Making decisions about screening cargo containers for nuclear threats using decision analysis and optimization

One of the most pressing concerns in homeland security is the illegal passing of weapons-grade nuclear material through the borders of the United States. If terrorists can gather the materials needed to construct a nuclear bomb or radiological dispersion device (RDD, i.e., dirty bomb) while inside the United States, the consequences would be devastating. Preventing plutonium, highly enriched uranium (HEU), tritium gas or other materials that can be used to construct a nuclear weapon from illegally entering the United States is an area of vital concern. There are enormous economic consequences when our nation\u27s port security system is compromised. Interdicting nuclear material being smuggled into the United States on cargo containers is an issue of vital national interest, since it is a critical aspect of protecting the United States from nuclear attacks. However, the efforts made to prevent nuclear material from entering the United States via cargo containers have been disjoint, piecemeal, and reactive, not the result of coordinated, systematic planning and analysis. Our economic well-being is intrinsically linked with the success and security of the international trade system. International trade accounts for more than thirty percent of the United States economy (Rooney, 2005). Ninety-five percent of international goods that enter the United States come through one of 361 ports, adding up to more than 11.4 million containers every year (Fritelli, 2005; Rooney, 2005; US DOT, 2007). Port security has emerged as a critically important yet vulnerable component in the homeland security system. Applying game theoretic methods to counterterrorism provides a structured technique for defenders to analyzing the way adversaries will interact under different circumstances and scenarios. This way of thinking is somewhat counterintuitive, but is an extremely useful tool in analyzing potential strategies for defenders. Decision analysis can handle very large and complex problems by integrating multiple perspectives and providing a structured process in evaluating preferences and values from the individuals involved. The process can still ensure that the decision still focuses on achieving the fundamental objectives. In the decision analysis process value tradeoffs are evaluated to review alternatives and attitudes to risk can be quantified to help the decision maker understand what aspects of the problem are not under their control. Most of all decision analysis provides insight that may not have been captured or fully understood if decision analysis was not incorporated into the decision making process. All of these factors make decision analysis essentially to making an informed decision. Game theory and decision analysis both play important roles in counterterrorism efforts. However, they both have their weaknesses. Decision analysis techniques such as probabilistic risk analysis can provide incorrect assessments of risk when modeling intelligent adversaries as uncertain hazards. Game theory analysis also has limitations. For example when analyzing a terrorist or terrorist group using game theory we can only take into consideration one aspect of the problem to optimize at a time. Meaning the analysis is either analyzing the problem from the defenders perspective or from the attacker’s perspective. Parnell et al. (2009) was able to develop a model that simultaneously maximizes the effects of the terrorist and minimizes the consequences for the defender. The question this thesis aims to answer is whether investing in new detector technology for screening cargo containers is a worthwhile investment for protecting our country from a terrorist attack. This thesis introduces an intelligent adversary risk analysis model for determining whether to use new radiological screening technologies at our nation’s ports. This technique provides a more realistic risk assessment of the true situation being modeled and determines whether it is cost effective for our country to invest in new cargo container screening technology. The optimal decision determined by our model is for the United States to invest in a new detector, and for the terrorists to choose agent cobalt-60, shown in Figure 18. This is mainly due to the prominence of false alarms and the high costs associated with screening all of these false alarms, and we assume for every cargo container that sounds an alarm, that container is physically inspected. With the new detector technology the prominence of false alarms decreases and the true alarm rate increases, the cost savings associated with this change in the new technology outweighs the cost of technical success or failure. Since the United States is attempting to minimize their expected cost per container, the optimal choice is to invest in the new detector. Our intelligent adversary risk analysis model can simultaneously determine the best decision for the United States, who is trying to minimize the expected cost, and the terrorist, who is trying to maximize the expected cost to the United States. Simultaneously modeling the decisions of the defender and attacker provides a more accurate picture of reality and could provide important insights to the real situation that may have been missed with other techniques. The model is extremely sensitive to certain inputs and parameters, even though the values are in line with what is available in the literature, it is important to understand the sensitivities. Two inputs that were found to be particularly important are the expected cost for physically inspecting a cargo container, and the cost of implementing the technology needed for the new screening device. Using this model the decision maker can construct more accurate judgments based on the true situation. This increase in accuracy could save lives with the decisions being made. The model can also help the decision maker understand the interdependencies of the model and visually see how his resource allocations affect the optimal decisions of the defender and the attacker

Offshore terror preparedness in the Barents Sea : "preparing for the unexpected"

