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US STRATEGY BETWEEN THE TWO FALLS: FROM  
THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL TO BAGHDAD

Khamis Mohamed Itbega

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of  
Durham University for doctor of philosophy

Research undertaken in the School of Government and  
International Affairs

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2010

## **Abstract**

This study argues that American foreign policy (AFP) represented continuity rather than change from the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to the fall of Baghdad in 2003. During this time, the US pursued a hegemonic strategy that aimed to preserve its unipolar moment in the new American century. However, this argument is challenged by two sets of AFP literature. The first sees the 1990s as a period of inconsistency in AFP strategy, and the second identifies post-9/11 policy as a revolutionary change in AFP.

This study's analysis goes below the surface of AFP's to its deep structure (hidden agendas). In contrast to the majority of AFP literature, it argues the 1990s were not a fragmented era but that AFP showed continuity rather than change, and the strategy of hegemony was already in operation. Likewise, putting aside the rhetoric of the Bush II administration, post-9/11 policy cannot be understood except in the context of AFP's hegemonic strategy of the post-Cold War (CW) era and 9/11 was no more than a terrorist attack carried out by a terrorist group. However, to serve US hegemonic agenda that was on hold from the early 1990s, the attack was deliberately exaggerated and portrayed as an existential threat to the US.

The study does not deny the political fragmentation in the 1990s or ignore the effects of 9/11 on AFP strategy. Therefore, to critique the two sets of literature, the research assesses the impact of domestic politics on the ability of US officials' to build on America's unipolar moment. In doing so, this study highlights several aspects of US domestic division that curtailed the ability of bureaucrats to handle FP issues. This also demonstrates that AFP's failure in the 1990s was not on the strategic planning level but in its domestic context. Congress emerged as a counterweight to the leadership of the president. Societal groups gained unprecedented influence over policy-making as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. This status changed after 9/11 when a new external enemy appeared. The president regained his supreme role and Congress's role retreated. Under these circumstances, the study concludes that an unchanging AFP strategy gave the basis for the emergence of an explicit American hegemony.

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## List Of Abbreviations

ABM	Antiballistic Missile Treaty
AFP	American Foreign Policy
AHIPAC	American Hellenic Institute Public Affairs Committee
AIPAC	American Israel Public Affairs Committee
APEC	Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation
BUR	Bottom-up-Review
CCFA	Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs
CCFR	Chicago Council of Foreign Relations
CDA	The Cuban Democracy Act
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CNN	The Cable News Network
CTBT	The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CUSFTA	The Canadian-United States Free Trade agreement
CUSFTA	The Canadian-United States Free Trade agreement
CW	Cold War
DOD	Department of Defence
DOS	Department of State
DPG	Defence Planning Guidance
EC	European Community
EU	European Union
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FPA	Foreign policy analysis
FY	Financial year
FY	Financial Year
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Growth Domestic Production
GNP	General National Production
HST	Hegemonic stability theory
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICC	International Criminal Court

IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPE	International political economy
IR	International Relations
KP	Kyoto Protocol
MEF	The most-favoured-nation status
MFN	Most-Favourite Nation
NAC	New American Century
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEPDG	National Energy Policy Development Group
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisations
NSA	National Security Advisor
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPEC	The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
ORB	Opinion Research Bussiness
PIPA	Program on International Policy Attitudes
RDS	Regional Defence Strategy
RMA	The Revolution in Military Affairs
QDR	The Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review
UN	United Nation
UNMOVIC	United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
UNSC	UN's Security Council
US	United States of America
USAID	US Agency for International Development
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization's
WWI	World War One
WWII	World War Two

## Declaration

I, the undersigned, thereby declare that this dissertation entitled “US strategy between the two falls: from the fall of the Berlin Wall to Baghdad” is my own work, and that all the sources I have used or quote have been indicated or acknowledged by means of completed references.

Signature: ..... Date: /10 /2010.

## **Copyright**

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[William Shakespeare says] nothing can come of nothing.  
(Bobbitt, 2008: 429)

[Victor Hugo asserts] there is nothing more powerful than an idea whose time has come.  
(Kegley, 1993: 131)

[There is no period in US history that] has offered more opportunities for shaping international politics for American ends than the years immediately following the fall of the Berlin Wall.  
(Henriksen, 2001)

## Introduction

This introductory part is in several sections. The first section introduces the research statement and highlights areas of convergence and/or divergence with mainstream literature on American foreign policy (AFP). The next section pays attention to the rationale of the study and is followed by a section on its aim and objectives. The fourth section contextualises a number of terms and concepts related to the research problem. Then, the chapter describes the organisation of the study, and in the subsequent section, the main concern is to throw some light on the modest contributions that this research claims. The concluding section is the summary of this chapter.

### 1. Statement Of The Research Problem

From the end of WWII, when the US first emerged as a hegemonic power, it was only 45 years to the end of the Cold War (EoCW).<sup>1</sup> Despite an intensive body of literature about the disarray of AFP strategy in the post-Cold War (CW) era, this research rests on the belief that between 9 November 1989 (the collapse of the Berlin Wall) and early April 2003 (the fall of Baghdad) the US grand strategy represented continuity rather than change and this strategy has been characterised by clear hegemonic ambitions.

---

<sup>1</sup> Ian Clark argues that the roots of America's hegemony can be traced back to the early 20<sup>th</sup> century or even before when the US "emerged as a hegemon-in-waiting" (2009: 24). However, its recent history started after WWII when the capitalist states had united under a protectorate system commanded by the US from the late 1940s to the EoCW. During this period, the US emerged as a hegemon by invitation (Clark, 2009). In this context, prior to WWII end, the famous journalist, Henry Luce, the publisher of *Time-Life* magazine not only predicted the victory over Nazism, but also proclaimed that the American Century had dawned in 1941 (Hoff, 1994; Trubowitz, 1998; Dunne, 2000; Ingimundarson, 2000; Tuathail, 2006; Ryan, 2007; Halliday, 2009). Therefore, since 1945, "if Americans have been serious about anything," as Michael Cox argues, "it has been about the uses of power on the not entirely unreasonable grounds that if international history taught anything it was that order was impossible without the deployment of a great deal of power by a single conscious hegemon" (2006: 114).



This argument contradicts with at least two broad sets of AFP literature. The first set sees the EoCW as a turning point which changed everything in international affairs and AFP alike (Nye, 1990a; Gaddis, 1992; Eagleburger, 1993; Dumbrell, 1997).<sup>1</sup> The second group of literature distinguishes 9/11 as an unprecedented “earthquake” or a “stark turning point” that changed everything in international relations (IR) and produced a new grave phase of American militarism and unilateralism (Gaines, 2002; Putnam, 2002; May, 2003b; Neack, 2003; Crocker, 2005; Gordon, 2005; Griffin, 2007; Bolton, 2008).

In contrast to scholars who expected “dramatic shifts in world politics after the Cold War, such as the disappearance of American hegemony” (Ikenberry, 1998/1999: 43), this study argues that much has not changed. AFP’s agenda of hegemony and supremacy that was in operation during the CW did not decay at the eve of the EoCW, but the triumph over communism reenergised US propensity to be the world’s sole hegemon (Cox et al., 2001). In the same way, this research also argues that the horrible attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in September 2001 were no more than a “terrorist act” carried out by a non-state terrorist actor (Gaddis, 2005). This is not to deny its apparent significance upon AFP conduct, but, according to several scholars (for example, Ali, 2003; May, 2003a; Kennedy-Pipe & Rengger, 2006; Buzan, 2006), the terrorist attacks had made no profound change in world politics. According to Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Nicholas Rengger, the only thing that has changed is “the belief that there has been a great change in the architecture of world politics” (2006: 540). Therefore, from this research’s perspective, it is impossible to understand the US’s War on Terror (WoT) merely as a response to 9/11 attacks, as US official have repeatedly argued. Instead, it argues that 9/11 has been exaggerated as a pretext to legitimise a US new hegemonic project which was launched immediately the CW had

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<sup>1</sup> According to Cox, the collapse of the USSR and the EoCW were a “remarkable conjunction of events” that had changed the whole geopolitical landscape (2002a: 265). In a similar way, Nye (1990a) & Gaddis (1992) describe these shifts as a “bouleversement” in the “tectonic plates” of world politics. Clark (2001: 240) identifies them “as one of history’s great ‘punctuation points’” while Michael Mandelbaum suggests that they were “the greatest geopolitical windfall in the history of American foreign policy” (taken from Dumbrell, 1997: 129). The Secretary of State at the time, Lawrence Sidney Eagleburger (1993) describes these historical events by saying that “it is abundantly clear that we are in the middle of a global revolution—a period of change and instability equalled in modern times only by the aftermaths of the French and Russian revolutions”.

ended (Mearcher, 2003). What has been done in the post-9/11 era, in consequence, cannot be separated from the political improvements of the 1990s. In this context, the George H. W. Bush (Bush I) and the Bill Clinton administrations had prepared America to bear the burden of its unipolar moment and, without their efforts, the George W. Bush (Bush II) administration would not have been able to respond to 9/11 the way it had done. On the other hand, the political transformations after the dismantling of the Soviet Union (USSR) to the collapse of Baghdad can only be understood in terms of the context of AFP strategy that has continued since WWII (Layne, 2009a). This argument, therefore, is in line with Robert J. Art who argues that the US strategy of hegemony has been clear “four times: at the outset of the Cold War; near the end of the Cold War; immediately after the end of the Cold war; and at the turn of the twenty-first century” (2003: 87).

## **2. Rationale Of The Study**

This topic has been chosen because of its relevance to two important arguments. The first argument denies any hidden agenda behind the America’s WoT. According to the proponents of this perspective (for example, Dennis Ross, 2006), post-9/11’s controversial policy marked an ‘exceptional course’ in the history of AFP and it was merely a response to the events themselves. The second argument is that 9/11 heralded America’s decline. The symbolic importance of the attacks is greater than the reality. The proponents of this approach may be found in the circles of fundamental Islamists and marginal groups in the Middle-East such as the Leftists and, to a lesser degree, the extreme Arab nationalists.

This study puts forward the contention that neither of these arguments is completely true. The post-9/11 course cannot be seen as a crucial turning point in the AFP trajectory, but it is in line with AFP strategy that was formulated in the mid-20th century. Moreover, 9/11 itself is not an unprecedented event in world history, and it has not changed everything in America and abroad. As said above, 9/11 was a terrorist attack deliberately exaggerated to serve AFP strategy in the early 2000s. On the other hand, it is no more than a hyperbole to say that a terrorist attack such as 9/11 will lead to America’s collapse. In fact, the EoCW, not 9/11, the event that offered the US unprecedented opportunity to be the sole global hegemon, but, the US hegemony strategy was partly during the 1990s due to a political cleavage at home. In contrast to

those dreamers in the Middle-East, 9/11 reunited America and offered it not only an unprecedented moment to rejuvenate its hegemonic project, but also the morale justifications needed to carry such a project on. Accordingly, it is clear AFP's grand strategy in post-WWII did not represent any crucial turning but that it still shows the same agenda.

### **3. Aim And Objectives**

The overall aim of this study is to demonstrate the continuation of US hegemonic strategy between two falls: from the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 and the fall of Baghdad in early April 2003. This argument means that the US response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 did not mark any new crucial turn in AFP strategy. The present study also has a set of other objectives which are given below.

First, this research highlights the importance of America's unique combination of hard and soft sources of power as leverage to establish its post-CW hegemony.

Second, it demonstrates the continuation of America's hegemonic strategy during the Bush I and Clinton administrations and emphasizes the importance of the 1990s as a cornerstone of the American unilateral hegemonic shift post-9/11.

Third, the study seeks to make a clear causal-connection between domestic politics and foreign policy in order to enhance and/or weaken the grand strategy of hegemony. It therefore underlines the political barriers that partly hindered the US hegemony during the 1990s and shows how 9/11 remedied AFP's fragmented domestic context and reunited America around the flag.

Finally, this study also explains how 9/11 advances and legitimates the US hegemonic agenda in international affairs and how the WoT has enlarged the US's geopolitical and hegemonic presence worldwide.

### **4. Concepts Of Central Terms To The Study**

#### **4.1. US Recent Historical Phase: Hegemony Or Empire?**

Joseph Nye argues that "when power is distributed unevenly, political leaders and theorists use terms such as empire and hegemony" (1990c: 185). For AFP, this has been the case since WWII. In the mainstream literature of IR "the theoretical debate over US

global power is dominated by conflicting arguments about the degree to which the United States is an imperial or a hegemonic state” (Fakiolas & Fakiolas, 2007: 53). In this context, Walter Lippmann wrote in 1926: “our imperialism is more or less ‘unconscious’ and that the United States was an ‘empire in denial’” (taken from Huisken, 2006). More obviously, since the end of WWII, the US has been described as an imperial power, but, as Niall Ferguson argues, “the intellectual dilemma was rationalized by contending that the United States might be postured like an imperial power but that the threat from the Soviet Union, an entity that was even more unmistakably imperial in structure and intent, allowed no alternative” (taken from Huisken, 2006). In the same way, after the EoCW, when the USSR had collapsed and the US enjoyed an unprecedented unipolar moment, the description of the US as an empire has also become widespread in IR literature (Ikenberry, 2004b). However, post-9/11, the discourse and practice of “empire that were previously kept sotto voce have ... come into the open, with a vengeance” (Boggs, 2005: 35). Since that time, more than at any other period in US history, “no subject has been more studied or discussed in world politics than the sheer extent of American power as imperialism, empire, or hegemony” (Grondin, 2006: 1).

Therefore, scholars have intended to compare America’s massive power and influence to several historical empires. For example, Michael Boyle argues that “America had set its sights on the imperial mantle left behind by the British” (2004: 82). Bush’s post-9/11 far-reaching program, as Robert Jervis argues, therefore “calls for something very much like an empire” (2005: 79) because he “regarded imperialism as a positive force for global democratization and for global capitalism” (Gardner, 2005: 21). Some scholars argue that America’s unique position in world affairs today cannot be exactly recognised, unless “one has to go back to the Roman Empire for a similar instance” (Wittkopf et al., 2003: 4). Cox describes America’s post-9/11 position by saying: “call it a hegemon; even a ‘hyper power’; call it what you want, this was an empire in all but name” (2007: 648). In this meaning, 9/11 was exploited “to provide the justification, the fear, and the funding for the so-called war on terror, which would be used as a pretext for enlarging the [US] empire” in the post Soviet era (Griffin, 2007: 15). However, in general, it does seem sensible to say that “the use of the term empire has been a shortcut for any form of critique of US foreign policy at large since September 11, 2001, prior to the concept being discussed in a rigorous or serious way” (Grondin, 2006: 1).

On the other hand, according to John A. Agnew, hegemony, “is a much better term for describing the historic relationship between the United States and the rest of the world than is the word empire”. This “is not an aesthetic choice”, Agnew continues, but “it is an analytic one” (2005: 31). In line with Agnew’s argument, Adam Watson highlights what distinguishes a hegemonic relationship from an imperial one. Empire, according to his view is “the direct administration of different communities from an imperial centre”. However, hegemony is “the ability of some power or authority in a system to ‘lay down the law’ about external relations between states in the international system, while leaving them domestically independent” (taken from Beeson & Higgott, 2005: 1174). Therefore, despite the very diverse academic and historical baggage with which the term hegemony is weighted, most studies use it to merely signify a state of domination and pre-eminence over all others (Nye, 1990c; Du Boff, 2003; Kegley & Wittkopf, 2004; Lentner, 2005; Grondin, 2006; Lentner, 2006; Nilsson, 2008). In more detail, Thomas McCormick argues that “in the context of the world system, hegemony means that one nation possesses ... unrivalled supremacy ... predominant influence in economic power, military might, and political-ideological leadership that, no other power, or combination of powers, can prevail against it” (1995: 5). Or, as Daniel Garst explains, hegemony “is defined in the first instance by the ability of a state to combine ... material sources with political strategies that make other states recognise and consent to its leadership” (1988: 13).

Hegemony in international politics studies is also used with two separate meanings: leadership and dominance. While both represent similar characteristics of supremacy, some scholars make a clear distinction between the two. Hegemony depends fundamentally on coercive power, whereas non-coercive influence can bring only leadership but not hegemony (Lentner, 2006). Hegemonic power can also be used in several ways. “(1) to create a transitional order, underpinned by rules and laws (the benign hegemon); (2) to ignore or misuse the international rules and laws; and (3) to use hegemony in order to gain structural power within the international system” (Farrell, 2005: 131). Recent US history demonstrates the three usage of hegemonic power in its FP.

On the basis of this discussion, it would be plausible to argue that since WWII, the US “could not, and did not, bully the governments [of the world’s countries], but it could

and did apply pressure—sometimes considerable pressure ... in order to get them to accept its position, while simultaneously considering the leverage possessed by its allies” (Nilsson, 2008: 130). On the other hand, it is true that the US is widely constructed as an “informal empire” after 9/11 because of its unilateralist and militant behaviour, but such a construction does not fit its status during the 1990s when it showed “less an intrusive mode of control” (Grondin, 2006: 2). Therefore, “identifying the US power position and role with an empire’s imperialism is a useless and potentially dangerous anachronism, insofar as the Age of Empire is definitely over and an Age of American Hegemony has commenced” (Fakiolas & Fakiolas, 2007: 58). In this context, Michael Hunt puts it succinctly: “if ever the term hegemony was appropriately applied, it is to what the United States became in the second half of the twentieth century and now remains” (2007: 314). Accordingly, the argument of Torbjørn Knutsen that “there is an essential difference between great power based on force and great power rooted on consent [and his conclusion that] only the later qualifies as hegemony” should be neglected (Wight, 2001: 83).

This study adopts the idea that the US power is better served by the term hegemony because it “has the capacity to encompass both the Gramscian concept of consensus and persuasion as well as the classical view that highlights the role of military power and coercion in the evaluation of US foreign policy” (Grondin, 2006: 1-2). However, it is also important to admit at the very outset that capturing US hegemony in a single “model which allows description [and] explanation” (Matzner, 2002: 1) might be unavailable as will be shown in the next chapter.

#### **4.2. A Re-Conceptualisation Of Terms: EOCW, Post-CW And Post-9/11**

It is also necessary to explain at the outset that the conviction that the AFP grand strategy has been in continuation since WWII contradicts well-known concepts of related terms. First, EoCW has been used to highlight the most significant turning point in post-World War II history, as has repeatedly been claimed in the mainstream IR literature (for example, Bush, 1990; Wallerstein, 1993; Sulfaro & Crislip, 1997; Crockatt, 2001; Hill, 2003; Lieber, 2005; Kegley, 2007). However, in terms of the US hegemonial project, EoCW was “meaning-less” and the old global system did not really come to an end, but it was merely “as if two horses were racing around a track, one broke its leg, and the other kept on running anyway” (Cumings, 1992: 89). “If the Cold

War ended by 1990”, Bruce Cumings continues to argue, “the project of American hegemony did not” (1992: 97). According to Cumings (1992), it has been obvious in the 1990s and afterward that the US kept containing both allies and enemies and promoting its hegemonic project globally. At the tactical level, the only thing changed by the EoCW was that “America’s temporary Cold War hegemony in Western Europe and East Asia should be converted into permanent US global hegemony” (Clark, 2009: 26). In other words, it is true the EoCW changed the world system, but that shift was and still remains in the interest of America’s global ambition of dominion and hegemony.

In the same way, both the terms post-CW and post-9/11 also have to be reconceptualised according to their relevance in relation to the continuance of US hegemony. As is well-known, the term post-CW has largely been used in AFP studies to denote the period between the collapse of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 (11/9) and the fall of the Twin Towers on 11 September 2001 (9/11) (Ikenberry, 2001b; Lieber, 2002; Buzan, 2006; Owens & Dumbrell, 2006; Rezakhah, 2007). Post-9/11 has also been coined to signify the period that started with 9/11 to the present.

This chronology divides the post-Soviet era into two distinguishable historical phases and reveals that America’s response to 9/11 marked a fundamental turn in AFP strategy in the post-Soviet era. It also represents a challenge to this study’s main argument. In order to avoid ambiguity and confusion, the study holds the premise that AFP in the post-Soviet era does not show any break with the trajectory of AFP strategy of hegemony since WWII. Therefore, according to this understanding, the use of these terms does not reveal any crucial shift at the level of grand strategy and strategic thinking. The only change they might reveal is transformation at the level of practical policy and tactics. With this modification, the EoCW does not mean that America’s CW strategy changed while the controversial post-9/11 policy is merely a continuation of US hegemony with increased levels of militarism and unilateralism.

## **5. The Organisation Of The Research**

This research is divided into six substantive chapters. Following this introductory part, chapter one discusses the conceptual, theoretical and methodological framework of the study. It depicts the general road map and the organizing principles of the work.

Chapter two highlights the US turn from just a superpower in a semi-balanced world system to a hyperpower in a unipole world system. It also discusses several elements that entitled the US to be the only world hegemon in the post-Soviet world such as material power capabilities (military and economic) and societal forces and ideology. It then turns to depict the world geopolitical map of the 1990s and how the second-tier powers failed to counterbalance the US.

The third chapter contradicts AFP's mainstream literature that describes the 1990s as a fragmented and directionless period. It explains that both the 1990 administration's FP and Bush II's agenda in the pre-9/11 era represented continuity rather than change.

Chapter four establishes links between US domestic politics and foreign policy. On the one hand, this chapter presents the view that if AFP witnessed a period of directionless and inconsistency during the 1990s it was not because of the US administration's short-sight as has often been argued. But if the leadership abroad starts at home, the cleavage at home during this period hinderd the state from doing well in international politics. By reference to the domestic political process, this chapter interprets the US's poor performance in achieving its post-CW objectives of hegemony in the 1990s. On the other hand, if the absence of the USSR, the external enemy that glued the AFP elite and society for more than four decades, fragmented the AFP domestic context, then the emergence of al-Qaeda and Islamic terrorism as a new enemy remedied AFP's lack of a focal point and regenerated domestic unity. This shift helped the US administration to carry on its agenda of hegemony without domestic resistance and the US hegemony was refuelled again after a decade of domestic disagreement.

Chapter five argues that 9/11 did not result in any crucial shift in AFP strategy and US hegemony bridges the pre-and the post-9/11 policy. Therefore, it positions the terrorist attacks and their aftermath in a wider theoretical and geopolitical context and claims that 9/11 has been exaggerated to serve another set of agenda and used as a pretext to enlarge US hegemony. The WoT was not exactly to defeat terror, but it has been consistent with US wars since the mid-1940s.

Chapter six provides the final remarks and conclusions.



## 6. The Contribution Of The Research

This study bridges the gap between several divergent sets of AFP literature. The first set is the conflict between those who argue that the 1990s was not a break in the US post-WWII hegemonic strategy—the idea that is adopted in this study—and those who believe that AFP did not show any hegemonic characteristics; rather it suffered from unprecedented fragmentation and lack of direction in the 1990s. The second set is the recent controversy between critics who describe post-9/11 policy as a break in AFP strategy and their challengers who believe that 9/11 did not initiate any new trend; rather it just motivated and legitimated an extra dose of militarism and unilateralism. The logic behind putting such divergent sets of literature together is that when treating them jointly in a wider context, several preconceptions and false ideas are easily revealed. In fact, this research reconciles these divergent streams of literature using a combination of foreign/domestic analytical techniques.

As is constantly repeated in AFP literature, the EoCW brings simultaneously a challenge as well as an opportunity to AFP grand strategy (Allan, 1992; Wallerstein, 1993; Khalilzad, 1995a, 1995b; Clark, 2001; Lieber, 2005; Chollet & Goldgeier, 2008; Roberts, 2008). It was a challenge but not because of the appearance of any real danger or competitor to its unipolar moment as many critics suggested; rather that the victory “seems to have left America disoriented by its own success” (Chace, 1996: 116). It was also an opportunity; but this opportunity had been threatened by the internal disagreement over post-1989 FP strategy. The problem therefore was laid in the US domestic politics in which Americans failed to build a new political consensus at home that allowed policymakers to put their proposals to advance US grand strategy of hegemony into practice during the 1990s, but this also should not reveal that US hegemonic strategy was inoperative at the time. By evaluating policies and agenda from the 1990s, such as Bush’s strategy of the New World Order (NOW) and Clinton’s engagement and enlargement strategy (En-En), this study finds that the US hegemony is still the supreme perspective that drove AFP at the time. However, as opposed to the political atmosphere of the CW, when US policymakers pursued such an agenda backed by a broad domestic unity, the political cleavage of the 1990s forced policymakers who were aware of the importance of the moment to pursue such an agenda under very difficult domestic conditions. In line with this understanding, not only did AFP strategy of hegemony continue during the 1990s, but also post-9/11 cannot be seen as a new turn

in AFP trajectory. The reason is that while the EoCW fragmented the domestic consensus of AFP, the attacks of 11 September rebuilt it. Moreover, as US hegemonic strategy did not garner domestic unity in the 1990s, the unity around the flag supported the post-9/11 hegemonic policies and put the proposals of the 1990s in practice (McDonough, 2009).

There is an inescapable link between the abstract world of theory and the real world of policy.  
(Walt, 1998: 29)

A (simple) theory can account for a (complex) phenomenon.  
(Allan, 1992: 235)

## **Chapter One**

### **Conceptual, Theoretical And Methodological Framework**

#### **1.1. Introduction**

According to Costas Melakopides, the study of foreign policy is “best conducted by adopting organising devices known as models, frameworks, or perspectives” because “they provide the methods, concepts, assumptions, and hypotheses by which we analyse and evaluate the relevant material” (1998: 23). Accordingly, this chapter’s main concern is to build a suitable framework which will enable conceptualising, theorising and evaluating the research problem. The chapter is divided into three main parts. The first section conceptualises the continuation of the US grand strategy of hegemony since the end of WWII to the present. The second section focuses on theorising US hegemony and unipolarity from the end of the Cold War (EoCW). The last part highlights the methodological basis of this research.

#### **1.2. From Berlin To Baghdad: Continuity In US Grand Strategy**

First of all, according to Christopher Layne, a grand strategy “is the process by which a state matches ends and means in the pursuit of security [and interests]” (1998: 8). Therefore, it can be understood as a plan “integrates military, political, and economic means to pursue states’ ultimate objectives in the international relations” (Biddle, 2005: v).

For the US, it could be argued that, since the Truman administration adapted George Kennan’s famous article titled ‘Mr. X’ in its National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68) in the early 1950s, the US grand strategy has been defined by anti-communism and fears about the Communist threat which have set the American Foreign Policy (AFP) agenda (Tucker, 1990; Petersen, 1993; Brinkley, 1997; McGrew, 1998; Lieber, 2005; Lind, 2006; McKeever & Davis, 2006; Saull, 2008). However,

what is not in doubt is that the Cold War (CW) containment strategy was not only used to minimize the USSR's influence internationally, but also to increase US global power. According to Layne (1998: 9):

This was made clear in 1950, in the important National Security Council paper, NSC-68, which laid the intellectual groundwork for a policy of "militarized" and "globalized" containment. NSC-68 stated that: (1) the purpose of American power was to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish and (2) the strategy of preponderance was a policy which the United States would probably pursue even if there were no Soviet Union.

This statement contains several commitments: (1) the prevention of the appearance of any competitor or rival within its spheres of influence, such as Germany or Japan; (2) the management of its closest alliances, such as the one with Great Britain; (3) the maximization of American power and control over the rest of the world; and (4) the utilization of German and Japanese industrial and economic powers as an influential part of the anti-Soviet strategy (Cumings, 1992; Steel, 1992; Wells, 1992; Layne, 1997; Curtis, 1998; Layne, 2001). Accordingly, critics such as McCormick argue that the CW was "merely a subplot, part of a larger story that some historians call America's hegemonic project" (1995: xiii), and since the early 1950s, the US government covertly adopted a strategy of "rollback" that entirely contradicted the publicly stated policy of containment (Art, 2003). In Robert Jervis' words, after the victory over Nazism in WWII "no point on the globe was untouched by American military, political, and economic policy" and no country came "close to rivalling America's worldwide influence" (1999: 220).

However, since 1989, mainstream literature on AFP has described the 1990s as a period of strategic confusion and foreign policy disorientation. Not only was the EoCW an opportunity but it was also the first time since the late 1940s that the "familiar strategic guideposts" (Kober, 1990; Mandelbaum, 1990/1991) or the "magnetic north pole" of AFP (Cox, 1995; Hastedt, 2000) and its "dominant impulse" (Williams, et al., 1993: 1) had gone. As a result, not only AFP's "driving sense of purposes" but also its "overarching rationale" and its "judgements and assumptions" were removed (Ornstein, 1992; McCormick, 1995; Cronin, 1996; Dittgen, 1996; McCormick, 1998; McGrew, 1998; Hurst, 1999; MacLean, 2006). In the words of Phil Williams et al., AFP's "roles and rationales long taken for granted have been called into question" (1993: 1). Owing

to this, America remained “a superpower adrift” (Allison & Blackwill, 2000: 1) and AFP was “directionless” (Perritt, 1998/1999: 95). It also seems to be one of the “last-minute efforts”, and characterised by a “capricious flow of events”, not by a strategic guideline (Schlesinger, 1993; Maynes, 1996).

This argument portrays the 1990s as a break in the American post-WWII strategy, and the US’ post-9/11 policy can also be considered a new era in AFP strategy. However, this thesis argues that AFP did not lose its bearings or suffer from any conceptual failure during the 1990s, as many critics have suggested (e.g., Allison, 1996; Allison & Blackwill, 2000; Clough, 2004). As Cox recognizes the post-CW political confusion covered a “new sort of policy and thinking ... beneath the surface of everyday political reality one can detect a reasonably clear set of goals which have been pursued since 1989”. Cox asserts that such a set of goals was “to ensure that the United States remained the dominant actor in the international system” (1995: 1). In the same way, John Ikenberry also argues that, even if most critics of AFP did not completely recognize its nature and achievements in the post-CW era, the US’ liberal dominance strategy of the CW had actually survived the EoCW. The author then states that despite “all the talk about drift and confusion in contemporary American foreign policy, the United States is seized by a robust and distinctive grand strategy” (2000: 104). Because of this, Derek Chollet asked scholars to pay greater attention to the 1990s period in order “to draw lessons for the road ahead” because he believed that “the roots of all of the problems America confronts today ... stretch back to the period that began with the end of the Cold War in 1989” (2007: 5).

In the same way, Michael Mastanduno challenged those critics who “see US security policy after the Cold War as incoherent or directionless”, arguing that “US officials have in fact followed a consistent strategy in pursuit of a clear objective – the preservation of the United States’ pre-eminent global position” (1997: 51). Consequently, following Layne (1998) and Clark (2001), it can be argued that no factual shift has been observed in US grand strategy since 1945. The collapse of the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991 merely “removed the one impediment to the realization of America’s hegemonic ambition” (Layne, 2001: 59), and “left the US the unchallenged head of a coherent global system” (Hunt, 2007: 314). As Ian Clark argues, “the landscape in 1999 may look very different to 1989, but there are still some very

familiar landmarks” (2001: 241). Furthermore, “in terms of ambitions, interests, and alliances”, Layne argues that “the United States today is following the same grand strategy that it pursued from 1945 until 1991, the strategy of preponderance” (1998: 8). Accordingly, the US strategy of primacy and hegemony has “spanned the Bush and Clinton administrations, notwithstanding differences in their foreign policy rhetoric” (Mastanduno, 1997: 51-52).

The Bush I presidency seems to be, at least to some commentators, a short transitional period during which it cannot be demonstrated whether or not there was continuation of the American hegemonic strategy. However, it is obvious that immediately after the EoCW, the Bush administration reaffirmed the CW reality. At that time, according to Layne, “the overriding goal of US strategy was to perpetuate America’s ‘unipolar moment’ by preventing the rise of both new great powers – ‘peer competitors’ – and potentially hostile regional powers” (2009a: 6). Preserving the unipolar moment as an urgent objective of AFP after the collapse of the bipolar system quickly became established in America’s hidden agenda and was first laid out clearly in the Pentagon’s strategy of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) in 1992 (Mastanduno, 2000; Art, 2003).<sup>1</sup> The New World Order (NWO) that was designed in the lead-up to the war against Iraq in 1990-91 was also part of the hegemonic project and continued the same agenda of the CW.

Challenging those who have argued that AFP was directionless and disoriented during the Clinton presidency and those who understood Clinton’s geo-economic strategy as a shift from the US traditional geo-politics, Colin Dueck states that “one of the most striking features of America’s national security policy under Clinton was its essential continuity with Cold War assumptions” (2006: 114). According to Dueck, such a continuation was very clear during his eight years in office (2006: 114):

Some 200.000 troops remained deployed by the United States in Western Europe and North East Asia, the United States spent much more on its armed forces than any possible combination of hostile powers ... If anything the pace of US military intervention overseas actually increased under Clinton. And all

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<sup>1</sup> The DPG was a secret report/strategy written by key officials of the Bush administration supervised by Paul Wolfowitz, the third highest-ranking civilian in the Department of Defense (DOD) at the time and Lewis Scooter Libby. However, it was leaked to the *New York Times* early in 1992 (Layne, 1993-1997; Cameron, 2002; Gowan, 2002; Clark, 2005; Cohen, 2005; Huisken, 2006; Lind, 2006; Bacevich, 2007).

those strategic commitments were justified, just as they were during the Cold War, by two central claims: first, that the United States is and ought to be the preeminent world power, with significant interests and obligations in every corner in the globe; and second, that the United States has a special responsibility to promote and uphold a liberal international order characterised by free markets and democratic government.

On the other hand, Manstanduno argues that (1997: 52):

US foreign economic policy has worked at cross-purposes with US national security strategy. In relations with other major powers, the United States, in effect has been trying simultaneously to play “economic hardball” and “security softball”. US officials have been forced to manage the resulting contradiction in order to prevent the friction generated by its foreign economic policy from spilling over and frustrating the attainment of its primacy national security objective.

Therefore, the US hegemony was a comprehensive strategy in the last decade. Militarily, the 1990s was an odd decade. Unilateral military strikes, such as those carried out against Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998, or the air war against Serbia under NATO without a clear United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate, were regarded as clear symptoms of the US hegemony (Farrell, 2000; Cameron, 2002; Hall, 2002; Walt, 2002; Art, 2003; Stengel, 2006). However, the enlargement and engagement (En-En) strategy is also regarded as an attempt to reconstruct world affairs in the post-bipolar world and establish absolute US hegemony after the CW. Globalisation and a free market strategy revitalised the US economy and enlarged its global dominance. In consequence, it readied America to play the role as global leader from the 1990s onwards. This perspective led Agnew to conclude that “globalisation is a hegemonic project intimately connected to the geo-political calculus of the US government and economic interests” (2005: 2).

Thus, the US hegemonic project that was launched in the immediate aftermath of WWII has been more obvious since the CW’s end. Scholars summarise some of its characterisations in the post-1989-1992 period by saying that the US is a country spending far more on its military than it did at the height of the CW without a military challenger in sight (Murden, 2002; Beets, 2005). It is also a superpower that fights wars of choice rather than wars of necessity (Schlesinger, 2003; Leffler, 2004).

In line with the discussion, it can be argued that the US’ post-9/11 policy did not mark any new shift in AFP strategy, but that “in 2001-2002, a fourth appearance of dominion-

like behaviour became manifest under George W. Bush” (Art, 2003: 89). This phase of hegemonic strategy including the War-on-Terror (WoT) and the controversial invasion of Iraq “must be understood in the context of the grand strategy consistently pursued by the US since at least the beginning of the 20th century” (Callinicos, 2005: 593). As David Grondin argues, this is because “anyone interested in understanding the principles of neo-liberal hegemony in US national security conduct since WWII cannot see the Bush foreign policy as a historical anomaly” (2006: 13). In this context, Layne argues that the George W. Bush era “is not a grand strategy outlier. Rather than breaking with the essentials of America’s post-1945 grand strategy, there is a strong chain of continuity linking the administration’s policies and those of its predecessors” (2009a: 6). Layne continues that “Iraq may not have been an inevitable consequence of the grand strategy America has pursued since World War II’s end, but the assumptions underlying that strategy predisposed the US to go to war in March 2003” (2009a: 6). Cox also argues that, without the collapse of the USSR, “it is most unlikely that Washington could have acted in the way it did [after 9/11] ... or have enjoyed the success it did” (2002a: 264-265). Furthermore, he also concludes that without crucial changes in the American global position during the 1990s, the Bush II administration’s success following 9/11 would not have been possible. Accordingly, it is very difficult to compare 9/11 to the EoCW in terms of setting the stage for the emergence of American unilateral hegemonic strategy in the new era. In this milieu, Goh (2002), Saravanamuttu (2006), Chollet (2007, 2008) & Chollet & Goldgeier (2008) argue that 9 November 1989, or (11/9) the date of the collapse of the Berlin Wall, not that of the attacks of 11 September, was the most significant event to influence world politics and therefore AFP.

True, the hegemonic appearance of the post-9/11 era is “marked by tough rhetoric toward adversaries, a huge increase in American defence spending ... an unvarnished pursuit of American self-interest, a penchant for unilateralism ... [and] a reaffirmation of the 1992 DPG” (Art, 2003: 89). However, these characterisations marked a new change in tactics but not in US hegemony strategy. The Bush administration’s “breaking from Washington’s reliance since the Second World War on coalition building, is seeking to use one of the main comparative advantages of the US—its military supremacy—to



perpetuate a favourable global balance of forces” (Callinicos, 2005: 593). In this sense, Alex Callinicos argues that (2005: 593):

The seizure of Iraq seemed to favour this strategy, particularly since it would enhance US capacity to deny access to Middle Eastern oil to actual or potential rivals such as the European Union and China. But popular resistance to the occupation of Iraq is now testing this policy, perhaps to destruction.

Thus, 9/11 did not change the US grand strategy, as has been claimed by US officials such as Dennis Ross (2006), but has been in line with the post-1945 US grand strategy. The former German chancellor Helmut Schmidt, in an article published in *Die Zeit*, argues that “September 11 is actually a sign of continuity rather than a dramatic caesura” in world politics and “American foreign policy did not change suddenly in the year after September 11, 2001, but instead had been moving in an increasingly imperialist direction for the past two decades (cited in Steinmetz, 2003: 323). Therefore, according to Layne, “Iraq, after all, is only one part of a larger picture for the US [grand strategy in the post-Soviet world]” (2009a: 6).

On the basis of what already has been said, it is difficult to agree with those who have seen the 1990s as “America’s decade-long holiday from history” (Hozic, 2006: 55). But it was a busy decade, in which both Bush I and Clinton worked energetically to expand American hegemony to include the entire globe. AFP during the 1990s continued the same agenda of hegemony and supremacy. At the time, there were no remaining external (systematic) obstacles that could hinder the US’ transition towards the position of being an absolute global hegemon. This is not to say that their performance was perfectly real because the “strong interparty and intraparty conflicts undermined further the hegemonic reach of United States policy makers” (Volgy & Imwall, 1995: 823-824). It is true that the absolute leadership by the US in the new world cannot be guaranteed “unless US policy has the consistency and domestic support to prevail” (Haig, 1991). However, it might be also true that “the absence of [clear] evidence is not the evidence of absence” (d’Abadie, 2005).

Arguably, none of the 1990s administrations succeeded in offering an answer to the question initiated by the EoCW: “What does a superpower do in a world no longer dominated by a superpower conflict?” (Ornstiein, 1992: 1). However, “leaders from George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton to George W. Bush have emphasized toughness,

overwhelming American power, and aggressive defense against emerging challengers” (Suri, 2010: 4). What was not in doubt was that these administrations worked to prepare America to enter the new millennium as the only hegemon. The effects of such efforts have become clear in the post-9/11 period.

### **1.3. US Hegemony And International Relations Theory: Debates And Approaches**

#### **1.3.1. The Concept Of Power**

Since power is a very important element in pursuing the strategy of predominance and hegemony, it is necessary to determine the concept and highlight its relevance to the concept of the term ‘hegemony’. The definition of the concept of power is contested. Nye captured this when he argued that “power, like love, is easier to experience than to define or measure” (1990c: 177).

Hans Morgenthau, the classical realist, based his concept of power on the characterisation of human nature in which “people, individually and collectively are power-seeking, selfish, and violence-prone” (Mearsheimer, 2007: 72). On this basis classical realists argue that “the problem in international politics is that anarchy gives these tendencies free rein” (Morgan, 1994: 248). Power, therefore, “is an end in itself” (Mearsheimer, 2007: 72).

Neo-realists, however, suggest that what leads states to pursue power is the nature of the system (the international structure), not human nature. Thus, neo-realists assume that power is the currency and the central concept of international politics (Duvall & Barnett, 2005; Mearsheimer, 2007). Neo-realists assume that the overall capabilities of states, military, economic and technological, define its political power in world politics (Walt, 1998). Thus, in contrast to the view of classical realists, power, for neo-realists, “is a means to an end and the ultimate end is survival” (Mearsheimer, 2007: 72).

The importance of material power to protect the survival of a state is not merely a neo-realist belief; neo-liberal institutionalism also shares such a presumption. Both trends “assume that material power, whether military or economic or both, is the single most important source of influence and authority in global politics” (Hopf, 2000: 1760).

Hegemonic theory encompasses both neo-realist and neo-liberalist perspectives. Although its fundamental concern is with economic hegemony, it also emphasises the importance of military power in world politics. Hegemony stability theorists (HSTs) call on a government to over-invest in military affairs in order to be able to enhance the country's predominance and leadership in world affairs (Ikenberry et al., 1988; Grunberg, 1990; McCormick, 1995; Kohout, 2003; Layne, 2006). However, according to Nye "theorists of hegemonic stability generally fail to spell out the causal connections between military and economic power and hegemony" (1990c: 188).

Constructivists, in contrast to the neo-realist and neo-liberalist concepts of power, argue that "both material and discursive power are necessary for any understanding of world affairs" (Hopf, 2000: 1760). In this way, Garst argues that "power is actualized not by the presence of material resources", but that soft power is also included. Therefore, hegemony, according to constructivists, rests "on the acquisition of leadership, in particular on the ability to persuade and carry out singular accomplishment ... hegemony presupposes some form of activity in the form of both persuasion and deeds" (1988: 13). By expanding the concept of power beyond the neo-realist boundaries, in and through social relations, the term acquires new dimensions. Power becomes the production "of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate". This alteration adds persuasions that falls outside neorealists' concept of power (Duvall & Barnett, 2005).

Building on the above discussion, this research will not depend merely on the neo-realist's understanding of material power (military, economic, and political) as a main source of US hegemony in world politics, but also will expand this conception to encompass dimensions of 'soft power', such as culture, ideology and ideals (Hoffmann, 1989). In this context, the neorealists' and hegemonists' argument that full hegemony rests on "productive, commercial, and financial as well as political and military power" (Nye, 1990c: 186) is not sufficient, as it rests only on material aspects. Walter Russell Mead's (2004) list of American powers is more comprehensive when he divides American power into three categories: sharp or traditional military power; economic or sticky power; and sweet power (culture, ideas and ideals). These three powers "contribute to hegemonic power" (Kaufman, 2006: 146). Josef Joffe has also added

diplomatic prestige to Mead's list as an additional source of power (Schuller & Grant, 2003: 42).

### **1.3.2. Balance Of Power**

The term 'balance of power' is "sometimes used not as a prediction of policy, but as a description of how power is distributed. In the latter case, it is more accurate to refer to the distribution of power" (Nye, 1990c: 185). In this section the main concern is to highlight some aspects of the relationship between hegemony and balance of power. For Kenneth Waltz, who developed the balance of power theory during the 1970s as a perspective for understanding world politics, the distribution of material power in the system is the main variable analytical tool in international relations (IR) theory. The distribution of gross capabilities in an anarchic system defines and motivates the behaviour of states (Waltz, 1979; Garst, 1988; Mastanduno, 1997).

In his theory of balance of power, Waltz argues that the balancing of the power mechanic is natural in world politics, in which the "weak have a common interest in balancing against the strong" (Pape, 2005: 19). He argues that states' struggle to acquire relative power at the expense of others may lead to "the formulation of balance of power out of the coordinated actions taken by states" (Morgan, 1994: 252). According to John Mearsheimer "the balance of power, is a function of the tangible military assets that states possess ... [in addition to] latent power which refers to the socio-economic ingredients that go into building military power" (2007: 73).

