We study hedonic games with dichotomous preferences. Hedonic games are
cooperative games in which players desire to form coalitions, but only care
about the makeup of the coalitions of which they are members; they are
indifferent about the makeup of other coalitions. The assumption of dichotomous
preferences means that, additionally, each player's preference relation
partitions the set of coalitions of which that player is a member into just two
equivalence classes: satisfactory and unsatisfactory. A player is indifferent
between satisfactory coalitions, and is indifferent between unsatisfactory
coalitions, but strictly prefers any satisfactory coalition over any
unsatisfactory coalition. We develop a succinct representation for such games,
in which each player's preference relation is represented by a propositional
formula. We show how solution concepts for hedonic games with dichotomous
preferences are characterised by propositional formulas.Comment: This paper was orally presented at the Eleventh Conference on Logic
and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT 2014) in Bergen,
Norway, July 27-30, 201