Masteroppgave i Energy management - Universitetet i Nordland, 201

The Macroeconomic Consequences of Terrorism

We perform an empirical investigation of the macroeconomic consequences of international terrorism and interactions with alternative forms of collective violence. Our analysis is based on a rich unbalanced panel data set with annual observations on 177 countries from 1968 to 2000, which brings together information from the Penn World Table dataset, the ITERATE dataset for terrorist events, and datasets of external and internal conflict. We explore these data with cross-sectional and panel growth regression analysis and a structural VAR model. We find that, on average, the incidence of terrorism may have an economically significant negative effect on growth, albeit one that is considerably smaller and less persistent than that associated with either external wars or internal conflict. As well, terrorism is associated with a redirection of economic activity away from investment spending and towards government spending. However, our investigation also suggests important differences both regarding the incidence and the economic consequences of terrorism among different sets of countries. In OECD economies, in particular, terrorist incidents are considerably more frequent than in other nations, but the negative influence of these incidents on growth is smaller.growth, conflict, terrorism

US STRATEGY BETWEEN THE TWO FALLS: FROM THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL TO BAGHDAD

This study argues that American foreign policy (AFP) represented continuity rather than change from the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to the fall of Baghdad in 2003. During this time, the US pursued a hegemonic strategy that aimed to preserve its unipolar moment in the new American century. However, this argument is challenged by two sets of AFP literature. The first sees the 1990s as a period of inconsistency in AFP strategy, and the second identifies post-9/11 policy as a revolutionary change in AFP. This study‘s analysis goes below the surface of AFP‘s to its deep structure (hidden agendas). In contrast to the majority of AFP literature, it argues the 1990s were not a fragmented era but that AFP showed continuity rather than change, and the strategy of hegemony was already in operation. Likewise, putting aside the rhetoric of the Bush II administration, post-9/11 policy cannot be understood except in the context of AFP‘s hegemonic strategy of the post-Cold War (CW) era and 9/11 was no more than a terrorist attack carried out by a terrorist group. However, to serve US hegemonic agenda that was on hold from the early 1990s, the attack was deliberately exaggerated and portrayed as an existential threat to the US. The study does not deny the political fragmentation in the 1990s or ignore the effects of 9/11 on AFP strategy. Therefore, to critique the two sets of literature, the research assesses the impact of domestic politics on the ability of US officials‘ to build on America‘s unipolar moment. In doing so, this study highlights several aspects of US domestic division that curtailed the ability of bureaucrats to handle FP issues. This also demonstrates that AFP‘s failure in the 1990s was not on the strategic planning level but in its domestic context. Congress emerged as a counterweight to the leadership of the president. Societal groups gained unprecedented influence over policy-making as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. This status changed after 9/11 when a new external enemy appeared. The president regained his supreme role and Congress‘s role retreated. Under these circumstances, the study concludes that an unchanging AFP strategy gave the basis for the emergence of an explicit American hegemony