Balance of power is not only a concern to realists but also "liberals view it as part of a larger picture of international politics" (Owen, 1994: 124). In contrast to realists, liberalists believe that amongst democratic powers, because of their common political and economic infrastructures, the possibility of cooperation is higher than that of conflict. Therefore, liberal states do not balance each other, but they ally to balance non-liberals (Lundestad, 1993; Väyrynen, 1993; Owen, 1994; Doyle, 1997; Ikenberry, 2000; Reus-Smit, 2004; Judis, 2004). Accordingly, national security can also be achieved "through the exploitation of economic means and strength, rather than by war and aggression, or other coercive means" (Farrell, 2005: 129-130). Therefore, "the key question is how power politics can be mediated through cooperation within the framework of international institutions" (Farrell, 2005: 131). To perfect international

cooperation and to manage anarchy in the international system, liberalists claim that international institutions can help. “A high level of institutionalisation significantly reduces the instability of the system” (Farrell, 2005: 130).

However, in contrast to the above discussion, the strategy of hegemony and “preponderance rests on the assumption that states gain security not through a balance of power, but by creating a power imbalance in their favour (that is, by seeking hegemony)” (Layne, 1998: 10). Hegemony, as said in the last chapter, is “understood as a unipolar configuration of politico-military capability with a structure of influence that matches capability” (Wilkinson, 1999: 143). Accordingly, hegemony and balance of power are not coexisted. This matter will be discussed in the next section.

### **1.3.3. Balance Of Power Or Hegemony: The US In A Bipolar System**

On the basis of the above discussion, a key challenge for this research is how to accommodate the argument adopted in this study (the continuation of US hegemony since the mid-1940s) with the characterisation of the CW period as an era in which balance of power predominated. Is it possible to establish a hegemonic status in a world that was divided between two contested poles? In contrast to the neorealist assumption that the CW was a period of balance of power between the US and its rival, this section aims to explain that the CW system was imbalanced in terms of power distribution and the US was a hegemon power even with the existence of the USSR. If it is so, the EoCW did not originate US hegemony; rather, it merely fuelled this strategy to an unprecedented extent.

In fact, the main problem with the argument that the US has been a hegemon since the mid-1940s is “the status of the socialist world that opted out of the US sphere” (Clark, 2009: 39). Therefore, with the existence of the USSR as a challenger in a bipolar system “was the United States hegemon of half the world only?” (Clark, 2009: 34). In response, Christopher Layne & Benjamin Schwarz argue that “although the Soviet Union was the immediate focus of US security strategy, it was really quite incidental to America’s liberal internationalist policy” (1993: 5). The USSR, according to Layne, “was a much less central factor in shaping US policy than is commonly supposed” (1998: 9). In this context, there is a dispute between hegemonists and neo-realists. Robert Gilpin’s labelling of the post-1945 period as a hegemonic one contradicts most neo-realists’

view of this period as a bipolar one (Bennett & Stam, 2004). From Waltz's viewpoint, the USSR and the US "may have been adversaries but, as the two dominant powers, shared a mutual interest in system stability, an interest that prompted them to cooperate in providing public goods such as nuclear non-proliferation" (Wholforth, 2009: 14). But in terms of power, hegemonists repeatedly argue that, even with the existence of the USSR as a peer, the US enjoyed absolute predominance over its sphere of influence and over most of the world. The USSR was merely a military competitor and its power was not sufficient to counter the US comprehensive hegemonic status during the CW (Brown, 2001; Beets, 2002; Ralph, 2006).

In this context, it is of great value to highlight the differences between the two terms, hegemony and bipolarity. Hegemony, according to Thomas J. Volgy and Lawrence E. Imwalle "requires that one central actor holds a unique combination of military and economic [and soft power] capabilities ... and is willing to lead in fashioning a world order" whereas a bipolar and (non-hegemonic) system is a "substantial control of military capabilities between two central actors in system" (1995: 824). These actors, according to neorealist perspective were individual states, not alliances among them (Gowa, 1989). Building on such a distinction, and in contrast to the labelling of the CW as a bipolar system, Colin Wight argues that the two countries "were never equal actors since the USA was always strong in terms of normative power, whereas the USSR was weak" (2001: 83). In this vein, Mastanduno also argues that "the United States faced the Soviet Union as a peer competitor in international security but was peerless in the world economy" (2008: 123-124).<sup>1</sup> In addition, US efforts were backed by an attractive

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<sup>1</sup> The US was unrivalled and a real hegemon, not only militarily but also economically on the eve of WWII (Stallings, 1995; Ralph, 2006). After WWII, the US economy made a significant transformation from "extensive industrialisation to intensive technological revolution". This shift yielded a significant increase in the US accumulation of output, which outperformed that of France and Britain at the height of the colonial era (Abu-Rabi, 2003: xix). The US economy remedied the effects of the Great Depression when it grew by 70% after WWII. A few years later, in 1950, 50% of the world's gross production was supplied by the US, in addition to 60% of the world's industrialized production (Ikenberry, 2001b; Du Boff, 2003). During the CW "the US economy dwarfed that of any other state or combination of states, with 40-50% of world GDP and four to five times the Soviet GDP. There was also a substantial technological advantage across many fields; the key role of dollar, the US capital markets as the only source of aid and loans for the world economy" (Lsrison, 1998: 70). US companies also "dominated Europe as well as the Third World; US aid bought influence in many parts of the world; and US exports, backed by sophisticated technology could outperform those of any rivals" (Stallings, 1995: 6). The US, in consequence, was the stronger not only compared to its global rival, but also within its anti-Soviet alliance (Stallings, 1995; Kaufman, 2006; Lind, 2007). In this context, it should be noted that the US

ideology that promotes values of liberty, democracy and human rights, whereas its rival's ideology was totalitarianism (Nye, 1990c). Furthermore, even militarily, the US was dominant.<sup>1</sup> In this context, Gareth Porter for instance, argued that “it was not the Cold War ideology or exaggerated notions of the threat from communism in Southeast Asia that paved the US road to war in Vietnam, but the decisive military dominance of the United States over the Soviet Union” (2005: 259). In this vein, Waltz's writing in the late 1970s, “questioned the Soviet Union's ability to keep up with the United States” (Wholforth, 1999: 10). Accordingly, Knutsen concludes that “because of its lead in normative power, the United States has functioned effectively as a hegemon since 1945” (taken from Wight, 2001: 83).

Building on the argument based on hegemonic order theory that the hegemon is a public good provider to others (Moe, 2004), it could be argued that the US, because of its supremacy during the CW, was actually a world hegemon, with the USSR a second-tier power. The CW system was not merely a bipolar, but a hegemonic system centred on the US (Lind, 2007). In this context, William Wohlforth et al. argue that the CW “international system was never ‘perfectly’ bipolar. Analysts used to speak of loose versus tight bipolarity and debated whether the Soviet Union had the full complement of capabilities to measure up as a pole” (2009: 25).

In an attempt at compromise, hegemonists brought the two codes of the CW system together, arguing that “bipolarity can occur simultaneously with hegemony when a militarily strong contender arises to challenge the hegemon's leadership” (Volgy & Imwalle, 1995: 823). In the same way, the liberalist scholar Joseph Nye (1990c: 185) argues that “the balancing of power does not always prevent the emergence of dominant states”.

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provided security to Germany and Japan—the second and third largest economies—during the CW (Stallings, 1995; Ikenberry, 2004b).

<sup>1</sup> America, for example, spent approximately US\$4.000 billion on defence during the CW (Ambrose & Brinkley, 1993). However, Lafeber (1993) argues that the value was actually US\$8 trillion, while Accornio (2000) calculates it at US\$13.1 trillion. Accordingly, it possessed the most advanced military in the world, in addition to the strongest economy and highest level of prosperity (Ambrose & Brinkley, 1993; Henriksen, 2001; Huntington, 2004).

### **1.3.3.1. The US Hegemony In The CW: The Cooperative Model**

In line with the argument, the existence of the USSR as a military competitor to the US did not decay its hegemonic status, but this is not to mean that the US hegemony was absolute during the CW. Hegemony has taken different shapes since WWII. Cooperative hegemony was to a large extent the dominant model during the CW and early post-CW period. According to Mary Farrell, cooperative hegemony “fills in the gaps left by traditional theories of liberalism and realism” In contrast to the realist’s aggressive assertion of the US global role, a cooperative hegemony emphasizes “the role of ideas, the importance of state actors, and the necessity of institutions for cooperation actions” to achieve a hegemonic position in international affairs. It is true that liberalists, and particularly international liberalists, favour “the promotion of an ‘Americanized’ world order, characterised by the spread of democratic government and open market” (2005: 128). Therefore, in contrast to the neorealist approach, liberalists “believe that a strong set of multi-lateral institutions – more than America’s military predominance – is really the key to creating and sustaining a more friendly and democratic world order” (Dueck, 2006: 121). This strategy has been summarised by Mastanduno as follows (2008: 122):

The United States has maintained the relative openness of its large domestic market to absorb the products of its export-dependent supporters. It has provided security benefits to those supporters. In exchange, they have absorbed and held US dollars, allowing US central decision makers the luxury of maintaining their preferred mix of foreign and domestic policies without having to confront—as ordinary nations must—the standard and politically difficult trade-offs involving guns, butter, and growth.

This cooperative order helped the US to bear the burden of the geo-political competition in the CW. It also legitimated its hegemony at home, over allies and elsewhere abroad. The US was a hegemon, but it was a hegemon by an invitation (Litwak, 2002; Clark, 2009).

Accordingly, the US, not only succeeded in the projection of its own material sources of power into a lasting hegemonic order, but it also facilitated its supremacy and leadership. America used several organisations and instruments to enhance its unique position in the international system. These included (Huisken, 2006):



The United Nations, the far-sighted largess of the Marshall Plan, the early and not particularly popular resolve to make Germany and Japan key stakeholders in the new international system, and the willingness, under NATO, to assume very demanding security obligations to Western Europe.

These were not only important to consolidate US hegemony, but “gave rise to no anxieties about disproportionate power” (Huisken, 2006).

Therefore, because of the legitimacy of this model on the one hand and the existence of the USSR as an enemy on the other, second-tier and major powers did not seek balancing against the US, but rather to join with it. As a result, its role in Europe and Asia was not seen as a hegemonic or imperialist one, although this was the case. This consensual acceptance of its role allowed it “containing other centres of global powers within the overall framework of order managed by [its leadership]” (Chomsky, 2003: 16). Without this consensus, the establishment of US hegemony in Europe and Asia would have been impossible. This is actually “what distinguishes a hegemonic relationship from an imperial one, empire and hegemony being very different things. A hegemonic power is thus dependent on its allies at the same time as it dominates/leads them” (Nilsson, 2008: 129/130). However, the Soviets failed to establish such a model of cooperation within their sphere of influence and “only the coercive presence of the Red Army held together the Soviet bloc” (Litwak, 2002: 78). In this context, it should be noted that the US’ allies were economically and militarily great powers and they contributed to the US efforts that led to winning the CW (Layne, 1993; Wohlforth, 1999; Chan, 2008). By contrast, none of the Soviet allies were a great power, nor were they able to support the USSR efforts to carry on the CW’s expensive politico-military competition. In consequence, “with its defence burden already consuming nearly one-fifth of its national product, the USSR simply could not continue its political contest and arms race against the US, not to mention the entire Western coalition” (Chan, 2008: 59). This weakness, among several others, led to the collapse of the USSR in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

However, this cooperative model of hegemony does not mean that America’s CW hegemonic project disregarded the politics of power and militarism. Conversely, the US hegemonic project was not only based on multi-lateral institutions and market mechanisms (Ikenberry, 2003b; Agnew, 2005), but was also dependent on the exercise of tangible power (Cumings, 1992; McCormick, 1995). According to Cumings, the

major wars on Korea and Vietnam were also important elements in US hegemonic strategy that was improved by the containment strategy. For example, in the Korean War the US “sought to keep South Korea and Taiwan within Japan’s historic economic area ... to aid its reviving industry”, while in Vietnam it claimed “reasons connected to the needs of the French and Japanese economies” (1992: 88). In addition, after the Korean War the US used the reason of containing Soviet expansionism to expand its military presence across the globe (Chace, 1996). It is true that the emergence of the USSR hindered absolute hegemony by the US. However, even with the USSR as a competitor, the US enjoyed a hegemonic position in the world (Volgy & Imwalle, 1995; Ralph, 2006). If this is the case during the CW with the existence of the Soviet power, what would be the status after the collapse of the US rival?

#### **1.3.4. The Post-Soviet International System: Balance-Of-Power Theory on Trial**

As is well known, several circumstances have radically changed since 1989. The CW drew to an end, the USSR and its satellites collapsed and the distribution of power in the system was no more balanced. The relevance of balance of power theory to the post-CW international environment, therefore, came into question (Mastanduno, 1997; Fortmann et al., 2004). Arguably, state-centred theories, and in particular neo-realism, neither predicted the peaceful end of the CW nor offered a clear imagination to the post-CW world (Mastanduno, 1997; Dueck, 2006), despite the fact that balance of power remains the very heart of realist strategy in global politics (Nye, 1990c). In consequence, several key neo-realists, including Waltz (1993), Jervis (1993), Layne (1993; 1998; 2002); Pape (2005) and Brown (2009) argue that ‘the unipolar moment’ was an ‘illusion’ and that moment ‘will not last long’. The US, consequently, should prepare itself for a world of multi-polarity instead of seeking international primacy and hegemony (Mastanduno, 1997; Kupchan, 1998; Mastanduno, 2000). The reasoning behind this axiom, as Layne argues, is straightforward “as the geopolitical counterpart to the law of physics that holds that, for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. Simply put, the response to hegemony is the emergence of countervailing power” (2002: 237).

HSTs also share the same idea. They suggest that “the putative law of uneven growth ensures that unipolarity will erode. The erosion may be slow, however” (Owen,

2001/2002: 118). Accordingly, a balance of power status will soon be regained (Modelski & Thompson, 1999; Craig, 2009). In line with such a perspective, neo-realists, such as Waltz, Mearsheimer and Layne, predicted in the early 1990s that, in a space of ten to twenty years, Germany, Japan, the EU and China would emerge to compete with the US for great power (Craig, 2009). Waltz also predicted, not only a geopolitical competition between the previous allies, but also an end to the transatlantic partnership. In this way, “NATO’s days are not numbered, but its years are” (1993: 76). In this new setting, the US “would be transformed from an extraordinary superpower to a more ordinary great power sharing the centre stage of global politics with the likes of a rearmed Germany and Japan, a rising China and a recovered Russia” (Mastanduno, 2000: 503).

However, the post-CW political milestones have not supported the neo-realist key argument that world self-correction will restore a balance of power scenario and weaker states will counterbalance the predominant power by allying against its hegemonic status. The most striking aspect of the post-CW world order is the stability in US relations with European states, Japan, and even China and Russia (Ikenberry, 1998/1999; Ness, 2002; Snyder, 2004). This proves that unipolarity is not a temporary course in modern history and the return to a multi-polar system, which is similar to that of the 19th century or of the 1930s, is unlikely (Nye, 1990a; Krauthammer, 1997).

Therefore, the relevance of the theory of balance of power to the post-CW status quo could not be proved in the aftermath of the CW. Scholars “were quick to recognize that a new ‘unipolar moment’ of unprecedented US power had arrived” (Wohlforth, 1999: 5). In this vein, Robert Pape has argued that “historically, major powers have rarely balanced against the United States and not at all since the 1990s when it has been the sole superpower” (2005: 8). In the unipolar moment, the US was liberated “from the confines of the bipolar structure, behaving as an unconstrained great power with considerable discretion in its statecraft” (Mastanduno, 1997: 56). Depending on the uniqueness of the US moment, policymakers were not concerned about the future of the US’ absolute leadership and hegemony. They believed that big powers, such as Europe, Russia, China and Japan “may grumble, but they will not stand in the way of US military policies and will quickly seek to mend fences once the United States imposes its will by implementing these policies” (Pape, 2005: 8).

In fact, the historical evidence drawn from the events of 1989-1991 created a large hole in the realists' central argument. However, even with the presence of such a problem, neo-realism, according to John M. Owen "implies that a system is unipolar when the second most powerful state cannot by itself counterbalance the most powerful state". For neo-realists, the author argues "only states, not alliances, may be poles. But in theory a pole may be counterbalanced by an alliance of non-polar states" (2001/2002: 117). However, in support of hegemonic order theorists, weaker states in Europe and Asia did not unite to balance the US power in the post-CW era, because of the latter's importance to the stability of the system (Moe, 2004; Brown, 2009). Hegemonists assume that "through coercion or by providing service, [the hegemon] is understood as an international public good" (Moe, 2004: 1). However, liberalists, such as Ikenberry, suggest that (1998/1999: 44):

Neorealism misses the institutional foundations of Western political order - a logic of order in which the connecting and constraining effects of institutions and democratic polities reduce the incentives of Western states to engage in strategic rivalry or balance against American hegemony.

However, this idea can also be criticised, because the institutional foundations of Western cooperation, such as NATO, have also been used to establish and sustain US hegemony, as will be illustrated in the following chapters.

#### **1.3.4.1. Realism's Re-awakening: A 'Power Preponderance' Approach**

In contrast to the early 1990s' suggestions of the neo-realists, it was apparent by the late 1990s, "that unipolarity had not immediately given way to a new round of multipolar politics" (Pape, 2005: 8) and consequently "the scholarly conventional wisdom began to change" (Pape, 2005: 9). Unlike the CW era, the US hegemony has become "the defining feature of the post-Cold War international order" (Clark, 2009: 23). A number of AFP scholars, such as Ikenberry et al, describe the new changes in American global position thus (2009: 1):

While in most historical eras the distribution of capabilities among major states has tended to be multipolar or bipolar—with several major states of roughly equal size and capability—the United States emerged from the 1990s as an unrivalled global power. It became a "unipolar" state".

Such a transition led Waltz to acknowledge that some of realism's concepts, such as self-help, anarchy, and balance of power "may have been appropriate to a bygone era,

[and] they have been displaced by changed contradictions and eclipsed by better ideas” (2000: 5). Waltz concludes that “changing conditions require revised theories or entirely different ones” (2000: 5). In this context, Campbell Craig (2009) argues that a younger generation of realists intends to remedy the large hole in the realists’ main argument regarding balancing against the US. A new theory of ‘power preponderance’ has been developed by scholars, such as Wohlforth and Brooks, which provides an insightful realist account of unipolarity. Power preponderance theorists, such as Craig, argue that balancing against the US in the post-Soviet era has been delayed because (2009: 29):

First, the gap in military power between the US and any potential rival has passed, or is approaching the threshold where, balancing becomes a practical impossibility. Rival States look at the distance between themselves and the US and conclude that it will be impossible to catch up. Second, geography reduces the threat potential rivals feel from American power, magnifies the rivalries among themselves, and causes them to worry that an attempt to contend with American power will only antagonise their neighbours. Third, the US emerged suddenly after the end of the Cold War as a unipolar hegemon *fait accompli*, rather than a revisionist state aiming to overturn and take over the system.

However, even with the addition of the power preponderance approach, the founder of the neo-realist paradigm still believes that the balance of power mechanic will—sooner or later—be restored. According to Waltz, the arrival of unipolarity did not bring an “end to interstate security competition. US primacy falls well short of global hegemony, which means that major powers must continue to worry about security issues and take steps to guarantee it, either alone or in concert with others” (2009b: 87). In an attempt to answer the question, “why has a new balance of power been slow to form?” Waltz argues that (2009a: 32):

Formation of a new balance is slowed or hastened by two main forces. Mild and moderate behaviour by the state at the top will slow it; arbitrary and arrogant behaviour will hasten it. Under the present circumstances balancing should proceed apace, but there are difficulties. First, the materials for balancing are not ready to hand. In the old days, victory in major war always left enough great powers standing to make a new balance of power through realignment among them. In bipolar and unipolar worlds, realignments are impossible. In a unipolar world the making of a new balance depends on one or more major powers lifting themselves to great power status. The wider the gap in capabilities between the one great power and the others, the longer it will take to close it. The gap is now immense.

At the very end, the proponents of preponderance theory are also loyal to the balance of power theory. Balancing against the US is a matter of time. Other major powers are

“edging from the United States and balancing or preparing to balance against it” (Mastanduno, 1997: 56).

#### **1.3.4.2. Unipolarity, Imbalance Of Power And Hegemony**

Putting aside the theoretical quarrel between neorealists and the proponents of preponderance power, the collapse of the USSR and the gap in power between the US, the leading nation in the system, and the rest of the world have “yielded an international structure unique to modern history: unipolarity” (Krauthammer, 2002/03: 550). Accordingly, the CW’s balance of power “has ceased to have any meaning” (Dannreuther, 2007: 29). However, according to Jervis “we have neither a powerful theory nor much evidence about how unipolar systems operate” (2009a: 188). The reason, according to Waltz, is that “the implications of unipolarity have yet to receive sustained theoretical attention; there are after all only fifteen or so years of history on which to base any evaluation of our conjectures” (2009b: 87). However, Waltz is still convinced that “realism remains relevant both as an element of the explanation for the emergence of unipolarity and as a tool for understanding its dynamics” (2009b: 87). Similarly, Farrell argues that “the realist view of the self-interested and power seeking state remains true” (2005: 128). But this is not to say that realism can answer every single question regarding unipolarity (Waltz, 2009b). In this context, Stanley Hoffmann argues that ‘the defence of the national interest’ approach of realism, for instance, “was developed for a multipolar world. In an empire [ie unipolar], as well as in a bipolar system, almost anything can be described as a vital interest, since even peripheral disorder can unravel the superpower’s eminence” (2008: 47).

In order to overcome the lack of an overriding theory, one could begin with Waltz’s conviction that great powers’ rank in the system “depends on how states score on a combination of attributes – size population, resources endowment, economic capabilities, military strength, and political stability and competence” (1993: 50). In other words, unipolarity is “a statement about [a superpowers’] cumulative economic, military, and other capabilities” (Mastanduno, 2008: 123), in which “one state’s capabilities are too great to be counterbalanced” (Wohlforth, 1999: 9). Thus, unipolarity is valid to describe the status quo in the post-1991 world “in which US military and economic power has dwarfed that of all other states” (Layne, 2009b: 148). And, “no

combination of states or other powers can challenge ... [it] militarily, and no balancing coalition [against it] is imminent” (Snyder, 2004: 56). Using such criteria, the former French President Jacques Chirac saw American unilateralism in the late 1990s, as “a product of the post-Cold War imbalance of power and the emergence of the United States as the world’s lone ‘hyperpower’” (cited in Oudenaren, 2004).

Arguably, then, if material power is distributed asymmetrically, the system lacks the balance that occurred under the bipolar system; one nation in the system uniquely possesses material resources as well as significant organizational skills and shows a willingness to lead as the US has done in the aftermath of the CW. The system might turn into a hegemonic one (McMahon, 1991; Liese, 1997; Brown, 2009; Wohlforth et al., 2009). This is the case because “being the only superpower is not the same as having power over most other in the system” (Brown, 2009: 125). As a number of critics argue, hegemonic status is the opposite of a balance of power (Ikenberry et al., 1988; McCormick, 1995; Dittgen, 1996; Layne, 2006). Accordingly, if the balance of power created a bipolar system during the CW, its absence concentrated massive power in one country in the system and, if the CW’s bipolarity had constrained the US from an absolute hegemonic project, the collapse of that system resulted in the US enjoying a unipolar moment and led to an unprecedented historical phase of hegemony (Krauthammer, 1990/1991-2002).

Accordingly, it is obvious that unipolarity has completely changed the characteristics of the bipolar world system and established its new logic. Borrowing from the US constitution’s idea of checks and balances, Waltz argues (2009: 31):

In a bipolar world, two states check and balance each other. In a unipolar world, checks on the behaviour of the one great power drop drastically. Unipolarity weakens structural constraints, enlarges the field of action of the remaining great power ... An international system in balance is like a political system of checks and balances. An international system in which another state or combination of states is unable to balance the might of the most powerful is like a political system without checks and balances.

Therefore, when a state enjoys a ‘unipolar moment’ in world affairs, the possibility of its becoming a global hegemon is very high. In this context, hegemonic order theorists and to a degree realists claim that the rise of a hegemonic leader will be conducive to global political and economic stability (Grunberg, 1990; Liese, 1997; Layne, 2006;

Antoniades, 2008; Brown, 2009). However, this assumption “was challenged by the neo-liberal literature on regimes and international institutions developed since the late 1980s”. In fact, neo-liberalists “attempted to shift the focus of analysis from the subject of hegemony (i.e. the hegemon) to the conditions and mechanisms of its operation” (Antoniades, 2008: 3). Neo-realists are also concerned with the structure of international systems rather than focusing on some units (Waltz, 1979). However, in the early 1990s, Kenneth Waltz challenged the HSTs’ idea of the hegemon as a public good provider by arguing that (1991: 669):

The powerful state may, and the United States does, think of itself as acting for the sake of peace, justice, and well-being in the world. But these terms will be defined to the liking of the powerful, which may conflict with the preferences and the interests of others ...With benign intent, the United States has behaved, and, until its power is brought into a semblance of balance, will continue to behave in ways that annoy and frighten others.

While this is true, the proponents of the HST assume that the existence of a hegemon power is helpful to the global order because it can regulate and stabilise the system in which units operate. However, these proponents pay no attention to the behaviour of second-tier powers and fail to elucidate how these powers respond to the hegemonic power. Furthermore, they do not draw any clear distinction between cooperative and coercive models of hegemony (Spar, 1994). Scholars of IR and international political economy (IPE) have raised several critical points concerning the idea that a hegemon is a public good provider. These points, according to Debora L. Spar, are important in understanding the behaviour of the unipolar hegemonic power. First, they argue that there is no clear evidence to prove HST’s presumption that cooperation between the system’s units and stability is merely “attributed to the existence of a hegemon” because, in many instances throughout history, cooperation and stability have survived at a time when “no hegemon existed”. Second, there is also “no evidence that the stability created by the hegemon benefits all states in the system” (1994: 7). Furthermore, HST does not explain when and how the hegemon pursues its own interests instead of providing public good to others. This point might be much more obvious within the realist paradigm. Waltz (2000, 2009a), for instance, argues that, in a unipolar system, the unipole power operates without fear of being challenged or constrained. For realists “the only formal justice is to be victor’s justice: the hegemon would do what is needed to maintain its position” (Jervis, 2009: 196). This echoes what



the Greek realist Thucydides argues: “large nations do what they wish, while small nations accept what they must” (cited in Chomsky, 2003: 16). In this context, some HSTs acknowledged that the “weaker states might be unhappy about their position, but do not have the power capabilities to change it”. In consequence, hegemony is “based on coercion” and the hegemon is “acting as a quasi-government” (Moe, 2004: 3). On the basis of this discussion, how can we understand the US’ behaviour in the post-CW system? Would it be possible to say that America was a public good provider or was it a hegemon pursuing its own agenda? Some argue that nothing much has changed by the EoCW. America was a hegemon pursuing its interests and using new rhetoric of spreading democracy, free market and human rights, instead of containing the communism in the CW (Farrell, 2000). Or, as Peter H. Smith put it, the EoCW “relaxed the terms of ideological confrontation, strengthened centralist elements, reinforced processes of liberalisation ... and enhanced the prospect of democratic consolidation” (2001: 35).

What is apparent in the mainstream IR literature is that the two terms, hegemony and unipolarity, have regularly been used inter-changeably; however, despite this overlap, there is some theoretical distinction between the two terms (Moe, 2004; Hurrell, 2005; Wohlforth et al., 2009). Wohlforth et al. argue that (2009: 3):

Unipolarity refers narrowly to the underlying material distribution of capabilities and not to the political patterns or relationships depicted by terms such as empire, imperium, and hegemony. What makes the global system unipolar is the distinctive distribution of material resources.

Likewise, Wohlforth (1999: 9) is aware that concentrating on the material resources in the hands of a unipole power might cause confusion between the terms, unipolarity and empire. From his point of view, in the unipolar system, “capabilities are not so concentrated as to produce a global empire” (1999: 9). However, “unipolarity should not be confused with multi-or bipolar systems containing one especially strong polar state or with an imperial system containing only one major power” (Wohlforth, 1999: 9). Nevertheless, “the specific characteristics and dynamics of any unipolar system will obviously depend on how the unipolar state behaves” (Wohlforth, 2009: 10). Depending on the hegemonic order theories, Espen Moe also argues that “unipolar powers may be hegemons, but this follows from their foreign policy behaviour and not from their power position” (2004: 2). This meaning is also found in Waltz’s argument regarding

how the behaviour of the hegemon could slow and/or accelerate the balance against it (Waltz, 2009a).

In sum, if theoretically there is some clear distinction between unipolarity and hegemony, practically all the distinction between the two is still blurred. For instance, the EoCW's redistribution of power turned the system to unipolar and gave the US military predominance. This, in turn, "caused US strategy to shift from policies of deterrence or containment of threats to policies of preventive warfare" (Lieberfeld, 2005: 3). The unipolar predominance after the EoCW also "created incentives for the US to deemphasize collective security and to rely more heavily on its own military". With US power unrivalled, "realist theory predicts that any US leader would view multi-lateral institutions as more of a hindrance than a help" (Lieberfeld, 2005: 3).

#### **1.3.4.3. US Hegemony Model In The Post-CW Era**

The post-CW hegemonic project is a mixture of cooperative and unilateral models. The "economic instruments of foreign policy have become at least as important as diplomacy and force," (Light & Groom, 1994: 100) and high politics has also combined with low politics. Clinton's bid to establish US hegemony therefore turned from the customary balance of power perspective to a liberal internationalism and economic predominance (Dueck, 2006; Kurth, 2007).

US hegemony was also institutionalized through multi-lateral entities, such as NATO and other multi-lateral organisations. As argued above, according to neo-liberalists, institutions are supposed to be very important in order to maintain cooperation and peace. Thus, "institutions both limit and project state power; they are mechanisms of hegemonic self-restraint and tools of hegemonic power". However, institutions are neither autonomous from the influence of a hegemon power nor "capable of checking its exercise of power" (Schweller, 2001: 163). In this context, Waltz (2000) points out, the ability of the US to survive and expand NATO's authority and presence in the post-CW era serves its geo-strategic interests. Echoes Waltz, Randall L. Schweller argues that (2001: 181):

In this respect, NATO is no different from any other US-led institution. They have all been designed to preserve and promote American primacy by (1) enabling the United States to project its preponderance of power more

effectively than it otherwise could, and (2) discouraging secondary powers from pursuing independent policies or attempting to realize their potential power and become viable contenders for America's crown. It is not surprising, therefore, that both the Bush and Clinton administrations strongly supported the continued existence of NATO as a way to prevent the formation of an independent European force that could potentially challenge U.S. global supremacy.

The institutionalisation of the US hegemonic project in the post-CW period also rested on free markets, globalisation and the spread of democracy (Colás & Saull, 2006: 1). This mixture of pragmatic and ideological agendas served US hegemony at a time that the US lost its external enemy which had glued its allies and enhanced its hegemonic project for nearly a half century. These ideas will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters.

#### **1.3.4.4. The Unilateral Hegemonic Turn**

In the unipolar moment, the US intervened in several spots around the globe, such as in Kuwait, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo. These interventions were to a large degree perceived as legitimate action (by the majority of states). However, the post-9/11 controversial policies were widely condemned. Therefore, Moe concludes that the post-9/11 policy “is a US foreign policy directed towards hegemony rather than non-hegemonic unipolarity” (2004: 2).

As stated previously, “the specific characteristics and dynamics of any unipolar system will obviously depend on how the unipolar state behaves” (Wohlforth et al., 2009: 10). The move from the previous model of cooperative hegemony to the post-CW model of unilateral hegemony began in the immediate aftermath of the CW with the emergence of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) of the early 1990s, and reached its zenith after the 2000 election, prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In the early 1990s the US re-charted its grand strategy by prohibiting any potential regional unification and preventing the rise of any new rival. In consequence, the US showed a strong willingness to manage world affairs in line with its geo-strategic interests.

The most obvious course of unilateral hegemony appeared as a reaction to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. According to Jack Snyder, realism’s clearest success “is its ability to explain the United States’ forceful military response to the September 11 terrorist attacks” (2004: 55). Realists argue that (Snyder, 2004: 55):

When a state grows vastly more powerful than any opponent it will eventually use that power to expand its sphere of domination, whether for security, wealth, or other motives. The United States employed its military power in what some deemed an imperial fashion in large part because it could.

A strategy of unilateral hegemony would “imply that Washington would try to weaken traditional multi-lateral institutions and replace them by a new institutional structure” (Mace & Loiseau, 2005: 112). Such a strategy has been implemented during the 1990s, particularly during the Clinton administration (e.g., the attacks against Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998, and against Iraq along the 1990s). However, the approach was very clear after 9/11 in the lead up to the invasion of Iraq, when the US ignored the UNSC and acted alone with its key ally, the UK (Kapteyn, 2004). After Bush II took office in early 2001, the US appeared as a hegemon, not as a public good provider. The Bush II’s early explicit unilateral moves on issues such as the Kyoto Protocol and missile defence “may perturb and even anger US allies, but should not drive them toward military counter-balancing” (Owen, 2001/2001: 121).

The attacks of 9/11 legitimated an open form of unilateral hegemony, which appeared when the US decided: to strike pre-emptively; to go it alone or with limited allies; to exploit the WoT for achieving its hegemonic and geo-strategic aims; to impose its weight over other countries; and to fight terrorism by spreading democracy (Snyder, 2004). However, this is not to argue that the US’ response to the attacks of 9/11 has undermined the NWO that was established on globalisation and a geo-economic thesis. Although it is true to argue that the main concern of US’ FP agenda returned to security as a fundamental issue, nevertheless, according to Tom Conley “globalisation has not been seen to be less important because of terrorism” (2007: 140). In fact, the rise of the new wave of global terrorism “has often been seen as a response to globalisation” (Conley, 2007: 140). On the other hand, the WOT has also been seen as an attempt to make control over the natural resources in the Middle-East and Central Asia. Therefore, Conley (2007) concludes that the most obvious phenomenon of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is the simultaneous existence of terrorism, globalisation and hegemony.

On the basis of the above discussion, it could be argued that since the EoCW, when the US has become the only hyper-power or hegemon, and more obviously after 9/11, the US showed its desire to go it alone, whatever the interests of other powers. If the US pursued a cooperative model of hegemony to serve its interests and contain its allies and

foes during the CW, the EoCW and the US emergence as a victorious nation with huge material capabilities weakened this model and produced a new unilateral model which is fit to its unipolar moment. True, the characteristics of this new model appeared since the early 1990s; however, it became clearer after 9/11.

### **1.3.5. Hegemony Beyond State-Centred Theories**

Two important questions remain to be answered: if the end of the bipolar system and the emergence of unipolarity were the main incentive to establish US hegemony, why did AFP not present a clear and a coherent hegemonic strategy during the 1990s? And: what reasons hindered such a strategy from emerging explicitly until 9/11 took place? These questions can be reformulated: does hegemonic status occur merely because of the imbalance of power in the system and is it conditioned by shifts on the international level? Or is it also relevant to the intrastate relations? These questions direct attention towards domestic politics as a source to AFP making because the external context is not sufficient to establish a hegemonic strategy. Important conditions to move towards hegemony are laid down in the internal and societal sources of the FP-making process. The shift from bipolarity to unipolarity gave America an unprecedented opportunity to move towards an explicit phase of hegemony. However, the US hegemonic project during the 1990s was unclear, not because it was absent, but because of the failure to build a domestic consensus over the AFP strategy.

State-centred approaches (realism and liberalism) are insufficient to answer these questions, as they fail to clarify the picture of the motivations behind a state's FP strategies. FP, according to this approach, is merely a response to external events (Dunne & Schmidt, 2001; Brown, 2001). Domestic sources of power, cultural differences among countries and dissimilarities in regimes types are not relevant to most structuralist explanations of IR (Chafetz, et al, 1996; Walt, 1998; Ryan, 2000; Hill, 2003; Mearsheimer, 2007). The structuralist paradigms miss a set of crucial variables that enlighten the motivations behind the US hegemonic project. On the other hand, the system today is a hegemonic one in which the basic concepts of realism (anarchy, self-help and power balancing) provide little guidance or explanation of a state foreign behaviour (Ness, 2002). Furthermore, "it is harder for the normally state-centric realists to explain why the world's only superpower announced a war against al Qaeda, a non-

state terrorist organization” (Snyder, 2004: 55). In the same way, liberalism’s main concern with institutions and cooperation as a mechanism to discipline the anarchical system and understand international affairs downgrades “politics of power” and other realistic concepts of IR. The institutions also failed to constrain the hegemon’s appetite to use coercive and tangible power to serve its interest (Brown, 2001; Chittick, 2006). In the same way, “the theory of hegemonic stability and transition will not tell us as much about the future of the United States” (Nye, 1990c: 188).

In sum, from this study’s viewpoint, it is true that systematic conditions (at the inter-state level) are crucial to the emergence of a global hegemon, but also, with the availability of these conditions, domestic requirements (or intrastate prerequisites) are also needed. This matter will be discussing in the following section.

#### **1.3.5.1. An Intermestic Approach: Opening the Black Box of Domestic Politics**

Domestic politics, according to Gideon Rose (1986: 260), are “part of the internal setting of the process of foreign policy”. In other words, “the foreign has protractedly transformed the domestic and, conversely, domestic factors have had significant implications for the outside” (Haubrich, 2006: 85). In this regard, Laura Neack (2003: 8) argues that “the stuff of foreign policy derives from issues of domestic politics as well as foreign relations”.<sup>1</sup> Equally, if not more importantly, Charles F. Hermann (1990) ranks external crises after a sequence of domestic sources that lead a state to change its FP course. From his viewpoint, four of the change agents contribute to changing FP orientation: leadership; bureaucratic advocacy; domestic restructuring; and external shock. John A. Vasquez also lists a series of domestic activities that triggered internal

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<sup>1</sup> In this context, John Lewis Gaddis argues that the containment strategy of the CW, to a remarkable degree, was not only a product of what happened in the external scene with the USSR and its allies, but it was also a product of domestic forces that were working within the American political system. From his viewpoint, the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century witnessed two forms of containment strategy. The differences between them resided in the differences between the US administration’s economic philosophical approaches. “Republicans prior to Ronald Reagan favoured tight fiscal policies capable of reining in inflations, while Democrats prior to Jimmy Carter preferred expensive policies capable of generating employment” (Khong, 2008: 253). However, in contrast, external challenges also play a crucial role in one policy prevailing over other. For example, the invasion of South Korea in 1950, “made it easy to choose the NSC-68 version of containment over George Kennan’s more political/diplomatic approach, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 also helped Team B win the debate about the Soviet intentions, facilitating the Reagan administration’s massive military build in the 1980s” (Khong, 2008: 255).

disputes over FP-making: “level of interest on foreign policy questions; frequency of participations on foreign policy issues; the kind of participation (debate, bipartisanship, technical criticism, rejection, reassessment); shifts in belief systems; and changes in personnel” (1985: 651). From James N. Rosenau’s viewpoint, any FP decision not only reflects “the response to an opportunity or challenge elsewhere in the world” but it also mirrors “the decision of an individual, the deliberation of a committee, the outcome of the policymaking process, the sum of clashing interest groups, the values of dominant elites, the product of a society’s aspirations and the reinforcement of a historical tradition” (1987a: 2). Patrick James & Athanasios Hristoulas summarise the aforementioned domestic activities under two broad categories: “(1) the public, including electoral phases and presidential standing; and (2) Washington, referring to the Congress and bureaucratic politics” (1994: 328). Such views have ranked domestic context in a salient position, whether it is in the making of or in the influencing of the whole process of FP agenda-setting and implementation. Robert O. Keohane & Helen V. Milner determine three pathways in which international affairs could influence domestic politics. The influence might be “by affecting an actor’s policy preferences and the resulting political coalitions; by creating a crisis; and by undermining governmental autonomy and policy efficacy” (1987: 244). Such a foreign-domestic interaction would happen through several tools, such as public opinion, the media and interest groups. These elements not only place restrictions on the FP making process, but they also constitute a significant component of the US foreign policy arena (Putnam, 1988; Scott & Crothers, 1998; Hoffmann, 2004; Wittkopf & McCormick, 2004; Haubrich, 2006). Consequently, these elements define not only the degree of US foreign policy consistency, but also the level of movement and commitments (Risse-Kappen, 1991).

The EoCW removed any precise distinction between domestic and foreign affairs in practice and in theory (Lake, 1993; Miller, 1994; Dunne, 2000). In this context, Miroslav Nincic observes that, when international affairs changes and foreign challenges become less imminent, the aphorism that says America’s “politics stop at the water’s edge” has reflected neither actuality nor the core principles of American democratic characteristics. Except at a time of great crisis, as he suggests, when American values and interests are at stake, foreign policy is a product of domestic

politics (2008: 126). Therefore, during the 1990s, it was fair to argue that the old style of AFP-making process was no longer workable and had lost its “bearing and sway” under the new circumstances (Clough, 2004). In fact, “when the constraining effects of the CW were removed,” domestic actors’ concerns over FP making process increased (Nye, 2000: 55). Unipolarity brings the “international system closer to the domestic one” (Jervis, 2009: 196), and a clear distinction between the two has become impossible (Kamath, 1990; Paarlberg, 1995; Wayne, 2000). In this context, Thomas Paterson et al. argue that globalisation “made foreign relations less foreign” (2010: 469). Owing to these changes, politics and partisanship did not stop when America dealt with foreign and security matters (Wiarda & Skelley, 2006).

In consequence, US hegemony from the 1990s onwards cannot be understood solely from a state-centred approach, but, as Mark Beeson suggests, “interests, values, ideology, and strategic beliefs are, in many cases, just as important as imbalances of power or threat in determining how states choose sides and why they wage war” (2007: 621). That is why Jean A. Garrison suggests that the opening of “the black box of domestic politics and policymaking” (2003: 155) is becoming a supportive methodological approach to understanding the state’s FP choices in international politics. In this vein, McCormick argues (1995: 7):

Hegemony does not simply happen; individuals and groups of people make it happen. A sufficient base of power is the prerequisite for global supremacy, but it is insufficient unless the will to use that power is present in those determining public policy for the potential superpower.

Accordingly, in contrast to the realist assumption that a state is a unitary rational actor, this study treats a state as a diverse and complex entity, which comprises various sub-actors all competing for influence (Hoffmann, 1986; Light & Groom, 1994; Hill, 2003; Chittick, 2006). Therefore, individual belief systems, psychology, interests, collective social forces, ideological groups, economic and ethnic lobbyists and governmental and non-governmental organisations are very important elements in the framing of a state’s agenda, both internationally and domestically (James & Hristoulas, 1994; Lindsay & Ripley, 1997a; Taber, 1998; Garrison, 2003; Huntington, 2004). That is why FP explanations, in terms of society-centred approaches, are “found in the ongoing struggle for influence among domestic social forces or political groups.” For some proponents of this approach, “state officials or institutions play neither an autonomous nor significant



intervening role in shaping or constraining policy” (Ikenberry et al, 1988: 7). In turn, external events are not to be understood as an influential force affecting a state as a unitary rational entity, but they can be understood in terms of their effects on “the way that individuals interact with reality” (Mowle, 2003: 562). However, understanding AFP behaviour cannot depend only on domestic politics (Brown, 2001; Chittick, 2006). In the next sections, this chapter will show how the AFP decision-making process can be understood in terms of external and internal factors.

### **1.3.6. The Study’s Meta-theory: State and Society Centred Approaches in Unity**

As Ikenberry argues “it is not enough simply to pick some theoretical approach and run with it” (2005: 7); rather, a student of IR needs guidance “on how to proceed when different approaches seem to provide equally plausible explanations—to better understand when a particular level of analysis or type of variable is most suitable in rendering an account of foreign policy” (2005: 7). This is because, according to Stephen M. Walt, “no single approach can capture all the complexity of contemporary world politics” (1998: 30). Each of these competing perspectives captures important aspects of world politics. Critics are becoming persuaded that no one theory or method is the most important when addressing all the challenges that face a state (Sprinz & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2004b; Ikenberry, 2005). In terms of AFP, Walt recommended that one should remain “cognizant of realism’s emphasis on the inescapable role of power, keep liberalism’s awareness of domestic forces in mind and occasionally reflect on constructivism’s vision of change” (1998: 44). This technique is followed in this research.

