a succinct representation for such games, in which each player's preference relation is represented by a propositional formula. We show how solution concepts for hedonic games with dichotomous preferences are characterised by propositional formulas.Comment: This paper was orally presented at the Eleventh Conference on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT 2014) in Bergen, Norway, July 27-30, 201

Games for the Strategic Influence of Expectations

We introduce a new class of games where each player's aim is to randomise her strategic choices in order to affect the other players' expectations aside from her own. The way each player intends to exert this influence is expressed through a Boolean combination of polynomial equalities and inequalities with rational coefficients. We offer a logical representation of these games as well as a computational study of the existence of equilibria.Comment: In Proceedings SR 2014, arXiv:1404.041

Knowledge and Blameworthiness

Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents is often defined in terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be responsible for an outcome, the outcome must take place and the coalition should have had a strategy to prevent it. In this article we argue that in the settings with imperfect information, not only should the coalition have had a strategy, but it also should have known that it had a strategy, and it should have known what the strategy was. The main technical result of the article is a sound and complete bimodal logic that describes the interplay between knowledge and blameworthiness in strategic games with imperfect information