Russian Concept of War, Management and Use of Military Power : Conceptual Change

This publication consists primarily of articles presented in the annual Russia Seminar 2022 organised by the Department of warfare of the Finnish National Defence University (FNDU) and titled as “Russian Concept of War, Management and Use of Military Power – Conceptual Change”. The aim of the Seminar was to raise a discussion on Russian military policy and military power. The focus of the seminar was on the Russian concept of ”war” – that is – the use of lethal military force in order to achieve certain political objectives. It should be noted that the publication is not an exhaustive presentation of all the aspects related to the concept of war. This leaves room for themes and questions to be researched also in the future. The use of force is one of the two main functions of the Russian military power, the other one being deterrence, which was discussed at the Russia seminar 2021. The objective of deterrence is to influence the conciousness of the adversary - to change adversary’s behaviour and make it relinquish possible ideas of aggression or threat to use military power against Russia. In the 2021 seminar the main emphasis was on the military aspects and prerequisites of preventing a war. As we know now, at the time of writing these lines, in May-June 2022 – these aspects and methods of deterrence conducted by Russia and its military during the past year were not only aimed at preventing war, but also, they were actual preparations for a war. Furthermore, despite the fact that these means and capabilities were partly escalatory and threatening by nature, they did not enable Russia to achieve its political, military-political or military objectives. Regarding Ukraine, or more broadly the security structure of Europe, they were set by Russia, perhaps, intentionally on a level which was clearly unacceptable. In this manner Russia could justify to Russian people – after the launch of the operation – that there is no other solution than to conduct “a special military operation” in Ukraine. In this introductory chapter I will briefly introduce the articles or presentations of this report which were contributed in the seminar. All the presentations and discussion can be found on the FNDU YouTube-channel: https://www.youtube.com/watch?-v=ywyasBuw7vg&t=3263s.CONTENTS Klaus Ilmonen SPEECH BY MANAGING DIRECTOR OF THE MANNERHEIM FOUNDATION ON THE EVE OF THE SEMINAR Pentti Forsström 1. INTRODUCTION TO THE PUBLICATION Pentti Forsström 2. INTERPRETATIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RUSSIAN CONCEPT OF WAR Dima Adamsky 3. COMMAND AND CONTROL CULTURE À LA RUSSE Leonid Nersisyan 4. NEW RUSSIAN STRATEGIC WEAPONS AND MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEMS – CHANGE OF THE BALANCE? Jukka Viitaniemi 5. STRATEGIC ACTIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES – CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS Jyrki Terva 6. SCHRÖDINGERS CAT IN EASTERN UKRAINE – HOW RUSSIA’S WAR IN UKRAINE CREATES AND DESCRIBES NEW RUSSIA-WEST CONFLICT Juha Wihersaari 7. EVGENY MESSNER’S THEORY OF SUBVERSION WAR VS. HYBRID WARFARE Oscar Jonsson (and Bryce Johnston - absent from the seminar) 8. RUSSIA’S REVOLUTION IN INTELLIGENCE AFFAIRS Rod Thornton and Marina Miron 9. INTERFACE BETWEEN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND CYBER. CREATING REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS? THE RUSSIAN MILITARY’S UTILISATION OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO ENHANCE ITS CYBER OPERATIONS: THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY Jonna Alava 10. REPRESENTATIONS OF WOMEN SOLDIERS IN RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES 2008–2021 Aristide M. LaVey 11. ADMIRAL USHAKOV: A STUDY OF RUSSIAN POWER PROJECTION Santeri Kytöneva 12. JUSTIFYING THE USE OF FORCE: RUSSIA’S SPIRITUAL AND NATIONAL SECURITY Justin Bronk 13. DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIAN COMBAT AIR SPENDING AND LIKELY OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS Lester W. Grau (and Charles K. Bartles) 14. RUSSIAN MANEUVER DEFENCE AND THEIR CONCEPT OF THE FRAGMENTED BATTLEFIELD Michael Kofman 15. ON PRESENT WAR IN UKRAINE - KEYNOTE

Semper floreat

Title varies: Gamut; Time off: Semper; The press. Numbering system very erratic

The Changing Dynamics of the Perception of U.S. Foreign Policy towards Kurds in Syria: Developing Relations in Light of Ignorance, Cooperation and Desertion (2011-2020) [védés előtt]

Kurds have played an significant role in the Syrian conflict since the 2011 crisis, mainly through their strong participation in the fight against ISIS. During the war against ISIS, the U.S. made significant gains both under President Obama and President Trump’s administrations but did not strive to establish long-term strategies about Syria, especially the Syrian Kurds. After the collapse of the ISIS caliphate in 2019, Trump’s decision to withdraw the U.S. forces from Syria left the Syrian Kurds with tough domestic and external challenges. This decision raised the question of whether the United States has a clear policy and strategy for dealing with the Kurds in Syria. Thus, the objectives of this study are to find reasons and factors that have led to shifts in US foreign policy towards Syrian Kurds. In addition to exploring the outcomes of changing USFP dynamics post-2011, this research also investigates the ramifications and implications of ISIS's rise for the US-Syrian Kurdish strategy. Through employing a qualitative methodology, this research examines the application of the neoclassical realism theory on the relations under study. In this regard, semi-structured interviews were conducted with politicians, policy makers, academics, and journalists, mainly in Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan. It can be inferred that changes in the US foreign policy from direct military intervention to “no boot on the ground” and “America First'' alternatives arose from accomplishing the primary objective of defeating ISIS. Under the presidencies of Obama & Trump, Washington has tactically used Syrian Kurds to maintain regional hegemony and combating ISIS. This is the main reason behind the absence of a coherent American policy for Kurds. The withdrawal of US forces left the Kurds exceedingly vulnerable. They were trapped between Assad's regime and Turkey's desire for vengeance without the presence of US troops to act as a buffer. Deserting Kurds has possible ramifications for other American allies throughout the world. It is vital for the United States to regain its reputation as a reliable partner. Indeed, if the US does not want to serve as the world’s policeman, it will need allies