This research aims to understand hegemony (as a FP strategy) from a wider perspective. Following Ikenberry, this theoretical framework develops a ‘meta-theory’ that incorporates several types of variables into a larger-scale framework (2005: 9). In other words, it aims to put together a collection of several elements from state-centred theories, such as realism, liberalism, and globalism, and society-centred theories such as constructivism, pluralism, and elitism. Using Stephen Walt’s words, this research’s theoretical model is a “diverse array with competing ideas rather than a single theoretical orthodoxy” (1998: 30). However, these factors are not always treated as being equally important. Sometimes, greater priority is given to one approach over

another or to one level of analysis over the rest. The choice is entirely determined by the context of analysis, but, in general, these theories are applied, not as rivals, but as complementary analytical tools.

The main reason behind the study's intention to build a meta-theory is to be able to work at each level of analysis. According to Ikenberry et al. (1988: 1):

[International, or system-centred approaches] explain American policy as a function of the attributes or capabilities of the United States relative to other nation-states. In this view, government officials are perceived as responding to the particular set of opportunities and constraints that America's position in the international system creates at any moment in time.

Neo-realism as a security and power focus approach, for example, is the tool needed to evaluate the external sources of AFP's hegemonism in the post-Soviet era. It can highlight both the opportunities and challenges that the EoCW created and explain their influence over AFP strategy. It is also very important to evaluate power capabilities, security dilemmas and national interests of the US and its closest powers. The neo-realist approach is also able to assess the international determinants and constraints of AFP strategy in the pre- and post-1989 eras. Furthermore, it offers the analytical tools to explain AFP's apparent hegemonic shift at the eve of the CW (Viotti & Kauppi, 1987; Holsti, 1992b; Walt, 1998; Lieberfeld, 2005; Kaufman, 2006).

Moreover, liberalism is also required in order to throw light on the US hegemonic project. The survival of a state is not only maintained by military power but also by economic resources and economic power. Maximizing a state's military power cannot be achieved without economic strength. This assumption is also pursued by most realists (Walt, 1998; Waltz, 2009a). Furthermore, a state's conduct in international affairs is not always determined by security issues. For example, during the CW, authors such as Robert J. McMahon argue that the struggle against communism was not, as was usually claimed, a struggle against a hostile and tyrannical competitor but to a larger degree was precipitated by US economic expansionism. US policy-makers, according to McMahon, "were convinced that domestic peace and prosperity required the aggressive pursuit of foreign markets" (1991: 136). Thus, these policy-makers also saw the USSR and revolutionary nationalism in the third world "as the principal impediments to the Open Door world they sought to construct; consequently, they

moved quickly to contain those twin threats, forging in the process a global American empire” (1991: 136). This perspective is also seen in post-CW, when the Clinton doctrine premised that “economic instruments of foreign policy have become at least as important as diplomacy and force” (Light & Groom, 1994: 100). It is therefore very difficult to ignore the effects of such a combination on the AFP-making process and behaviour since Clinton’s bid to establish US hegemony in the post-CW era turned from the traditional balance of power to liberal internationalism and primacy (Dueck, 2006; Kurth, 2007). In this context, some observers suggest that a crucial issue amongst the post-9/11 WoT’s objective was guaranteeing the control of the US over natural resources in Central Asia and the Middle-East (Dunn, 2003). In general, liberalism also highlights the importance of issues such as international institutions, multi-lateral cooperation, trade and the ideals of democracy, liberty and prosperity. This perspective also makes links between international and domestic levels of analysis, because the opening up of the AFP-making process, particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, to economic lobbyists, who enjoyed significant influence at the time, demonstrated that firms and industries became key figures in determining national interests and FP (Fordham, 1998).

Several elements of hegemonic theory can also be used to complement the above theories. Since hegemonic power tends to stabilise world affairs and provide public good to others, it can be argued that HST can offer the legitimacy that the hegemon needs to promote its leadership (Moe, 2004). This assumption was in place during the 1990s, when Washington legitimised its dominance using the claim that US was the engine of globalisation and the free market. A similar idea is also found in Waltz’s argument, “when rulers establish their dominance, the result is arbitrary and destructive governance that works for the benefit of the governors rather than the governed” (Waltz, 2009: 31).

In addition to the above state-centred theories, the study’s meta-theory also uses several elements from society-centred approaches. Society centred approaches, according to Ikenberry et al. (1988: 1, 2), view AFP:

... as either reflecting the preferences of the dominant group or class in society, or as resulting from the struggle for influence that takes place among various interest groups or political parties. In either case this approach explains foreign

... policy essentially as a function of domestic politics ... State-centred approaches view foreign ... policy as highly constrained by domestic institutional relationships that have persisted over time, and also by the ability of state officials to realize their objectives in light of both international and domestic constraints.

Constructivism, in contrast to realist and liberalist approaches, premises that a state's behaviour is not subject merely to the international environment but has also been shaped by domestic factors such as elite beliefs, collective norms and social identities. Therefore, it is vital, not only to clarify domestic influences on AFP, but also to make the necessary causal-connection between external and internal levels of analysis (Chittick, 2006; Phillips et al., 2007). Constructivism came to the forefront of analysis after the CW because of realism's and liberalism's lack of ability to predict the peaceful end of the CW. For constructivists, Gorbachev's thinking and the USSR's domestic and international reformist process were the main reasons behind the EoCW. The constructivist approach has acquired greater attention since the events of 9/11. Since then international politics and AFP alike have been influenced by the role of identity and culture (Walt, 1998; Brown, 2001; Chittick, 2006; Phillips et al., 2007). In this way, some critics suggest that the "emphasis on the link between political attitudes, national institutions, and national culture ... can contribute to the study of international relations" (Benn, 2007: 970). A decision-making approach which premises that "human decision making was central to the interpretation of foreign policy action" (Hermann & Peacock, 1987: 22) is also very important to clarify dimensions in AFP. But these decision makers would also be influenced or constrained by the surrounding environment (the organisations) which they are operating in (Hermann & Peacock, 1987). Likewise, rational choice theorists put more emphasis on individual actors as the basic units of analysis (Hay, 2002; Watson, 2003). However, these actors are "not subjected to structural constraints but have the ability to fashion and alter the environment – that is, the systemic structure – in which they find themselves" (Haubrich, 2006: 85). In line with this perspective, and in contrast to the realist view that the WoT is essentially rooted in the national security perspective, constructive liberalists argue that the rise of the neo-conservative (neo-con) group to the top level of the policy-making pyramid in the US with their ideological perspective was a key driving force that led America into the war. The neo-cons put forward their policies—combining the liberal agenda of spreading democracy internationally with unilateralism

and militarism—to create and preserve US hegemony in the post-CW world. Constructive liberalists also argue that the WoT was ignited by a strong domestic coalition, composed of conservatives, neo-cons and US nationalists in the Republican Party, supported by the military-industrial complex and business lobbyists (Risse & Panke, 2007).

In the same way, the pluralist perspective can also contribute to the research. Pluralists suggest that all policy areas are inter-connected and therefore influence each other. States are considered as important players, but FP decisions are not just the result of governments but other economic and social forces, such as political parties, ethnic and business groups, the media, the public and non-state actors play a crucial role in the FP-making process (Viotti & Kauppi, 1987; Holsti, 1992b; Walt, 1998; Robinson, 2008).<sup>1</sup> Using this approach would help to determine, for instance, the domestic barriers that prevented the US hegemonic project from emerging fully during the 1990s, and the internal motivations that encouraged the materialisation of such a plan post-9/11.

However, the pluralist, with its societal focus, might not be able to offer a comprehensive understanding of the variety of influences on US domestic politics. Therefore, it is necessary to incorporate elitist perspective and bureaucratic theory. A theory of bureaucratic politics helps to answer the question of “why different bureaucracies adopt different policies, making assumptions about the preferences of decision-makers” (Zakaria, 1998: 14). Coupling individual behaviour with bureaucracy theory also throws light on the effects of members of government, of parliament, and groups on their institutions and on the FP-making process as a whole. The influence of the US neo-cons in shaping the post-CW foreign policy agenda is a good example. These tools can help in clarifying the domestic struggle over power within the US political system and how such competition affects the domestic context for AFP.

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<sup>1</sup> According to Melakopides “this perspective occupies a middle ground between idealism and realism. It is broad enough to embrace a variety of approaches known as liberal institutionalism, neo-realism, and even the model of interdependence” (1998: 24). Roberts argues that pluralism “accepts the relevance of many different approaches to international relations: not just the proper emphasis on power and interest that is found in realist theories, but also approaches that stress the significance of ideas and norms, the impact of domestic political and economic structures on international politics, the roles of transnational movements and international organizations, and the existence of new challenges” (2008: 335).

## **1.4. Methodology**

The aforementioned discussion showed that AFP is recognised to be a very complicated, multi-layered and multi-faceted process (Cakmak, 2003; Mead, 2003). This section therefore attempts to build an analytical technique which is capable of capturing these divergent issues related to US hegemony after the CW. Just as AFP is a diverse process, this analytical model must also be equipped with a multi-level analysis, in addition to the integrative theory mentioned in previous sections (Viotti & Kauppi, 1987; Hox, 2002; Hudson, 2007). The following sections highlight the various analytical techniques used in the research.

### **1.4.1. A Multi-Level Analytical Technique**

Scholars choose this analytical approach because it meets several criteria. First, a multi-level approach is more able than a single-level approach to analyse the diverse and multiple layers of actors engaged in the AFP-making process (Zhao, 1996; Krahnann, 2005). Therefore, the explanatory powers are not concentrated in only one location, but flow through several levels: individual, sub-national, national, transnational and international. Second, the variety of analytical levels in this approach is not dependent on only one explanatory theory. As no one theory is available from the toolbox of IR, the model used must be designed to be suitable not only for each level of analysis, but also for each single variable in the research. According to Ole R. Holsti (1989: 32), it is not sufficient only “to acknowledge the existence of various levels of analysis” but most important to determine “which level(s) of analysis are relevant and necessary” to clarify political phenomena.

The utilization of multi-levels analysis has occurred in several academic works. For instance, it has been found in Waltz’s (1959) model of three levels of analysis, the individual, the state, and the state system, as well as in Putnam’s (1988) theory of a two-level game. Putnam’s theory looks at the national or the first level of the game, in which “the domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups” (Putnam, 1988: 434). However, at the international level or the second level of the game, “national governments seek to maximise their own ability to satisfy domestic

pressures, while minimising the adverse consequences of foreign developments” (Putnam, 1988: 434).<sup>1</sup>

Waltz (1959) argues that domestic forces, such as different pressure groups, socio-economic classes and parties are unable to influence world politics unless they influence the state itself. Therefore, the first level of analysis is the individual, whose behaviour, beliefs and characteristics influences IR because of their roles in their own government. Although this level of analysis seeks to answer the question of why a nation goes to war, it focuses essentially on individual personalities and motivations (Neack, 2003; Kegely & Wittkopf, 2004; Ikenberry, 2005). The second level of analysis concentrates on society as a source of FP-making. The causes of war might lie within cultural or political institutions. In fact, Waltz suggests that each level of his analysis captures a different level of causation; however, his levels are not equal in terms of their influence. The system structure level would be the strongest, because it not only “identifies the forces within which individuals and states operate”, but also it “generates constraints and imperatives by which all individuals and states, regardless of their uniqueness, must abide” (Ikenberry, 2005: 3).

Kalevi J. Holsti echoes Waltz’s model of analysis suggesting four possible levels of analysis: individual; state; systemic; and global. Focusing on the actions and behaviours of individual statesmen helps to understand the motivations, ideologies, culture, perceptions and other elements that lead policy-makers to make FP decisions. However, looking at IR and FP from the perspective of the ‘individual state’ enables the researcher to clarify the behaviour of a state, not only in terms of ‘power politics’ or the ‘external environment’ but also through the lenses of domestic and internal politics. The

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<sup>1</sup> Echoing Putnam, Chittick (2006) coined the term ‘political bargaining game’ to describe the situation occurring between the government and society on the one hand, and the government and other states on the other. Society here can influence government by means of elections, public opinion, [media](#) and pressure groups (economic and non-economic). In the words of Valerie M. Hudson, politicians and decision-makers simultaneously play “the game of domestic politics and the game of international politics” (2005: 3). These ideas are not too far from Rosenau’s argument of the ‘penetrated system’. The national political system, he argues, is strongly influenced by international events and tendencies; therefore, “national societies have become so penetrated by their external environment” (Hanrieder, 1967: 978). In their attempt to study AFP, Nathan & Oliver (1994) use a similar technique of several levels of analysis. One level of analysis concentrated on the executive-legislative relationship in the domain of the AFP-making process. However, evaluating the interconnection between the demands of democratic accountability and foreign policy was the second level of analysis. In consequence, they examined the effects of public opinion and the influence of interest groups such as the business community, or ethnic minorities on the FP-making process.

concept of the state system also offers scholars different analytical capabilities. This level is used to focus on the distribution of power between states in the international scene. Furthermore, it allows the study of the rise or fall of a state. Furthermore, the globalist lens can be used, whereby the world is a small village and units such as states are disregarded. These perspectives enhance each other and each offers a partial explanation of a state's foreign policy behaviour (1992b: 6). However, Holsti does not completely fit his model of analysis with Waltz's idea that the external level of analysis is more important in terms of its influence over FP-making. He argues that "the main characteristics of the external environment are not less important than those of the state's internal environment. Therefore, all four levels of analysis will be employed at different times, depending upon the type of problem to be analysed" (1992b: 7).

In this way, Eugene R. Wittkopf et al. apply a framework of analysis that was developed by the political scientist Rosenau in 1980 and improved later in 1986 (see Figure 1.1). Rosenau argues that the influential factors that explain AFP can be divided into several sources: the external, or the global; the governmental; the societal; and individuals and FP elites (2003: 15). Eugene R. Wittkopf & James M. McCormick similarly studied AFP's domestic context using a methodological perspective that grouped its sources "into three broad categories: the nation's societal environment; its institutional setting; and the individual characteristics of its decision-makers and the policymaking positions they occupy" (2004, 6; 2008: 9). These authors argue that each of these levels of analysis or categories includes different variables and wider important elements, but, taken together, they help a researcher to "think systematically about forces that shape American foreign policy" (Wittkopf et al., 2003: 15).






Figure 1.1 AFP's Different Sources  
Source: (Wittkopf et al., 2003: 15).

Therefore, this technique's main characteristic is the attempt to combine behavioural and traditional methodologies. It includes elements of classical IR theories, such as realism, but also uses mechanisms derived from constructivism and other theories, as well as emphasizing individual influence and group behaviour. Brian Hocking & Michael Smith also list a series of analytical frameworks for studying world politics: (1) common-sense empiricism; (2) single-factor explanations; (3) single-level explanations; (4) middle-range theory; and (5) grand theory. However, they conclude that "the bias is towards middle-range theory, in the light of different levels of analysis" (1995: 17, 18). In a similar way, Charles W. Kegley & James M. Wittkopf adopt a "multi-level, multi-issue perspective" in their study of world politics. They argue that such a perspective is of crucial importance because it tends to investigate several issues (2004: 18):

- (1) the characteristics, capabilities, and interests of the principal actors in world politics (states and various nonstate); (2) the principal welfare and security issues ... and; (3) the patterns of cooperation and contention that influence the interaction between and among actors and issues".

After all, the aforementioned discussion concludes that, owing to a variety of factors which contribute to the FP making process, multi-level analysis is probably the best technique that can be implemented in order to understand AFP's multi-dimensions. This kind of analysis needs also to be supported by integrative theory to be able to evaluate political phenomena in each level of analysis. According to Detlef F. Sprinz & Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, "methodological pluralism serves to improve our understanding of

policy-making and world events by creating opportunities for scholars to re-evaluate their claims and to compensate for the methodological weaknesses in any particular approach” (2004b, p. 378). AFP’s multi-dimensionality inevitably necessitates the use of multiple levels of analysis or multi-method research (Viotti & Kauppi, 1987). The remaining question, however, is this: “which level of analysis gives us the most useful perspective from which to explain or understand politics among nations?” (Holsti, 1992b: 7).

#### **1.4.2. From Theory To Practice**

In attempting to answer this question, Rosenau argued that “all time frames, and all units of analysis, whatever their sizes, are important ... no facet can be safely ignored, or easily held constant,” and students of FP analysis must “concern themselves with politics at every level” (1987a: 1). This is because each level of analysis, according to Holsti, “makes a contribution, but each fails to account for certain aspects of reality that must be considered” (1992b: 7).

On the basis of what has been said above, and since this work assumes that the US unilateralism and hegemony in global affairs has been energized by the EoCW, it is necessary to begin with the realist approach and the systemic level of analysis. This is because “if one begins at the level of discrete individuals and events, one is likely to be trapped and preoccupied in a maze of particularistic detail and idiosyncratic factors” (McCormick, 1995: xvi). Therefore, it is “very difficult to work from the specific to the general, to write from the inside out. It is far less problematic, however, to write from the outside in” (McCormick, 1995: xvi). Accordingly, critics, such as Ikenberry et al. (1988) and McCormick (1995), suggest that a systemic-centred approach might be regarded as a good starting tool to analyse the international level, because “unless one begins with a global unit of analysis, one runs the proverbial risk of missing the forest for the trees” (McCormick, 1995: xvi).

International, or system-centred approaches “explain American policy as a function of the attributes or capabilities of the United States relative to other nation-states. In this view, government officials are perceived as responding to the particular set of opportunities and constraints that America’s position in the international system creates at any moment in time” (Ikenberry et al., 1988: 1).

Thereafter, the analysis will move towards an analysis of domestic politics in order to reach a comprehensive understanding. This integrates both state-and society-centred approaches. However, according to Ikenberry et al., state-and society-centred approaches “begin their analyses within the nation state; systematic theories abstract from domestic politics and focus on the relative attributes of countries. In this perspective, theoretical propositions are only derived from the interrelationships and interactions among nation states” (1988: 4). For this reason, the international system is “a necessary first-cut in any analysis in international or comparative politics” (Ikenberry et al., 1988: 5).

Accordingly, addressing US hegemony in the post-CW era starts in the international level of analysis in which the US’s competitor collapsed finally in 1991. But it does not stop there. The collapse of the external enemy produced an opportunity to the US to establish its hegemony, but it also brought several changes to the state and domestic level of analysis. The AFP’s domestic actors who were glued by the external challenge of the CW were freed when that challenge had gone and a new diversity within had been aroused. The analysis, therefore, will assess how the EoCW affected the role of individuals and groups and their shift in belief system within government and society. When the analysis turns from international to domestic levels, theories such as realism and liberalism are no more applicable. Just as the level of analysis changes, the theoretical perspective needs to be changed also. The appropriate theories to work in this level of analysis are the society-centred approaches, such as pluralist, and constructivist, in addition to bureaucrat and elitist theories. However, marriage between the two approaches is also possible whenever the analysis turns to make the necessary connection between two levels.

Such a technique of using a combination of several theories in a multi-level analysis, to be able to offer reasonable explanations for AFP in the post-CW era, requires that this research draws on relevant literatures from widely diverse disciplines, such as history, sociology, psychology, organisational behaviour, bureaucratic theory, economics, politics, law, anthropology and even literary theory. This helps to consolidate the various analytical tools and consequently to clarify the whole picture and help us to

understand political phenomenon (Viotti & Kauppi, 1987; Clifford, 1990; Walt, 1998; Hudson, 2005).<sup>1</sup>

Building on psychological theory, this study utilises ‘the external enemy’ as a tool to investigate several related areas: the cohesion of AFP in the pre-1991 and in the post-2001 periods and its confusion during the 1990s; the presence of domestic political bipartisanship and its disappearance; institutional unity and conflict; and the rise and fall of particular ideological dogmas. The external threat, according to Allison Astorino-Courtois (2000), was the essential reference point that facilitated the American foreign and security policy-making process; however, since the EoCW, AFP bureaucrats have suffered from problems in decision-making because of the absence of that threat. In fact, with the demise of the external threat, both external and internal interests may undergo a reshaping (Nathan & Oliver, 1994). On the other hand, a crucial part of the acrimonious post-CW debate between internationalists and isolationists, the rapid rise of the neo-conservatives’ political influence and the growth and demise of US nationalists’ power, can also be understood in terms of psychological approach. The demise of the external rival and the victory over communism motivated internationalist individuals and groups to implement their ideologies and perspectives.

Psychology and organisational behaviour are also of crucial significance in explaining the causes of the failure of the AFP institutions to reform in the post-CW era. Individual and organisational delay or resistance to reform was a crucial reason behind America’s lack of readiness for the post-CW era. The key point is that, while the US administration behaviour showed FP hegemonic tendencies in the 1990s, it failed to create a concrete and explicit hegemonic grand strategy prior to 9/11. The reason can also be linked to the ‘threat-deficit’, as Buzan (2006) argues. However, after 9/11 the existence of the external enemy gathered the nation around the flag. This transition facilitated the establishment of the WoT as a FP strategy without any significant resistance at home, at

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<sup>1</sup> One could reasonably ask: what has literary theory to do with foreign policy analysis? Terry Eagleton (2008: 169) might offer the answer. First of all, literary theory and politics have been much more interconnected than many generations of scholars of the two disciplines would recognize. It is sufficient to say, as does Eagleton, that “modern literary theory is part of the political and ideological history of our epoch”.

least until the collapse of Baghdad in 2003. America's post-9/11 wars have also been justified by the existence of the external enemy. In fact, leaders usually use the external enemy image to pursue and legitimise their own agenda, domestically and abroad. Leaders tend to exaggerate the hostility of the external enemy to galvanise public opinion or to satisfy their own domestic and international objectives (Luostarinen, 1989; Larson, 1997; Murray & Meyers, 1999).

Since foreign policy, at least according to the realist perspective, is usually characterised by high levels of secrecy and sensitivity, states do not publicise their real strategies. Policy-makers often cover up those strategies and offer alternative, more palatable interpretations of their agendas. This study, therefore, borrows from critical theory the idea that any text has two levels of structure: surface structure and deep structure. The real meaning of a text is not clearly stated in its surface structure; texts conceal rather than reveal. To clarify the deep meaning of texts, a reader needs to break through the surface structure to reach its deep structure (Harries & Hodges, 1995). On the basis of this technique, this study treats the relevant primary data which have been obtained from governmental publications and policy-makers' speeches as 'dissembled sources' that tend to hide rather than elucidate. Therefore, it is proposed that such texts (written and oral) may also contain the two types of structure.

However, the question is how to break down these texts and which methods should be applied. Literary theory depends on grammatical analytical tools that are used to dismantle the surface structure and reconstruct it to approach the deep meaning of the text (Ellis, 1999). However, this kind of analysis is not appropriate to the study of unwritten texts.<sup>1</sup> In contrast to those of literary critics, who believe that the text encompasses the complete reality and that there is no need to draw from outside the text to understand its several structures, this study draws from outside the text to clarify the hidden agenda (Chomsky, 2006). The method by which this is accomplished is by evaluating texts in the light of policies implemented, the ideological beliefs of persons and groups involved, historical facts and so on. Accordingly, this technique deals not only with texts, but also with political slogans and policies adopted by different US

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<sup>1</sup> The word 'unwritten' here is not synonymous with the word 'oral', but refers to non-creative or non-fiction works, such as political, social and economic texts. Creative works include literary texts, such as poetry, novels, and stories (Stow, 2007).

administrations. This sceptical perspective is a necessity for deepening the analysis and enriching our understanding beyond a government's announced rhetoric. This technique is of crucial importance in clarifying aspects of the 1990s hegemonic agenda that is not otherwise clearly represented. For example, President George H. W. Bush's rhetoric on the NWO may be better evaluated using such an approach. Clinton's multi-lateralism and free market ideas can also be understood differently using this technique. Therefore, it is applied in several parts of the study.

### **1.4.3. The Analytical Design Of The Study**

The design of this study is not intended to be quantitative in nature and, consequently, "there is no systematic use of various control variables in an effort to identify a single causal factor to explain policy decisions" (Gleek, 2003: 27) or political trends. Instead, this research is designed to derive data from a multi-disciplinary inquiry and to employ a combination of meta-theory and multi-level analytic techniques.

This study can be classified as a mixture of case study and a piece of evaluative and descriptive research; the nature of this research necessitates such a methodological marriage. First, the case study, as John Gerring argues, "is best defined as an intensive study of a single unit with an aim to generalize across a larger set of units" (2004: 352). However, this study follows another technique. It aims to use several cases across the timeframe of the study to discover the implicit and/or explicit similarities between different policies. This research deals with AFP in its entirety and the key components of the US post-CW grand strategy cannot be merely found in a single case study. That is why this study's technique is to write from the diverse to the specific. On the other hand, the usage of case study and/or non-case study techniques is determined by "the state of the research within a given field" (Gerring, 2004: 352). Therefore, it is of great importance "to acknowledge that practical and contextual considerations are often paramount in the choice between a case study and a non-case study research format" (Gerring, 2004: 352). On the basis of these views, instead of one key case study, this research evaluates several small units or mini-case studies, such as the project for the NWO, the Clinton strategy of En-En and the WoT, among others. The aim is to highlight elements of US hegemonic grand strategy. It uses information derived from several case studies coupled with a descriptive and evaluative technique.

This study also depends on scientific information, particularly opinion polls and economic estimates, and military budgets. Because of this, the structure of the thesis is a combination of thematic and chronological styles. The justification for this mixture is that, while several issues need to be traced and evaluated in their historical contexts, others have to be studied in thematic contexts.

#### **1.4.4. Limitations**

However, it is worth noting that such a mixture of theoretical approaches and multiple levels of analysis does have its weaknesses and limitations. The result of adding several levels of analysis, as Hostli suggests, might be “an undisciplined proliferation of categories of variables”, which could lead to limitations. “It may become increasingly difficult to determine which are more or less important; and ad hoc explanations for individual cases erode the possibilities for broader generalisations across cases” (1989: 31). Such a collection of theories might also be accused of being a ‘no-theory’ model. Some critics argue that FP research “would yield large quantities of reliable [and] readily comprehensible information about foreign policy phenomenon,” if it adopted and applied a more rigorous methodological technique (Hermann & Peacock, 1987: 16).

Taking these points into consideration, this study argues that political concepts and phenomena can be “treated in different ways by different political analysts” (Heywood, 1999: 8). Because there has been no epistemological consensus between scholars regarding which theory or method is best for studying FP grand strategy and security issues (Watson, 2003; Ikenberry, 2005). For example, after several decades of an intensive academic effort to understand the causation of war—systematic efforts which started in the early 1950s— Jack Levy wrote in the early 1980s that “our understanding of war remains at an elementary level”. He justifies the judgment by saying that “no widely accepted theory of the cause of war exists and little agreement has emerged on the methodology through which these causes might be discovered” (1983: 1). This problem is inherent in the social sciences because, “social science theory – invention -- cannot, of course, be tested and evaluated in laboratory replications. Its only test is a relative and subjective one” (McCormick, 1995: xvi). Furthermore, according to Brian Ripley (1993: 403):

The rational reconstruction of reality in social science research programs is a risky business. It is tempting to overstate expectations, oversimplify assumptions, and overestimate the rationality and coherence of the scientific enterprise. In the practice of science, complex intellectual debates are never really settled; the residual ambiguity leaves plenty of loose ends and unfinished business for a new generation of debaters.

Mainstream literature in IR theory suggests that, just as no one worldview perspective is right and others are wrong, and none of them is also prevalent over others, no one analytical model is far superior to the others (Griffiths, 2007). In the same way, just as each worldwide perspective may spawn several attractive insights, each methodological perspective may also generate different analytical force. On the basis of such understanding, Robert P. Watson et al. argue that a student of IR and AFP “should understand that there is not necessarily a singular account of history” (2003: 5). It is important to appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of each theoretical framework. This is because such diversity is beyond any particular theory’s explanatory capabilities and, to be more reliable, a piece of research should apply a combination of IR theories and a multi-level analytical technique to enable understanding FP issues at different levels and from several angles and viewpoints (Bennett, 1987; Garrison, 2003; Hill, 2003; Kaufman, 2006).

#### **1.4.5. The Time Frame Of The Study**

The specific time frame of this research is defined between two major events: from the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to the end of 2003, the year that witnessed the fall of Baghdad. This period is of crucial importance in following and highlighting the characteristics of AFP’s hegemonic tendency after the CW. It allows an evaluation of the impact of the EoCW on the whole FP-making process for more than a decade. This period witnessed three US administrations – comprising the Bush I, Clinton and Bush II administrations. The period is sufficiently lengthy to throw light on the divergent agenda that was advancing US hegemonic strategy from the early 1990s. Furthermore, it also makes it possible for this research to go beyond the enunciated policies to analyse why the hegemonic project was not explicitly acknowledged prior to 9/11. This period also allows this research to evaluate how 9/11 contributed to enhancing America’s hegemonic shift by offering the pretext needed for the existing post-CW agenda.



The end of 2003 is defined as the end of the study's time frame, instead of April 2003, the date of the fall of Baghdad. The justification for this is twofold. First, the expansion of the research time frame to the end of 2003 is very important because it enables the research to investigate the pretexts that were given for the invasion of Iraq, such as weapons of mass destructions (WMD), and the link between the Iraqi regime and the organisers of 9/11 among others. Second, it disengages the study from dealing with the later mismanagement of the occupation, which negatively impacted on the prospects for America's hegemonic project. In addition, political developments inside and outside the US occurred after 2003. The US, according to mainstream literature, was in danger of losing the war in Iraq (particularly during 2004 and 2005). The liberalization and democratization of Iraq turned out to be a uniquely bloody humanitarian disaster, estimated in the ORB's 2007 poll (Opinion Research Business) at 1,220,000 casualties (Susman, 2007). Therefore, the domestic consensus in the US that initially supported the invasion began to erode and public opinion turned to disapproval, particularly after the elections of 2004 that overturned the Republican majority in the Senate and House (Thurber, 2006).

#### **1.4.6. Data Sources**

The research uses material from divergent and wide-ranging studies in AFP and IR. Primary data in the form of governmental documents and official speeches are also of great significance to this work. However, it was impossible to obtain access to classified documents, which would undoubtedly be of great importance to the main focus of this research. Therefore, the study cannot clarify exhaustively the research problem and, thus, inevitably, leaves room for further research.

The research was, to a large degree, dependent on literature published between 1989 and 2001. Its fundamental ideas, and particularly that concerning the American hegemonic shift after the CW, were derived from the 1990s literature to address two methodological impediments. First, it demonstrates that the US hegemonic agenda was asserted repeatedly in AFP literature and official US discourse prior to the attacks of 11 September. Second, it avoids the influence of US post-9/11 literature, which turned to evaluating themes, such as US hegemonism, unilateralism and empire. In other words, it

becomes clear from the outset that the 1990s political scene can be regarded as the solid basis of America's post-9/11 hegemonic project.

This study does not make a strict distinction between the inner-circle of US decision-making and the outer-circle of influence, such as think tanks, interest groups and the business community, in attempting to clarify the US post-CW dominance agenda. This is because, in a pluralist style of democracy such as the US, most of the proposals from lobbyists, pressure groups or the epistemological community find their way into policy-making circles, as will be discussed throughout this study. A clear image of the US post-CW dominance project appears not only in the light of governmental procedures, but also through proposals and arguments held by intellectuals, ideological groups and various organisations. Consequently, the study treats material from all of these sources on an equal footing in understanding the roots of the US's hegemonic policies and strategy.

### **1.5. Conclusion**

This chapter highlights several aspects of the continuation of US hegemonic strategy in the post-WWII era. America, as discussed above, was a hegemonic power even with the existence of the USSR, its military competitor during the CW. The bipolar system was not a perfect one. America and its allies were the strongest, militarily, economically, ideologically and scientifically, compared to their rival. Because of this, it could be argued that America and its allies were the hegemonic power, whereas the USSR and the Warsaw Pact were merely a second-tier competitor. On the other hand, the US was also the strongest amongst its allies and consequently it was the hegemon power within its sphere of influence. Owing to this hierarchal order, once the USSR collapsed, the US enjoyed an unprecedentedly powerful position in world politics, as will be shown in detail in the next chapter. The manifestation of American hegemony has been reflected in AFP strategy in the 1990s and since 9/11 it has become more obvious.

On the basis of the above discussion, this chapter aimed to develop a theoretical and methodological approach in order to find out the characteristics of AFP's hegemonic strategy between the two falls; from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the fall of Baghdad. However, this aspiration would probably be out of reach without understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the traditional FP perspectives and exploring the existing

set of methodological approaches. In fact, while realism, idealism and liberalism have offered logical insights to understand FP conduct during the 20th century, it can be argued that none of these schools of thought alone is able to offer a comprehensive understanding of AFP in the post-CW world. Each offers merely a partial interpretation of the story. However, none can be applied alone to clarify the whole picture.

For example, on the one extreme, while realism offers insights to help understand the ‘security dilemma’, it is less concerned with domestic politics or the economic dimension as a source of influence on AFP-making. On the other edge, liberalism addresses wealth maximisation and mutual cooperation and peace as a main focus to FP strategy but it disregards power politics and security matters. Owing to increasing interplay between domestic politics and foreign policy after the EoCW, society-centred theories have become more important tools in order to understand the behaviour of a state in the international scene. Constructivism, for instance, offers further explanatory tools to understand the AFP-making process. Issues such as how identity and interests influence AFP and IR are of crucial importance to the main objectives of this research, because the traditional perspectives of IR, such as realism and liberalism, have had little to say about these themes. Indeed, because of their dependence “on abstract reasoning and hard facts ... they have often missed the uniqueness of particular individuals, situations and moments” (Roberts, 2008: 339). This research, therefore, makes a clear connection between AFP and its broadest domestic context. This ‘intermestic’ perspective is an appropriate analytical tool not only to evaluate the factors that hindered the U.S. from transforming into an absolute hegemony during the 1990s, but also to understand the interplay between external and internal politics. Accordingly, this chapter builds a complex theoretical approach, incorporating several analytical tools from each of these theories.

This chapter also evaluates several analytical techniques and levels of analysis, concluding that multi-level and inter-disciplinary analysis is necessary. The analysis flows from the individual level to the global level. No level of analysis has been ignored. At each level, this research aims to use the most appropriate theory. At the global and international level, realism and other systemic theories are dominant. At the domestic level, however, another set of theories has been applied, but in accordance with realist theory. This inter-disciplinary approach also derives analytical tools from

bureaucratic politics, organisational behaviour and psychology. The image of the enemy is a central element in this analytical framework. Therefore, this chapter draws from sociology and psychology to highlight the centrality of the image of the enemy as an analytical tool to clarify several elements in this research. This theoretical framework also draws on literary theory to evaluate texts and policies. This technique argues that each text has two structures and each policy or political slogan can be seen as having a double structure. This technique allows the research to deal with each text or policy encountered with sceptical systematic tools.

Such a complex model is necessary to study the US grand strategy of hegemony in the post-CW era because the hegemonic project is not only related to international politics, but is also inter-connected with domestic issues.

The French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine in a speech in Paris in early 1999 observed that: the United States of America today predominates on the economic level, the monetary level, on the technological level, and in the cultural area in the broadest sense of the word.

(Ikenberry, 2001a: 191)

The United States emerged from the Cold War as a "hyperpower," and the economic and military gap between it and the other leading powers ... increased still further in the 1990s.

(Litwak, 2002:79)

## Chapter Two

### America As A Hyperpower: Trends And Transformations During The 1990s

#### 2.1. Introduction

Peregrine Worsthorne in 1991 and the French politician, Hubert Védrine in 1998 are correct when they used the new neologism 'hyperpower' to describe the US' unique combination of powers in the 1990s (Marcus, 2000; Boniface, 2001; Quirk, 2008), because according to Jonathan Marcus "the term 'superpower' may no longer be a terribly useful one with which to categorize America's position in the world" (2000: 92). Since then, "transcending the Cold War rubric 'superpower', 'hyperpower' has entered our political lexicon to convey the magnitude of the United States' paramount international status" (Litwak, 2002: 76).<sup>1</sup> While the US was a hegemonic power during the bipolar Cold War (CW) era, when the CW imperfect distribution of power ended the US gained a unique position in world politics. The purpose of this chapter is to

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<sup>1</sup> The term 'superpower' entered the English language in the 1920s; however, it has been idiomatically used since the mid-1940s "to describe the superordinate position" that the US and the USSR enjoyed after WWII. It also signified the rivalry between them during the CW. Most importantly, the term has also been applied "to signify the essential 'distance' in power capability terms between those two countries on the one hand, and all other major powers on the other". However, when the USSR collapsed and the gap in relative powers increased to unprecedented levels between the US and the remaining second-tier powers in the system, the term superpower was no longer able to capture the new characteristics. For this reason, politicians and scholars popularized the term hyperpower to describe the post-superpower American status. A hyperpower, therefore, "is one where there is a considerable and indeed ... an unbridgeable distance in capacity between it and all others in the international system". It has the intention and the susceptibility to use "its superordinate power capacities in a manner well beyond what others do, seeking almost obsessively to define the behaviour of others as conflicts of interest, and to ensure that in those conflicts of interest with others in the international system, its interests prevail". What is key, however, is that with this meaning, the term hyperpower not differ from the term hegemonic power, the only is the latter term is more commonly used than the former (Nossal, 1999). Accordingly, the two terms are used interchangeably in the thesis.

underline the set of elements (material capabilities, thoughts, groups, and international transformations) that were essential in facilitating the absolute hegemonic transition of the US.

To do so, it is divided into several sections; the first aims to illustrate how the end of the Cold War (EoCW) brought an end to the pre-1989 discussion over the decline of America and introduced a new phase of internal revivalism and self confidence. The US' relative material power that was of crucial importance in establishing US dominance after the CW is the subject of the second section. The third part throws light on the neo-conservative's (neo-con) role as an influential societal force pushing America towards hegemony and unilateralism. This is followed by a discussion on the theoretical attempts that offered American foreign policy (AFP) a new roadmap with which to sustain its unipolar moment and to rationalize its hegemony. Thereafter, the chapter examines the possibilities of balancing against the US in the 1990s, before debating the US' search for a global leadership to counterweight its hegemony.

## **2.2. After The EOCW: The US Regains Its Confidence**

### **2.2.1. Decline Or Hegemony?**

A few years prior to the EoCW, Henry Luce's forecast that the 20th century will be an American century "lost much of its glow and force" (Ingimundarson, 2000: 165) because as several critics argued, America would (sooner or later) retreat from its hegemonic position on the global scene. This idea emerged initially in the context of the dramatic events of the 1970s, "including the collapse of Bretton Woods, the OPEC oil shocks, and the humiliating end of the Vietnam War" (Mastanduno, 2000: 502), as well as "other humiliations in the developing world (notably the 1979-80 Iranian hostage crisis)" (Dumbrell, 2008: 91). According to some critics such as (Ingimundarson, 2000; Dumbrell, 2008), the Vietnam War, eroded US political credibility, and weakened its economic competitiveness.

Central amongst those who argued that as with other great powers American power would fail was Andrew Hacker, who published *The End of the American Era* in 1971. This predicted that the US was in terminal decline. However, this debate increased significantly during the Reagan presidency when the budget deficit grew to unprecedented levels (Stallings, 1995; Dumbrell, 2008). Hacker's argument was revived

by Paul Kennedy's (1987) book *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. Kennedy argued that the US was in danger of imperial overstretch, the disease that had brought down previous empires: Spain in the 17th century; France in the 18th century; and Britain more recently. Kennedy recommended that the US reduce its overseas presence, avoid commitments that consumed its scarce resources, and revitalise its domestic economy and industrial base. After the EoCW, Kennedy argued that the post-CW world would not be unipolar, but multi-polar, with Japan as the main CW winner (Ikenberry, 2001c; Mueller, 2005; Black, 2008).

Building on such views, scholars such as McCormick (1995) argued that if America was in decline prior to 1989, the EoCW might speed the collapse of American hegemony. This view was logical if the context of the early 1990s prophecy that the unipolar moment would be brief is taken into consideration. This view was rationalised by the economic recession in the early 1990s in which the US economy showed patterns of "weak investment and weak consumption" (Cline, 1994: 9). The economic indicators showed that "from 1989 to 1991, real investment fell by 15%, and consumption stagnated with a meagre 1% total increase over the period" (Cline, 1994: 9).

Finally, similar to the argument concerning bipolarity and American hegemony, the theory of US decline could also be considered as an example of the lack of US hegemony; on this occasion during the 1970s and 1980s (Clark, 2009). However, as Jan Fichtner argues the US declinists "focused their attention on the decline—relatively speaking not in absolute terms—of the American power base" (2007: 34). The main argument was that the US' share of global General Domestic Production (GDP) had fallen from 50% at the end of WWII to merely 25% in the mid-1980s. However, this fall in economic power did not see any collapse in political influence or global leadership. In fact, "no point on the globe was untouched by American military, political, and economic policy" (Jervis, 1999: 220). One of the reasons behind the fall in the US' share of world GDP was because most European economies, Japan, and the rest of world increased their levels of production. Nevertheless, one-quarter of the world's output was a sufficiently large to maintain the US' hegemonic position (Fichtner, 2007).

### **2.2.2. Victory over Communism: Revival**

However, the early 1990s demonstrated that the declinists' predictions, including those of Paul Kennedy, were mistaken. The American political system did not witness a severe crisis and its economy recovered from the 1980s recession. Furthermore, it was the USSR, not the US, that was in absolute decline between 1989 and 1991 (Knutsen, 1999; Ingimundarson, 2000; Mastanduno, 2000; O'Hara, 2006). Therefore, in contrast to the declinists' prophecy that America would follow the fate of previous great powers, the US emerged as a unipole power in the post-CW era. The EoCW not only removed the USSR as an opponent, but also enhanced US self-confidence (Krauthammer; 1997; Cox, 2002a, 2002b; Halliday, 2009). Accordingly, John L. Gaddis argues that the EoCW left America in "the fortunate position" (1991: 102) and this "worked to America's long-term advantage" (Cox, 2002a: 265). The change in the international political architecture led several policy-makers and intellectuals to believe that "the long sought after goal of American predominance seems tantalizingly within reach" (Layne, 1994: 25). This was clear just six days after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, in the military strategy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, Colin Powell's which aimed to shift from the CW's containment strategy to the post-CW global hegemony (Armstrong, 2002). This strategy aimed that, "no country will come close to rivalling America's worldwide influence" (Jervis, 1999: 220) in the indefinite future.

Thus, the EoCW "changed the context of world politics", but the change "gave the United States a degree of strategic choice it had never had before" (Cox, 2002a: 265). Therefore, the EoCW did not mark any crucial shift in AFP, it merely removed the US' hegemonic challenger. This strategic advantage led Richard Haass, the National Security Council's member in the Bush I administration, to argue in 1994, that when the US was liberated from its geo-political rival, it became freer to intervene militarily everywhere (cited in Foster, 2003). Accordingly, during 1990-91, the US liberated Kuwait, because Iraq now lacked its CW sponsor. Likewise, the war in the late 1990s in the Balkans was also fought because Serbia "also suffered from the inability of Russia to provide support" (Black, 2008: 169). The disappearance of the Soviet challenger gave the US unprecedented access to areas, such as Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, previously blocked under the bipolar world system (Cox, 2002a; Callinicos, 2003).



Thus, the expansion of the US-influenced North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) eastwards was a result of the USSR's collapse (Black, 2008: 169).

The US' successes in carrying out several global missions led Robertson Hall to claim that the 1990s was an odd decade, which "started with the Gulf War, with very few US casualties, and ended with the bombing of Serbia, with no US combat casualties" (2002: 1).<sup>1</sup>

In fact, the victory over the communist threat motivated the US to take this opportunity to establish a new American world dominance or leadership in the 1990s, without facing any significant disadvantages (Powell, 1992; Christopher, 1995; Barry, 2000; Dannreuther, 2007). President Bush I wrote in his diary just one day after the dismantling of the Berlin Wall that "I don't want to miss an opportunity" (cited in Chollet & Goldgeier, 2008: 1). The US, therefore, was ready to seize "the predominant role, yet without adequately formulating the new rules for the global system—and without offering new goals for an emerging new global society" (Gardner, 2005: 9).

### **2.3. Capabilities Needed To Guarantee Hegemony**

As shown in the second chapter, hegemonists and neo-realists argue that if a single country enjoys "overwhelming strength in relationship to all other states ... it will achieve predominance or hegemony" (McMahon, 1991: 137). In keeping with this argument, it can be argued that the US' post-CW hegemonic project was fuelled and expanded not only by the collapse of the USSR, but also through the unprecedented combination of powers it enjoyed at the time (Volgy & Imwalle, 1995; Maynes, 1996; Walt, 2000; Smith, 2001). In this context, and in line with hegemonic theory's presumptions, Colin Powell (1992) argues that there were four necessary pillars to the US' post-CW leadership: a forceful military; a strong economy; a skilled political performance; and the strength of the US values and beliefs of freedom and human rights. These elements are highlighted in the National Security Strategy (NSS) of 1995 that stated: "American assets are unique: our military strength, our dynamic economy,

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<sup>1</sup> American self-confidence was restored following the easy victory in the Gulf War, in which it had few casualties. While between 100,000 and 200,000 Iraqis were killed, the US lost just 148 soldiers (Hoff, 1994; Everest, 2001; Betts, 2002). Therefore, it could be argued that the Gulf War of 1991 was the cheapest war in terms of American blood and treasury since the American-Spanish War (Beets, 2002; Atkinson, 1998).

our powerful ideals and, above all, our people” (White House, 1995: I). Because of such a combination of powers, the US was “in a league of its own. It is the only nation on earth able to project a power in every part of the world” (Rezakhah, 2007). In this context, Ikenberry argues that “American power—military, political, economic—is the not-so-hidden hand that built and sustains American unipolar order” (2002: 288). The next sections look at the four pillars—the military, economic, ideal, and political power—at the EoCW.

### 2.3.1. Military Power: The First Pillar of US Hegemony

As discussed in the first chapter, a hegemonic power must maintain military superiority in the system in order to be able to pursue its agenda and facilitate its leadership. Such a perspective was clear in the American political discourse and performance in the 1990s. Powell emphasizes the centrality of military force as a political leverage to US global leadership: “the presence of our arms to buttress these other elements of our power is as critical to us as the freedom we so adore. Our arms must be second to none” (1992: 23). Dick Cheney (1993) also argues that America cannot rely on collective approaches to deal with international problems, but it must have its own forces that are being able to protect its interests overseas. In the same way, the former Secretary of Defense William Cohen said that without military modernization, the US “would be unable to provide the sort of leadership essential for global order” (cited in Cox, 2002a: 269). For these reasons, the propensity to modernize US military forces and the need to build up a capable national missile defence arsenal were crucial reference points during the presidential campaigns of 1992, 1996, and 2000 (Singh, 2006).

Accordingly, even with no remaining serious challenge to its security and interests, the US maintained very huge military expenditures during the 1990s as figure 2.1 shows.




Figure2. 1 Federal Budget Outlay for Defense Function: 1990 to 2000 (In billions of US dollars)  
Data from: (Infoplease) <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0883084.html#axzz0zyasrCc3>

In early 1990s, the US' military outlay equalled nearly 27% of total worldwide military expenditure (Hook & Spanier, 2000; Huntington, 2004). In 1992 the US' share of great powers' defence spending increased sharply to exceed 53% (Volgy & Imwalle, 1995: 832). This percentage exceeded the defence budgets of the next seven largest military spenders combined (Kwasniewski, no date). In the mid-1990s, the US defence budget was still bigger than that of 1985, when the CW was at a peak (Maynes, 1996 & Waltz, 1999), and by 1996, the American defence budget "equalled that of all other developed nations of the world combined" (Ryan, 2000: 189). In 1998, the US military expenditure equalled that of the next ten major military forces added together (Jones, 1998; Dobson & Marsh, 2001; Wedgwood, 2002) and by the end of the decade, US defence outlays "began to approach 50 percent of world military expenditure" (Huisken, 2006). In this context, Cox offers an accurate measure of the US' predominance position (2002a: 268):

In every year after 1992 the United States alone accounted for nearly 40 per cent of all the world's military expenditures; and while this represented only 2.9 percent of US GDP and 16 per cent of the US budget, it still meant that by the year 2000 America was spending just over \$280 billion on its defense, in real terms only 14 percent less than in an average year during the Cold War.<sup>1</sup>

Accordingly, the US spent more than "three times what any other country on the face of the earth spends, and more than all its prospective enemies and neutral nations combined (see figure 2.2)" (Jones, 1998: 75). On the other hand, at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, most of its potential rival's military budgets combined were just one-fifth of the US'. In fact, "the combined military budgets of China, Russia, Iraq, Yugoslavia (Serbia), North Korea, Iran, Libya, Cuba, Afghanistan, and Sudan added up to no more than US\$60 billion" (Betts, 2002: 22).

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<sup>1</sup> The level (less than 3% of GDP) was "the lowest percentage since 1940, the year before the attack on Pearl Harbor" (Chace, 1996: 116). Richard N. Haass, nevertheless, suggests that the total spending on defence, intelligence, foreign assistance and diplomacy "comes to just under \$300 billion" and this huge amount "represented about one-fifth of the federal budget, or just under 4 percent of ... America's GNP" (1997: 104). In fact, 14% of the federal budget as a de facto defence spending in a threat-free time was not a marginal amount (Haass, 1997; Ryan, 2000; Betts, 2002). It was more than enough not only to preserve the CW's military quality, but also to advance America's hegemonic project. In fact, militarism, according to David Ryan, "was the one area where the United States was exceptional" (2000: 189) on the eve of the CW, because, according to Ignatieff, "the US has achieved its [military] dominance at incredibly low cost to its economy" (2004: 43).




Figure2. 2 Military Budgets in the Late 1990s, Selected States (in billions of US dollar)  
Data from (Wedgwood, 2002: Murden, 2002: 6).

However, even with such huge military expenditure in the 1990s, it was still a tiny percentage of America’s GDP as figure 2.3 illustrates (Huisken, 2006).




Figure2. 3 US Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP, 1990-2001  
Data from: Truth and Politics. org: <http://www.truthandpolitics.org/military-relative-size.php>

The US’ military strength was reflected not only in its massive budget and advanced equipment, but also in terms of personnel and worldwide presence (Ikenberry, 2004b). The Pentagon sustained “over 1.4 million men and women in active duty plus another 870,000 in reserves” (Borosage, 2000: 2) deploying in more than 400 key bases in 120 countries, compared to only 269,000 who had served in 1940 (Boggs, 2006; Brown, 2009; Wittkopf et al., 2003).<sup>1</sup> The US military, therefore, was the biggest in the 1990s compared to other major power’s (see figure2.4).

<sup>1</sup> According to Chalmers Johnson, by September 11, 2001, the Department of Defence (DOD) “acknowledged at least 725 American military bases existed outside the United States”. He adds that this number is not accurate because “there are many more, since some bases exist under leaseholds, informal agreements, or disguises of various kinds” (2004: 4). Patrick J. Buchanan believes that the true number is about 1000 bases around the world. Since the EoCW, the US military has added new bases in “North Africa, Central Asia, Pakistan, the Persian Gulf, Balkan peninsula, and Eastern Europe” (2007: 127). However, in terms of US troops positioned outside, Clyde V. Prestowitz suggests that there were




Figure2. 4 Size of Arm, Selected Countries (2000) (in hundred thousands)  
Source: Mearsheimer (2001: 383-384).

Since the collapse of the USSR, and prior to 9/11, the “US has negotiated ‘access’ arrangements for troops and equipments deployment in thirty eight countries (thirty in the Third World), in addition to the hundred bases in sixteen foreign lands that [it] already possessed” (Hoogvelt, 2001: 161). By the 1990s, the US Air Force, for example, “had a presence of some sort on six of the world’s continents” (Kaplan, 2003a).<sup>1</sup> In consequence, “US military bases and carrier battle groups” circled the world (Ikenberry, 2004b: 609).<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, there was public support for this level of defence spending and overseas deployment. The reasons for this support were “fears of homeland vulnerability, concerns for preserving defense jobs, and support for maintaining the dominant US role in the world” (Kull & Destler, 1997: 134).<sup>3</sup>

The American military was not only the largest in terms of quantity, but it also enjoyed unprecedented superiority in quality. The US spent huge money on military research

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“120.000 American troops in Europe; 92.000 in East Asia and the Pacific; 30.000 in North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia; and 15.000 in the Western Hemisphere outside the United States” (2003: 26).

<sup>1</sup> There are several military strategists who consider “air power the linchpin of a new Pax Americana, as land power had characterized Pax Romana and sea power Pax Britannica” (Atkinson, 1998).

<sup>2</sup> “One American aircraft carrier battle group can project more force than most of the world’s armies put together ... A carrier battle group is virtually indestructible. Its full complement comprises some 15,000 personnel. Its aircraft alone can strike up to 700 targets in a single day within an accuracy of 1 meter. There is no equivalent in the world to its concentration of offensive military power. The United States does not just have one of these battle groups, it has 12 of them” (Sheetz, 2006: 3).

<sup>3</sup> According to John J. Accordini, in 1991, for instance, the total number of workforce in US defense industries and the Department of Defence (military and civilians) was about 6 millions, or 5% of the nation’s 119 million workers. However, “the total number of jobs that depended on defense spending was even larger [because] military or defense contractor job supports an additional service job in the community” (2000: 1). Therefore, Accordini suggests that no less than “12 million person, or roughly 10 percent of the US workforce, were directly or indirectly dependent upon defense employment in 1991” (2000: 1).

and development during the 1990 to prepare its military force for the requirements of the new American century (see figure 2.5).




Figure 2. 5 US Military Research and Development Outlay: 1990 to 2000 (in billions of US dollar)  
Data from: <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0883084.html#axzz0zyasrCc3>

These huge numbers equalled nearly 80% of the world's total military-related research and development at the time (Ikenberry, 2001c). Therefore, during the 1990s, American military force was seven times more advanced than that of its nearest rival, France (Cox, 2002a).<sup>1</sup> Kapstien (1994), Hirst (2002), Schuller & Grant (2003) and Black (2008) all stress that American military superiority relies on the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA), which produces high-tech systems and capabilities. The new technology has enabled the US "to make a post-heroic policy of intervention, in which the US need not risk its soldiers' lives to achieve policy objectives remote from the everyday concerns of its citizens" (Hirst, 2002: 329). Since the Gulf War (1990-91), the US has been testing the value of new military weapons and tactics such as the "air-land battle, high level of readiness and strategic mobility, and advanced technology" (Cordesman, 1991: 40), to meet its new self-appointed tasks in its role as the only hegemon. Moreover, the US also maintained "a strategic nuclear arsenal of over 6,000 nuclear warheads" (Brown, 2009: 122) in addition to its conventional weaponry.

Indeed, "the nation-state system had never witnessed such a concentration of the resources of power in a single state" (Hook & Spanier, 2000: 263) and "there has never in the past thousand years been a greater gap between the No. 1 world power and the No. 2" (Krauthammer, 1997). In this milieu, Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, asserts that "no other nation on earth has the power we possess. More important, no other nation on earth has the trusted power that we

<sup>1</sup> In this context, it is true that the EU member states' militaries were bigger than the US' in terms of soldier numbers and that their combined defence budgets equalled three-quarters of the US', but in terms of technology and hardware there was no comparison (Judt, 2002).

possess” (1992: 33). The Secretary of State during the Clinton presidency, Warren Christopher, also states that “today, our military is the best-equipped, best-trained, and best-prepared fighting force in the world” (1995: 8-9).

This unique military status led James Chace to write in the mid-1990s, that America today “enjoys a global military dominance that combines the transoceanic reach of Pax Britannica with military power of imperial Rome at the height of its power” (1996: 116). Charles Krauthammer argues that America at the end of the 1990s after the CW was very different from historical hegemonic powers such as Great Britain. The British army, for example, was smaller than that of the next greatest competitors’ armies and although the British navy was double the size of its rivals, its domination over the seas was shared by other major powers (1997-2002).

This military might that once used to contain the USSR and its expansionist ideology, entitled the US to enlarge its goal to be nothing less than the ruler of the entire world (Chace, 1997a). As Dueck argues, “the goal was not a balance in terms of military capabilities, [but] clear military superiority over potential adversaries” (2006: 13) and previous allies.

### **2.3.2. Economic Strength: US Hegemony’s Second Pillar**

Hegemony is not only about military power, but as Black argues, economic strength is a sine qua non to establish and sustain hegemony (2008). Robert J. McMahon also argues that “any hegemonic power must, simultaneously, contain the dominant financial centre, possess a clear comparative advantage in a wide range of high-tech, high-profit industries, and function commercially as both the world's major exporter and its major importer” (1991: 137-138). In this context, the US was a unique state in the 1990s, not only in terms of military power, but also economically (Art, 2003; Harries, 2005; Black, 2008). As shown above, the dismantling of the USSR renewed the “relative strength of the American economy, [and] marked the real arrival of US global dominance” (Betts, 2002: 21).

In 1991, the date of the CW end, American companies’ production of goods and services equalled US\$5.6 trillion, or more than one quarter of worldwide production (Hook & Spanier, 2000; Walt, 2000). In 1992, the US’ “share of great power economic capabilities stood at no less than 35% and was probably closer to 39%”. And its portion

of great power total capabilities was “in a range of 44.3% to 46.1%” (Volgy & Imwalle, 1995: 832). The US share of world’s total GDP of 27.6% in 1997 was greater than any other single country’s in the late 1990s as figure 2.6 shows.




Figure2. 6 Shares of Gross World Product in 1998, selected countries  
Data from: (Wittkopf et al., 2003: 160)

Furthermore, as figure 2.7 shows the US economic growth between 1990 and 1998 was almost four times that of the Japanese’s and outperformed growth in the EU.




Figure2. 7 Growth Between 1990 and 1998, selected economies  
Data from: (Ikenberry, 2001a, 2001c, 2003).

In this context, in 1989, the year that witnessed the collapse of the Berlin Wall, America’s economy was 1.8 times larger than its nearest rival, Japan, with a GDP of US\$5.2 trillion. Although Japan ranked second to the US in terms of economic size, its production of US\$3.4 trillion in the early 1990s was only “three-fifths of the US total” (Hook & Spanier, 2000: 262), and its economy was “about one-third the size of the United States” (Huisken, 2006). In 1995 alone, US GDP was US\$7 trillion, achieving a growth of 30% from the 1989 indicators, while the Japanese and German economies had grown 4% and 5% respectively (Walker, 1996b; Dobson & Marsh, 2001) and between “1995 and 2000, US GDP growth accelerated, rising from 3.1 percent to 4.1 percent” (Soederberg, 2006: 162). America’s GDP therefore equalled the collective



outputs of France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom (Hook & Spanier, 2000). In this context, it is very important to mention that “65% of the top 80 companies in the world just happened to be American” (Cox, 2002b: 61).

In the turn of the new millennium, when the US General National Production (GNP), was “running well over \$10 trillion a year”, and constituted “almost 30 percent of the world’s combined GNPs” (Brown, 2009: 122), there was no other major power’s economy can catch up or compete (see figure 2.8)




Figure2. 8 GNP, selected countries (2000) (in trillions of US dollar  
Data from: (Mearsheimer, 2001: 383-384).

Due to this unique economic status, the US, during the 1990s, more than any other country, “served as an engine of growth overseas by importing far more” (Hook & Spanier, 2000: 262). Not only was US output increasing, but also the country “was tapping the resources of the information revolution that has been transforming the world economy” (Nye, 2000: 54). The US was also the leader in higher education and the service industry (Walt, 2002). According to Martin Walker, “only three non-American universities—Oxford, Cambridge, and London—seriously qualify for any list of the world’s top 20 academic institutions” (2002: 38). In consequence, the US enjoyed the highest economic productivity and an unprecedented amount of scientific and technological resources (Modelski & Thompson, 1999; Ryan, 2000; Cameron, 2002; Judt, 2002; Wittkopf, et al., 2003; Pastusiak, 2004; Halliday, 2009). Such a unique economic power led the NSS of 1996 to argue clearly that “our economic strength gives us a position of advantage on almost every global issue” (White House, 1996).

Furthermore, the US, throughout its history has “repeatedly demonstrated the capacity to translate this economic weight into decisive military power” (Huisken, 2006).<sup>1</sup>

### **2.3.3. Power From Values And Beliefs: The Third Pillar Of US Hegemony**

The US political culture that includes “values, beliefs, and self-imagines ... stand out as a primary source for American foreign policy” and these basics “remain potent forces explaining what the United States does in its foreign policy” (Wittkopf & McCormick, 2008: 10). The roots of this phenomenon can be traced back to America’s very foundation. The US, since then, has regarded itself as an ‘exceptional’ nation in world system as a “city upon a hill in international system” (Williams et al., 1993: 17). Due to this, it believes that “the export of its model of government—liberal democratic market capitalism—is a universal good” (Dunn, 2003: 285). This has been a very important source of hegemony. Just as material power is an important source for hegemony, ideology and values are also of great significance to a hegemon “to compel deference to its principles and policies” (McMahon, 1991: 138). In this context, it is not true that the history of AFP is about the conflict between power and principles, as has usually been portrayed (Coll, 1995; Leffler, 2003; Christie, 2008). But, as Melvy P. Leffler argues, “America’s ideals have always encapsulated its interests. America’s ideology has always been tailored to correspond with its quest for territory and markets. In short, power, ideology and internal interests have always had a dynamic and unsettled relationship with one another” (2003: 1050). For this reason, Robert J. McKeever & Philip Davis argue that AFP’s “rhetoric has been peppered with widely understood codewords” such as liberty, freedom, human rights and democracy.<sup>2</sup> Such notions are becoming “essential to the formulation and practical conduct of international policy”

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<sup>1</sup> This is demonstrated, for example, “by developing its navy from unranked in the 1880s to second-ranked by 1907, awesomely so following the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, and more or less continuously following the onset of the Cold War” (Huisken, 2006). In this way, America’s economic boom of the 1990s supported its large military forces during the decade and afterwards (Art, 2003).

<sup>2</sup> In this context, President Woodrow Wilson, for example, entered the war in 1917, not only to defeat Germany, or to enlarge the US geostrategic presence, but also to create a world safe for democracy and to guarantee the independence and dignity of small nations as well as bigger nations. Franklin Roosevelt, in a similar way, fought in the Second World War (WWII), not only to defeat the Axis, but also to secure four freedoms for the entire world. Freedom of religious thought, free speech and expression, and liberty from fear and want. To preserve world peace and security after the war, he supported the creation of the United Nations (UN). His successor, Harry Truman adopted the same agenda and continued the same way (Coll, 1995; Ambrosius, 2002; Callinicos, 2003; Wittkopf et al., 2003; Leffler, 2004; Holsti, 2006a; Christie, 2008). Ronald Reagan had also started what is so-called the second CW not only against a geopolitical rival or competitor, but also to defeat an “empire of evil” and to enlarge liberty (Ambrosius, 2002 & Kaplan & Kristol, 2003).

(2006: 172). In fact, “US principles need US power every bit as much as US power needs principles” (Coll, 1995: 387).

In this way, the victory over communism praised liberal ideology, democratic values, and capitalism. American culture, products and lifestyle, therefore, spread rapidly into every corner of the globe (Harries, 2005; Halliday, 2009). In addition to its material capabilities, the US values and culture constitute a source of its massive soft power in international politics (Hoffmann, 1989; Nye, 2002/2003). According to Walker (2002: 38):

The United States has established a unique cultural predominance, not just through the quality of its free principles and constitution but through the seductive power of its entertainments and fashions, from movies to blue jeans to gangsta rap. Never before has there been anything quite like this American domination of the world.

In the same way, Krauthammer argues (1997):

There has been mass culture. But there has never before been mass world culture. Now one is emerging, and it is distinctly American. Why, even the intellectual and commercial boulevard of the future, the Internet, has been set up in our own language and idiom. Everyone speaks American.

In this way, the French Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine argued that “American globalism ... dominates everything. Not in a harsh, repressive, military form, but in people’s heads” (cited in Harries, 2005: 227). This soft power was an additional source of the US’ self-confidence and hegemony in this period (Maynes, 1999; Henriksen, 2001; Cox, 2002a; Mazlish, 2007).

Therefore, the defeat of the USSR’s communist ideology enhanced the credibility and power of the US and offered the US an opportunity to be the world leader not only in military and economic power, but also ideologically and culturally. Values such as liberal ideology, democracy, and capitalism were used as a mechanism to expand US geo-strategy after the CW. In this milieu, President George H. W. Bush invaded Panama in the name of “democracy” and prepared to liberate Kuwait in the name of defending the sovereignty of small states (Chomsky, 1992). Clinton in the same way intervened in the former Yugoslavia in the name of humanitarianism.

### **2.3.4. Political Power: The Fourth Pillar of US Hegemony**

Hegemony is not only about economic and military powers, but it also “about will” (Layne, 2006: 11) and the political will is simply a cumulative result of all sorts of power. The US triumph over communism and the collapse of its CW rival not only transformed the world structure from being a bipolar to unipolar system, but also enhanced US centrality in the post-CW world. The US became the only global power with massive military and economic capabilities and a unique predominant position, both ideologically and culturally. Such a new scene offered the US an opportunity to be the only world leader and the most influential figure in driving world politics. World institutions such as the UN, the WTO, World Bank, and IMF, among others, became subjected to American influence and used to push the American agenda. On the other hand, America appeared as an indispensable nation according to Madeleine Albright (Chollet, 2007). In this context, Krauthammer argues that (1997):

Diplomatically, nothing of significance gets done without us ... Until the Americans arrive in Bosnia, the war drags on. When America takes to the sidelines in the Middle East, nothing moves. We decide if NATO expands and who gets in. And where we decide not to decide, as in Cambodia--often held up as an example of how the UN and regional powers can settle local conflicts without the U.S.--all hell breaks loose.

### **2.3.5. Summary Of The Four Pillars Of US Hegemony**

This combination of powers consolidated the American hegemonic tendency during the 1990s and reinforced the belief that the US could rule the world without risking much of its own blood or resources (Walt, 2002). In fact, when a state possesses such a concentration of power and can “undertake an action alone,” unilateralism will be “very feasible” (Alger, 2006: 51). This unique status of a concentration of powers led French Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine in early 1999 to suggest that American global dominance “is not comparable, in terms of power and influence, to anything known in modern history” (cited in Ikenberry, 2001a: 191), and in the words of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s National Security Advisor (NSA), the US was “the first, last, and only global superpower” (cited in Nossal, 1999).

Building on what has been said so far, the normal and traditional constraints on the actions of states could no longer limit American international behaviour (Maynes, 1999). In consequence, AFP was ready to move into a new phase of unprecedented

hegemony (Leffler, 2003), and the collapse of its external rival gave the “flexibility to US foreign policy that the Cold War had not allowed” (Kaufman, 2006: 124). Because of this huge size of power resources, any tiny shift in US policy can have significant effects for other countries (Ikenberry, 2001c). For this reason, Hoffmann questions that with no remaining rival, and no imminent challenge to its security and interests, and with such a combination of power resources “what ought American foreign policy to be?” (1989). This question is difficult to answer because such a combination of power has “perplexed politicians, pundits, and academicians as to [what to do]” (Henriksen, 2001).

#### **2.4. The Hegemony’s Communal Sources: The Burgeoning Influence Of The Neo-Conservatives In The 1990s**

As argued in the first chapter, material capabilities and the lack of a principal geo-strategic rival are very important for establishing hegemony, but they are not the only conditions needed. “The present US hegemony did not fall from heaven; it is the result of human action” (Matzner, 2002: 1). In the case of the US, the rise of the neo-cons in the 1990s was a crucial element in pushing the country towards an unprecedented phase of militant and hegemonic foreign policy (FP). Importantly, the neo-cons’ ideological and political influence was apparent long before the EoCW. For example, they firmly stood against the strategy of containment, believing in roll-back and regime change for failed states and unfavoured governments. They also criticised the Nixon-Ford administration’s détente policy with the USSR during the 1970s, which they regarded as similar to an ideological defeat (Allin, 1994). However, they were able to extend their influence when Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency. Reagan ended the post-Vietnam soft containment policy and started the ‘second-CW’ (Garthoff, 1994; Allin, 1994; Maynes, 1996; Flanigan & Zingale, 1998; Hastedt, 2000 Halper & Clarke, 2004; Vanaik, 2007).

The neo-cons believed that the EoCW was an American ideological victory, primarily driven by Reagan’s ‘victory school’ (Hastedt, 2000; Lundestad, 1993). This conviction led them to believe that “the method used to attain it [the Cold War triumph] licensed the United States to throw its weight around the world” (Guyatt, 2003: 234). The triumph over communism gave the neo-cons a new energy to enhance their position within the US political scene and pursue their radical and hegemonic agenda to replace

the CW containment strategy. In this way, “ideological polarization between the major parties, increasing support for the Republican Party among former Democrats, and a shift to the right of the Republican party under the growing influence of the religious right” became obvious after the elections of 1992 and 1994 (Minkenberg & Dittgen, 1996: xiv). Furthermore, the long cleavage between the Republican traditional conservatives and neocons increased during this period (Cohen, 2005; Isaacson, 2006a). On the other hand, the CW ideological divisions did not stop at the end of the CW. Rather, they stretched to the new era. AFP leaders, therefore “perceived the events surrounding the end of the Cold War, and the lessons to be drawn from these events, through their old ideological lenses” (Murray & Cowden, 1999: 456).

Within such shifts, neo-cons’ intellectual manoeuvres ranged from Reagan’s utopianism to Bush I’s pragmatic realism. Therefore, they supported the 1990-91 Gulf War, not only to establish the new world order (NWO), but also, as will be shown in the next chapter, to remedy the defeatist ‘Vietnam Syndrome’ effects, and ready America for the unipolar moment (Hoff, 1994; Huisken, 2006). Despite President Bush I’s alleged lack of vision and President Clinton’s preference for leading from within the international community, and focusing on geo-economics instead of the traditional geo-politics, there was a team of pervasive neo-cons within and outside both administrations which worked continuously to influence and redirect AFP to a more ideological, radical, and aggressive path (Cliffe & Ramsay, 2003; Gardner, 2005; Huisken, 2006). By the end of the 1990s, not only was the Republican Party dominated by the neo-cons’ school of thought, but also the wider debate on AFP. A set of influential journals, such as the *New Republican*, the *National Interest*, the *Weekly Standard*—and a collection of pervasive and powerful think tanks, such as the Project of a New American Century, the American Enterprise Institute, the Hoover Institute, the Hudson Institute and the Heritage Foundation—took a leading role in energizing the neo-cons’ intellectual dominance over AFP thinking (Szabo, 2004). According to Philips et al (2007) it is not true that there was no neo-cons presence within the Clinton administration and that they had to promote their project from outside the policy-making circle. However, it is true that an ‘obscure bunch’ of officials who worked under the Reagan and Senior Bush

administrations came back to power to promote their previous agenda of global military dominance and leadership (Lobe & Barry 2002; Lobe, 2003; Escobar, 2003).<sup>1</sup>

The EoCW affected neo-cons' proposals for the militarization of AFP. This was because the EoCW, as Yuen F. Khong argues, deprived the neo-cons of "a clear external other or outside enemy upon which to focus". On the other hand, they were also dissatisfied with Bush Senior's and Clinton's failure to maintain the military spending levels of the CW era (2008: 254). Despite these obstacles, the neo-cons kept trying to militarise US post-CW foreign policy by resisting any proposals for reducing military expenditure and by promoting US military superiority (Barry, 2004b; Huisken, 2006). Kagan and Kristol (1996) criticised Clinton's soft FP and called for the establishment of American post-CW hegemony, by arguing that the US should increase its defence budget in order to meet the requirements of worldwide leadership. Documents, such as the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) of 1992, the Project of the New American Century's document of 2000, written and signed by key neo-cons, crystallised their vision about America's post-CW strategy; US global dominance (Escobar, 2003; Dueck, 2004; Parmar, 2005; Clark, 2005; Philip, et. al, 2007; Tunander,

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<sup>1</sup> During the debate over globalisation in the mid-1990s, the neo-cons focused on US economic supremacy and how to preserve national interests and secure energy supplies (Lobe & Barry 2002). Moreover, the reconciliation of the neo-cons with the Democratic Party was enhanced during the Clinton administration because the administration did not shy away from the hegemonic agenda. In addition, the neo-cons themselves were also "more liberal critics of liberalism than converts to conservatism" (Rovinsky, 1997: 4). Therefore, not only key neo-con members found their way into the Clinton administration, but also the neo-cons' FP prints were obvious during his administration (Barry, 2004a). In reality, the neo-cons "found little that was objectionable in Clinton's commitment to spreading democracy and promoting free trade" (Reus-Smit, 2004: 29), because they "are optimists, hyper-Wilsonian in their belief that the world can be democratized and thus pacified" (Szabo, 2004: 55). However, "they hated his weak and inconsistent internationalism and his failure to give full expression to America's indispensable role" (Reus-Smit, 2004: 29). Although the influence of the neo-cons within the Clinton administration was limited compared to that of his predecessor's administration, they were still important actors. For example, many neo-con intellectuals penned pieces of work arguing that the US should lead on the basis of opportunity and American hegemony would be the ideal for the world; for example, William Kristol and Robert Kagan's 1996 *Foreign Affairs* article. Because of the absence of a clear external enemy, Kristol and Kagan focused instead on the NSC-68 and the Team A and B debate about the Soviets as basis for strategic thinking to lay the foundation for AFP in the post-CW environment. From their viewpoint, neither Buchanan's neo-isolationism nor Clinton's Wilsonian multi-lateralism ideal perspectives for the post-Soviet America. They argued that conservative realism would be preferable. The neo-cons did not support Henry Kissinger's detent policy during the CW, but they espoused his promotion of realpolitik in the post-CW era because it de-linked ideals of foreign policy and called for preserving US military supremacy (Szabo, 2004; Khong, 2008). Paul Wolfowitz was a neo-con who criticized Clinton's FP from his academic position as a dean of Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies between 1994 and 2001 while remaining influential inside the administration (Bolton, 2008). Those ideas will be very important after 11 September when George W. Bush put them into practice.

2007; Vanaik, 2007).<sup>1</sup> They adopted a “proposed agenda involving concepts like regime change, benevolent hegemony, unipolarity, and pre-emption” (Fukuyama, 2006a: 3) based on militarism because they believed that the US was “ill-equipped for the post-Cold war era” (Robin, 2004). Therefore, the realist approach to AFP during the CW was being replaced by a new ideological FP thinking style.

Alongside the neo-cons’ ideology, the motto of ‘global democratisation’ occupied the US official discourse during the 1990s. The tendency for spreading democracy worldwide and the intention to rollback unfavoured regimes were part of the main focus of the neo-cons’ political discourse. For example, in May 1998 a group of key neo-cons (critics and politicians) wrote a letter to the President and Leaders of the Senate and the House of Representatives calling for replacing Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq with a democratic one.<sup>2</sup> The rhetoric of democratisation became a new tool, which the US selectively applied to achieve its ends (Garthoff, 1994; Allin, 1994; Ehrman, 1995; Cronin, 1996; Maynse, 1996; Hastedt, 2000). The post-CW neo-con principles focused around four key issues: democratisation of world politics; concerns about human rights and domestic politics; that US power can be used not only pragmatically but also idealistically; and unilateralism as the preferred FP perspective because of their sceptical views about multi-lateralism, international organisations and international law (Fukuyama, 2006a).

Thus, the neo-cons and their aggressive ideology played a significant role in leading America toward a new phase of hegemony in the post-Soviet world.

### **2.5. Alternatives To The CW’s FP Perspective: Hegemony Versus Balance Of Power**

The victory over communism encouraged scholars to offer new proposals for AFP strategy in the new era. The justification for such efforts was the claim that “the very

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<sup>1</sup> The report/strategy DPG was one of the earliest pieces of evidence that uncovered America’s new perspective for dealing with the new world order. It might also be understood as an early attempt to militarize AFP in the new era (Tyler, 1992; Lobe, 2003; Everest, 2004; Cohen, 2005; Right Web, 2008).

<sup>2</sup> The calls for toppling Saddam Hussein regime first appeared in Paul Wolfowitz’s proposal for DPG of 1992 as a vital strategy to secure the flow of oil and raw materials to the US. The toppling of Saddam Hussein re-appeared in 1996, when neo-cons such as Richard Perle, Douglas Feith and David Wurmser reported to the new Israeli Likud government regarding the peace process. They called for removing the Iraq regime and re-establishing the principle of pre-emption doctrine. From their viewpoint, Iraq’s future could profoundly affect the Middle East’s strategic balance (Katzman, 2003).



thing that gave structure and purpose to post-WWII American foreign policy” had disappeared: “fear of communism, fear of the Soviet Union, and a determination to contain both” (Wittkopf et al., 2003: 6). Some scholars argue that the US had not only been deprived of its CW mission, but also, the rationality of the containment strategy that guaranteed US dominion in the CW had ended (Nye, 1990a; Eagleburger, 1993). This deficit led the US knowledge community (individuals and think tanks) to offer alternatives to the containment strategy even before the EoCW. The delay in producing a new perspective to deal with the new status quo, according to Zalmay Khalilzad, was “squandering a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to shape the future of the world” (1995a: 57).

The important factor is that although neo-realists argued that the US’ unipolarity could not be sustained and a multi-polar world would emerge, other critics contradicted this perspective to pave the way towards American absolute hegemony in the new era. Individual examples include Francis Fukuyama’s (1989-1992) thesis of the End of History, Samuel Huntington’s (1993) controversial hypothesis of the Clash of Civilisations, and Charles Krauthammer’s (1990-1991) unipolar moment, which were examples of efforts to guide America towards hegemony. Institutional attempts include the proposal of the Project of the New American Century (PNAC) (Tsygankov, 2003; Aysha, 2003). In this context, it would be fair to remember what John Maynard Keynes, more than a half century ago, wrote: “the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood” (cited in Tsygankov, 2003: 55).

Accordingly, these ideas have been perceived internationally as “constraints to social and cross-cultural creativity at best, and as a war-prone justification for a global West-centred dictatorship at worst” (Tsygankov, 2003: 54). However, in general, H. W. Brands argues that the arguments of Fukuyama and Huntington “had policy implications for the United States, but on the whole they described rather than prescribed” (2006: 11).

### **2.5.1. The End of History (1989): AFP’s “Geo-economic Approach”**

In summer 1989 when he was the Deputy Director of the Department of State’s (DOS) policy planning staff, the neo-con Francis Fukuyama celebrated the Western victory in

the CW and offered his vision of the post-CW international order (Roberts, 1991; Bacevich, 2007). His article *The End of History* contained “the usual disclaimer that his opinions did not reflect those of the US government” (Roberts, 1991: 518). Roberts (1991) and Crockatt (2007) argue that Fukuyama’s thesis was one of several answers to the urgent question regarding the world system after the prolonged bipolarity of the CW. In this context, David Ryan claims that Fukuyama turned back to the Western heritage to provide “an intellectual framework at a time when the president lacked a ‘vision thing’ and the nation emerged into a bewildering future” (2000: 184). Fukuyama’s argument is rooted in the idealistic and liberalist heritage of AFP (Prestowitz, 2003). However, as Andrei P. Tsygankov argues, it is “a hegemonic and expansionist” perspective (2003: 54).

Fukuyama’s response to the EoCW cannot be separated from the discussion above, the triumphalist school of thought that identified the EoCW “as a victory of the good over the evil” (Carlos, 2004). The thesis promoted the view that democratic capitalism won the CW and that the Western ideas had become universal (Gray, 1998; Cohen, 2005; Crockatt, 2007; Bolton, 2008). Therefore, it can be viewed as an early attempt to push the US towards unilateralism. Fukuyama did not just celebrate the Western victory but “theoretically articulated and politically justified these policy beliefs for what would become the post-Cold War world” (Tsygankov, 2003: 58). This belief of the victory of Western Liberalism cannot be isolated from the Western conservative struggle of the late 1980s against the communist ideology (Gray, 1998; Tsygankov, 2003). In early 1987, Fukuyama before the disintegration of the USSR, argued that ideology was no longer the dominant factor in the creation of the Soviet foreign policy objectives (Muller, 1992). The EoCW gave his previous views credibility, leading him to proclaim the end of history. Accordingly, the End of History thesis not only put forward the idea of the end of ideology, but also initiated a new ideology for the new era in which American liberalism triumphs over its rivals (Dumbrell & Barrett, 1990). From this perspective, the majority of previous conflicts, particularly the CW, were “cases of ideology versus liberalism” (Roberts, 1991: 518). In turn, the defeat of Fascism and Marxism-Leninism, and the triumph of liberalism, led to the end of history, and the only remaining legitimate regimes were liberal democracies (Roberts, 1991; Fukuyama, 1992). In this argument, Fukuyama delegitimized non-Western liberal regimes such as China and most of the Third World regimes. On the other hand, that victory over the

communist ideology with its economic style, guides to “a growing common marketization of international relations, and a diminution of the likelihood of large-scale conflict between states” (Artaud, 1992: 185). This is the materialistic dimension of the victory in which the victorious should gain the rewards of victory.

The influence of the Fukuyama’s thesis over AFP strategy in the 1990 was profound. For instance, Clinton’s perspective of globalisation and a free global economy as Richard Crockatt argues, was “broadly consonant with the Fukuyama thesis ... Fukuyama’s analysis helped to set the American agenda for the 1990s” (2007: 137). Therefore, according to Andrew J. Bacevich, Fukuyama “held that economic security was the first pillar of US foreign policy; the second and third pillars were streamlining the military and promotion of democratic values” (2007: 34).

### **2.5.2. The Clash Of Civilisations (1993): AFP’s “Geo-Cultural Approach”**

During the political confusion of the transitional period (1989-1993) critics such as Michael Clough argue that “without clear and present danger, the public is no longer willing to trust experts to make the right decisions” (2004: 80, 81). This is because “at a fundamental level, our enemy is our pretext” (Sulfaro & Crislip, 1997: 104). As Shoon K. Murray and Jason Meyers (1999) argue, the creation of an enemy is important for mobilising the nation around common objectives.

Huntington’s *Clash of Civilisation* thesis is based on this perception. The creation of a new enemy would be beneficial to US hegemony. Thus, Huntington argues that Fukuyama’s End of History argument suffers from “the single alternative fallacy”. It is rooted in the CW assumption that “the only alternative to communism is liberal democracy and that the demise of the first produces the universality of the second”. However, Huntington argues that “there are many forms of authoritarianism, nationalism, corporatism and market communism (as in China) that are alive and well in today’s world” (1993a: 191). Therefore, he suggests that after the CW “there is clearly a need for a new model that will help us to order and understand central developments in world politics” (1993a: 187), and alternatively, offer a new strategy of ‘cultural/civilisational clash’ instead of the old geo-political containment strategy.

According to Emad E. Aysha, the clash of civilisations thesis was “stylized as, and probably intended to be, the X article of the post-Cold War era” (2003: 113). In contrast

to those critics who predicted that China, Germany, or Japan might fill the position of the USSR and emerge as potential enemies to the US, the clash of civilisations thesis offered a set of ambiguous threats to America. However, such ambiguity could prove useful for the American hegemony project because it gives the US the excuse to be involved globally under the pretext of preserving its interests and defending its security. Therefore, in contrast to Tsygankov who suggests that the clash of civilisations thesis was “defensive and isolationist” (2003: 54), critics, such as Layne (1994), Smith (2002b) and Aysha (2003) argue it is hegemonic and aggressive. Steve Smith argues that Huntington assumes that “a world without US primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country in shaping global affairs” (2002: 173). Layne posits that the perspective “held the assumption that American security hinges on its ability to maintain its international primacy” (1994: 21), while Aysha considers that Huntington’s thesis “promotes US geo-political interests, maintaining US primacy, strengthening the Atlantic alliance, and identifying potential enemies and allies” (2003: 114).

In contrast to those critics who deny the influence of Huntington’s thesis over the US external agenda, Fawas A. Gerges suggests that while American leaders did not believe in Huntington’s thesis, “American post-Cold war policy appears to be affected by the fear of an ‘Islamic threat’” (1999: 4). In the same vein, Steve Smith suggests that the dangerous effect of Huntington’s thesis is that it “seems to have guided US policy since September 11” (2002: 175).

### **2.5.3. The Project For The New American Century<sup>1</sup> (2000)**

The task of theorising of US hegemony was not only undertaken by individuals, but also by think tanks (or groups). Central amongst these bodies was the Project of the New American Century (PNAC). Its document of 2000 calls for establishing a new American global leadership in the new century. The document reproduces the essential concepts of

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<sup>1</sup> The PNAC is a think tank founded in 1997 by dozens neo-cons, social conservatives and military-industrial complex representatives. This body was established to remedy the conservative’s failure to advance a clear strategy for AFP in the post-CW era; therefore its founders promoted the concept of US global leadership in the post-Soviet world based on American military power and strength. Among the 25 signatories were Paul Wolfowitz, Luis Libby, Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, Elliott Abrams, Zalmay Khalilzad and William J. Bennett (Lobe & Barry 2002; Lobe, 2003).

the DPG of the early 1990s. It calls for preserving America's unipolar position and taking the opportunity to establish the new American century through rebuilding its military capabilities and stopping other major powers from becoming new rivals. It offers a set of new missions and tactics deemed more fitting to America's unique position and role in the post-CW world. Crucially, the document calls for readjusting US nuclear deterrence in order to be able the US to outweigh the current and potential nuclear powers from the previous doctrine that was rooted in counter-deterrence with the Soviets. The document calls for increasing the US defence budget, and raising the numbers of American forces to at least 1.6 million. To ready America for the 21<sup>st</sup> century the document also offers new tactical steps such as the repositioning of American bases to Southeast Europe and Southeast Asia and shifting the deployment of the US navy to respond to rising strategic concerns in East Asia. However, the most striking idea is the assertion that such a project of global dominion could not be accepted by Americans unless the state faced a new Pearl Harbour (The Project of the New American Century, 2000).

The document's recommendation concerning nuclear operations appeared later in the Nuclear Posture Review Report prepared by the Department of Defence and submitted to Congress on 31 December 2001. The report, which became public two months later, offers new tactics and directions for the US nuclear power in the post-Soviet era. Since then the US has prevented not only Russia and China, but also other potential challengers like Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya and Syria from developing their nuclear potential. The report also calls for using nuclear power against biological or chemical powers that could attack the US (Global Security, 2002; Arkin, 2002; Clark, 2005; Global Security, 2005).

PNAC members had previously criticized Clinton's neo-liberal FP perspective, claiming that his policy did not suit America's unipolar moment. In 1998, several grandee members sent a message to Clinton over regime change in Iraq.<sup>1</sup> In addition, dozens of the PNAC founders wrote to members of the House of Representatives and the Senate leaders, Newt Gingrich and Trent Lott, asking them to take the lead in foreign policy issues. They argued that President Clinton did not represent the sort of

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<sup>1</sup> Among the signatories were Elliott Abrams, John Bolton, Francis Fukuyama, Robert Kagan, Zalmay Khalilzad, William Kristol, Richard Perle, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz. (Khong, 2008: 258).

decisive presidential leadership that America needed as the only superpower (George, 2007). This group and their organisation became more influential during the administration of President George W. Bush (Lobe & Barry 2002; Smith, 2005a).

In sum, just as Fukuyama's thesis is based on the Western liberal democrat dogma, and provides theoretical cover for Western capitalism and liberal democrat political system as the only legitimate model in the post-Soviet era, a former National Security Council (NSC) official in the Carter administration, Huntington's thesis is deeply rooted in the concept of the 'centrality of the Western civilisation', which assumes "the West stands against the rest". Moreover, it provides academic cover for the supremacy of Western culture (Aysha, 2003: 114). Importantly, both Fukuyama and Huntington are aware that in the post-CW era the US is seen as the 'doorkeeper' of Western values as the unipole power. In doing so, the two scholars reintroduced old terminology in a new context, not only to capture the changing characteristics of the post-CW era, but also to preserve American hegemony over its sphere of influence and to legitimate its expansion over the rest (Crockett, 2007). Accordingly, both theses offer a hegemonic and unilateralist roadmap for AFP. In this way, Aysha argues that although the two theses were different in style, the aim was the same (Aysha, 2003: 114). The PNAC's strategy is also in the same way offering the proposal needed to maintain and sustain the unipolar moment. American hegemony in the 21<sup>st</sup> century cannot be guaranteed unless military power is modernised, expanded and implemented.

## **2.6. Balancing Against The Hegemon: Geo-Political Challenges**

This section discusses potential scenarios for the other major powers to balance against the US in the post-Soviet era. As discussed in the first chapter, critics, and particularly neo-realists, were unsure about the evolution of the post-CW's geo-political scene. They predicted that the post-CW era "may simply see the emergence of a five-way-balance-of-power system rotating around the United States, Europe, Japan, China, and what remains of the Soviet Union" (Bird & Alperovitz, 1992: 207). Accordingly, the US hegemonic status might not only be challenged by its CW allies (Germany, the EU, and Japan), but also from old foes such as China and Russia (Bird & Alperovitz, 1992; Cumings, 1992; Haass, 1997). Meanwhile, Americans were uncertain about who was the new potential enemy and challenger (Lieber, 2005; Wiarda & Skelley, 2006). AFP studies offered several different answers to the question during the 1990s, which are

“not as clear-cut as they were when the Soviet Union was ... [the US’s] main adversary” (Wiarda & Skelley, 2006: 15). The following sections trace some proposals and fears about the then geo-political status quo.

### **2.6.1. Japan And Germany: Allies Or Potential Rivals?**

At the EoCW, Richard Rosecrance (1992) argues that by the EoCW the traditional state would be in transition and military power in IR would also be discounted. The post-CW state might be a trading state. On the basis of such a view, the author predicts that economic power would put Japan and Germany in a predominant position in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, unless the US shifted from its dominant concern with military power maximization to revitalise its economic competitive capabilities.

Rosecrance wrote: “the most potent future antagonism the world could witness is a radical division between the United State and Japan” (1992: 78). Japan therefore was seen as a potential challenger to the US due to its economic penetration of the US market. Accordingly, critics such as Deibel (1992), Garthoff (1992) and Wallerstein (1993) argued that Japan would be transformed into a world hegemon, particularly if it integrated more with South East Asia. Economic indicators highlight that Japanese direct investment had increased six-times from 1985 to 1988, while its trade and exports with South East Asia had also doubled during the same period. In addition, Cumings predicted that the Asian countries, and Australia, would “have a GNP of \$7.2 trillion by the year 2000, which will be bigger than that of the EC [European Community and] ... the number of effective consumers in the region will be at least as large as Europe” (1992: 97). For these reasons, Friedman and Le Band, predicted in the very early 1990s that Japan and the US “would descend into a downward spiral from trade friction to protectionism to armed showdown over markets and raw materials” (cited in Benn, 2007: 972). Huntington (1993a) argues that Japan attempted to use its economic power to replace US global influence and to weaken American primacy, which meant “the continuation of [the cold] war by other means” (Mueller, 2005: 19). Such fears motivated the Clinton administration to attempt to rectify trade imbalance with Japan, as will be illustrated in the next chapter.

Not only economically, but psychologically, Japan was entitled to be a new competitor. In this way, Richard Rosecrance argues that (1992: 78):

beneath the external policy of a Japanese trading state boil nationalist resentments directed at a half century of American tutelage and Western neglect ... if current trends continue, it may not too long before ideological rationalisations of Confucian strength and vitality are propounded by Japan as antidotes to supposed Western decadence and growth.

However, in contrast to this perspective, Nye argues that “Japan remains one-dimensional in its economic power” (1990a: 513). Japan was a “first class economy but third rate in politics” (Arrighi & Silver, 1999: 6). As Volgy and Imwalle highlight, “Japan’s economy is not matched by similar military or political capabilities” (1995: 823), while Ikenberry perceived Japan to be “stagnant” (2004: 609). Irrespective of its economic strength, Japan “will remain a vulnerable state” (Chace, 1997b: 79). However, the Japanese threat did not last long, because, by the mid-1990s “the once miracle economy of Japan was in crisis” (Cox, 2002a: 270). The end of the Japanese economic miracle led Huntington to turn his argument from the struggle over economic resources as a source of war to the clash of civilisations (Mueller, 2005).

Meanwhile, several scholars (e.g., Steel, 1992; Garthoff, 1992; Wallerstein, 1993; Peterson, 1996; Ikenberry, 2001b) paid particular attention to Germany rather than other European states as a potential competitor to the US in the new era. They argue that while the CW offered a solution to the German question, its termination, on the contrary, brought the German matter into the spotlight once again. Its reunification, in addition to its geo-political influence in the recently independent states of Eastern Europe, could revive its traditional tendency to adopt an independent geo-political role. If Germany succeeded in doing so, it could pose constraints on American hegemony in Europe and elsewhere. Therefore, Peterson suggests that “the New Transatlanticism may be viewed largely as a by-product of German unification” (1996: 58).

However, in contrast to this perspective, the resurgence of Germany as a rival to the US was undermined by the problems associated with its reunification “especially the large costs involved and high unemployment in the former East-Germany [that] diverted German’s attention inward and delayed its ambitious European agenda” (Ingimundarson, 2000: 181). On the other hand, the main concern of Germany was not a geopolitical struggle, but its economic power, which might threaten US hegemony in the post-Soviet world.



In reality, Chollet (2008) argues that the EoCW was a sort of paradoxical moment because of the contradiction between victory, defeat and decline. On the one hand, it was regarded as a victorious moment for the US and its allies. However, on the other hand, some thought that Germany and Japan were the real victors; America, from their viewpoint, had sacrificed its economic potential struggling against communism, while the Germans and Japanese were able to expand their economies. This led some to repeat the early 1980s assertions about the US as a declining power. Nye, however, points out that “even a reunited Germany is only one fifth the size of the United States economy” (1990a: 513). Waltz, ignoring the economic aspect, argues that “the ghastly experiences of Germany and Japan in the first half of the twentieth century make them reluctant to step forth [towards becoming rivals to the US]” (2009a: 32).

### **2.6.2. The European Union: The New Regional Power As A Potential Rival**

The EU (as a political and economic regional unity) was also considered to be a potential rival to the US at the EoCW. According to Dannreuther (2007), the US supported European integration when it served American hegemony on the continent and to contain the USSR. Nevertheless, after the EoCW, the status of the EU changed. The independence of the Eastern European countries, EU enlargement towards the east and the reunification of Germany added further power to the European unification project and arguably led to closer cooperation and deeper integration amongst Europeans (Garthoff, 1992). In addition, several European states such as France and Germany were enthusiastic about building a common foreign and security policy (CFSP), despite the numerous obstacles. Moreover, Europeans appeared to be willing to play a crucial role in international affairs. Therefore their seeking to be more independent of the US was an appropriate response (Schirm, 1998; Smith, 2003). The French approach to the negotiations of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) appeared as a desire to charge the EU with “the defense of Europe, for Europe, by Europeans” (De La Serre, 1996: 32). This shift was seen as a threat to US political influence over the CW allies (Ikenberry, 2001b). Regardless of the mutual cooperation of the CW, the absence of the USSR “made cooperation more difficult because there no longer seemed to be an imperative for collective action in the face of a common enemy” (Lieber, 2005: 25). Transatlantic unity, therefore, could potentially be torn apart in the post-Soviet era because the allies were no longer dependent on the American military role for protecting their security. In accordance with the neo-realist

approach, Ikenberry argues that “without the cohesion provided by a common external threat ... the major powers would revert to competitive strategies driven by the underlying structure of anarchy” (2001b: 21).

However, the EU was suffering from several weaknesses. First, although the EU was equal to the US in terms of economic weight and population, it lacked the geo-strategic presence (Ikenberry, 2001b; Clark, 2005). Second, Europe was drawn inward with its post-CW transitions: German reunification; the impact of the East European countries’ independence; creating the single currency, the Euro; the crisis in the former Yugoslavia; and EU enlargement towards the east. Europe, therefore, was not in a position to be either a military or a political rival to the US (Mastanduno, 1997; Chace, 1997b).

Although pre-2002 military indicators showed that the EU member states’ total soldiers were more than the US’s, and their combined defence budgets were about 70% of the US’s, the EU lacked the qualitative power and the geopolitical prestige that America had (Judt, 2002). This is not the complete story. Volgy and Imwalle (1995) suggest that the emergence of the EU as a potential challenger to the US is unlikely in the near future unless the internal mechanisms of the decision-making process are changed. This idea is also expressed by Nye when he argues that “unless progress on political unification in Europe accelerates well beyond current plans, the United States is likely to remain by far the largest power in the next decade” (1990a: 513). Furthermore, Waltz argues that “despite its plentiful resources, Europe does not constitute a political unit able to act in the arena of foreign and military policy” (2009a: 32). Despite the lack of threat, tensions arose between the two sides over issues such as commerce, and the EC’s international role in the immediate post-CW era. More serious differences arose over sanctions against Iraq and trade with Iran (Keohane & Nye, 1993; Dittgen, 1996; Nye, 2000; Ikenberry, 2004b). However, building on the above discussion, and in line with what has been said in the previous chapter, Europe will not stand in the way of US hegemony due to several impediments (domestic and international).

### **2.6.3. China**

In the minds of many Americans, US hegemony could be exclusively challenged by China. In a forecast on the global situation in 2015, released in December 2000, the US National Intelligence Commission argues (Benjian, 2001):

If China becomes stronger, it will then seek favourable rearrangement of power in the Asia-Pacific and may engage in conflicts with its neighbours and some outside forces. As a rising power, China will keep on expanding its own influence without considering the US interests.

China was seen a long-term challenger to the US dominance, not only because of its military capabilities, but also due to its economic progress since the 1980s, when it opened its domestic market to foreign investment. By the 1990s, the Chinese economy was performing strongly and had started to be an economic giant (Wallerstein, 1993; Maynes, 1996; Hyland, 1999; Callinicos, 2003). China's total trade increased more than eightfold in a space of only 14 years, jumping from only US\$20.66 billion to US\$165.6 billion between 1978 and 1992. This sharp increase saw China ranked as the eleventh largest economy by trade. Furthermore, Mearsheimer illustrates that "If China's per capita GNP equals South Korea's, China's overall GNP would be almost \$10.66 trillion, which is about 1.35 times the size of American GNP. If China's per capita GNP is a half of Japan's, China's overall GNP would be roughly 2.5 times bigger than America's" (2001: 398). Therefore, there was a general conviction that China would no longer be content to play a marginal role, but would become an influential player (Gong, 1994).

Because of such predictions, critics such as Charles W. Maynes (1996) imagine that China might play the former role of the USSR and replace Moscow as an enemy for the US. Militarily, "following US successes in the Persian Gulf War of 1991 and the Kosovo campaign of 1999" (Owen, 2001/2002: 120), China increased "its gross military spending and attempt[ed] to modernize its navy, air force, and missile arsenal" (Owen, 2001/2002: 119). Furthermore, following in the steps of Huntington's clash of civilisations thesis, Volgy and Imwalle (1995) emphasize the sharp ideological differences with the US as a potential motive to challenge US hegemony. However, they acknowledge "but it may take decades of sustained economic growth before the Chinese can upgrade their domestic infrastructure or their military to superpower status" (1995: 823).

In a similar vein, James Chace argues that "China was on the rise" and maybe someday would vie with the US, "but not in the near term" (1997b: 79). Waltz emphasises this view when he argues that "China, though growing rapidly, still has a long way to go" (2009a: 32), while Cox also agrees that "China was bothersome but marginal" (2002a: 270). Furthermore, Christopher (1995) and Ikenberry (2001b) argue that China would threaten US interests only if the Chinese challenged the international community and

attempted to destabilize Asia and the rest of the world. Therefore, the early post-CW predictions that China might be able to fill the USSR's position and challenge America's hegemony have not been fulfilled. The 1990s illustrated that China accommodated to US wishes and was no more than a developing country (Ikenberry, 2001c; Callinicos, 2003; Ikenberry, 2004b).

#### **2.6.4. Russia**

Close relations between the US and Russia started after Gorbachev's political revolution and peaked in 1990-91 when the Soviets and the Americans jointly worked to liberate Kuwait (Paterson et al., 2010). Despite this co-operation, several US strategists remained convinced that Russia was still a threat to American hegemony. Regardless of its internal problems, in 1991 it was still a powerful state because of its 30,000 nuclear warheads, the size of its territory and its membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). These strengths encouraged Russian nationalists to play a geo-political role, especially in Eurasia, through the control of oil and gas reserves and pipelines, thereby creating a new status quo (Cox, 1995; Maynes, 1996; Callinicos, 2003; Natural Resources Defense Council, 2006). However, John M. Owen argues that "Russia has mostly acquiesced to US predominance", but that since 1991 Russians have haltingly changed "from a cooperative to a testy relationship with the United States". This was clear during Russia's attempt "to block NATO, and hence US, control of Kosovo in June 1999 by attempting to carve out its own zone of occupation; and in July 2001 Russia entered a 'friendship pact' with China" (2001/2002: 119).

However, during the 1990s Russia was in decline and retreated to being just a regional power. In general, "Russia's military, its economy, and its political system were in confusion" (Volgy & Imwalle, 1995: 823). Russia lacked the capability to balance against US hegemony. Its economy in the 1990s was about that of Denmark (Cumings, 1992; Ikenberry, 2001c; Nye, 2008) and according to Carl Kaysen et al. it showed "no will to use its military power externally and almost certainly lacks the political coherence to do so" (1991: 95). Furthermore, "its military capability is unlikely to be matched by successful economic innovation" (Modelski & Thompson, 1999: 112). In consequence, as Halliday (2009) argues, Russia's military power was exaggerated because as Nye argues, Russia's economy is essentially "based on a single commodity, energy" (2008: 57). Its military capabilities alone do not give it sufficient strength to act

as a counterbalance or a rival to the US (Waltz, 1993) because, to “be a great power, a state needs to excel not in one area, but across a range of capability attributes” (Manstanduno, 1997: 53).

The 1990s showed two contested US attitudes regarding Russia. First, American willingness to integrate Russia into the international community in the immediate collapse of the Soviet Union; and second, the US tended to ignore Russian influence in international affairs. For example, Russian opposition to war was ignored twice: during the 1991 in the Gulf and in 1999 during the Kosovo air campaign (Kapteyn, 2004).

In brief, none of the above potential rivals was able to counterbalance against US hegemony during the 1990s. And, as mentioned in the first chapter, the remaining of the US as a sole hegemon does not support the realists’ viewpoint regarding the counterbalance of power and the self-correction machine in world politics. The US policy-makers’ ambition of establishing a new phase of American hegemony and predominance was consolidated by the geo-political circumstances of the 1990s: Europe was “drawn inward”, Japan was “stagnant”. China was accommodating the US and Russia was “in a quasi-formal security partnership with the US” (Ikenberry, 2004b: 609).

## **2.7. Pretences To Hegemony**

### **2.7.1. Rogue States: Justifying Hegemony In A Threat-Free Environment**

As said above, if there was no real challenge or enemy to the US in the post-Soviet era, and the existence of an enemy was very important to advance America’s hegemonic project, the creation of a new enemy became necessity. According to Valerie A. Sulfaro & Mark N. Crislip, literature derived from psychology, sociology, and politics “has suggested that individuals need an example of an “enemy” in order to function in their everyday lives” (1997: 104). And, if those enemies or scapegoats “have not been readily available ... [individuals] have created them” (Murray & Meyers, 1999: 555). By extension, this argument can be prolonged to include nations in addition to individuals. “International behaviour requires direction, and this direction is often determined by perceptions of potential conflict and opportunity,” consequently, “the role of enemy is more fixed than those filling the role” (Murray & Meyers, 1999: 555).

In this context, the threat of 'rogue states' that developed by leading academic security theorists, decision-makers, commentators and analysts since the early 1980s, reappeared in Colin Powell's military strategy in 1989 and were refined over the next decade to include a set of the third world's states such as Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea in addition to some political enemies like Noriega, Aided, Saddam Hussein, and Gaddafi (Klare, 1998; Ryan, 2000; Caprioli & Trumbore, 2005).

This sort of challenge was developed to an unprecedented extent during the Clinton administration. President Clinton and his assistants overused this threat (see for example, Christopher, 1995; Lake, 1993; Albright, 1999). The NNS of engagement and enlargement also asserted that rouge states "pose a serious danger to regional stability in many corners of the globe" (The White House, 1996). True, the challenge of rouge states is not necessarily affecting the US in a direct manner, but those states are still harming their neighbours, the US closest friends. Consequently, American interests would be at stake (Christopher, 1995; Layne, 1997).

If there was no remaining geopolitical rival, the US officials created the rogue states as a new enemy to serve the US hegemony project in the 1990s and afterward. The new existing challenge enabled the US government not only to enlarge its geopolitical presence in the world, such as in Iraq and the Middle East, the Former Yugoslavia and the Balkans, and around the world, but also eased the mobilisation of congress and the US public to accept the government's agenda of modernising military might and maintaining high defense spending to support American involvement around the world.

### **2.7.2. Unprecedented Challenges**

Not only rogue states, but in the absence of great geostrategic rival, the US's explicit discourse of the 1990s emphasized unprecedented kinds of threats to its security and interests. The NSS of 1991 declared that "we face new challenges not only to our security, but to our ways of thinking about security" (White House, 1991). The NSS of 1992 did not identify those threats, but it stated that "though yesterday's challenges are behind us, tomorrow's are being born" (White House, 1992). President Clinton's State of the Union addresses of 1994, 1995, and 1999 and NSSs during the 1990s (White House, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000) identified those new sorts of threats. They included burgeoning terrorism, trans-border challenges such as drug travelling,

immigration, illnesses, organised crimes, ethnic conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the increasing production of WMD's delivery systems. Likely challenges could also come from technological innovation and information flow. In addition to the above list of challenges, the liquidity of instability from the marginal to the core areas of American interests as a result of the ethincisation of international politics was also a dominating fear in the American political discourse of the 1990s. Therefore, the NSS of 2000 put the homeland security against unconventional attacks between its urgent priorities (White House, 2000). The same fear was also echoed in the official discourse since the early 1990s. President Bush I (1992), for example, asked congress when supporting his administration to find "a program to protect ... [America] from limited nuclear missile attack" (White House, 1992).

In brief, the US was actually searching for a new enemy to serve its hegemonic agenda. In the absence of any geopolitical challenger, it developed the rogue state challenge, and it tended to support this with set of lesser challenges. These enemies were needed to preserve the uncertain conditions that keep America ready to expand its hegemonic project.

## **2.8. Some Hegemonic Strategy's Instruments**

### **2.8.1. NATO And US Hegemony**

Balancing against US hegemony should also be analysed in the context of NATO, the organisation that helped prolong US influence in Europe and elsewhere during the CW. According to Lord Ismay, the First Secretary General of NATO, "the purposes of the alliance were to keep the Russians out, Americans in, and Germans down" (cited in Nye, 2000: 53). In this way, some critics argue that (e.g., Stallings, 1995; Bloch-Lain, 1999) the organisation played a crucial role in sustaining American comprehensive influence (military, political and economic) in Europe and Japan. NATO was founded on the basis of the Soviet threat, which diminished considerably after the EoCW. Therefore, NATO's existence could be brought into question (McCalla, 1996; Schirm, 1998; Bloch-Lainé, 1999).<sup>1</sup> However, without the organization, the US would not have

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<sup>1</sup> This coincides with the former Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld's argument during the early stage of the WoT that "the mission determines the coalition" (Krauthammer, 2002). In this spirit, Peter J. Anderson asks "what the Alliance's role should be after the fall of its principal opponent, Soviet

been able to legitimize stationing of its troops in Europe (Bertram, 1990). Furthermore, it “will no longer have the capacity to extract political leverage from its provision of security to others” (Art, 1991: 7). In other words, the US would lose its influence in the region and worldwide because NATO was not only a military arm, it was also a very significant institutional tool and, without it, the US could lose its ability to play any vital role in Europe (Nye, 2000).

Possible changes resulting from the end of the bipolar world system include “alliances would come unstuck, collective institutions ... would erode, and national military and economic cooperation would intensify” (Reus-Smit, 2004: 25). In this context, supporters of the European common identity repeatedly argued that NATO is no more than an instrument for the US to exercise influence and pursue its interests in Europe (Schirm, 1998). However, the EoCW changed the status quo. Anthony Foster and William Wallace interpreted Javier Solana’s move from NATO’s Secretary General to the position of Secretary General of the Council of Ministers of the EU as symbolic, signalling “a change in the relationship between the EU and NATO which may mark a turning-point in the development of a CFSP” (2000: 462). However, it could be impossible to combine a European common foreign and security policy (CFSP) with NATO.

In contrast to the argument that has been advanced by neo-realists and neo-liberalists that alliances were essentially created to balance a hegemonic power, the 1990s demonstrated that alliances such as NATO could be used by the hegemonic power to: preserve the status quo; minimize, or even check, the influence of allies; and prevent a likely competitor or a counter-alliance from emerging (Du Boff, 2003). As a result, during the 1990s the Americans worked hard to keep NATO alive, as it serves the US’ own post-CW agenda. It has been used to prevent Europeans from challenging US hegemony.

If NATO had been dissolved it would have been harmful to US post-CW hegemony. It would have curtailed America’s dominance over Europe, and set the stage for the emergence of the EU as a new rival. Therefore, maintaining the organization was a

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Communism.” (2000: 195), while Bloch-Lainé (1999: 148) questions “was NATO still needed in its CW form?”



priority. Fears about Europe's potential transformation into a rival were explicitly stated in the DPG of 1992 (Du Boff, 2003). Thus, the US' concern that NATO survival was not only to maintain the transatlantic relationship (as is usually argued) but also to prevent the EU or some of its members from becoming rivals to the US in its unipolar moment.

The European failure to resolve the problems of the former Yugoslavia gave the US the pretext to re-engage NATO in the region (Ham, 1994; Jakobson, 1995). Thus, President Clinton actively "advocated a stronger European engagement in the continent's security, but inside the transatlantic partnership NATO" (Schirm, 1998: 70). It was for the reasons of maintaining its hegemonic position that the US bore the greatest burden of NATO's engagements in Yugoslavia. For example, the US "provided two-thirds of the aircraft in the campaign over Kosovo and Serbia" (Nye, 2000: 58).

### **2.8.2. Global Leadership As A Counterweight To US Hegemony**

According to Doug Stokes (1998) the military issue was relevant to international politics in the post-CW era. The concentration of such a massive material power, the collapse of the external enemy, and the desire to lead, inevitably guided Americans to exercise hegemony worldwide. This search for hegemony was often conducted under the guise of global leadership, which, according to Robert J. Pauly & Tom Lansford, was readily available because "leadership in the international arena is really about power" (2005: 3). Furthermore, "to exercise leadership is to get others to do things that they would not otherwise do" (Pauly & Lansford, 2005: 3). However, it is not surprising that a world hegemon, as a public good provider, seeks leadership to regulate the system. The problem, as discussed previously, is the difficulty in distinguishing the hegemon's actions to provide public good from its actions to enhance its own hegemony.

In line with this argument, American discourse in the 1990s presented the US as a unipole power that sought leadership to enhance the NWO. As mentioned in the previous section, Americans identified several new challenges not only to its security, but also to its allies and the rest of the world (White House, 1995, 1996; 1997, 1998). Thus, claiming to preserve the world peace and stability, the US sought leadership. President Bush (1990), for example, argued that in the post-CW period "there is a need for leadership that only America can provide". One year later, he also said that "today,

in a rapid changing world, American leadership is indispensable” (Bush, 1991). The NSS of 1991 also accentuates that “there is no substitute for American leadership”. American leadership in the post-Soviet epoch was “pivotal and inescapable” (White House, 1991, 1992). President Bush (1992) also declared that the US, the leader of the West during the CW, “has become the leader of the world”. Dick Cheney argues that without American leadership, the world would not be able to take a collective approach to solve international crises (1993). The centrality of American indispensable leadership became even clearer in the following years. Clinton (1994), for example, made a causal connection between the flourishing of democracy worldwide and American leadership, saying that: “the young democracies we support still face difficult times and look to us for leadership”. In this way, Hoffmann (1989), for example, argues that the US cannot lead by using the previous style alone, but it needs new mechanisms. He adds that the US must set rational FP goals for the post-CW era to maintain its unique position and lessen any potential resistance. In the end, Hoffmann states that the US can rule if “games of skill” replace “tests of will”. Similar ideas may be found in Nye’s soft power thesis (Nye, 1990b-1990c).

However, in contrast to Hoffmann’s perspective, Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, for example, emphasized that “America should lead” because it was ‘obligated’ to do so (Powell, 1992). Former Secretary of State, Madeline Albright’s slogan of America as an indispensable nation also captured such an approach (Kagan, 2002; Chollet, 2007). This tone was also repeated in the 1996 NSS that declares that “we must exercise global leadership” (White House, 1996). Importantly, in the mid-1990s American official discourse began to highlight US interests instead of international concerns as the priority for its leadership. Clinton placed greater emphasis on the relationship between American worldwide leadership and the spreading of peace, freedom, and democracy; stating that “we still can’t be strong at home unless we’re strong abroad” (1995). The 1995 NSS declares that “if we exert our leadership abroad, we can make America safer and more prosperous. Without our active leadership and engagement abroad, threats will fester and our opportunities will narrow” (White House, 1995: 2).

In 1997, the basis for American leadership developed to include a clear hegemonic dimension, the strategic view of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Clinton argued that “to prepare

America for the 21<sup>st</sup> century we must master the forces of change in the world and keep American leadership strong and sure for an uncharted time” (Clinton, 1997). Clinton’s argument can best be understood as a direct influence of the home-grown dialogue over the New American Century that had been initiated by the neo-cons. However, arguably there were no differences between these ideas, and those principles adopted in the Pentagon’s DPG of the early 1990s during the Bush I administration. Clinton’s call for managing the forces of change in the world can be understood as a counterpart to the idea pursued in the 1992 document/strategy of preventing the emergence of any new rival in the post-CW era. Clinton continued to stress America’s unique responsibility as a tool to establish American leadership in the new century. In his State of the Union address of 1998 he said: “we must exercise responsibility ... around the world. We have the power and the duty to build a new era of peace and security” (Clinton, 1998). This statement echoes Bush’s NWO, but the most important aspect is Clinton’s emphasis on the availability of power as a guarantor for America’s global leadership. Clinton called for reforming and developing America’s infrastructure (people, communities, and technology) in order to be able to lead the world economy. He suggested if this reform took hold they would inevitably have commenced their obligation to “build a 21<sup>st</sup> century of propensity for America” (Clinton, 1999, 2000).

Scholars, such as Hoffmann (1989) and Nixon (1992), suggest that America’s demand for unilateral world leadership from the 1990s was a realistic, rather than a rhetorical, feature in AFP practice. Thus, the claim that America was seeking world leadership to establish a NWO and preserve peace and security was merely an instrument to enhance and sustain its hegemony over the system. This was its unipolar moment.

## **2.9. Conclusion**

In line with neorealist, hegemonist and neoliberalist approaches, a state’s share of material capabilities is a sine qua non to establish its hegemonic position in the system. Without it, hegemony is impossible. America, as discussed above, was in a category of its own as a hyperpower in terms of military, economic and scientific capabilities after the CW. In early 1991, for instance, its military expenditures of \$280 billion equalled 27% of the world’s total, and in the late 1990s, this percentage increased to more than 40% of the world’s total. While the US military budget approached \$300 billion in the late 1990s, no other second-tier’s military budget broke the record of \$40 billion at the

time. The US military outlay therefore was bigger than that of the rest of the industrialised world combined. Not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively, the US military forces were seven times more advanced than those of France, its closest rival in militant technologies. What matters here, however, is that while these huge numbers were much bigger than that of its allies and potential foes combined, they were only 16% of its federal budget and less than 4% of its GDP. America military might, therefore, was inoffensive economically, and the US economy kept performing magnificently during the 1990s and afterward. Accordingly, the US emerged from the CW struggle not only the strongest militarily, but also economically. Even with the severe economic problems of the late 1980s and the early 1990s', the size of the American economy was about two times the size of its closest rival - the Japanese economy, while Japanese production was about three-fifths of the US total. The EU's economic size was nearly parallel to that of the US, but geostrategically, Europe did not enjoy the position that America held. In the mid-1990s, the US economic growth was bigger than any other economy in the world, and by the late 1990s, the US economy was the engine of the world's growth. Scientifically, the telecommunication revolution, and the advancement in computer hardware, enhanced America's post-CW leading role in global, political and economical affairs.

Therefore, this is in contrast to the neorealists prophecy that the unipolar moment would not last long and that the system would regain its balance. Predictions that China, Japan, Russia, or the EU would be transformed into a new rival to the US proved wrong. There was no single power or coalition that was able to challenge the US' unipolarity and hegemony. The US was hegemonic in the 1990s to a degree that it was able to project its power everywhere and use NATO to sustain its dominance over allies. Germany was looking inward to manage its reunification's effects, and even economically, Germany would not be capable to be a new rival to the US; its economic size was about one-fifth of the US. The Japanese miracle of the 1980s turned out to be stagnant, and instead of becoming a new competitor to the US over raw material, the Japanese economy witnessed a period of recession. Russia retreated from being a superpower to merely a corrupted regional power and its economic size was less than Denmark's. China was no more than a developing country. This status consolidated America's propensity to be the world's lone leader. Therefore, while the last chapter proved that the US was a hegemonic power during the CW, this chapter shows that classification is also apposite

in the 1990s. In fact, as the 1990s progressed, the US became a unique political behemoth that had not been experienced previously. The US as unipole power with such huge power resources cannot even be compared to ancient Rome or the British hegemony in the early 20th century.

That is why the term superpower was no longer capable of describing the US's new powerful position in world politics. If it is true, the US enjoyed a hegemonic position within the CW's bipolar system. How did the EoCW and retreat of the USSR to become a regional power impact on America's status in the new global environment? This transformation not only yielded a unique global structure in which the US was a hyperpower at the apex of a unipole system, but also resulted in a considerable gap in relative power between America and the remaining powers, as shown above. Accordingly, the term hyperpower or hegemon would be more able to capture the characteristics of US power and to describe its new position in world politics.

True, material power is a very important source to establish hegemony and predominance over all; but more importantly, the crucial factor to give the US self-confidence was the victory over communism which was widely seen as an American triumph. Furthermore, the victory over the communist ideology boosted the US ideology of freedom and human rights, which, as will be discussed in the next chapter, was a further source for enhancing and legitimating US hegemony in the period. Since 1989 onward, the declinist theory has been defeated and the revivalist and expansionist approach has flourished. However, it is also important to note that America's hyperpower or hegemonic status did not come about just because of the collapse of the USSR. It was also driven by individuals, groups, and particularly hyper-internationalists such as the neo-cons.

Neo-cons amongst other groups offered several proposals to push America into a new form of an aggressive internationalism and hegemony. The neo-cons' pervasiveness in the policy-making circles of the 1990s encouraged them to put their agenda into practice. The DPG of 1992 written by Wolfowitz and Libby, for instance, was supposed to be a new NSC-68 to guide AFP at the unipolar moment. As shown later, the DGP has been the organising principle of AFP strategy throughout the 1990s and after 9/11.

The neo-cons' influence also exceeded the governmental institutions to reach AFP's knowledge community. This mood was reflected in AFP thinking and strategy throughout the 1990s, as seen in Fukuyama's and Huntington's theses and in the PANC's proposals. Instead of looking inward, America needed to be more internationalist, and AFP strategy was also in need of a new roadmap. In this context, Huntington, for example, created the clash between cultures as the successor to the clash between superpowers. This was sufficient to redirect American attention beyond their borders. Fukuyama rejoiced in the US ideology of triumph over its competitors and cried for Americans not to retreat, but to enjoy the fruits of the victory over communism. According to Fukuyama, the history's running stopped at 1989. Western capitalism and democracy was the only legitimated regime, and America, the door keeper of this regime, will be an eternal power. The expansion of the global market and the liberal democratic system is the instrument needed to expand American hegemony.

In line with these efforts, the PNAC institution proposed to strengthen the American military in order to guarantee American hegemony. It posited the argument that the country needed to aggrandize its military capabilities and expand its political influence in the post-bipolar world. This proposal was not only in line with the DGP of 1992, but also in harmonisation with Clinton's efforts to keep the US military, the best equipped and trained in the world.

At the very least, the above discussion highlights several aspects of the US transition from the CW era to the post-CW reality and summarizes how a superpower differs from a hyperpower and hegemon. The aforementioned debate reveals that the US post-CW hegemonic appearance was due to several factors: psychological effect of the US triumph over the USSR; societal groups and individuals who were enthusiastic to invest in the collapse of America's rival to sustain its unipolar moment; and material capabilities that were of great significance to impose the hegemonic weight over all.

A key question arising from this chapter is: what implications does this new American status have for the US' role and place in the post-CW world? The reflection of this shift will be reflected in AFP during the 1990s and beyond. The next chapter discusses AFP's continued hegemonic agenda between 11/9 and 9/11.

American hegemony is the only reliable defence against a breakdown of peace and international order.  
(Kagan & Kristol, 1996: 22)

At present the United States faces no global rival. America's grand strategy should aim to preserve and extend this advantageous position as far into the future as possible.  
(Project of American New Century, 2000: ii)

The new unilateralism seeks to strengthen American power and unashamedly deploy it on behalf of self-defined global ends.  
(Krauthammer, 2001)

## Chapter Three

### Between 11/9 And 9/11: AFP's Hegemonic Strategy In Progress

#### 3.1. Introduction

As argued previously, the US emergence from the Cold War (CW) as a hyperpower with no real challenger to its interests or security motivated the 1990s American administrations to follow the same strategy of hegemony that had been pursued by previous governments for half a century. However, in contrast to this perspective, an extensive body of literature puts forward that AFP was confused about its strategic direction during the 1990s. Jeremi Suri, for instance, argues that after the end of the Cold War (EoCW) "American policymakers sought to create a new grand strategy for the United States, but they failed in this endeavour" (2009: 611). However, this chapter demonstrates that AFP was strategically consistent in its aims in this period, rather than discussing whether or not the US administrations succeeded in formulating a new strategy similar to the containment strategy. For this reason, this chapter looks beyond the fragmented daily policy by breaking through American foreign policy's (AFP) surface structure to reach its core. It achieves this by comparing and contrasting the two contested sets of AFP literature. This process enables this chapter to establish a relationship between the explicit policies of the 1990s and the implicit background agenda.

The chapter is divided into several sections. In the first section, the main concern is to discuss the first set of literature that sees the 1990s as a period of disorientation for AFP following the EoCW. The second part reviews the Bush I policy to highlight the hegemonic characteristics of AFP during the early 1990s. The third part explains Clinton's contribution to preparing the US for the 21<sup>st</sup> century; however, the last section focuses on Bush II policy prior to 9/11.

### **3.2. America Alone: A Unipole Power Without An Enemy**

As stated in the first chapter, the post-Soviet era produced a large body of literature which argues that the fall of America's external enemy in the early 1990s disoriented AFP performance in international affairs. According to Michael Howard, this shift left America "with a peculiar paradox" (1993: 49), which, as Cox argues, "the nation seemed to be all at sea in the new world; more secure than it had ever been in the twentieth century, but without a mission to fulfil" (1995: 1). Thus, in the words of Barry Buzan, Washington "seemed to experience a threat deficit" (2006: 1101), and "without barbarians at the gate it was difficult to formulate an attractive policy" (Ryan, 2000: 185). Because of this, the US's "interaction with the world lacked the defining peril and mission that had given structure to US policy" (Brands, 2008: 1). Therefore, the decade of the 1990s has been described by Mead, amongst others, as "lost years in American foreign policy" (2003: 3) because the disappearance of the enemy ended the rationality of AFP's containment strategy (Hentz, 2004; Stokes, 2005) and left the US "without a map, or a set of maps ... [to] navigate the ... challenges of the new world order" (Hentz, 2004: 1), but also "to play beyond its own borders" (Paarlberg, 1995: 1).

#### **3.2.1. The Lack Of AFP's Vision Or A Grand Strategy In The 1990s**

As Stephen D. Sklenka argues (2007: v):

the US inability—or unwillingness—to connect strategic ends and appropriate means to accomplish clearly defined goals ... has occurred so often over the past 15 years ... [that problem] has become a disturbing and pervasive characteristic of the modern American way of war.

In a similar way, Graham T. Allison & Robert Blackwill put it clearly: after five decades of consistency, AFP experienced a decade of discomfiture, and the "defining feature of American engagement in recent years has been confusion" (2000: 1). Consequently, under such conditions of strategic blindness AFP became "reactive and impulsive in a fast-changing and uncertain world" (Allison & Blackwill, 2000: 4).

Critics such as Zalmay Khalilzad (1995a, 1995b) and Karen J. O'Connor & Larry J. Sabato (2004) argue that this confusion resulted from the threat deficit, which meant that the US has been relatively unsure about its post-CW objectives and entered into the new era without certainty or a clear foreign strategy. Thus, the US's role in the new global system was no longer self-evident (McGrew, 1994; Joffe, 1995; Allison &



Blackwill, 2000) and it was unclear which set of forces America ought to embrace in its FP strategy (Hastedt, 2000). With the US as the only superpower left, John L. Gaddis suggested in 1993 that “no one can guarantee that the long peace will survive” (1993: 22). Furthermore, he argued, because of the early 1990s ambiguousness “no one can foretell with any assurance what is going to happen” (1993: 8). Cox agrees with Gaddis that “nobody—not even the Council on Foreign Relations—seemed to have any easy answer” (1995: 2). There was no guarantee, Cox confidently argues, that AFP “would ever rediscover the international road back to true happiness” (1995: 1).

At a macro level, Stephen Walt argues that “the post-CW world still awaits its ‘X’ article. Although many have tried, no one has managed to pen the sort of compelling analysis that George Kennan provided for an earlier era, when he articulated the theory of containment” (1998: 36). In line with Walt’s viewpoint, Hal Brands suggests that an absence of a grand strategy in the 1990s was not because of a shortage of ideas, but that an overall design or vision was lacking, a grand strategy “that incorporated US interests into a coherent and politically sustainable framework” (2008: 2) and that “gave coherence and purposes of American involvement abroad” (Wittkopf et al., 2003: 9).

Because of this, the Bush I administration has been accused of having no unified FP or coherent strategy. Jeanne Kirkpatrick, for instance, suggests that there was “no centre of gravity to Bush’s policy” (cited in Hyland, 1999: 9). Wiarda (1996), Dumbrell (1997), Hurst (1999), Reus-Smit (2004) and Brands (2008) also argue that, although President Bush offered AFP great energy, operational efficiency, management and tactical mastery, there was a lack of leadership and a clear vision; as Suri put it, “Bush had process without purpose” (2009: 611). The administration had also been accused of being unable to translate its success in dealing with the early-1990s individual problems into a long-standing strategy for the post-CW era (Hurst, 1999; Chollet, 2007). Thus, Ron Huisken argues that Bush “had no discernable appetite to think grandly about what the United States could do with its unipolar moment in the post-Cold War world; instead, he focused closely on unravelling the central front of the Cold War and reversing Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait” (2006).

Bush’s foreign policy (FP), therefore, was criticized for being tentative and cautious, relying on a new perspective of wait-and-see, particularly in relation to the changes in Eastern Europe and the disintegration in the former Yugoslavia (Rosati & Twing, 1998;

Dobson & Marsh, 2001; Krauthammer, 2005; Chollet & Goldgeier, 2008). Steven Hurst, for instance, observes that the Bush administration “spent much of this period preoccupied by the question of how best to respond to and encourage these developments [in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe]” (1999: 38).

Bush’s plan of the New World Order (NWO) that was adopted as a response to the Gulf War of (1990-91) is also criticised. Instead of highlighting its importance as a cornerstone in American post-CW hegemonic grand strategy, most scholarly attention has discussed and criticized its marriage between idealistic and pragmatist components.<sup>1</sup> Critics, such as Noam Chomsky (1992), also suggest that the NWO was not a fully-fledged strategy to replace the CW strategy; rather, it was an attempt to remedy the problem of his administration’s lack of vision by claiming that the coalition of the Gulf War was the foundation of a new world order. Because of this, the NWO “was never more than a slogan” (Chollet, 2007: 5), and, once the Gulf War ended, it “lost its luster and became a source of discontent and disillusionment among scholars” (Davis, 2003: 55).

In the same way, Clinton’s FP has also been accused of being vacillating, hesitant, visionless and inconsistent (Ambrose & Brinkley, 1997; Rosati & Twing, 1998, Barry, 2000; Szabo, 2004; Marsden, 2005). Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger described Clinton’s FP as “a series of seemingly unrelated decisions in response to

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<sup>1</sup> Nye (1992) argues that the NWO is rooted in two various contexts of American political perspectives, the tradition of the realist approach that was represented by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger and the tradition of the liberal approach of Woodrow Wilson and Jimmy Carter. The first approach supposes that international politics is a continued struggle between sovereign states to balance each other’s power, whereas the latter believes that the world order is to be built upon broad values of human rights, freedom, democracy and respect for the international law and institutions. “The problem for the Bush Administration,” as Nye (1992: 84) argues, is that it “thought and acted like Nixon, but borrowed the rhetoric of Wilson and Carter.” Hendrickson (1992: 54) agrees with Nye’s analysis, adding that the new American task in the NWO embodies a blending of two conflicting traditions in AFP. The first team includes the legacy of Thomas Jefferson and Woodrow Wilson that seeks international ambitions, achieving it through “measures sort of power.” The second, however, includes the legacy of Alexander Hamilton and Henry Cabot Lodge who think that FP must be linked to the national interests and believe in the need of the military alertness as a command in the conflicts among nations. Therefore, AFP that was built to set the NWO has embraced “both universal aspirations and military force” (Hendrickson, 1992: 55). Hurst (1999) & Davis (2003) suggest that the NWO was a combination of two heritages of AFP: the legacy of both Franklin Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. President Bush, following the steps of his predecessors, designed a strategy based on the combination of collective security, free trade and democracy. In general, Ryan (2000: 187) suggests that “the tension between freedom and order, and the universal and inclination of US foreign policy,” was echoed in the Bush’s FP agenda since his state of the Union of 1990. That was because of “the pursuit of ... [the US] national interest, vied with the promotion of national narrative” .

specific crises” (cited in Dumbrell, 2002: 43) and criticized the [enlargement and engagement strategy] (En-En) strategy “as being less a strategy and more a statement of principles, as overly ambitious and lacking operational terms” (cited in McCormick, 2000: 64). In the same way, Redd (2005: 138) describes AFP as “an ever changing policy” under his presidency.

However, Josef Joffe argues that Clinton’s problem was not “a lack of conviction, but a surfeit thereof. He believe[d] in too many things, either all at once or in short sequence and that ... [did] not make for steadiness of purpose. Worse, there ... [was] no unifying concept” (1995: 95). As Suri argues, “Clinton had purpose without process” (2009: 611). In the same way, Chollet (2007: 6) agrees that the President was “full of ideas and had a vision for the future—globalisation”, but, in contrast to Joffe (1995), he argues that the president “lacked the confidence, attention, acumen and political capital to implement it”. Earlier examples are also apparent in the literature: one high-ranking military officer from Clinton’s National Security Council (NSC) asserted that Clinton “vacillates a lot because of the political capital he does not have and has never had” (cited in Redd, 2005: 138). Because of this, according to Jerel Rosati and Stephen Twing, he had “not taken a strong leadership role or exercised considerable power over foreign policy” (1998: 36).

Likewise, an intensive body of literature views a strong causal connection between the administration’s departure from the traditional geo-political perspective to the new geo-economic perspective and the confusion over the direction of AFP. According to Tom Barry, opponents to this shift joked that “the sum of Clinton’s foreign policy experience had been gleaned at the International House of Pancakes” (2000: xvii). Critics also argue that Clinton’s thinking about Russia and China was ambiguous; it had no policy to deal with ‘rogue states’ and, most important of all, failed to build a solid domestic constituency for consistent foreign action (The Economist, 19 February 2000). Furthermore, during the 2000 presidential campaign, Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush’s senior FP adviser, also criticized Clinton’s perspective of using force abroad, saying that he “has never really had a picture of how America's power should operate in the coming world” (The Economist, 19 February 2000: 51).

Overall, it would appear that the above spectrum of views reveals that the 1990s was considered to be a decade in which the two administrations failed to find a new mission

or a grand strategy for the US in the new era. However, this conclusion clearly contradicts with the argument put forward in the first chapter, that the overall thrust of AFP strategy has been continuous since the end of WWII. Thus, in what follows, the main concern is to assess these views more closely, taking into account the influence of the EoCW upon AFP uniformity in order to show that the continuity of AFP and the existence of American hegemonic strategy cannot be denied.

### **3.3. The Bush I Strategy: Preparing The Stage For US Post-CW Hegemony**

This section questions the idea that the Bush administration lost its strategic guidance and pursued a collection of fragmented policies. In contrast to the previous discussion, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, the Deputy Secretary of State (1989-1992), may be right when he argues that Bush's political perspective has been largely misunderstood, or even intentionally deformed. The administration, as he suggests, "may be faulted, perhaps with having chosen to articulate ... [its] vision more in deeds than in words" (1993: 16). True, the Bush era was a transitional period in AFP and international affairs (Kaufman, 2006) and the President and his assistants suffered from time shortage (Cohen, 2005). Furthermore, the political transformations were unprecedented and the administration lacked the experience to deal with such status. But, even with these problems, the administration's performance was magnificent in terms of preparing America to deal with its emerging opportunity. In the subsequent subsections, the discussion highlights the organizing principle that lay behind the Bush administration's policy.

#### **3.3.1. Managing The Transformative Moment: The Integration Strategy**

In contrast to the previous views, Eagleburger suggests that the administration dealt successfully with the various dangerous events between 1989 and 1992, such as the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, German reunification, the invasion of Kuwait, and the Gulf War of 1991. These achievements, as numerous critics argue (e.g., Maynes, 2000a; Cameron, 2002; Barry, 2003; Chollet, 2007), were undertaken in a changeable and unpredictable period following the EoCW and the US containment strategy was no longer able to offer policymakers the choices needed to meet the emerging status quo.

The discussion about the Bush I administration's lack of vision should not reveal that it failed to manage this crucial turning moment, nor that it had lost its strategic guidance when dealing with these events. It is true that US policymakers were taken by surprise at the sudden and unexpected change in Mikhail Gorbachev's policy that led to the fall of the USSR between 1989 and 1992 (LaFeber, 1994). Furthermore, it is also true that, once the Berlin Wall had crumbled, the administration "initially divided between hardline 'squeezers' and 'dealers' over the correct response to Gorbachev" (Paterson et al., 2010: 443). However, the administration immediately moved from the previous containment strategy to a new policy of integration, not only to help the Soviets' movement towards democracy and a liberal market but also to re-engage the Soviets as a partner in international affairs (Dobson & Marsh, 2001; Paterson et al., 2010). The administration was aware of the sensitivity of the moment and, according Eagleburger (1993) and Burgess (2002), the President, who proved to be one of the most magnificent experienced policymakers in US history, aimed to facilitate the transition from the bipolar system to the new unipolar one calmly. Accordingly, instead of pursuing an aggressive or interventionist policy, the administration adopted a policy of 'strategic silence' which "signalled that the United States would not exploit the upheaval in Eastern Europe" (Paterson et al., 2010: 443). According to Jack Matlock, the US ambassador to Moscow (1987-1991), "our marching orders [were] don't do something, stand there" (cited in Paterson et al., 2010: 443). Krauthammer (2005), among other critics, suggests that this policy showed hesitancy in relation to the liberation of the USSR satellite states. He uses the example of the speech by Bush in Kiev in 1991, in which he warned Ukrainians against suicidal nationalism, which Krauthammer argues highlights that Bush preferred the unity and stability of the USSR, rather than the emergence of 15 new independent countries. In this way, some scholars claim that the shift from containment strategy, and the change of the US from an influential global actor into a passive observer, created very important contradictions for AFP during the early 1990s. This retreat occurred at the critical juncture of the EoCW (Dobson & Marsh, 2001).

However, Charles Krauthammer's view ignores the nature of this crucial moment in which nobody could predict what was going to happen. The administration, rather than being hesitant, did not wish to rush into any uncalculated adventures, bearing in mind that at this stage the changes did not threaten US interests. In general, this policy not

only avoided any unwanted competition with the remaining big powers over the potential allocation of spheres of influence in the post-CW world, but also allayed fears over the US role in the post-CW system. Thus, the Bush administration acted benignly rather than aggressively. This perspective is clear from the President's discourse. In relation to the Baltic countries, Bush stated (1991):

The principle that has guided us is simple: our objective is to help the Baltic peoples achieve their aspirations, not to punish the Soviet Union ... We will watch carefully as the situation develops. And we will maintain our contact with the Soviet leadership to encourage continued commitment to democratization and reform.

In the same way, the 1990 NSS asserted that "our response [to Gorbachev's demilitarisation] represents prudent caution, but the Soviet leadership and people should realize that it is a caution based on uncertainty, not on hostility" (White House, 1990: 10).

The policy resulted in the US being able to guarantee the smooth fragmentation of the USSR and the independence of ex-Communist states in Europe and Central Asia at no cost to the US in blood or resources. The main problem for the US was the USSR's nuclear arsenal. Bush was reluctant to push the independence of the Soviet Republics before the elimination of the nuclear weapons positioned in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (Burgess, 2002). In this context, the administration planned to reduce and control the USSR/Russia nuclear weaponry by signing the START accords. According to Thomas G. Paterson et al., the START-I accord "limited each nuclear superpower to 1.600 delivery vehicles and 6.000 strategic nuclear devices". Bush also signed the START-II agreement before leaving office in 1993 in Moscow with the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin. The accord "provided for the cutting of nuclear warheads and bombs to 3,500 (US) and 2,997 (Russia)" (2010: 448).

The overall objective was setting the stage for the US's emergence as a unipolar hegemon. At this stage there was no need for the explicit use of hard power or an aggressive policy. According to Nye, the successful foreign policy of George H. W. Bush "was more a matter of brilliant intuition and management of rapid change on the ground than an attempt to change the world" (Nye, 2006: 142). However, when the use of a tangible power was needed to preserve the US interests, the administration acted decisively, such as in its response to the invasion of Kuwait. In sum, Bush I successfully

managed the uncertain conditions of the early 1990s and achieved the important transition from bipolarity to unipolarity at no domestic cost to the US.

### **3.3.2. The NWO: Setting The Stage For The US Post-CW Hegemony**

First of all, it is important to note that this section does not claim that the NWO was a coherent strategy similar to the containment strategy. However, it concentrates on establishing whether or not the NWO served the US ambition to be the global hegemon at this critical transitional period. If the NWO met this objective, the debate around whether or not Bush had a grand strategy is irrelevant, as this thesis is concerned with the continuity of US hegemonic agenda rather than the abstract controversy about grand strategy.

In contrast to those who sees the NWO as a temporary plan, the establishment of a NWO “would be to the Bush presidency what the New Deal had been to Franklin D. Roosevelt presidency” (Hyland, 1999: 3). Such calls to manage problems of peace and war multilaterally have obviously been echoing in AFP literature since the National Security Council’s 1950 document, the (NSC-68) (Layne & Schewarz, 1993). In this context, President Nixon, for example, called in 1971 for the establishment of “a new and stable framework for international relations” (cited in Hastedt, 2000: 8). Therefore, it could be argued that President Bush and his administration did nothing new; rather they reused these ideas from the AFP legacy. The return to these ideas arose because of the pressure of the EoCW, which had ended the validity of the containment strategy. The US’s demand to replace the containment strategy was a vital need to accommodate its conceptual balance with such changes in world politics (Hendrickson, 1992; Nye, 1992; Kaufman, 2006). Therefore, the NWO was supposed to be a new foreign policy framework to remedy the US’s lack of post-CW strategic foresight and to give AFP the necessary consistency.

The world entered a new unpredictable period in the early 1990s resulting in the US’s explicit discourse revealing that it was not concerned with major powers but, as President Bush claimed, the enemy was the new “unpredictability and instability” (cited in LaFeber, 1994). To remedy such anxieties, the US required to stabilize the post-bipolar world system, or, more precisely, reshape the world order in harmonisation with its international agenda of hegemony and predominance (Huntington, 1993c;

McCormick, 1995; Hurst, 1999; Dunne, 2000; Davis, 2003; Bolton, 2008). Thus, Bush's FP was not visionless but was a grand strategy designed to establish a post-CW Pax Americana (Tunander, 2007). As Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi suggests, the "Pax Americana seems to be a de facto system of hegemony that no one ... can dare challenge" (2003, xx). The opportunity to personalise the NWO came with the Iraq occupation of Kuwait in 1990.

### **3.3.3. The Gulf War 1990/91: The NWO's Hegemonic Agenda**

The Middle-East, among other regions, has been pivotal to the US pre-eminence strategy since its emergence as a global power after WWII. Brzezinski (1997), President Bush's main advisor during the Gulf War, described the area from Portugal to Malaysia, including the Middle-East, as a grand chessboard on which America operates to guarantee its hegemony in the post-CW world. It is in such a geo-political context that the Gulf War must be understood. Accordingly, it is unsurprising that the US portrayed the Kuwaiti invasion, not only as a challenge to regional stability, but also to the entire post-CW order. Thus, the international community under the lead of Washington ought to deal with the problem. On the basis of this view, the US created a 'coalition of the willing' to defeat Iraq. However, it can be mooted that war was the achievement of another set of geo-political ends.

The Gulf War started at the EoCW and the collapse of the bipolar system. Therefore, while the war was ostensibly fought to defend Kuwaiti sovereignty, it also symbolically declared that the new American Century had started (Cumings, 1992; Hunter, 1992; Maynes, 2000a). The discussion inside the US cabinet, which followed the invasion of Kuwait, did not reveal the ideals of the NWO that President Bush later spoke about in his address on 29 January 1991. However, according to Brent Scowcroft, the mood was "well, this is a little conflict, we don't much like Kuwait anyway, they're not that friendly with us, they're halfway around the world" (cited in Chollet & Goldgeier, 2008: 9). Equally, if not more important, General Colin Powell, the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman at the time, admitted that the war was not essentially prepared to this end, but "the Iraqis sat there and we kicked the shit out of them" (cited in Chollet & Goldgeier, 2008: 12). This was clear since President Bush I said, "what is at stake is more than one small country; it is a big idea—a new world order" (1991). On the other hand, the US would be in need of such a war for expanding its geostrategic presence in the region.



Those who support such a perspective argue that the US had “begun luring Iraq into attacking Kuwait, to give it a pretext to launch the Gulf War” (Ralph, 2006: 264). The US indirectly encouraged Saddam Hussein to invade Kuwait when the US ambassador to Baghdad, April Glaspie, said to Saddam Hussein, in an interview held prior to the war that “we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait” (*The New York Times*, 1990) and this revelation might be understood as a “green light to Saddam Hussein about his hostile plan to invade Kuwait” (Frum & Perle, 2004: 186). This perspective of conspiracy became more acceptable after 2003, when the US created several artificial scenarios to legalise its old proposal to invade Iraq.

In the context of the establishment of US hegemony, the Gulf problem was an occasion to convey a message to friends and foes alike that the US would not hesitate to use force to maintain its own interests in the whole region and sustain its influence in the new era. Therefore, the war, irrespective of the rhetoric of the NWO, highlighted to the remaining powers America's unprecedented military capabilities and its political will (Hunter, 1992; Cox, 1995; McCormick, 1995; Maynes, 2000a). Therefore, to defeat the Iraqi army, that was ranked “a fourth-rate army”, the US sent “8 out of 18 Army divisions, 6 out of 9 Marine brigades, 6 out of 15 aircraft carrier battle groups, and 10 out of 22 Air Force tactical fighter wings” (Bello, 2005: 26). In the words of General Colin Powell, “the Gulf War was the war against the Russians we did not have. There were no trees and no hills, but that's what we were trained to fight” (cited in Chollet & Goldgeier, 2008: 12).

Relevantly, the administration did not fight the war alone. The rhetoric of the NWO and the multi-lateral action against Iraq were not only steps to serve a temporary agenda but were also very important techniques to stabilize the international system after the profound shock of the EoCW and to allay the fears of other major powers at the time (Davis, 2003; Colás & Saull, 2006). Although America would have been able to fight the war alone, the administration's response to the Kuwaiti invasion revealed its intention to share the responsibility for sustaining world peace and security with others. Thus, according to Gibbs (2001), America represented itself as a benign rather than predatory hegemon. This crisis-management style served America's long-standing aim of containing other major powers (previous allies and potential foes alike). Furthermore, by initiating the NWO rhetoric, the US did not offer the excuse for any potential rival to

work individually or collectively against its hegemonic desire (Martel, 2007; Chollet & Goldgeier, 2008). According to Peter J. Anderson, the other major powers, if they wanted, were “capable of causing US hegemony substantial trouble” (2003: 38). But Bush’s policy towards these powers not only relaxed them, but also encouraged them to cooperate, rather than challenge, the US leadership.

The NWO’s first war can be seen as part of the long-term strategy of hegemony, with the US seeking to secure the flow of crude oil and to control such a significant geo-strategic area (Cumings, 1992; Martel, 2007).<sup>1</sup> In this context, from the early stages of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the US was concerned about Saddam’s potential control over the region’s oil. Iraq after the invasion controlled nearly 20% of the world’s oil reserves, and if Saddam had also invaded Saudi Arabia his reserves would have doubled to 40%. In such a scenario, Saddam would have threatened not only US interests, but also European and Japanese interests. At the time, the US imported 20% of its oil from the region, while Europe’s dependence on the Gulf’s oil was 40% of its need and Japan’s was 70% (Martel, 2007). This was amongst the main reasons that encouraged the Europeans to contribute to the war and was also a crucial motivation for the US. Gaining control of the region’s oil resources not only served its economic interests, but also gave it the ability to control access to oil of its other potential adversaries. For this reason, the US did not want any regional power to be transformed into a regional hegemon. This is supported by the Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney’s statement in 1990 when he said, (cited in Scott, 2007: 180).

We’re there because the fact of the matter is that part of the world controls the world supply of oil, and whoever controls the supply of oil ... would have a stranglehold on the American economy and on indeed on the world economy.

The Americans were not only concerned about the Saddam regime, but also about the pervasive Chinese presence in the region. China established a significant presence in the region from the mid-1980s, when its relations with Saudi Arabia—the US’s traditional partner in the region—improved to a degree which saw Beijing supply the Kingdom with strategic weapons such as medium-term missiles (Mann, 2003; Gendzier, 2006). China also developed relations with Iraq, helping to develop its infrastructure,

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<sup>1</sup> After all, the war was not ignited for a temporary objective, as many have argued, but it was a continuity of the Eisenhower (1958) and Carter (1980s) doctrines that had pledged to defend the US interests in the Gulf region forcefully (Bromley, 2005; Clark, 2005).

especially the communication sector. Such developments led the US to recognize that China might emerge as a challenger to its interests in the region (Gendzier, 2006).

Accordingly, the US strategy behind the war was to establish a presence in the region, not only to control the huge reserves of oil, but also to prevent other big powers such as China (the main potential rival at the time) from gaining control of the region and undermining the American unipolar moment. Despite these efforts, Bush has been criticised more for “his mishandling of China than over any other foreign policy” (Hyland, 1999: 8). In this context, Bush’s wars (in Panama and Iraq) cannot be separated from the CW’s long-standing strategy of hegemony (Cumings, 1992; Kiani, undated; Martel, 2007). Cynthia Weber also suggests that Panama’s war was to rescue US post-CW hegemony because “the Panama Canal functions in Bush’s discourse as the reflective pool/screen that can mirror/project US hegemonic subjectivity” (1999: 98). In this milieu, Layne and Schwarz conclude that the efforts of the early 1990s to create a new strategy show that the “CW grand strategy is being reaffirmed ... rather than re-examined” (1993: 6). American policymakers, as some scholars argue, “could hardly imagine any alternative future” (Schulzinger, 2006: 457).

Finally, while the US rush into the region was not unsurprising, what actually surprised some observers was the way in which the Bush administration responded. Neo-cons, for instance, were unsatisfied that America defended its own interests by depending on an international coalition of more than 30 countries when it could have easily defeated Iraq by itself (Hunter, 1992; Hyland, 1999; Barry, 2004a; Reus-Smit, 2004). Disproving such views, the next section casts more light on the causes that led Bush to react as he did.

#### **3.3.4. Bush’s Multi-Lateralism: Between Choice And Necessity**

In the light of the said argument in the first chapter regarding the activation of the US hegemonic project after the CW, it is reasonable to ask: if the US was really interested in sustaining its hegemonic project after the CW, why did the Bush administration deal with the Gulf problem multi-laterally? If the US was really keen to be a hegemon, the logical action would have been to go it alone. A unilateral response to the Iraqi aggression was the preferable response for the interventionist wing inside and outside the administration. However, there were four major barriers to unilateral action.

The first deficit was the financial deficit. The administration was constrained by the massive budget deficit inherited from the Reagan administration and the economic recession of the early 1990s. President George Bush I would not or could not ask Americans to make more sacrifices to fund unilateral military action (Maynes, 2000a; Nau, 2002; Cohen, 2005). This can be understood from Bush's speech to Congress in September 1990, when he had said "the US had a vital interest in the conflict, but was unable to pursue it without support from an international coalition of states" (cited in Peterson, 1996: 67). As Fraser Cameron suggests, the lack of financial resources was "an important factor in the US response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the summer 1990" (2002: 15). Central amongst American objectives to build the NWO's coalition was the financing of the war. As a result of Bush's successful policy, Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait paid nearly 90% of the war's bill. Japan, alone, paid about US\$13 billion, while Germany's contribution was around US\$10 billion. The largest contribution of US\$37 billion was from the Gulf countries (Cumings, 1992; Hoff, 1994; Peterson, 1996; Atkinson, 1998; Hurst, 1999; Maynes, 2000b; Beets, 2002; Cameron, 2002; Wedgwood, 2002; Mann, 2003; Cohn, 2005; Daggett, 2008). This matter led some scholars to put it in the context of US weakness. Joan Hoff, for instance, argues that it was first time that the US "could not afford to finance its own participation in a war effort" (1994: 211). However, Bush succeeded in overcoming this weakness and achieved US interests at little domestic costs.

Second, the US built an international coalition because of the 'domestic consensus deficit', as it was difficult at the time to build a domestic consensus to support any unilateral action towards Iraq. Building an international coalition of the willing mobilized support from both Congress and the US public to accept military action. In addition, the administration was aware that it needed the support of the electorate in future elections (Khalilzad, 1995a-b; Maynes, 2000a).

The third deficit was the psychological barrier. The impact of the defeatist Vietnam Syndrome was still constraining a generation of the AFP elite, Congressmen and the public (Lafeber, 1992; Lindsay & Ripley, 1997a; Hurst, 1999). There was a lack of confidence, or a 'confidence deficit', in the immediate aftermath of the CW, but this problem is not related to the administration itself, or to the historical moment. It was

inherited from the Vietnam failure that advocated no more Vietnams (Crabb, 1988; Lafeber, 1992; Maynes, 2000a; Mueller, 2008).

The fourth deficit was US uncertainty about the reaction of the other powers, particularly China. The Bush administration aimed to allay the concerns of other major powers by engaging them in the Gulf War effort. However, it could also be argued that the US used the resources of other powers to achieve its own hegemonic agenda.

From the above discussion, it can be seen that the US multi-lateral perspective to deal with the crisis was not the result of a lack of commitment to the unipolar moment, but was a matter of necessity rather than a matter of choice. In what follows, the US's multi-lateral perspective will be given greater consideration.

### **3.3.5. Bush's Multi-Lateralism And The US Post-CW Hegemony**

As Walden Bello argues, if multi-lateralism leads to achievement of the objective of hegemony, then the US would not hesitate to apply it, which was actually the case in the Gulf War (2005). It enhanced America's CW experience that a unilateralist tendency needed occasionally to be "tempered by realization that alliances and multilateral strategies could be adopted if they advanced American interests" (Leffler, 2003: 1050). Therefore, the administration used multi-lateral discourse in order to gain UN approval to become involved militarily in Panama and Iraq (Brands, 2008) and built international coalitions to serve its own agenda. Because of this, the US guaranteed its interests and global leadership, without igniting resistance and, once Iraq was defeated, the allies left the region while America's troops remained and its direct political influence became stronger. It was a burden-sharing strategy (Hurst, 1999) to consolidate US post-CW hegemony. The Gulf War of 1991 allowed the US to deploy approximately 500,000 soldiers in the Persian Gulf, with their military facilities, and to operate permanent military bases in all the Arabic Gulf countries (Cox, 2002a, 2002b). In this context, in the post-1991 war, the US "was invited by the Saudi monarchy to maintain US military forces near Riyadh. At the same time, the Department of Defense stored vast quantities of munitions and military materials in Kuwait and Qatar" (Clark, 2005: 46).

Thus, the NWO was a useful slogan to serve the US hegemonic agenda. In this vein, the US used its political weight to influence the members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to pass Resolution 678, and to ensure support from its NATO allies. However,

it also paid US\$1billion to Russia to gain its support and approval (Kiani, undated; Bennis, 2000). On the other hand, the centrality of the US in the international coalition led to the marginalization of the UN's role (Hendrickson, 1992; Barry, 2002).

Although, according to Joffe, the rhetoric of the NWO was used in the Gulf, it was not the case in Serbia (1995: 94). The reason the US did not invoke the NWO in the former Yugoslavia was because of fears of being seen as a policeman (Cameron, 2002; Kaplan & Kristol, 2003); James Baker had justified the lack of US concern to the crisis by saying that "Serbs did not have Iraq's capabilities [and] we do not have a dog in that fight" (cited in Cameron, 2002: 17). This ambivalence led a number of critics to argue that the US "was guilty of double standards. It was ready to act quickly and decisively when its oil interests were threatened, but not otherwise" (Cameron, 2002: 17). However, Bush's unwillingness to intervene in the Yugoslavian war that started in March 1992 was not because of its insignificance to US strategy, but because of the re-election question. This was true because, once he took office, President Clinton started dealing with the Yugoslavian crisis. In fact, Bush's neglect of the Yugoslavian conflict that wrongly or rightly was understood as a green light "to Serbian ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Croatia" (Gelb, 2009: 64) gave President Clinton the pretext needed to intervene in the region on the ground of moral humanitarianism.

However, most importantly, the Gulf War was actually a warm-up to ready America to meet its commitments in the new century, rather than to establish a NWO. President Bush, once the dust of the war had settled down, announced that "by God, we have kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all" (cited in Lafeber, 1992: 17).<sup>1</sup> This statement highlights the hidden agenda behind the AFP at the time. John Dumbrell and

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<sup>1</sup> In fact, the efforts to remedy the "Vietnam Syndrome" - the main psychological barrier in the face of exercising armed FP in the post-CW era - had started before the Gulf War of 1990-1991. Western (2005) suggested that the US had been battling the Vietnam Syndrome since 1983 in Grenada. However, according to Dumbrell, the invasion of Panama in 1989 "was, in the President's own phrase, 'a warm up' to eradicate the Vietnam Syndrome and its inhibitions on US military action" (1997: 132). President George H. W. Bush, according to Melanson (2005) and Dumbrell (2008), proclaimed that the Vietnam syndrome lay buried in the desert sands of the Persian Gulf. In this context, Eagleburger elaborates on some points regarding the Vietnam Syndrome. He suggests that Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait because he thought that the world had changed after the CW and the US would not be able, or would even be unwilling, to do anything to defend Kuwait. However, "What Saddam did not know was that the American people, if not the entire political class, were no longer in the thrall of the Vietnam Syndrome" (1993: 17). According to such a view, the Gulf War just consolidated such a recovery.

David M. Barrett suggest that the NWO was an attempt to “institutionalize the termination of Vietnam Syndrome inhibition on the use of American military force” (1997: 43). In this context, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf acknowledged that, with the victory in the Gulf War, “the nation rediscovered the pleasure of adoring a military hero” (cited in Atkinson, 1998).

In sum, it is clear that that the US did not enter the war against Iraq to create a new multi-lateral world order. Rather, it was undertaken to enhance its position, preserve its interests and establish its absolute leadership in the post-CW world. Thus, there was no profound discontinuity with the US grand strategy since WWII. It was a plan to secure US hegemony in a changeable and uncertain era.

### **3.3.6. After The Gulf War: Preparing America For The Future**

True, Colin Powell, a few days after the fall of the Berlin Wall, proposed to change American strategy to a new hegemonic one, but this proposal/strategy was put on hold for a while. However, President Bush publicly accepted this strategy with few changes on August 2, 1990, the day that Iraq invaded its neighbouring country, Kuwait (Armstrong, 2002). However, after the victory over Iraq in 1991, the US desire to be the global hegemon became obvious. The psychological effects of the Vietnam Syndrome were removed and America acquired self-confidence. The US administration now needed to sustain its predominance and enhance its global hegemony. In contrast to those who have argued that the Bush administration pursued divergent policies, Layne suggests that the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) of the early 1990s was a “new NSC-68 intended to establish an intellectual framework for America’s post-Cold War grand strategy” (1993: 6). In contrast to America’s explicit discourse about the NWO and multi-lateralism, Mearsheimer argues that the DPG copied the elements of the CW strategy. The main difference, however, was that, instead of prohibiting the rise of a competitor within its Western sphere of influence, the US no longer tolerated the emergence of any competitor anywhere (Kaufman, 2006; Bacevich, 2007). According to May (2003b), the impact of the victory in the Gulf War appeared immediately in US military strategic thinking. Therefore, it can be argued that military force would still play a political role as significant as during the CW, if not more so (Betts, 2005). The interconnection between the Pentagon and foreign policy led scholars, such as Cameron (2002), Lobe & Barry (2002), to argue that the US intended to militarise its post-CW

foreign policy. Therefore, such efforts to use US military forces cannot be understood except in the context of US preparations to hold to the New American Century's obligations, because such a profound shift in AFP thinking took place when the strategic challenger to the US had eventually been removed.

After its multilateral perspective that helped to regain its self-confidence, the US turned to its permanent style of policy. The DPG proposal (strategy) was unilateralist, hegemonic, and aggressive, and some of its components have been demonstrated in today's AFP (Lobe & Barry, 2002). Importantly, the strategy marked the end of the cooperative hegemonic model, the international collective strategy of the CW (Tyler, 1992; Clark, 2005; Cohen, 2005), and initiated a new model of malignant hegemony (Henriksen, 2001; Guyatt, 2003). The document/strategy outlines the main objectives of American defence strategy for the forthcoming years. It calls for an unparalleled increase in the defence budget<sup>1</sup>; the safeguarding of the unipolar order; the blocking of the emergence of any global or regional contestant powers (e.g., Germany, Japan, China, or the EU); the pre-emptive, or even preventative, use of force; and the avoidance of a multi-lateral perspective in international affairs if this was not expedient to the US' dominant position. It also calls for an interventionist policy to solve international disputes, even if these do not directly affect American interests. This document demonstrated the neo-cons' early efforts to push the state toward an unprecedented phase of hegemony and unilateralism (Tyler, 1992, 1993; Hook & Spanier, 2000; Ryan, 2000; Gowan, 2002; Buchanan, 2003; Halper & Clark, 2004; Cohen, 2005; Right Web, 2008).

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<sup>1</sup> In contrast to the document's call, the US administrations during the early 1990s announced their intention to downsize the military budget and redirect these huge sums of money to other pressing needs (Rockman, 1997; Accordino, 2000; Dueck, 2006). In 1991, for example, the government had proposed cutting 22% of defence spending, and reducing the number of people in uniform by 26% in the space of five years (Lindsay & Ripley, 1997b & Stockton, 1997). Senator Edward Kennedy, in 1992, called for cutting US\$210 billion from defence spending over a few years and redirecting the funds for domestic services (Phillips *et al.*, 2007). Notwithstanding, even with such announcements, the US had done some symbolic reduction "at a slower rate than other countries" (Ikenberry, 2001a: 191). However, by 1992, a strong resistance to this tendency appeared in Washington, particularly in the Senate (Phillips *et al.*, 2007). This resistance is also apparent in government documents of the time. The reduction of the US military's personnel and spending must not affect the overall quality of US power, according to Cheney's (1993) Regional Defense Strategy (RDS) for the 1990s. He adds "high-quality personnel and technological superiority represent capabilities that would take decades to restore if foolishly lost in this time of reductions" (1993: 2). The Department of Defense (1993) had also shared the same idea and called for "avoiding the risks of precipitous reductions in defense capabilities and the overseas commitments", because of dangerous effects on America's attempts to improve both its overall security and interests.



This object of the document was to maintain the US' hegemonic position, because it was written when there was no remaining significant global challenge to American security and interests (Gaddis, 1991; Cheney, 1993; Ray, 2000). In the new era, the US needed to meet new commitments, and, to do so, it had to redefine carefully its defence strategy and aggrandize its military and political influence over the rest of the world (Gowan, 2002; Buchanan, 2003; Tunander, 2007). Therefore, it is rational to argue that the US's post-CW problem was a problem of expansion, not a problem of exhaustion. The early-1990s calls for military modernization and an increased defence budget can be seen to mirror the US's expansionist ambition (Stockton, 1997; Lindsay & Ripley, 1997b; Clark, 2005).

The DPG debunked the rhetoric of the NWO and highlighted America's constant hegemonic tendency. On the other hand, the explicit rhetoric regarding the new kind of risks that the US prepared itself to face at the time, such as terrorism, the ethnicisation of world politics and WMD was no more than a diversionary tactic to avoid unfavourable reactions by other major powers. America's real fear was the re-emerging of any new geopolitical competitor that could threaten its unprecedented unipolar moment.

In contrast to what has been said so far, some observers could argue that the President himself refused this document and it also faced a storm of criticism from Congress (Right Web, 2008). However, such contestation is worthless. On the one hand, it is ironic that the strategy was discussed in the National Security Council (NAC) and the President did not know about it. On the other hand, the presidential condemnation of the document was after it became public knowledge. Such a reaction is logical to avoid further criticism. True, the document was revised by Lewis Scooter Libby; however, its final edition "merely softened some of the hard edges of the earlier draft" (Right Web, 2008). Nevertheless, according to Clark, the idealistic objective of "a US global power, enforcing its role of dominance remained alive throughout the 1990s" (2005: 25).

In the context of the establishment of US hegemony, Peter Gowan (2002) argues that the DPG draft was leaked to the *New York Times* deliberately in 1992 for the same purpose as the Gulf War was fought, to send a message of US power to the other major powers. In the words of one leading scholar, (Cox, 2002a: 268):

[The war was not only to] deter likely enemies, but also to send an unambiguously clear message to more friendly regional players that the United States would not countenance any challenge to its hegemony. Much might have changed since the fall of Berlin Wall and the end of the USSR, but one thing had not: the American urge to remain number one.

### **3.4. The Clinton Strategy: A Change Within Continuity**

#### **3.4.1. Clinton's Lack Of FP Experience And The Turn In The US Hegemonic Strategy**

The concept of 'national security', at least since the early 1940s, "had served as a profoundly unifying concept, yoking foreign policy, military decisions, and domestic affairs; it was America's commanding idea" (Olson, 2004: 307). Because of this tradition, generations of scholars and policymakers alike were "limited by the only history they knew—that of the Cold War" (LaFeber, 1994: 753). In this way, I. M. Destler (1998), for example, saw Clinton's new geo-economic approach to AFP as a clear reaction to the Bush's realism and the rhetoric of the NWO. However, what is not in doubt is that Bush and Clinton strategies shared a common agenda and the same objectives.

While Bush's experience in foreign affairs "was to be held against him" (Donnelly, 2004: 80) in the 1992 election, Clinton's campaign advisor suggested, the EoCW, "made Clinton's inexperience in foreign policy much less important" (Hyland, 1999: 15). Brands captured such a paradox when arguing that "Clinton had one important advantage over Bush ... his lack of prior experience made the transition from Cold War to post-CW less traumatic" (2008: 101). Thus, Clinton was freed from the traditional concept of national security that had - to a large degree - constrained the capabilities of his predecessors and responded to calls that America should think and act differently because the international environment had changed (Kaysen, et al., 1991; Deibel, 1992; Nixon, 1992; Lake, 1993; Walt, 1998; Waltz, 2000). Although Clinton entered the White House on a domestic platform by claiming "It's the economy, stupid" (cited in Miller, 1994), in the space of a few years he recognized that there was no clear distinction between foreign and domestic politics (Lake, 1993; Carter, 1998; Dobson & March, 2001; Kaufman, 2006).

In contrast to those who posit that Clinton's geo-economics is a departure from his predecessor's policy, it can be argued that his approach was in line with his

predecessor's rather more than many recognise. His aim was to ready America to meet the challenges and opportunities of the early 21<sup>st</sup> century (Ikenberry, 1996; Brinkley, 1997; Clinton, 1997; Cavanagh, 2000; Clinton, 1997). However, it should be noted that Clinton's policies can be traced back to the Bush I era, when the US signed the Canada-US Free Trade agreement (CUSFTA) in 1989 as a regional cooperative entity prior to EoCW (Du Boff, 2003; Clarkson, 2006). In addition, James Baker III, the Secretary of State during the Gulf War, admitted that the war in the Gulf was about jobs (Hyland, 1999). Thus, Ryan (2000) suggests that George H. W. Bush's security perspective was not just that of a realist, but also of a liberal democratic internationalist. His FP agenda did not show any discontinuity with the CW strategy (Hurst, 1999). However, what is not in doubt is that the Bush's stay in office and the nature of the historical moment itself did not allow him to complete the job of remaking the world order and building US hegemony, which was therefore handed over to his successor, President Clinton.

This next section bridges the gap between the two eras. The paradoxical issue that appears to reveal a policy break between the two administrations resides over the scholars' separation of Bush's NWO and Clinton's geo-economics.

#### **3.4.2. Clinton's Geo-Economics: An Absolute Change Or A Change In Continuity?**

The lesson drawn from the Gulf War for Washington was that to be capable of guaranteeing absolute global leadership and to provide public good and a security umbrella around the world as a hegemon, the US had to rebuild its economic strength (McGrew, 1998; Stokes, 1998; Sheetz, 2006). The early 1990s were unlike the post-War era, when the US emerged as "a victorious creditor nation with little foreign economic competition". While at the EoCW, America suffered a serious economic recession, along with a significant budget deficit; its CW allies were revitalizing their regional economies and competing internationally with the US (Nye, 2000; Hoff, 2008). Although the US enjoyed unilateral military dominance, in economic terms it could not be considered to be hegemonic, with economic power being distributed between the US, Japan, and Europe (Stallings & Streeck, 1995; Smith, 2001). This status worried AFP decision-makers because military strength alone no longer "appears to translate directly into global political influence" (McGrew, 1998: 168).

After the Gulf war, the other powers accepted that competition with the US in the military domain was no longer possible. As a result, according to Anthony McGrew, “economic power rather than military power is emerging as a key currency of international politics” (1998: 168). Furthermore, the changing nature of the new era had also changed the traditional concept of geo-politics. John Peterson argues that “global telecommunications, economic interdependence, and long-range weapons delivery systems make ‘geopolitics’ seem irrelevant” (1996: 57). In consequence, the US realized that its key foreign adversaries in the post-Soviet era would not be political or military but economic (Cox, 1995; Sulfaro & Crislip, 1997). Accordingly, in contrast to those who criticize the administration’s reduction of military budget in the early 1990s, it would be plausible to say that it was a plan to strengthen America’s long-term strategy. It is true that “US spending on national defense fell from a decade high of 6.2 percent of GDP in fiscal 1986 to 3.2 percent of GDP in fiscal 1998” (Calleo, 2001: 186), however, it is also true that “the federal budget deficit fell from 5.1 percent of GDP to a surplus of 0.8 percent in the same period” (Calleo, 2001: 186).<sup>1</sup>

This tied into neo-liberal thinking which argues that America’s predominance is not about military strength alone, “but it also lies in its predominance within the advanced sectors of the postmodern economies, its matchless financial dexterity, and in particular, its technological prowess” (Calleo, 2001: 377). According to Lee Marsden, “a dynamic economy would enable America to retain its preeminent role militarily, diplomatically, and economically” (2005: 41). In turn, it intended to open new markets for exports and use its wealth, rather than its military might, to control and manage international affairs (Hanson, 1996; Stokes, 1998; Ryan, 2000). However, without a doubt, “the rationales of free trade and capitalist economic were used to disguise America’s hegemonic power and make it seems benign, or, at least, natural and unavoidable” (Johnson, 2004: 256).

Clinton’s perspective of the use of economic power to guarantee hegemony is not new, but it follows a pattern in AFP. America’s post-WWII hegemony was based on two

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<sup>1</sup> This phenomenon contradicts with what is known as a “military Keynesianism”: the view that by promoting effective demand and supporting monopoly profits military spending could help place a floor under US capitalism” (Foster et al, 2008). This strategy recovered the US economy from the great depression’s effects in WWII. The NSC-68 emphasized that “the economic effects of the [military spending] program might be to increase the gross national product by more than the amount being absorbed for additional military and foreign assistance purposes” (cited in Gibbs, 2006: 34). It is probably true because between 1950 and 1953, US military production was expanded seven times (Saul, 2008).

cornerstones, “massive military spending and massive overseas investment” (McCormick, 1995: 239). In this direction, the promotion of globalization, free market, trade and global capital flows was not a shift in AFP strategy, but it is the second aspect of the NWO of the 1990s. Moreover, economic power can also be used to limit adversaries. For example, since 1993, the US “has imposed new economic sanctions, or threatened legislation to do so, 60 times on 35 countries that represent 40 per cent of the world population” (Maynes, 1999: 517). Accordingly, in opposition to those such as Khalilzad (1995a), who argue that Clinton came to the White House without a clear FP strategy and challenging those who have seen the Clinton administration’s call for continuing strong US leadership in the post-CW world as rhetoric (Volgy & Imwalle, 1995: 823), this section puts forward the argument in line with Cameron that Clinton and his advisors restored “the American economy to good health [as] an essential prerequisite for foreign policy” (2002: 19). The administration’s contribution to the establishment of the American hegemony in reality resided on the reprioritization of the AFP agenda and setting economic concerns at the heart of US geo-politics (Brinkley, 1997; Destler, 1998; Calleo, 2001; Judis, 2004). This shift was needed as the traditional distinction between economic and political issues was no longer beneficial. US security and its way of life depended on a prosperous economy (Christopher, 1995; Ryan, 2000; Dueck, 2006). On the other hand, “seizing a dominant position in the globalizing economy [would be] translated directly into political pre-eminence and offered the best guarantee for US national security” (Bacevich, 2002: 98).

#### **3.4.2.1. A Global Economic Regime To Drive US Hegemony**

In contrast to Paul M. Kennedy’s recommendation that the US must retreat to avoid the fate of other hegemonic powers, the engagement strategy “called upon the country to compete, not retreat” (Nau, 2001: 285), and “to make trade a priority element of American security” (Bello, 2005: 27). It was in this context that Mexico was included in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which in 1993 expanded the previous agreement with Canada (Cavanagh, 2000; Du Boff, 2003; Clarkson, 2006; Bacevich, 2007). Geo-economically, the NAFTA agreement created a “regional trade block discriminating against Europe’s interests persuaded the EU to engage more seriously with Washington’s trade demands” (Clarkson, 2006: 211). As a consequence, NAFTA’s negotiation was also used to jumpstart other global negotiations, such as the

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and in 1994 the US signed the Uruguay Round. This was quickly followed in 1995 by the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which Clinton hailed as promoting economic renewal for the US (Cox, 2008; Paterson et al., 2010). The Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was another economic space that advanced US interests regionally and globally. In this context, Mark Sheetz argues that “If globalization refers to the impact of foreign influences across national borders, be they economic, political, societal, cultural, or information-related, then globalization, in one sense, amounts to little more than an expression of US hegemony” (2006: 4).

In addition to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the new regional agreements were used to expand the liberalization and privatization of world economies by imposing structural reform in most countries, in order to open up their economies to globalization and foreign investment flows (Gardner, 2004; Smith, 2005b). They not only shifted “emphasis in security from geo-politics to geo-economics” (Ralph, 2000: 33), but also “represented the post-Cold war apogee of US hegemony” (Clarkson, 2006: 211). According to Dumbrell, “geoeconomics increasingly drives geopolitics” in contrast to the CW’s model in which “geopolitics drove geoeconomics” (2008: 89). These structural changes helped to overcome the fiscal deficits that hindered the Bush administration from acting unilaterally in 1990-91 and readied the stage for the following administration to act more unilaterally. By the end of the 1990s, the US economy had enjoyed a decade of “uninterrupted growth, the third longest expansion in the nation’s history” (O’Connor & Sabato, 2004: 721). During the CW the leader of the free world found an unprecedented opportunity to expand its leadership to include the entire world (Barry, 2000; Nau, 2001) and the US economy transcended the German and Japanese miracles of earlier decades (Cavanagh, 2000: 57).

#### **3.4.2.2. The US Economy: Restored Healthiness**

Although budget deficit had been a chronic problem since 1969 (Chace, 1996, 1997a), the main increase in the US budget deficit started during the Reagan administration (1981-89), because of the severe recession of the early 1980s and the increase in military expenditure (Cline, 1994; Chace, 1996; Du Boff, 2003). The US deficit “rose at

a rapid rate of 6% annually” (Cline, 1994: 12), and jumped dramatically “from \$9 billion in 1981 to \$207 billion just two years later” (Smith, 2005b: 123). By 1992 it was nearly US\$300 billion, the largest in the country’s history (Chace, 1996; Ambrose & Brinkley, 1997). As a result, the US “moved from being a creditor nation to being the largest debtor nation in the world” (Cameron, 2002: 15). Reagan’s policy left the state “dependent on foreign investors to keep its economy afloat” (Cohen, 2005: 13). Therefore, by 1989, “America’s foreign debt stood at \$500 billion” (Schonberg, 2003: 176). However, according to Douglas Kellner, during the Reagan presidency, “the national deficit was doubled to \$2 trillion” while during the George H. W. Bush administrations, the deficit doubled again to “an almost unconceivable record \$4 trillion dollar debt” (2003: 15). Not only budget deficit, but also trade deficit was a big problem faced US economy in the early 1990s. Andreas Falke argues that “the trade deficit with Japan was over \$60 billion” in the late 1990s, and the deficit with China jumped from US\$3.5 billion to almost US\$57 billion in the space of a decade from 1988 to 1998 (2001: 21).

Owing to these weaknesses, it was feared that the US might be on its way to losing its global hegemony in the post-CW era. In this context, several critics warned from the very early 1990s that the US would always be a “crippled giant abroad” until it could manage the federal budget deficit and trade imbalance (Rostow, 1991; Hamilton, 1991; Cox, 2002b). However, Clinton’s geo-economics approach allayed such worries and overcame American economic weaknesses.

In line with the early calls to remedy the budget deficit, the administration’s efforts led to breaking “the national habit of ever-increasing budgetary deficit” (Calleo, 2001: 377). It announced in 1998 that the state had ended a red period of deficit and entered a black period of surpluses (O’Connor & Sabato, 2004). As figure 3.1 shows, it was almost US\$300 billion in 1992 but had fallen to US\$255 billion in 1993. It dropped again from US\$117 billion in 1996 to reach just US\$70 billion in 1997 (Chace, 1996-1997). The US budget was balanced in 1998, four years earlier than had been projected, and in financial year (FY) 2000, there was “more than \$200 billion surplus” (Pfiffner, 2006: 47).




Figure3. 1 US Budgetary Deficit and Surplus (in billions of US 1996 dollars).  
Data from: (O'Connor & Sabato, 2004: 729).

On the other hand, in order to remedy the trade deficit, Clinton's tough trade stance eventually strengthened and revitalized the US economy and kept the trade deficit with its main economic competitors within acceptable levels (see figure 3.2). The US endorsed an assertive or even aggressive trade policy with its allies and economic partners to balance the trade deficit (Stokes, 1998; Nau, 2001) and this hardline policy nearly led to an unparalleled trade war when the US "threatened 100 percent tariffs if Japan did not open up the auto and auto-parts sector which contributed to 58 percent of the trade.




Figure3. 2 US Trade Partners in 1999  
Data from (Wittkopf et al., 2003: 219).

In consequence, the US, as said in the previous chapter, enjoyed an exceptional period of economic growth. The openness of the US economy also motivated capital flow from outside. Figures show that, from just US\$12 billion invested by foreigners in US business in 1980, private investment by foreigners had risen to approximately US\$200 billion annually by 1998, and by the early 21<sup>st</sup> century, the US "received more than twice as much foreign investment as any other country in the world" (Sowell, 2007: 462). On the other hand, America's private foreign direct investment abroad was about



US\$1.207 trillion in 1998 (in 2001 terms) (Rogowsky et al., 2001). Since 1994 the US “exported more than any other nation” (Stokes, 1998: 164), and its “stock market soared by more than 300 percent between 1990 and 1999” (O’Connor & Sabato, 2004: 721). Between 1993 and 1996, “more than 200 new market opening agreements helped to create 1.6 million American jobs” (Brinkley, 1997: 3). The structure of the US economy also changed. By 1995, business in commodities, services and financial tools represented approximately 30 per cent of America’s GDP, compared with only 6-8 percent during the mid-1950s (Walker, 1996). Exporting of services equalled more than \$80 billion once President Clinton took office in his second term, compared with only \$58 billion in 1992 (Brinkley 1997). The impact of these improvements can be seen in the US GDP’s increase during the 1990s (see figure 3.3).




Figure3. 3 US Gross Domestic Product GDP, Fiscal Years 1990 to 2001 (in billions of US dollar)  
Data from: [http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/us\\_gdp\\_history](http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/us_gdp_history)

These shifts led John Cavanagh to argue that in the late 1990s “everything that should be up is up—Gross Domestic Product (GDP), capital spending, incomes, the stock market, employment, exports, consumer and business confidence. Everything that should be down is down—unemployment, inflation, interest rates” (2000: 57). In this context, in early 1997, the economic growth rate was 5.6%, and the indicators of inflation fell to a lower rate (less than 4% in the same period). During this period, the unemployment rates also significantly dropped to the lowest level in 25 years - less than 6% in the mid-1990s, falling further to just 4% in 2000 (see figure 3.4). American companies made huge profits and dominated the broader global market. America also

shared one-third of the entire world's production (nearly 30%) and its exports increased from 9.9% to 12.1% of the US GDP (Bergsten & Henning, 1996; Chace, 1996, 1997a; Naím, 1997/1998; Cavanagh, 2000).




Figure 3.4 US Unemployment Rates, 1990 to 2000

Data from: United States Bureau of Labour Statistics, (Available at <http://actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/seura/usunemp.htm>); (Cavanagh, 2000).

These improvements, in addition to the promotion of the free global market and globalisation, played a vital role in transferring the US into a phase of unprecedented absolute hegemony (economically and militarily) in the 1990s and beyond. If the US's geo-strategic objective since the early CW had been to prevent the rise of any hegemonic power, then the Clinton administration maintained this objective, not only by prohibiting the rise of any geo-political rival, but also by stretching it to include the blocking of the potential emergence of any economic hegemon that could challenge the US in its unipolar moment (Stokes, 1988). Clinton's revitalization of the US economy was also seen as a very important dimension to AFP not only at the time, but also for the following administration. From the Clinton administration officials' viewpoint, the US was not only a dominant power but also an indispensable nation. Although they did not actually use the phrase 'hegemonic stability', in terms of practical policy, the US was a real hegemon (Deuck, 2006). The key question is: without Clinton's efforts to ready the US economically to bear the burden of its global hegemony, would it have been possible for the Bush II administration to respond to 9/11 as it did? If not, who can accept the argument that Clinton's geo-economic perspective diverted US strategy in the 1990s?

### **3.4.2.3. Clinton's Wilsonianism: The Legitimation Of The US's Hegemonic Agenda**

The En-En strategy listed the main US objectives in the 1990s: the enhancement of US security; the expansion of democracy and the free market abroad; and the promotion of economic prosperity at home (White House, 1994). Such a mixture of idealistic and realistic objectives is not unprecedented in US history and more than two centuries of AFP (Crabb & Holt, 1992; Wiarda, 1997). However, scholars aroused an intense storm of controversy and criticism of the Clinton strategy by arguing that such a combination was the main reason behind AFP fragmentation at the time (for instance, see Cox, 2000; Farrell, 2000; Smith, 2000b). In contrast, the National Security Strategy (NSS) of 1996 was clear when it stated "all of America's strategic interests ... are served by enlarging the community of democratic and free-market nations" (White House, 1996). For this reason, democracy enlargement was not only ranked among AFP's supreme objectives, but was also linked to US geo-political interests (Christopher, 1995; Gerges, 1999; Travis, 1998; Vanaik, 2007). It has been a polestar for AFP since the EoCW because it served the US geo-political agenda in Eastern Europe, the former USSR satellite states and the Middle East (Bakhash, 1993; Maynes, 1996; Travis, 1998; Vanaik, 2007).

For the Clinton administration, democracy and globalization were more connected than many observers may have recognised: while "democracy provided the foundation for the post-CW international community, trade and capital flows were seen as forces of political reform and integration" (Ikenberry, 2004b: 622). On the other hand, Wiarda (1997) argues that, without such an idealistic component, AFP may have lacked the support needed domestically and engendered resistance globally. In terms of tactics, listing democracy as a FP objective gave the US a moral excuse, and good cause, to intervene wherever it needed without having to face problems. Therefore, without a countervailing USSR, the US had "a more aggressive interpretation of the need to promote democracy" (Vanaik, 2007: 17).

In sum, the above discussion shows that Clinton's liberal and moral policy did not represent any discontinuity from or contradiction with AFP's mainstream since WWII. Clinton's promotion of geo-economy and democracy was complicit with traditional geo-political concerns, and Wilsonian discourse, such as liberty, democracy and human rights, had been used to legitimate and enhance the US agenda everywhere. David

Calleo was correct when he argued that under Clinton “American imperialism wore its Wilsonian face” (2001: 377).

### **3.4.3. En-En Strategy's Tangible Face: “Speak Softly And Carry A Big Stick”**

The discussion in the previous section reveals that the Clinton administration's approach to peace and security avoided traditional power politics and fitted exactly within the liberal and Wilsonian tradition (Dumbrell & Barrett, 1997; Cox, 2000; Litwak, 2007). However, although the Clinton administration “saw the world as much less hostile than either Bush administration did, it was not able to radically transform the military, reorient doctrine, or decrease the American military presence around the globe” (Crawford, 2005). In fact, Clinton's foreign and defence policy was not an entire shift from his predecessor's doctrine; it represented continuity rather than change (McGrew, 1998). The liberalist commitment for promotion of free trade and the market and the idealist commitment for enlarging democracy and enhancing human rights were coupled with an unprecedented willingness to use military force unilaterally if needed (Gowan, 2002; Posen, 2003; Dueck, 2006; Falk, 2007; Goldgeier & Chollet, 2008).

The core concepts of Bush's DPG strategy clearly reappeared when the remarks of Anthony Lake, the National Security Advisor (NSA), made at Johns Hopkins University in 1993. Then, these concepts found their way into policymaking circles (Khalilzad, 1995a; Gowan, 2002). The main components of the DPG and the Pentagon's two-war doctrine during the Bush administration were adopted by the Clinton administration's strategy. In this way, the Bottom-up Review (BUR) of 1993 had showed the administration's intention to keep the US military ready to fight and win two simultaneous regional wars, and offered several suggestions to prepare America for the future (White House, 1995; Department of Defense, 1997; Isenberg, 1998; Hartung, 2003; Johnson et al., 2003; Caprioli & Trumbore, 2005). This tendency was clear in all NSSs of the 1990s: it not only called for maintaining the quality of the US's CW military power but also pledged to increase military strength as a guarantor of US security and leadership in the post-CW world (White House, 1990, 1991, 1994, 1995, 1996, 2000).

By the time of the mid-term election in 1994, the Clinton administration had changed course and refused any further defence budget decreases. It pledged to keep the US

army unparalleled in terms of training, apparatus, and readiness to fight (Clinton, 1994, 1997, 1999). The administration requested Congress to increase the defence budget by US\$1.7 billion for FY 1994 and by US\$2.6 billion for FY 1995. The administration also called for an increase in the defence budget by US\$25 billion to improve the quality of military life over the next few years (White House, 1995). Clinton's domestic politics as a main focus lasted a short time before the emphasis shifted to FP, and his earlier calls to decrease defence spending also dramatically changed (Lindsay & Ripley, 1997b; Rockman, 1997; Phillips et al., 2007). While it is true that the defence budget had declined from the CW's peak of 28% to only 15% of the total government budget in FY 1997, as shown in the previous chapter, this did not mean that American capabilities differed from those of the CW. Perhaps most importantly, "the Clinton Administration presided over the longest sustained boom in US history, so that even a relatively huge outlay on defence became, at less than 3.5 per cent of GDP, quite inoffensive in economic and, more particularly, political terms" (Huisken, 2006).

The similarity between Clinton and his predecessors was also clear in his FP conduct. For instance, Layne (1993: 6) argues that there is no evidence that the Clinton administration's view of unipolarity was different from that of the Bush administration. Reus-Smit (2005) and Marqusee (2007) argue that the US's willingness to play the role of the world sheriff at the time was obvious and AFP showed the same conduct of unilateralism and global dominance. The US's strategy of assertive multi-lateralism that was promoted once the administration took office in 1993 soon turned out to be more pragmatic, internationalist, unilateralist or even hegemonic under domestic pressure and international calculations (Barry, 2000; Maynes, 2000b; Ikenberry, 2003; Kaplan & Kristol, 2003; Bello, 2005; Betts, 2005). In this context, Madeleine Albright, Clinton's Secretary of State, argued (1999: 14):

If our choice is always to wait until everything is perfect and all the downsides have turned rightsides up, waiting is all we would ever do. We have long since passed the time in our history when we could count on the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans to guarantee our security; when we could protect our interests by maintaining a few key relationships, principally in Europe; and when we could safely take a reactive approach to most events in most places most of the time. Our era demands a dynamic approach that recognizes the global nature of our interests, the rapidity with which new threats may emerge and the extent to which progress in one area can lead to breakthrough in another.

This kind of thinking and implementation not only represented continuity with the elder Bush's strategy, but also laid the foundations for the post-2001 pre-emptive doctrine that has been largely utilized to legitimise the US war on terror. Such a growing tendency led Charles William Maynes in 1998 to warn against the new militarization of AFP. He observed that "the surplus of power that the United States enjoys is beginning to metastasize into an arrogance toward others that is bound to backfire" (cited in Knight, 2000). Some official indicators at the time demonstrated that the US depended on military power to achieve its objectives, rather than other instruments. For example, in FY 1998, Congress appropriated US\$247.7 billion for the Department of Defense DOD compared with only US\$1 billion for the Department of State (DOS) and \$3 billion for the CIA (Jones, 1998). In this milieu, Marqusee (2007) argues, the use of force abroad during the Clinton presidency was greater than that of any post-Vietnam predecessors. According to Dumbrell, Clinton "ordered US forces into 25 separate operations" by the end of 1995, compared with only 17 in Reagan's two presidency terms and just 14 during the George H. W. Bush presidency (2002: 52). By March 1999, when the air campaign against Serbia began, Clinton had "notified Congress 46 times that he was deploying US troops abroad to face imminent hostilities", compared to President Ford who notified Congress "only 4 times, Carter once, Reagan 14 times, and Bush just 7 times" (Borosage, 2000: 12). Thus, Barry argues that President Clinton was also "the most interventionist, sending troops on more foreign missions than any of his predecessors" (2000: xvii). The Department of Defense also declared that the US would continue "using all dimensions of its influence to shape the international security environment" to protect its crucial interests. Key among these was the prevention of the "emergence of a hostile regional coalition or hegemon" (1997). Charles Knight asserts that AFP's hegemonic tendency was more obvious in the US defence strategies of the 1990s than during the CW. In fact, there was a growing political tendency in Washington to remake a new global environment through military force. For example, the US had "invaded Haiti, for nothing, but only to say that America was not a paper tiger" (2000). For this reason, Anthony Lake, Clinton's NSA, said prior to the invasion: "our action in Haiti will send a message far beyond our region, to all who seriously threaten our interests" (cited in Ryan, 2000: 188). Lake's assertion found its reasoning in the 1990s political discourse regarding defence strategy.

The continuity of AFP also appeared in the humanitarian intervention, or 'military humanism', that was largely adopted during the Clinton administration. It can be described as the equivalent of the CW discourse of the defence of freedom and democracy against the evil of Communism. As Achin Vanaik describes, it can also be linked to the post-9/11 'regime change' doctrine (2007: 16). Journalist Paul Starobin describes Clinton's humanitarian intervention as "liberal hawkism" (cited in Dumbrell, 2002: 43). Such rhetoric of humanitarian intervention was also found in President George H. W. Bush's political discourse. As the US forces led the military operation in the Gulf, the President announced in Congress: "We are Americans; we have a unique responsibility to do the hard work of freedom" (cited in Marqusee, 2007: 105). The Clinton administration was, in fact, "pushing an American agenda (and occasionally American soldiers) onto the rest of the world" (Guyatt, 2003: 233) to consolidate the US position as a hegemonic power. Therefore, Benjamin Cohen concludes that Clinton's strategies of multi-lateralism, regionalism, and unilateralism "may in practice be made to function as complementary components of an effective global policy—three cards in a potentially winning hand" (cited in Dumbrell, 2000: 45).

In fact, humanitarianism served the overall US global strategy. In contrast to the criticism of candidate Bush II's political advisor in the 2000 presidential election, Condoleezza Rice that Clinton had no perspective of using force abroad (The Economist, 19 February 2000), it could be suggested that her view was no more than electoral rhetoric. She knew that the strategic foresight behind Clinton's intervention abroad was the expansion of US strategic presence and the enhancement of US hegemony. Therefore, following the former Yugoslavia crisis of 1999, the US enjoyed military presence in several states, such as Hungary, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Albania, Croatia, Kosovo and Bosnia, in addition to its continuing presence in Europe, Asia and Japan (Henriksen, 2001; Kagan, 2007). This wider strategic presence did not exist several decades previously. Such military wide-deployment was set up not only to deter or defeat enemies but also to contain and manage allies and to protect and impose influence globally in the new American Century (Cox, 2002a, b).

In sum, after the EoCW, American global presence and influence did not retreat but expanded to new regions, such as Eastern Europe and the Middle East in addition to its continuing deployment in Europe and Japan (Kagan, 2007). The US, from the Clinton

administration officials' viewpoint, was not only a dominant power, but also an indispensable nation. They did not actually use the phrase "hegemonic stability," but in terms of practical policy, the US was a real hegemon (Deuck, 2006). In all circumstances, the economic agenda was enhanced by the argument of a democracy-advancing policy.

#### **3.4.3.1. Clinton's Strategy Toward Collective Organisations: Multi-Lateralism Or Hegemony**

Just as the Clinton administration utilised the world economic organisation to advance its own interests, the UN and NATO also were used to achieve its geo-political ends. In contrast to its explicit rhetoric of multi-lateralism was the declaration by Madeleine Albright, the US ambassador to the UN, in 1995, that the UN is an instrument of AFP (Cited in Bennis, 2000). Following in the steps of its predecessor, the Clinton administration used the multi-lateral organisation to advance its hegemonic agenda, since it offered solutions to the problems of finance and legitimacy. For example, the UN was used to legitimise the US's intervention in Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti (Maynes, 2000b; Brands, 2008).

However, the Clinton administration also weakened the UN as a constraint to its hegemonic strategy. Early in Clinton's second term in office, the US was "in arrears to every major international body except ... NATO" (Maynes, 2000b: 86). In March 1999, "Washington's debt to the UN totalled \$1.6 billion" (Bennis, 2000: 111), or "61 percent of all arrears" (Maynes, 2000b: 86). Moreover, while it asked others to pay their contributions to the peacekeeping costs, the US reduced its contribution to fund UN peacekeeping from 31% to 25% during 1995 (Christopher, 1995).

On the other hand, while the US promoted human rights political discourse and championed the creation of the ad hoc Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994, it opposed the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Ikenberry, 2003; Malone, 2003). Furthermore, while the Clinton administration joined the rest of the world's countries in ratifying the Ottawa Convention on the Banning of Land Mines in June 1997, the Senate opposed the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1999, and showed its opposition to the Kyoto Protocol (KP) (Ikenberry, 2003).



More importantly, on many occasions the US acted internationally without clear authorisation from the UNSC. Its intervention in Haiti in 1994, the missile strikes in Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998 and several missile strikes in Iraq (for example, in 1993, 1996 and 1998), and in Kenya were all mounted unilaterally without permission of the UN but were committed under the right of self-defence. The US-led air strikes against Serbia of 1999 were also carried out without a clear resolution from the UNSC (Kiani, no date; Dumbrell, 1997; Wedgwood, 2002; Ikenberry, 2003; Kohut & Stokes, 2006).

In the same context, while the US's involvement in Somalia was conducted under the UN umbrella, its unilateral withdrawal was not. The US not only failed to stop the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, but also impeded the involvement of the international community in the case. This was not only because of the US's bitter experience in carrying out Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, but also because of the insignificance of Africa in the US post-CW strategy at the time. Somalia did not possess the natural resources that Iraq had and the African Horn had lost its strategic importance in the US strategy after the CW (Hurst, 1999; Burgess, 2002; Malone, 2003; Judis, 2004; Kohut & Stokes, 2006; Murphy, 2007).

Therefore, by using the UN as a political scapegoat and hesitating to pay its bill, the US "weaken[ed] both the UN's reputation and its capacity relative to its expanded peacekeeping responsibility" (Sewall, 2002: 192). However, this undermining of the UN was preferable for the US because it enhanced its unipolar moment. In fact, with no great threat on the horizon, there was no need for allies. Therefore, according to Charles W. Maynes, American policymakers were "even less likely to accept the constraints of international institutions and obligations" (2000b: 86).

NATO was also used to marginalize the UN's commanding role in international politics and to offer legitimacy to the US's preferred action outside the UNSC (Reisman, 1999/2000; Bennis, 2000; Sewall, 2002). In this context, President Clinton repeatedly stated that the US and NATO were "operating on behalf of the world community" (Cited in Reisman, 1999/2000: 40). Consequently, the US, through NATO, legitimized the air strikes of 1999 during the Kosovo crisis (Reisman, 1999/2000; Hendrickson, 2002; Wedgwood, 2002). Secretary of State William Cohen asserted on 11 June 1998 that the US and NATO "had the right to use force ... without the approval of United Nations Security Council or Congress" (cited in Hendrickson, 2002: 119). However,

Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General at the time, “did not see fit to pronounce on the legitimacy of the war, probably because NATO approved and participated in it” (Kohut & Stokes, 2006: 194). For several observers, while it was NATO’s war, “it was clearly very much America’s war” (Marcus, 2000: 79).

From the above discussion, it is clear that Clinton’s policy did not lose its way. It was in continuity with the Bush administration’s agenda and neither administrations’ agenda represented any discontinuity with AFP since the end of WWII. Consequently, it seems logical to argue that “Clinton’s enlargement policy [was] already catapulting America into the next millennium” (Brinkley, 1997: 5).

### **3.5. Bush II’s Pre-9/11 Policy: Preparing America For An Unprecedented Hegemonic Phase**

The consequences of Clinton’s strategy were immediately reflected in his successor’s policy. The US was no longer constrained by its economic weakness and it was enthusiastic to abrogate the previous multi-lateral barriers to its power. This was clear during George W. Bush’s presidential campaign and during his eight months in office prior to 9/11. In contrast to his proclamation during the presidential campaign that the US must be a humble nation, George W. Bush’s policy showed no change from his predecessors’ agenda: hegemony and supremacy. Prior to 9/11, the characteristics of the post-CW era AFP became clear. These will now be examined.

First, the US intended to turn its back on the international community, either by separating itself from previous international commitments or by showing its intention to review or abrogate international treaties. The US declared that it might withdraw from any treaty that did not fit its own concepts and interests. These treaties included the ICC,<sup>1</sup> the Protocol on Biological and Chemical Weapons, the Kyoto Protocol and the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972. Most importantly, the administration treated international institutions such as the UN, the WTO, the G8, and NATO with gentle contempt. During the early period, Bush also declared that the US would be withdrawing from the peace negotiations in the Middle East and Northern Ireland and

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<sup>1</sup> According to Barry (2003) and Johnson (2004), the US’s withdrawal from the ICC treaty can be understood as part of the US strategic transformation toward unilateralism. Therefore, this avoids any multilateral constraints on American power in its unipolar moment. These steps echo Reagan’s early efforts to establish US unilateralism when America “rejected the Law of the Sea Treaty and the International Seabed Authority” (Buchanan, 2007: 159).

would not send any more troops to the Balkans (Boniface, 2001; Teixeira, 2001; Bremmer, 2002; Allen, 2003; Anderson, 2003; Guyatt, 2003; Hartung, 2003; Watson, 2003; Young, 2003; Boyle, 2004; Johnson, 2004; Daalder & Lindsay, 2005a; Dumbrell, 2005; Gaddis, 2005; Melanson, 2005; Rudalevige, 2005; Mingst, 2006; Singh, 2006; Tokatlian, 2006; Falk, 2007; McMurtry, 2007).

Second, after Bush took office, the movement toward modernizing US military capabilities took place. However, Bush's blueprint for the transformation of the US military was clear even two years prior to 9/11. On 23 September 1999, in his important speech at the Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina, candidate Bush vowed to construct a new advanced missile defence system, new advanced high-tech weaponry and a new strategic military dogma to make the mobilization of America's heavy land troops easier and effective. In early 2001, once he was inaugurated as President, Bush announced that his Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, had been given broad authorization to put the proposal articulated in his Citadel speech into practice (Klare, 2003). At the same time, his administration continued the efforts to build up the missile defensive shield and carried on the attempts to weaponize space. Furthermore, the Bush administration introduced modifications to its nuclear posture that had banned the US from using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states (Teixeira, 2001; Strategic Comments, 2002b; Guyatt, 2003; Boggs, 2006; Ruggie, 2006; Vanaik, 2007). In this context, Jonathan Schell concludes that, with such modifications (2002):

the United States, safe behind its missile shield, will, at its sole discretion and unconstrained by treaties or even consultation with allies ... protect its territory and impose its will in the world by using its unmatched military power to coerce or destroy, if possible by preemptive attack, every challenger.

Thus, "the threat of military power must now be exercised as never before to ensure American supremacy globally" (Vanaik, 2007: 15).

It should be pointed out that, during the Clinton presidency, the Republicans had criticized the US military interventions in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo; however, once they had control both of Congress and presidency, "the US government took a tough line" on foreign policy issues, even before the attacks of 9/11 (Kohut & Stokes, 2006: 218). Such toughness was apparent in the presidential discourse from the beginning of his presidency: President George W. Bush "prided himself as a decisive figure compared to what came before. He described the post-CW period prior to his presidency

as ‘years of repose’ and ‘years of sabbatical’” (Chollet, 2007: 5). He claimed that his presidency would be a corrective process “to poor decisions and mistakes of the past” (Cited in Chollet, 2007: 5). David Gergen has observed that recent history shows that “the First Hundred Days ... are the most precious time in the life of a president to define who he is and what he is seeking to achieve through his leadership. In those fourteen weeks, more than any other time in his presidency, he sets the stage for his entire stewardship” (2000: 128). If one accepts this view, then it can be reasonably argued that the time of explicit US hegemony had arrived.

From the discussion, it is clear that the 1990s administrations followed their predecessors, borrowed from the past and, in defining strategies for the new era, borrowed the ideas and the conceptions and intended to achieve the same ends. In consequence, themes such as liberty, freedom, democracy and peace predominated in the US's official discourse at the time (Ryan, 2000; Callinicos, 2003; Wittkopf et al., 2003). In the post-CW era, two administrations followed the same technique to establish US hegemony. Presidents George H. W. Bush and Clinton differed in styles but pursued the same agenda. Bush, the realist, justified military operation in the Persian Gulf by Wilsonian discourse and Clinton, the liberalist, used military force abroad more than Reagan and Bush (Cameron, 2002; Dumbrell, 2005).

### **3.6. Conclusion**

This chapter contrasts with the majority of AFP's mainstream literature that has argued that the US lost its strategic direction and entered a decade of disorientation and fragmentation between 11/9 and 9/11, and is in line with Chollet's (2007) call for rethinking AFP in the 1990s, because, as he suggested, American unilateral hegemony after 9/11 would have been impossible without the 1990s political improvements. This chapter argues that both Presidents Bush I and Clinton represented continuity rather than the opposite, which many scholars maintain.

President Bush I's (fragmented policy) - as it appears to some scholars - was more coherent than many may recognise. Owing to the nature of the period (1989-1992) as a transitional time that might bring unpredictable changes, the Bush I administration's urgent task was twofold. The first task was to facilitate the world's calm transition from

the bipolar system of the CW to the unipolar system of the post-CW and the second was to establish the firm foundations of the NWO that suited the US unipolar moment.

Bush's FP perspective demonstrated that America's CW grand strategy of hegemony was being reaffirmed rather than re-examined. The NWO was in fact in the service of American hegemony. Bush's multilateralism was a matter of necessity, owing to several foreign and domestic problems: 1) America was economically not ready to bear the burden of war: 2) Americans' consensus over FP strategy that was apparent during the CW turned to be a sort of domestic cleavage over the state's international conduct. Also, the bad experience of Vietnam was still dominant in US public mood and FP elite alike. The multilateral coalition, therefore, offered sensible solutions to all of these barriers. It offered money to fund the US military machinery, as well as the political aid that America was in need of to mobilise Congress and the US public. The multilateral approach also allayed the US public fear that there was any new Vietnam. True, the US - commanded coalition triumphed, but the real victor was the US. America achieved all of its aims without risking its blood or resources. It expunged the Vietnam Syndrome; enhanced its position as a global hegemon; secured its presence in the Middle-East; and showed other big powers its real tangible power. Imagine: if Bush had not taken such steps, particularly the remedying of the Vietnam psychological syndrome - would it have been possible for his successors and particularly President Bush II to intervene militarily? In a similar way, without Bush I steps, would it have been possible to President Clinton to turn attention from the traditional geopolitical struggle to geo-economic perspective for the remedying of US economic weaknesses that limited Bush I ability to choice in the early 1990s?

Accordingly, Bush I prepared the stage for the US hegemonic manifestation and, after the Gulf war, the prior debate regarding counterbalancing against the US was nearly muted. Bush's policy had convinced all the big powers to follow the US leadership, rather than competing with it. This achievement freed Clinton from any geopolitical struggle with other powers. Clinton was aware that American hegemony depends not only on its military might, but also on its economic power. His administration's new urgent task, therefore, was to establish America's economic hegemony as a complementary dimension to its military and political hegemony that was announced in the 1991 war. The first step was to place trade in the forefront of AFP's agenda and to

promote American trade. The administration completed the economic unity of North America (NAFTA) to limit European interests in the area and to enforce them to accept American economic needs. The negotiation led also to the establishment of GATT in 1994 and then to the creation of the WTO. These arrangements, in addition to the World Bank and IMF, served the American economic and political agenda in the 1990s. In consequence, hundreds of new markets opened and US exports went everywhere. The US economy, as a result, recovered quickly, after more than a decade of fluctuating performance. In this sense, globalisation, as discussed in the first chapter, was a hegemonic plan aimed at consolidating American position globally.

In the space of several years, therefore, the Clinton administration succeeded in managing the trade deficit with its main economic competitors, particularly Japan and China. The budget deficit that was about \$300 billion in 1992 was turned round to be a budget surplus in 1998 (about \$200 billion surplus). Unemployment also dropped to less than 4% in 1997, as did inflation. Economic growth increased to 5.6% in 1997 and its exports increased from 9.9% to 12.1% of its GDP. The US's share of the world's national production was about 30%. Therefore, Clinton's call on the nation to compete, not to retreat, led to the revitalisation of the US economy. In addition to this great achievement, the administration also worked seriously to expand the US's geostrategic presence worldwide under several justifications, such as humanitarian interventionism and democracy promotion.

This is not to say that Clinton's concern was only economic but it is clear that Clinton continued the same geopolitical policy of his predecessor. The administration pledged to increase military budgets and formulate new military strategies to deal with foreign affairs, such as BUR's two simultaneous regional wars. The administration's use of military power abroad was greater than any other administration's. For example, Clinton ordered US forces into 25 operations during his first term, compared to just 14 during his predecessor's presidency and, by 1999, the president had notified Congress 46 times of US troop deployment by his administration in foreign lands to fight against imminent challenges, compared to only 7 such deployments during the Bush administration. The administration also invaded Haiti without good cause and without a UN mandate. Clinton also used humanitarian intervention to expand US geostrategic presence. In the same way, building on the accomplishments of the Clinton

administration, the Bush II administration, even prior to 9/11, showed more desire to act unilaterally and to give back, not only to the international community, but also to its closest allies such as NATO members. These shifts will be discussed more in the fifth chapter of this research.

On the basis of the aforementioned discussion, it can be argued that, without the efforts of the Bush I administration that managed the status quo and controlled the forces of change in the very early 1990s, Clinton might not have been able to give attention to remedying US economic weaknesses. And if the Clinton administration had failed to revitalize the US economy, the Bush II administration might not have been able to respond to 9/11 as it did. In fact, just as the Bush I strategy had prepared the stage for the Clinton administration to build on, the later administration's achievement also enabled Bush II to pursue the strategy of fighting two wars simultaneously. What matters here is that a grand strategy cannot materialise in a very limited time. The small agenda and (fragmented) policies of the 1990s, when they are located in a wider context, demonstrate that AFP strategy of hegemony was still in progress between 11/9 and 9/11.

Finally, even with such evident continuity, this chapter does not deny the difficulties that had faced the administrations' strategy in the 1990s, or claim that AFP's hegemonic agenda was the dominant feature in AFP discourse. The Bush I and Clinton administrations were conducted under very difficult political circumstances, characterised by international unpredictability and domestic political fragmentation. However, even with these obstacles, AFP represented continuity rather than discontinuity.

What matters here is that this thesis puts forward the argument that the claim that AFP was fragmented in the 1990s was not entirely true, as discussed above, but what was actually fragmented was the domestic context of AFP after the CW. That domestic political cleavage was a considerable AFP obstacle, which puzzled US bureaucrats and the AFP elite. True, the demise of the external enemy affected AFP conduct but the effect was indirect. It was not the absence of a clear strategic perspective to deal with the world but the political cleavage at home that hindered the US policymakers from putting their agenda into practice in an ideal way. Since then US politics have not stopped any more at the water's edge until the morning of 9/11. Because of this, this

study distinguishes two issues, firstly, the existence of a grand strategy and secondly, a cohesive strategic guideline pursuing America's hegemony and the associated significant non-existence of US domestic consensus that puzzled US policymakers.

The following chapter, therefore, will turn to evaluating the effects of US domestic politics on AFP conduct in the light of the two events: the EoCW and 9/11.



Indeed, in the absence of a galvanizing Soviet threat, policymakers in the 1990s faced a significant challenge in mobilizing domestic support for an activist United States.  
(Litwak, 2002: 80)

Without consensus on a new vision, challenges to US leadership were all the more worrying.  
(Ray, 2000: 188)

Indeed, a new “North Star,” the war on terrorism, largely became the defining American foreign policy issue, much as the Soviet Union had been during the Cold War.  
(Wittkopf & McCormick, 2004: 17)

## **Chapter Four**

### **Leadership Abroad Starts At Home:**

#### **US Domestic Politics As A Constraint Upon And/Or A Motivator To The Formulation Of AFP Strategy Between The Eocw And 9/11**

##### **4.1. Introduction**

As shown in the last chapter, American foreign policy (AFP) in the 1990s did not suffer from the absence of a clear perspective. In contrast to those who argue that the 1990s was a period of confusion for AFP, the last chapter shows that the US post-CW hegemonic project was initiated with the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989. However, the seeming inability of the US to design and pursue a fully-fledged “new grand strategy for the new era has rooted in the changed and changing character of the United States” (Wittkopf et al., 2003: 12). Accordingly, the US administration’s ability to pursue its strategy was not only influenced by the transitional events, as has been repeatedly argued; as this chapter puts forward, the problem for AFP lay in the domestic political fragmentation and the absence of AFP’s bipartisanship. Owing to this cleavage at home, America, to a large degree, was not as capable of leading internationally as it could have been. The domestic disagreement over AFP not only complicated its policy-making process and hindered policy-makers from implementing their agenda, but also brought uncertainty to US grand strategy. However, this situation changed completely after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, when the emergence of a new external enemy remedied AFP’s domestic fragmentation and united the country again behind the presidential leadership. Since then, America has shown a clear hegemonic perspective in dealing internationally.

To highlight this argument, this chapter brings two sets of literature on AFP together to demonstrate the strong interplay between domestic and foreign policy. In doing so, this chapter is divided into two main sections: the first part is concerned with the political

fragmentation in the immediate aftermath of the CW, whereas the second part highlights the change of course after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.

#### **4.2. US Politics No Longer Ends At The Water's Edge**

As mentioned earlier, the end of the Cold War (EoCW) removed America's longstanding rival that had disciplined its foreign behaviour for decades. Since then, as Wittkopf et al., state, US politics no longer ends at the water's edge (2003) and the AFP-making process has become "subject to the same partisan and ideological dispute that characterised domestic policy making" (McCormick & Wittkopf, 1990: 1077). Furthermore, many of the presidential prerogatives were curtailed (Lindsay & Ripley, 1992) as Congress became more involved in FP-making to a degree that confused the AFP bureaucracy. In addition, societal sources became more deeply involved in setting the AFP agenda. These shifts were probably related to the uncertainty following the EoCW: the CW acted as glue for divergent societal and institutional forces behind the presidential leadership. The collapse of the USSR "released the centrifugal forces of American single-issue politics, the politics of particular interests and culture diversity, and has increasingly weakened the centripetal power of anticommunism" (Lösche, 1996: 157). Therefore, "no longer are political leaders or pundits able to argue that what happens abroad must take precedence over what happens at home" (Miller, 1994: 622). Arguably, the domestic cleavage curtailed the emergence of a new fully-fledged FP strategy between the early 1990s and 9/11. The collapse of the external rival and the end of the demands for a balance of power opened the way for the domesticization of FP-making. Since then, the domestic groups have injected AFP with sets of fragmented FP goals and policies (Huntington, 2004). These domestic groups and their lobbies, therefore, have influenced officials and legislators on how to direct the state's FP in the post-Soviet era (Lindsay & Ripley, 1997a). Deuck summarises these elements by arguing that (2006: 129):

The division of power<sup>1</sup> in the American political system, together with the byzantine structure of the national security bureaucracy, always complicates US

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<sup>1</sup> The root of this problem is laid in the US constitution that "envision[s] power as the rival of power, whatever friction and inefficiency resulted, to preclude" (Sorensen, 1994: 520). Or as James L. Sundquist put it: the constitution "put two combatants [the president and congress] in the ring and sounded the bell that sent them into endless battle" (1981: 16). Therefore, the constitution is not only a "bundle of compromises," as Edward Corwin (1949: 7) argued, but it also an invitation to "struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy" (cited in Foster, 2006: 429). While the president is constitutionally

strategic planning, and the absence of any strong sense of external threat during ... [the 1990s] made it unusually difficult to formulate and execute a coherent grand strategy.

The following sections give further detail on this aspect.

#### 4.2.1. The Governmental Sources Of Fragmentation

After the Vietnam crisis, “the long period of executive dominance in the diplomatic field” (Crabb, 1988: 153) was partly eroded, the president started to lose control over FP-making and an “Imperial Congress” appeared against an “Imperial president” (Trimble, 1989: 750). However, even with the existence of such obstacles, the overall AFP-making process remained in the hands of the president prior to 1989 (Peterson, 1994), because of the survival of the USSR and the explicit agreement over the AFP strategy of containment.




Figure 4. US Presidential Preeminance over AFP Making process during the CW  
Source: (Scott, 1997: 240)

A real change came with the fall of the USSR, when the “bedrock of US political consensus that gave the president a fairly free hand in foreign policy” was removed (Country Monitor, 2000: 1). Therefore, just as the CW had extensively aggrandized

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the commander-in-chief, his power has eventually been constrained by the authority of Congress. The congress, in fact, has been delegated to raise and support the military and navy, and most importantly, to declare wars (Mastanduno, 2005). On the one shoulder, “while the congress was a legislative branch, the president had a role in legislation” (Sundquist, 1981: 16). On the other shoulder, the constitution has also allowed Congress and Senate to share several FP governing authorities with a president (Thurber, 1996; Lindsay & Ripley, 1997a & Smith, 2000a). The Senate – with its advice and consent - has been also shared the authority of treaty making and diplomat appointment (Smith, 2000; Malone, 2003; Mastanduno, 2005). One of the most influential powers for the Senate is “to approve presidential nominations for Cabinet, senior State Department position and ambassadorship” (Cameron, 2002: 75). That is why, Thurber argues, that such a system “was designed for a small and fragmented Republic, not a global superpower” (1996: 60), because, according to Mastanduno (2005) it poses several constraints on the US ability to construct a successful and cohesive foreign and security policy.

presidential and bureaucratic power and control over foreign and security policy (see figure 4.1), peace, in contrast, brought such imperialistic dominance to an end. On the other hand, the containment strategy that clearly defined US purposes, focused the national mind, and united AFP elite in the pre-1991 period was no longer workable (Lindsay & Ripley, 1992; Peterson, 1994; Jamison, 1997; Carter, 1998; Rosati & Twing, 1998; Hyland, 1999; Hamilton, 2000; Wittkopf et al., 2003; Schlesinger, 2004; Dunn, 2006). Because of this, legislators no longer routinely followed the presidential leadership and “domestic politics ... increasingly shape[d] America’s actions abroad” (Wittkopf & McCormick, 2008: 8). Scholars, such as Norman J. Ornstein and Mark Schmitt, in the immediate EoCW, questioned: “How will the US political system operate without anticommunism as its central organizing principle?” (1990: 169). President Bush I was aware that, without domestic unity, the US administration would not be able to lead the country towards its objectives. This was obvious since his first day in office. In his inaugural address on January 20, 1989, said:

We need a new engagement ... between the Executive and the Congress ... There’s grown certain divisiveness ... And our great parties have too often been far apart and untrusting of each other. It’s been this way since Vietnam. That war cleaves us still ... A new breeze is blowing – and the old bipartisanship must be made again.

However, in opposition to President Bush’s desire, “bipartisanship”, according to Charles A. Kupchan & Peter L. Trubowitz, “dropped sharply following the end of the Cold War, reaching a post-World War II low after the Republicans gained control of congress in 1994” (2007: 76). In what follows, the discussion will address some aspects of congressional involvement in AFP making process and how this shift in congressional-presidential relationship affected AFP consistency.

#### **4.2.1.1. Congress As A Counterpart To The President’s FP Leadership**

According to Steven E. Schier, unlike in its CW position, the authority of Congress in foreign policy appeared to grow from the EoCW, with the president unable to lead as he had done previously (2000). Because of this, Wittkopf et al. argue (2003: 403):

The president saw his attempt to establish a new strategy for dealing with ethnic conflicts in the global south blocked, his effort to redesign foreign aid policy thwarted, his request for authority to negotiate expanded trade denied, his design for curbing global warming ignored, and his commitment to ending nuclear testing rejected.

For example, in 1992, against Bush's wishes, Congress prohibited all tests of nuclear weapons until the end of September 1996. Furthermore, Congress passed the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) in early October 1992 that was introduced by Representative Robert Torricelli (D-NJ). The bill imposed economic sanctions on the foreign subsidiaries of US companies that did business with Cuba, before it accepted the president's position. Similarly, Congress refused Clinton's 1993 request to renew the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act and it cut both Bush's and Clinton's military and diplomatic budgets and foreign aid programmes. In 1993, the Senate refused the President's demands to approve the START II Treaty with Russia, and in 1994 it would not ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It was a Democrat Congress that pressurized Bush I to respond effectively to the collapse of the USSR, while a Republican Congress did not support Clinton's FP objectives or his policies and tactics. However, Republicans were willing to encourage Clinton's policy of free trade, while they stood firmly against external humanitarian missions and cooperation with UN peacekeeping operations (Thurber, 1996; Carter 1998; Travis, 1998; McCormick, 2000; Smith, 2000a; Brenner et al., 2002).

The rivalry between the president and Congress did not end after Clinton gained party control of Congress following the 1992 election (Thurber, 2006). The challenge by Congress occurred on a number of occasions; for example, over the NAFTA ratification, "on whether and how long to keep US troops in Somalia, on whether and how much aid to give Russia's Boris Yeltsin, and over Iraq policy" (Wiarda & Skelley, 2006: 21). Overall, the Democrat-controlled Congress compelled the Clinton administration to reorient its policy and place additional emphasis on foreign affairs (Lindsay & Ripley, 1992; Carter 1998; Travis, 1998; Walt, 2000; McCormick, 2000; Lindsay, 2004; Kaufman, 2006; Dunn, 2006). Thereafter, the 1994 election again reshaped the congressional-presidential rivalry, and also changed the balance of power between the two, as the House became Republican-controlled (Thurber, 2006). The situation continued through to the late 1990s when "bitter partisan divide over President Clinton's impeachment" (Lieber, 2005: 12) was witnessed. Thus, during his eight years in office, Clinton was unable to build any solid domestic consensus to support his FP initiatives. This phenomenon was apparent even when Congress was under the control of the Democrats.

At the time, it was apparent that the Senate and House were becoming much more partisan but independent institutions in foreign affairs. Even in “areas like defence and security policy, where political consensus had been relatively easier to achieve during the Cold War, it now seemed harder for Congress to get things done” (Sinder, 2005: 242). According to Andrew Rudalevige, “The impeachment and trial of Bill Clinton in 1998-1999 were the first since 1868 and the first ever of an elected president” (2005: 140). Such division was also quite clear when the Senate rejected the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CNTBT) “by a 51-48 vote in October 1999” (Malon, 2003: 29).

#### **4.2.1.2. Congress And Multi-Lateralism**

Congress, as mentioned in the previous chapter, forced President Clinton to back away from supporting UN multi-lateral peacekeeping operations. In this context, in October 1993, Congress, against the president’s desire, voted to withdraw US troops from Somalia by 31 March 1994. Likewise, when President Clinton announced that US troops would be deployed to Bosnia after the Dayton accords were completed in late 1995, the Congress (in both chambers) passed a resolution supporting US troops in Bosnia, but rejecting the president’s approach to dealing with the country. In March 1999, the Senate vote over supporting the campaign on Kosovo was 52-48, but in April, the House rejected the authorisation of US participation in the air war (McCormick, 2000). In contrast to Clinton’s announced multi-lateral approach, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Jesse Helms, told the UN Security Council (UNSC) in January 2000, that Congress was the only custodian of the US taxpayers’ money and Congressmen “have not only a right, but a responsibility, to insist on specific [UN] reforms in exchange for their investment” (cited in Luck, 2003: 28). He warned that if the international organization rejected these conditions, “it would mark the beginning of the end of US support for the United Nations”. Because of this domestic cleavage, the president was not able to meet America’s commitment outside. That is why Clinton bypassed congress by conducting “the use of American troops for peace operations largely through ... NATO” from the mid-1990s (Sewall, 2002: 191).

#### **4.2.1.3. Congress And Foreign Economic Policy**

As argued in the previous chapter, Clinton was successful in revitalising the domestic US economy, despite the difficult political environment. Nevertheless, Congress was

unwilling to support Clinton’s international policies. Clinton struggled to build a cross-party coalition of both Republicans and conservative Democrats to be able to pass some of his economic agenda (see figures 4.2, 4.3). For example, in contrast to the Congress’s objection to an American rescue of the Mexican government after the peso plunged in late 1994 and early 1995, the Clinton administration “used its own executive legislative authority to fashion a \$50 billion assistance package” (McCormick, 2000: 71). The administration’s request to refinance the IMF after the 1997 financial crisis in Asia was delayed about a year before it was approved in October 1998, but only after a number of conditions were imposed on the IMF. In November 1997, the Congress also “failed to renew fast-track negotiating authority for the executive branch” (McCormick, 2000: 71; Sloan, 2003: 21). On the other hand, during Clinton’s two terms, and against his multi-lateral perspective, Congress imposed sanctions on 61 occasions; to put this in context, sanctions had been applied on only 43 other occasions in the post-WWII era (Sloan, 2003).

	NAFTA				GATT			
	House		Senate		House		Senate	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
<b>Democrats</b>	102	157	27	28	167	89	41	13
<b>Republicans</b>	132	43	34	10	121	56	35	11
<b>Total</b>	234	200	61	38	288	145	76	24

Figure 4. 2 Congressional Votes on NAFTA, 1993, and GATT, 1994  
 Source: Jentleson 2004: 540) ; [www.piie.com/publications/chapters\\_preview/92/iie2679.pdf](http://www.piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/92/iie2679.pdf)

As figure 4.2 and 4.3 shows, In 1993 Congress passed the NAFTA Treaty but ratification proved difficult, because a majority of Democrats refused to approve it. There was also a cleavage over the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the first track of 1998, and the normal trade relations with the People’s Republic of China. A coalition of the Republicans and conservative Democrats also backed President Clinton’s WTO agenda. In 1997, likewise, Clinton succeeded in putting partisanship aside regarding the blueprint to balance the budget over five years. President George W. Bush, Clinton’s successor, also worked successfully with Congress to approve permanent normal trade relations with China in 2000 (Institute for

International Economic, no-date; McCormick, 2000; Sloan, 2003; Wiarda & Skelley, 2006; Thurber, 2006; Pfiffner, 2006).

Democrats		Republicans	
Yes	No	Yes	No
29	171	151	71

Figure 4.3 House Vote on First Track of 1998  
 Source: [www.piie.com/publications/chapters\\_preview/92/iie2679.pdf](http://www.piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/92/iie2679.pdf)

#### 4.2.1.4. The Use of Power Abroad

However, in line with the post-WWII political realities, the president’s power to declare war did not undergo any profound change. President George H. W. Bush, for example, took a unilateral decision to invade Panama in 1989, without congressional approval (Briggs, 1994; Cameron, 2002). The president, at the time, “did not acknowledge the applicability of the War Powers Resolution, nor did he consult with congressional leaders before committing troops to Panama City” (Briggs, 1994: 159). This case was also repeated during the 1990-91 Gulf War. The President “boasted that he did not have to get permission from some old goat in the United States Congress to kick Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait” (Lindsay, 2003: 142), arguing that the UN authority to attack Iraq was sufficient. Hence, on 11 September 1990, Bush announced the war against Iraq, its objectives (the establishment of the new world order, and how it would be achieved—multi-lateral cooperative alliance) without consulting Congress (Lindsay, 2003; Krahnmann, 2005). The president also doubled the number of US troops in the region, and changed the objective of the operation from defending Saudi Arabia to liberating Kuwait without consulting Congress. However, he only took these steps after November to avoid criticism in the congressional election (LaFeber, 1994; Lindsay, 2003). In consequence, opponents of the Gulf War argued that even the war’s legislative resolution did not reflect the real attitudes of Congress. Congressmen were unable to do anything but to follow, because by the deployment of half a million troops to the region, Bush “had put them in an impossible position to debate a war resolution” (LaFeber, 1994: 762). The Gulf War showed a profound shift in congressional-presidential relations over foreign policy and the declaration of war. And “unlike the Tonkin Gulf



Resolution 27 years earlier when all but two members of Congress rallied behind President Johnson, the Iraqi resolution saw 47 Senators and 183 representatives vote no” (Lindsay, 2003: 143). On 12 January the vote in Senate was 52-47 in favour, whereas in the House of Representatives it was 250 to 183 in favour (LaFeber, 1994; Rosati & Twing, 1998; Cameron, 2002; Kaufman, 2006; Hodge & Nolan, 2007). However, during the Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992, Bush gained support from the UNSC, and domestically, he “received strong backing from congress and high approval ratings from the American public” (Hendrickson, 2002: 24).

President Clinton, in the same way, followed in his predecessor’s steps, not only in his belief that the president was constitutionally authorised to send troops abroad without congressional authorization, but also in arguing that NATO authorisation was sufficient to engage the US militarily in Bosnia and Kosovo (Reisman, 1999/2000; Cameron, 2002; Hendrickson, 2002; Wedgwood, 2002). In consequence, in cases such as the administration’s military operation in Haiti and the deployment of American troops to Bosnia, Clinton never had obvious congressional support, and took these steps regardless of Congress’ position (Rosati & Twings, 1998). According to Senator Biden, in the cases of sending American troops to Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, “one or both houses adopted resolutions giving rhetorical support to the US troops and their missions, but congress did not, in a formal legal sense, authorize the deployment” (2000: 17).

The congressional-presidential relationship witnessed a decade of confusion. True, President Bush I, owing to his public prestige and political skills, faced little opposition in Congress during his first two years in office. However, the last two years witnessed intensified opposition from the Democrat-controlled Congress (Lindsay, 2003). Moreover, the divided Congress and the Democrat-controlled Congress affected President Clinton’s ability to lead and had disoriented AFP conduct (Rosati & Twings, 1998).

On the other hand, President Clinton succeeded in gaining Congressional support when his approval was high, particularly during his first term; however, as his popularity dropped during his second term after the Monica Lewinsky scandal, he “failed to obtain first track authority” (Cameron, 2002: 76).

#### **4.2.1.5. George W. Bush's Perspective Prior to 9/11**

Because of the difficulties that President Clinton faced, during the 2000 presidential campaign, George W. Bush promised that his administration would “restore honour and dignity to the White House” (cited in Rudalevige, 2005: 211). Furthermore, he would not be willing “to let Congress erode the power of the executive branch”, as his obligation was to protect “the executive branch from legislative encroachment” (cited in Rudalevige, 2005: 211). When Bush II took office in January 2001, the Republicans were in control of the House and Senate; therefore, some of the president’s policies (e.g., his tax-cuts policy) gained greater support. However, six months later, the president’s party lost control over the Senate and a new partisanship replaced the short period of political consensus (Cameron, 2002).

After taking office, Bush’s ‘Americanist’ approach to foreign policy faced public and congressional dissatisfaction. A divided Congress—a six-seat Republican majority in the House and only one seat in the Senate—was not happy with the administration’s unilateralist tendency and created major problems for the president’s policy (Teixeira, 2001; Anderson, 2003; Malone, 2003; Covington, 2005; Dumbrell, 2005; Lindsay, 2005b; Melanson, 2005). Therefore, David Frum, a presidential speechwriter, acknowledged that “on September 10, 2001, George Bush was not on his way to a very successful presidency” (cited in Daalder & Lindsay, 2005a: 77). However, 11 September changed this and yielded a crucial new shift within the US political system, as will be shown in the next part of this chapter.

In sum, the congressional-presidential relationship witnessed a deep phase of ebb tide. In this context, Henahan argues that “congressional behaviour in the 1990s indicated that in foreign policy the president has been weakened, but not eliminated, and that the resurgent congress has backed down but not gone away” (2000: xiii). Brenner, et al. also argue, “the executive is today more fragmented, foreign policy is more complicated and diverse, and Congress is both more engaged and also more open to political forces in foreign policy than perhaps ever before” (2002: 193). Steven W. Hook & John W. Spanier (2000) might be right when they argue that the nation’s world politics represented the internal conflict. Consequently, it could be argued that the EoCW “made it harder to reach a consensus on most matters of foreign policy” (Rockman, 1997: 26).

Under such domestic cleavage, AFP bureaucrats were unable to articulate a fully-fledged strategy responding to the unprecedented opportunity offered by the EoCW.

#### **4.2.1.6. AFP's Institutional Problems In The 1990s**

The source of AFP's domestic cleavage in the 1990s was not only the imbalance of power between Congress and the various presidents, but also the AFP institutions themselves. Prior to 1947, the number of AFP institutions was small, and the number of AFP bureaucrats was also limited.<sup>1</sup> However, since that date, when Congress passed the new National Security Act (NSA), not only has AFP bureaucracy expanded considerably, but also AFP authority has been divided among several huge institutions, such as the Department of State (DOS), the Department of Defence (DOD), smaller groups such as the intelligence community (itself divided into a myriad of organisations), and individual players such as the president (Lindsay & Ripley, 1997; Taber, 1998; Wayne, 2000; McKay, 2001). However, even with this intensive growth, the machinery of AFP continued performing well because of the existence of a clear adversary that helped to create domestic consensus over FP strategy.

The shift came with the EoCW, in which the enemy that legislated the establishment of these organisations had gone. This status led Johnson to argue that the changes in the international scene might bring dramatic changes “within the government of its arch rival, the United States” (1997: 156). On the other hand, the AFP bureaucracy needed to be restructuring its institutions and reorienting its conduct to be able to deal with the new political status quo (Lindsay & Ripley, 1997a; Scott & Crothers, 1998). However, in contrast to this perspective, the 1990s showed that AFP institutions were “having considerable difficulty redefining” their objectives and policies (Jones, 1998:57). For instance, during George H. W. Bush's presidency (1989-1992), there was no “substantial change either to the military or to the intelligence service. There was no re-organisation of the NSC, the State Department or other executive branches. Nor was there any real pressure from congress or the public to do so” (Cameron, 2002: 11). In this context, Les Aspin, who served as Chair of the House Armed Service Committee, argues that the demise of the Soviet Union broke down the “Pentagon's long-standing

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<sup>1</sup> The State Department and the Department of war were established in 1789, and a Department of a Navy was also created a decade later in 1798. Since then there was no further expansion in the institutions of foreign and security policy till the outset of the CW (Nathan & Oliver, 1994; Lindsay & Ripley, 1997b; Rosati & Twing, 1998).

reason to exist and the rationale for its force structure and budget” (cited in Stockton, 1997: 108). He, therefore, “criticised the Bush administration for failing to recognise that the collapse of the Soviet Union necessitated a fundamental restructuring of the Pentagon” (cited in Stockton, 1997: 108). However, Aspin also failed “to revolutionize the Defense Department” when he later became Secretary of Defence (Lindsay & Ripley, 1997a: 11-12).

The lack of institutional change may have been because of resistance to losing influence. The Pentagon, for example, “was well placed to defend its own interests against the advocates of a peace dividend ... [because it had] a strong interest in preserving the [CW’s] status quo” (Guyatt, 2003: 116).

The domestic fragmentation was in part driven by an emerging conflict amongst the AFP institutions themselves. The most important was the growing bureaucratic conflict between the DOS and the DOD. While the DOS preferred “a US military presence abroad ... to back up its diplomacy ... [as the DOD is] not wanting to be put in an indefensible position militarily, it is usually more reluctant to go” (Wiarda & Skelley, 2006: 22). Therefore, since the early 1990s, the DOD enjoyed a much larger role in the process of FP-making through its planning group that periodically provided the Defence Secretary and President with a Defense Planning Guidance review (Cohen, 2005). The Pentagon’s responsibility was expanded to include not only the defence and military policy, but also the strategy of AFP (Tyler, 1992; Everest, 2004; Cohen, 2005). This led one official from the State Department to say that “it has long been easier for us to deal with Russians than to produce agreements with our own Defence Department” (cited in Wiarda & Skelley, 2006: 67). On the other hand, locating environmental issues and economic concerns within the DOS’s core agenda after 1993, in an attempt to adjust its tone to the new era, added another layer of complexity to the AFP-making process (Jones, 1998; Lyman, 2002). Furthermore, the Treasury and the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, Justice and Commerce were becoming more involved in foreign policy, as a consequence of the US’ global economic perspective (Hamilton, 2000; Wayne, 2000; Lyman, 2002; Wiarda & Skelley, 2006; Wittkopf & McCormick, 2008).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> President Clinton encouraged the US Treasury and Department of Commerce to adopt more ambitious plans. Treasury Department, especially under Robert Rubin, “enjoyed unprecedented influence and arguably represented the most powerful Cabinet seat” (Smith, 2005b: 21). The Treasury Department, as

The delay in reforming AFP agencies affected the consistency of the state's performance in international affairs. Thus, many scholars (e.g., Cox, 2002a; Frum & Perle, 2004; Johnson, 2005, 2006; Singh, 2006), blamed the delay in reforming the intelligence agencies—the CIA and the FBI—as a main reason behind the failure to detect, deter, and preserve America from the attacks of 9/11. Because of the lack of reform, the agencies failed to share the necessary information about the terrorist cells that were preparing the 9/11 attacks. In this vein, Bob Graham, the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) in 2002, said: “we probably did not shake the [intelligence] agencies hard enough after the end of the Berlin Wall” (cited in Johnson, 2005: 17), adding, “hey, look the world is changing and you need to change the way in which you operate” (Cited in Johnson, 2006: 186). The division into two agencies, according to Frum & Perle (2004: 165), was appropriate for the CW era, but was inappropriate for the new environment.

Critics, such as Haass (1997), Jones (1998), Borosage (2000), suggest that the poor performance of AFP institutions in the 1990s was also due to internal constraints brought with the collapse of the USSR. Crucial amongst these were the budgetary problems (although the foreign affairs budget during the 1990s had equalled only 1.2% of all government expenditures (Jones, 1998).<sup>1</sup> Likewise, US foreign aid dropped to just 1% of the federal budget in FY 1993, with the associated reduction in personnel (Jones, 1998). This level was not more than one-tenth of 1% of the US's GNP in 1995 (Hook, 1998). In 2000, foreign aid “has slipped to 0.11% of GDP” (Patrick, 2000: 38). The

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Hamilton (2000) & Lyman (2002) argue, played the leading role in fashioning the US response to the Asian financial crisis of 1998, while the Department of State “struggled for several weeks to have a seat at the table in order to inject its concerns” (Lyman, 2002: 78). The Secretary of the Treasury, Larry Summers, travelled to Africa in 2000, and spoke about other political and health issues, such as HIV. Furthermore, several domestic-oriented agencies, such as the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service also expanded their presence outside of the US, because of the interconnection between domestic and foreign concerns. These changes not only superseded the authority of DOS, but also changed the structure of the AFP-making process. The US role in international monetary institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, was also ambivalent. This was because the US Treasury Department, the State Department, and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) each tried to influence these international institutions. The Department of Energy also became more involved in FP-making. During 2000, for example, it persuaded the OPEC members to increase oil supply in order to lower rising oil prices. It also held meetings with African oil ministers and offered technical support to foreign states (Lyman, 2002). The Department of Treasury “has emulated the Pentagon in dedicating a war room to track international competition for contracts around the world.” Therefore, in support of this framework, “export promotion was elevated to the very top of the US foreign policy agenda” (Ralph, 2000: 33).

<sup>1</sup> According to Haass (1997) spending on US diplomacy is amounted to between US\$4billion and US\$5 billion a year

DOS had also suffered from workforce reductions. From FY 1993 through to FY 1996, its personnel were reduced by 2,500 (Jones, 1998). As a result, the Department not only lost a large number of its specialists, but also its ability to govern AFP was affected. The financial and employees' shortage led to the closure of more than 36 diplomatic and consular posts between 1993 and 1996 (Jones, 1998). Intelligence staffing saw also a 22% cut during the post-CW peace dividend period (1989-2001) (Bolton, 2008).

James Lindsay (1997) and Cameron (2002) list a number of reasons that slowed the pace of institutional change in the post-CW era: (1) bureaucratic resistance to change and vested interests to maintain the status quo; (2) congressional inflexibility, and a disregard for the post-CW institutional question; (3) the administration's lack of concern about its own proposals; and (4) a lack of domestic consensus over FP orientation. These problems all affected the ability of AFP institutions to deal with the new status quo after the CW. This was amongst the reasons that affected the external performance of the country between 11/9 and 9/11.

#### **4.2.1.7. AFP Bureaucrats**

The poor performance of AFP institutions is related to the divisions amongst bureaucrats over the FP-making process. The rivalries between individuals, the individuals' attempts to run organisations in a particular way, or to protect them from reform, were a significant element in influencing the performance of institutions (Clifford, 1990; Nathan & Oliver, 1994). For example, in contrast to President Bush I's strategy to deal with the transitional moment at the EoCW, his Secretary of Defence, Dick Cheney, adopted a clear hegemonic agenda during the early 1990s. However, the latter's rush to revolutionise AFP strategy was restricted by the National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and "the president's own preferences and world view" (Szabo, 2004: 62). But in general, it could be argued that Bush had a "close-knit foreign policy team" (Wiarda, 1996: 4). Together, Baker and Powell with Cheney and Scowcroft, "made up a competent team... [but] splits did occur, but were neither as deep-seated nor as damaging as those which affected their Carter and Reagan administrations counterparts" (Dumbrell, 1997: 131). In addition to his rich experience, the harmonisation of Bush I's FP team is another actor that could explain his administration's success in dealing with the urgent requirements of the moment.

However, President Clinton was unable to maintain a harmonized foreign policy group during his eight years in office. Under his presidency there worked two NSAs (Anthony Lake and Sandy Berger); three Secretaries of Defence (Les Aspin, William Perry, and William Cohen); and two State Secretaries (Warren Christopher and Madeleine Albright). Most of those officials had different views over how to preserve and promote US interests in the post-CW world. For example, Albright and Berger “tended to have a greater affinity for the use of military force than either Lake or Christopher (Pauly, 2005: 66; Pauly & Lansford, 2005: 20).

Furthermore, Secretary of State Warren Christopher disagreed with Clinton, Lake, and Gore over the enlargement and engagement (En-En) strategy. Christopher was an adherent of the old style of AFP (the *realpolitik*) and rejected human rights and peacekeeping as fundamental objectives of AFP. Therefore, in his four years as Secretary of State, Christopher “uttered the word ‘enlargement’ only in the context of NATO expansion—and then only with caution” (Brinkley, 1997: 121). Instead of the En-En strategy that emphasized democracy promotion as a central pillar of AFP, Christopher asserted in 1995 that democracy and human rights must be merely supportive instruments to perspective advance American interests and ideals (Travis, 1998). In contrast to Christopher’s FP perspective, high ranking positions within the AFP bureaucracy were filled by proponents of democratization. For instance, Brian Atwood, who served as a head of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and had acquired very rich experience in democracy promotion abroad, was appointed by Clinton as head of the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Unsurprisingly, perhaps, Atwood listed promotion of democracy among the four main goals of his agency. Furthermore, a new high-ranking position was created within the Department of Defence with Morton Halperin appointed as Assistant Secretary for the Promotion of Democracy and Peacekeeping (Travis, 1998).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Neo-cons tried to block the nomination of Morton Halperin because of his background. He resigned from the membership of the NSC during the Nixon administration in protest over the American invasion of Cambodia and he was also unhappy over US policy in Vietnam. He also condemned the Nixon-Kissinger “wiretaps of NSC officials” (Travis, 1998: 258). Before his nomination, he argued in an article that “when a people attempts to hold free elections and establish a constitutional democracy, the United States and the international community should not only assist but should guarantee the result” (Cited in Travis, 1998: 257).

Furthermore, the overlap between economic and foreign policy brought extra complexity for FP bureaucrats. Clinton's first Secretary of Commerce, Ron Brown, was "the most influential Commerce Secretary since Herbert Hoover" and he occupied a central place in the president's FP team (Melanson, 2005: 241). He initiated several plans to promote exports, while the encouragement of democracy and enhancement of peace were also on the agenda of the State Department International Affairs budget of 1994 (Rosati & Twing, 1998; Ralph, 2000; Dobson & Marsh, 2001). In the same way, Cameron (2002: 22) argues that because of the Clinton's increased attention to economic and trade issues, the US Trade Representative, Mickey Kantor, "enjoyed much better access to the president than Warren Christopher, the Secretary of State" (Clinton's view was that the US was like a mega-company struggling in the global market) (Cameron, 2002).

In contrast to Bush I, President Clinton, because of his lack of FP experience, was subject to his advisors' influence (Wittkopf & McCormick, 2004, 2008). This was clear, for instance, during the lead-up to the Kosovo War. Several critics argue that the use of air force against the Serbs happened because of the influence of his Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (Brinkley, 1997; Redds, 2005). AFP fragmentation at the time happened primarily because Clinton's advisors offered him highly conflicting views. This is because the administration encompassed officials from a very wide political spectrum. For example, "in his cabinet appointment, there were both strong left-of-centre leanings (Dona Shalala, Henry Cisneros, Robert Reich) and strong moderate leanings (Lloyds Bentsen, Janet Reno, William Cohen)" (Wittkopf & McCormick, 2004: 374).

#### **4.2.2. Societal Sources Of Fragmentation**

As previously said, the US political structure has given access to several non-state actors to become influential in AFP making process (Riss-Kappen, 1991; Peterson, 1996; Bose, 2002; Woodruff, 2005).<sup>1</sup> Such side-line actors can in reality "mobilise support and ... affect the balance of forces within the policy network" (Riss-Kappen, 1991: 502). Hence, throughout US history, the president has been checked by so many

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<sup>1</sup> They include "an ill-defined set of peripheral groups and institutions - members of critics of the foreign policy establishments; interests groups and lobbies, both foreign and domestic; and the media" (Taber, 1998:30).



influential interests and institutions in the domain of domestic policy. Consequently, “his only hope of succeeding is to swim with the political currents of the day, not against them” (Denison, 2006: 1).

When the CW drew to an end, such societal factors played a crucial role in the division over FP strategy. That is why John Dumbrell argues that “in post-Cold War conditions, the integrating Soviet threat absent, domestic opinions and domestic lobbies did have to be treated with care and attention” (2002: 47). The following subsections shed some light on the effects of several domestic societal divisions over AFP in the 1990s.

#### **4.2.2.1. Public Opinion**

One source of domestic fragmentation in the 1990s was the division of public opinion in the post-CW era. The EoCW and the triumph over communism showed both a sea change and a continuity of public attitudes from the CW era (Jentleson, 1992; Richman, 1996; Melanson, 2005). This is contrast to those scholars (e.g., Powlick, 1995; Clark & Dautrich, 2000) who argue that the CW’s irrational public mood became more stable and rational after its end. In this way, Olson Holsti argues that the EoCW “has had a retrogressive impact on public opinion” (2006b: 237). On the eve of the EoCW, Miroslav Nincic also argued that “the public is likely to be driven by naive moralism and uninformed emotion. Consequently, popular sentiment tends to be volatile and misguided, driving foreign policy off the path of cool reason, and ultimately undermining the national interest” (1992: 773). The following sections highlight aspects of the confusion over US public opinion.

##### **4.2.2.1.1. US Activism In World Politics**

In the first instance, the public showed very divergent views regarding America’s world role. On the one hand, the US public was still internationalist, preferring an American activist role abroad. For example, in March 1991, 79% of Americans still believed that the US should play an active role in world politics, whereas in November 1994 this percentage had dropped a little to 68% (Richman, 1996; Minkenberg, 1996; Lindsay & Ripely, 1997a; Holsti, 1998; Kull, 2002; Melanson, 2005). In the lead-up to the liberation of Kuwait, Gallup found that about 84% of Americans supported action to get the Iraqi troops out of Kuwait, 78% wanted to destroy Iraq’s nuclear capacity, and 73% wanted to see Saddam Hussein removed from power (Jentleson, 1992; Hermann &

Peterson, 1997). Such public consensus was reflected in President George H. W. Bush's popularity, that flew to an unprecedented level (91%) on the heels of Operation Desert Storm (Hodge & Nolan, 2007). Therefore, it is clear that Americans who supported US active international role remained higher in number than those of the 1970s (Melanson, 2005).

However, in contrast to this trend, an early-May 1993 poll conducted by CBS News, reported that 52% of Americans did not agree that the US had a moral obligation to intervene in the international crisis, whereas 37% believed it did. In the same way, the CNN/*USA Today* poll of May 1993 showed that 55% of respondents were against that the US conducting airstrikes against Serbian troops, compared to 36% who were in favour (Kelleher, 1997). On the contrary, in early 1993, a poll conducted by the *Los Angeles Times* found that 58% of Americans agreed to the use of US force in Bosnia, if there was no another option to protect civilian lives (Kull & Ramsay, 2003). Likewise, public approval for the deployment of US troops outside, which peaked at more than 70% during the 1991 military operation in Kuwait, started to see dramatic changes (Richman, 1996). It declined to 50% in November 1994, and, in December 1995, the CBS/*New York Times* survey found that only 36% of Americans believed the deployment of US ground troops to Bosnia was the right action. 58% disapproved of such action at the time (Clark & Dautrich, 2000; Murray, 2000). In the same way, in March 1999, a Gallup poll found that only 31% of respondents would support any Clinton intention to send ground troops to the Balkan, whereas 65% firmly opposed (Redd, 2005). Owing to this decline, Clinton's options to send ground troops to Kosovo in 1999 were very limited. As a result, he depended on airstrikes only, as a 'zero-casualty war' approach (Redd, 2005; Robinson, 2008).

The US public's internationalist trend was also contradicted with a higher degree of sensitivity over the costs of US engagement abroad, particularly in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions (Dumbrell, 1999; Redd, 2005). In early December 1992, for example, only 20% of Americans thought that the loss of American lives was not worth the cost of humanitarian duties; however, this percentage doubled when an American life was lost, to reach about 44% (Clark & Dautrich, 2000; Murray, 2000; McKay, 2001). This trend was dominant during the Clinton administration (Redd, 2005).

#### 4.2.2.1.2. Domestic Versus External Concerns

On the other hand, in contrast to the US public's internationalist mood, another set of evidence from the 1990s shows that American public interest in world issues had dropped to unprecedented levels, and the US public's domestic concerns outweighed concerns about any foreign policy matter (Lindsay & Ripley, 1997b; Walt, 2000; Lindsay, 2005d; Melanson, 2005; Holsti, 2006b). Therefore, when Americans were asked by a Times Mirror poll in late 1993, respondents ranked "protecting the jobs of American workers" as the top priority (85%), compared with just 22% for promoting human rights abroad, and 18% for enlarging democracy worldwide (Melanson, 2005: 25). The same was true in 1996; when a *Wall Street Journal*-NBC News poll "asked voters to rank sixteen issues that might help them decide how to vote in the presidential race, foreign policy was ranked last" (Lindsay & Ripley, 1997b: 320). Likewise, when Americans were asked by the Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs (CCFA) to identify two or three dilemmas challenging the country in 1998, "foreign policy issues did not even make the list" (Lindsay, 2005d; Lindsay & Ripley, 1997b).

In contrast to its internationalist trend, the data from the early 1990s reveals that the public continued to support domestic goals such as job protection, trade balance, and the securing of the energy supply. However, in sharp contrast, and despite the US public's traditional fear of free trade, a poll conducted by the Pew Research Centre in February 2000, found that 64% of Americans believed that free trade was a good thing for the country's economy, and 62% of Americans believed that the US's membership of the WTO was serving US economic interests. The public was less concerned about American commitments to remedy the Third World's economic problems, as seen by the decreasing support for foreign aid. The public also favoured the coupling of human rights and trade issues, particularly in relation to China: according to a *Times*/CNN poll conducted in May 1994, 60% of Americans preferred to use trade issues to achieve humanitarian outcomes, compared with only 28% who did not favour such a linkage. At the other extreme, the public did not automatically follow their officials' concerns about defence (Holsti, 1995, 1996; Richman, 1996; Hermann & Peterson, 1997; Rosati & Creed, 1997; Rourke & Clark, 1998; Holsti, 1998; Flanigan & Zingale, 1998; Rosati, et al., 1998; Dumbrell, 1999; Lindsay, 2005d).

#### 4.2.2.1.3. Multi-Lateralism Versus Unilateralism

The 1990s reveal an increasing gap between the public and the AFP elite occurring over America's suitable approach to its global role (Richman, 1996; Minkenberg, 1996; Holsti, 1998; Kull, 2002). Unlike the US officials, who were enthusiastic in pushing America as the hegemonic leader, the US public rejected this notion. During 1991, 71% said no to the notion that America should serve as the world policeman. Only 16% of the public supported the US leading role in world politics, whereas 57% said that America should take a chief role but not the leading one (Kull, 2002). This trend was repeated a year later, when just 29% of respondents found that the deployment of US forces to Bosnia was appropriate if it was to consolidate American global leadership (Kull, 2002).

In late 1994, for instance, 69% of Americans preferred that the US pursue its security concerns multi-laterally, and 51% supported its involvement abroad in a combination with other countries, compared with only 17% who called for unilateralist action (Richman, 1996: 307). In 2000, Americans were asked by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) to rank three general options for the US role in the world. 72% of the respondents supported multi-lateralism as an approach to AFP, compared with just 11% who preferred hegemony and unilateralism and 15% who favoured isolationism (Kull, 2002: 100).

In this context, the public also preferred to strengthen international institutions such as the UN and WTO (Lindsay, 2005b). In November 1997, a poll conducted by CNN-*US Today* found that 85% of Americans believed in the central role of the UN at the time. Likewise, in October 1999, a poll conducted by a Pew Research Centre showed that 76% of the respondents held a positive view of the UN (Kelleher, 1997; Kull, 2002; Kull & Ramsay, 2003; Lindsay, 2005d). This trend contradicts some of the US officials' claims. For example, the powerful Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms, in a strongly-worded speech to the UNSC, claimed that the US public's view about international organisation, particularly the UN, was essentially very negative. Americans, as he argued, think that the UN's attempts to establish a new global governance is threatening their state's sovereignty and they do not think that the US is obligated to pay the organisation its back dues (Kull, 2002). In this context, it would also be proper to mention that, in contrast to the US government's opposition to

the creation of the ICC, two-thirds of the respondents in a poll conducted by the Program of International Policy Attitudes supported the establishment of this court, even after being told why the US government opposed it (Lindsay, 2005d).

In sum, such instability in the public mood during the 1990s led Holsti to argue that the public “establishes a vast region of admissible policies surrounded by a belt of inadmissible policies” (1995: 263); therefore, on some occasions, the public mood tied the policymakers’ hands behind their backs, whereas in some other instances politicians considered public opinion an “insignificant element in policy making” (1995: 263). This conclusion accords with the realists’ viewpoint that the “quality of foreign policy is likely to suffer if the mass public is allowed to have much direct impact” (Jacobs & Page, 2005:1). This also shows the divide between US public preferences and their representatives over issues such as cooperation with the UN and foreign economic policy. However, elites, in the absence of public activism, were able to act freely in the FP-making domain (Polwick & Katz, 1998). Furthermore, the disengagement of the public in foreign affairs “opens the door to issue-driven special-interest groups ... [to] command political attention and wide influence perhaps beyond their numerical strength (Lyman, 2002: 73).

#### **4.2.2.2. Media And AFP Making Process**

Relating to the above discussion, the CW was “characterised by a dominant paradigm or meta-schema that organised “normal” elite thinking, media coverage, and public response to foreign and defence policy” (Entman, 2004: 95). In order to satisfy the mass media, the CW “provided a filter and a set of criteria for determining priorities in the selection of events to report ... as well ... the task of political reporting has become much more complex without the simplifying assumptions of the conflict’ (Soderlund, 2003a: 2). However, the EoCW did not only leave “the media without a clear fall-back frame for the interpretation of crises” (Soderlund, 2003a: 2), but also became “highly partisan and biased” (Wiarada & Skelley, 2006: 4). In this way, Entman (2004) found that US media coverage was being partisan even during the US intervention (with NATO) in the Kosovo crisis in 1999. Some of the US national media failed in offering a balanced view, but it was either with or against the war. Public opinion therefore was divided over critical issues due to the mass media’s conflicted coverage. That is why the press or the media appeared as a “sideline player and occasional cheerleader in the

policy process” (McCormick, 1998: 171). It creates public consciousness over FP issues through its role as a unique agenda-setter particularly after the CW (McCormick, 1998), “through tone, content manipulation, and issue frames” (Gershkoff & Kushner, 2005: 526).

In fact, “the media’s agenda-setting function,” according to Dumbrell & Barrett (1997: 182) “has long been recognised”. This recognition became clearer after the absence of any significant external challenge to America in the 1990s. Numerous critics (e.g., Allison & Blackwill, 2000; Strobel, 2000; Wiarda & Skelley, 2006; Robinson, 2008) argue that AFP became a prisoner to television images and the short-lived passions of domestic politics. The “CNN” effect,” or the television images, therefore, has acquired a significant influence on AFP making process. Echoing such a view, Colin Powell said: “we had been drawn into this place [Somalia] by television images; now we were being repelled by them” (cited in Schraeder, 1998: 353). It was also television “which showed bedraggled Haitians arrived on overcrowded boats on US shores – that prompted the Clinton administration to refocus its policies on Haiti”. In the same way, “the televised reports of rape, genocide, and mass starvation on Bosnia-Herzegovina ... forced the United States to consider intervention in that area” (Wiarda & Skelley, 2006: 20). Media also played a significant influential role in AFP agenda-setting on several occasions. In reality, both Presidents Bush and Clinton (between 1992, and 1995) were not convinced that the war in Bosnia directly threatened US vital interests to a degree that the US should intervene militarily; the same was also true during the East-Timor violence after the independence referendum of the late 1990s, when the US administration regarded such an issue as less significant. However, on the two occasions, the non-stop coverage and the images of the humanitarian suffering led to changes in the course of AFP (Strobel, 2000). At the other extreme, one of the basic and misused lessons from the Vietnam War, according to Ryan (2003: 107) was that “the media was in part responsible for the US defeat.” For this reason, President George H. W. Bush, for instance, in run-up to the Gulf War of (1991) indicated that “we don’t need another Vietnam ... No hands are going to be tied behind backs ... It will not be a long, drawn-out mess.” On the basis of such a suspicion, during the hot events like the Gulf war (1991) and the Kosovo crisis, all media narratives and reports were subjected to military censorship (Guyatt, 2003). However, Warren P. Strobel has argued that, if US strong diplomatic leadership was uncertain, as it was during the 1990s, during the

Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia crises, the US adversaries using the news media “move quickly to fill the vacuum. Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Mohamed Farah Aided in Somalia, and Slobodan Milosevic in the former Yugoslavia used the news media, particularly television, to complicate achievement of US foreign policy objectives” (2000: 27). But in a parallel way, US political leaders have also used television news and images to rally the American public behind the policy of engagement abroad in Somalia, Haiti, the Gulf region, and the former Yugoslavia (Cameron, 2002; Soderlund, 2003b & Wiarda & Skelley, 2006). In sum, according to Norquist (2007: 8):

the media has not only fuelled the public dividedness over FP issues, but also the partisan loyalty gets worse. America has approximately 500 TV stations, and a tremendous number of journals and news papers nowadays comparing with only three TV networks and some major journals at the past.

#### **4.2.2.3. Interest Groups: Ethnic And Economic**

In contrast to their limited influence during the CW, the 1990s witnessed a greater role for interest groups over the AFP-making process. According to Woodruff (2005) “in times when there is no real threat to our national security, American politics becomes the politics of organised groups”. In this way, McCormick (1998) illustrates changes that brought such groups into the policymaking circle after the CW. AFP committees and sub-committees in the House of Representatives and the Senate began playing a crucial role in formulating the AFP-agenda in the post-CW era. In addition, the number of congressional FP staff increased. These moves created increased opportunities for lobbyists to influence policy. Through the use of ‘soft money’ to political parties, the interest groups were more intertwined with congressional campaigns in the post-CW period.

##### **4.2.2.3.1. Business Interest Groups**

As said in the first chapter, globalisation “has erased the traditional distinction between what is national and what is international, what is private and what is public, and what is domestic and what is foreign” (Kegley & Wittkopf, 2001: 18). Thus, the EoCW brought economic issues into the centre of the AFP-making process as the interests of US companies shifted from domestic to global markets. Therefore, business groups became more interested in influencing the process of AFP-making and conduct (Kutler, 1995; Pahre & Papayoanou, 1997; Fordham, 1998; Cavanagh, 2000; Lyman, 2002; Conley, 2007). As a result, business interest groups became more active in “contributing

to election campaigns, lobbying congress for favourable legislations, and acting as advisors to government agencies” (Wiarda & Skelley, 2006: 52). This led Pascal Boniface to argue that the US “confuse[d] its national interest with a global interest ... when once the saying was, What is good for General Motors is good for the United States” (2001: 158).

Thus, the business groups were able to a degree directly or indirectly to affect AFP. Cox, for example, indicates that “pro-NAFTA business organisations spent between \$30 and \$50 million lobbying for the agreement, which made it one of the most expensive foreign policy campaigns in US history” (2008: 1530). Clinton’s difficulty in passing the NAFTA treaty in Congress was essentially because of the influence of interest groups. While business groups backed Clinton’s proposal, organised labour, supported by human rights and environmental groups, opposed the treaty. This divide was clear in Congress, where the Republicans and conservative Democrats supported the business groups and the president’s initiative, while the majority of Democrats supported the organised labour groups in condemning the treaty (Cameron, 2002; Wiarda & Skelley, 2006). When Congress was hesitant about refinancing the IMF on the heels of the Asian financial crisis of 1997, businesses, farmers’ lobbying groups, and officials played a crucial role in making Congress approve US\$17.9 billion, the amount that the administration had suggested nearly a year earlier (McCormick, 2000). Furthermore, “most multi-national companies, some large foreign-owned companies ... hire Americans with legislative and executive experience and contacts to represent them on pending issues in which they have an interest” (Wayne, 2000: 27). In the mid-1990s, according to Cameron, “a broad-based coalition of nearly 700 business and agriculture groups, set up USA Engage, to lobby for free trade” (2002: 95).

There is a widespread belief amongst the public and critics that American oil companies and weapons producers, among others, run or are even hijacking the AFP-making process (Cameron, 2002; Guyatt, 2003). The mutual interests of the business community and the Pentagon, for example, worked well against the advocates of the peace dividend, who wanted the military budget to be cut during the early 1990s. Because “many of the largest and most prestigious US corporations ... were major suppliers to the Pentagon: defence contracts funnelled hundreds of millions of dollars each year to companies like Boeing, General Electric, AT&T, and General Motors”



(Guyatt, 2003: 117). In a parallel way, weapons producers, such as Lockheed Martin, “helped finance the campaign for NATO enlargement” (Cameron, 2002: 95), while the missile manufacturer, Raytheon “helped support the campaign in favour of national missile defence” (Cameron, 2002: 95).

As Clinton saw the US “like a big corporation competing in the global market place” (Ambrose & Brinkley, 1997: 402; Dumbrell, 1997: 182), the business community supported him more “than any Democrat since Johnson” (Cox, 1995: 27). In consequence, the business groups’ fingerprints on the shaping of AFP are very clear. For example, according to John T. Rourke & Richard Clark (1998: 204), pro-China groups, which consisted of the US companies that were gaining huge profits from economic relations with China, and business and farm groups, played a very important role in the shaping of the US-China relations during the 1990s and beyond, in line with Clinton’s economic executive agencies. Clinton, during his presidential campaign in 1992, said that he “would deny most-favoured-nation status (MFN) to China ... impose trade sanctions, and encourage the younger Chinese generation’s democratic aspirations” (Rourke & Clark, 1998: 204). However, once in power he renewed China’s MFN status. Thereafter, in 1994, he officially made a distinction between economic and human rights issues in the government’s discourse, because of the influence of business groups. Meanwhile, agricultural business groups’ lobbyist activities led to an easing of the export restriction on Cuba in 2000 because their trade with the island was about US\$1 billion (Neack, 2003; Wiarda & Skelley, 2006).

#### **4.2.2.3.2. Ethnic Interest Groups**

Hoff (1994) and Woodruff (2005) argue that it is not totally accurate to say that only the ‘power elite’ possess the ability to guide the nation’s policy, but that there is also a set of small groups which can do the same. As with the economic groups, ethnic groups have also benefited from the post-CW political circumstances and enhanced their influence on policy makers. Thomas Ambrosio observes that ethnic groups sought “to influence policy in three ways: framing<sup>1</sup> information and policy analysis, and policy oversight” (2002: 2). In this context, Lindsay states that global politics in the US is increasingly becoming “local politics—and local politics, often, is ethnic politics”

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<sup>1</sup> “Framing refers to the attempt by interest groups to place an issue on the government’s agenda, shape perspective of the issue, and influence the terms of debate” (Ambrosio, 2002: 2).

(2004: 134). This became clear after the collapse of the external challenger to the US. The inability of Americans to create a grand strategy similar to the CW's containment created a significant policy vacuum, "which ethnic identity groups sought to fill to the advantage of their ethnic kin or national homeland" (Ambrosio, 2002: 12).

Thus, for example, Mexican-American groups played a crucial role in the NAFTA debate and in the framing of the whole US policy toward Mexico (Clough, 2004). Chinese-American groups, likewise, have played a similar role in shaping US foreign policy toward China. Cuban-American lobbies also play a fundamental role in driving US policy toward Cuba, even after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Ambrosio, 2002). Although the CW came to an end, and the Cuban regime lost its previous geostrategic importance, the US maintained the embargo of the CW against the island. The pressure of the Cuban-American lobbies continued and, for instance, yielded the passing of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and the Helms-Burton Act of 1996<sup>1</sup> (Haney & Vanderbush, 1999; Ambrosio, 2002). Thus, in contrast to "the political spectrum editorial writers, academic associations, business and labour leaders, farm associations, and even Cuban-American groups [who] have called for a change in U.S. policy" (Brenner et al., 2004: 193). It "would seem that US policy toward Cuba has stayed roughly the same since Clinton signed Helms-Burton" (Brenner et al., 2004: 192). The American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC),<sup>2</sup> in the same way, has been described as the strongest figure in formulating US policy towards the Middle East, as well as concentrating on the fate of Jews in other countries, such as Russia (Massing, 2006; Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006). Irish groups during the Clinton era followed and supported the Northern Ireland peace process (Ambrosio, 2002). The US engagement in the Balkans and Aegean was a major concern for the Greeks and other minorities from Eastern Europe. However, the Croats and Serb lobbies were both weak and their activities did not influence US policy towards the conflict in the Balkan during the Bush I administration. This factor would interpret James Baker's reaction that America did not have a dog in that conflict. The Eastern European American lobbies, particularly Polish-Americans, played a vital role in pushing US policy makers to adopt the

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<sup>1</sup> The Act introduced by Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina) and Representative Dan Burton (R-Indiana) and was passed on 26 March 1996. The Act "penalizes foreign companies that do business with Havana" (Ambrosio, 2002: 206).

<sup>2</sup> AIPAC is the strongest lobby in America with "55.000 members, a staff of over 150, and an annual operational budget of \$25 million" (Cameron, 2002: 88).

expansion of NATO (Farkas, 2003). Hispanic and Asians were more active in immigration legislation and trade deals (McKay, 2001; Uslaner, 2004). Indian-Americans also “used their growing political clout to block efforts to persuade congress to condemn Pakistani aggression in Kashmir” (Lindsay, 2005d: 52).

Such diversity of input can affect the consistency of AFP and lead to the domesticization of AFP (Huntington, 2004), because of the contested and even conflicting aims that these groups seek to fulfil. In the 1990s, it was widely argued that “the sheer volume of interest group activity at all levels of government had undermined the capacity of governments to articulate the wishes of the public and to get things done. On every issue lobbies mobilize for and against in ways which make the costs of pursuing a particular policy option very high” (McKay, 2001: 222). In this context, Buchanan discusses a number of examples. By the autumn of 1997, Armenian-Americans succeeded in blocking “aid to Azerbaijan though the United State had oil interests there, and Turkey was being deprived of US helicopters and frigates it had purchased because of pressure from Greek-Armenians” (1999: 337). Likewise, easing the embargo of Cuba during the 1990s was also blocked by the Cuban-Americans because of their voting weight in New Jersey and Florida (Buchanan, 1999; Cameron, 2002).

On some occasions, however, interest groups’ agendas have coincided with the US administrations’ foreign policy agenda. Thus, Cameron argues that “Clinton’s call to expand democracy was taken up by many ethnic groups with ties to Africa, Latin America, and the former Soviet Union” (2002: 88). Also, the coincidence of Eastern European groups’ agenda with US strategy was clear in promoting NATO expansion towards the East; thus, such groups “voted heavily for the Democrats in 1996 and 2000” (Cameron, 2002: 88). However, the US’s lack of concern over the mass killings in Rwanda in 1994 was in part because the genocide did not find sufficient “resonance in African-American political circles” (Ambrosio, 2002: 14), which, in turn, meant there was little effort to influence Congress and the US government to become engaged with the issue.

In a similar way, the majority of academics argue that the AIPAC extended its grip over important parts of the American government (Ambrosio, 2002), including the “Vice President’s office, the Pentagon and the State Department, besides controlling the

legislative apparatus of Congress” (Pravda, 2006). In this task, it was “being assisted by powerful allies in the two main political parties, in major corporate media and by some richly financed so-called ‘think-tanks’ such as the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, or the Washington Institute for Near East Policy” (Pravda, 2006). The American Hellenic Institute Public Affairs Committee (AHIPAC) was previously ranked the second largest lobby group; however, it lost most of its influence after the EoCW, when American concerns turned to other hotspots in the world. African-Americans turned to deal with FP issues after a long tradition of concern with only domestic politics. The abolition of the South African apartheid system was their initial main concern and, since 1993, the Congressional Black and TransAfrica—two African-Americans lobby groups—have become think tanks dealing with the FP agenda (Uslaner, 2004). Indian-Americans have started to be an active group in FP, not only because of the geo-political challenges that face India, but also because they are one of the richest ethnic groups in the US (Lindsay, 2004; Lindsay, 2005d). However, there are also less significant ethnic groups, in terms of their influence over policymaking, such as Arabs, Latinos, and Eastern Europeans, who are less united around particular political issues (Lindsay, 2004; Uslaner, 2004).

#### **4.2.2.3.3. Single Issue Lobby Groups**

The post-CW era also witnessed an increase in influence of powerful and well-organised single-focus or single-issue lobby groups (e.g., human rights movements, such as Amnesty International; environmental movements, such as Greenpeace, and the Sierra Club; and religious groups, such as the National Council of Churches). They have become more engaged in the AFP-making process, and have also joined external networks with the aim of influencing other governments. They exert considerable pressure domestically and internationally to achieve their global agenda (Cameron, 2002; Clough, 2004; Woodruff, 2005; Wiarda & Skelley, 2006). For example, labour, human rights and environmental groups oppose the role of the WTO and challenged business groups that were advocating free trade and economic openness in the Seattle meeting in late 1999, and during the Washington D.C. meetings of the IMF and World Bank in 2000. This union of disparate groups influenced the US public against free trade and the WTO. Such groups also worked against the NAFTA treaty in the early 1990s. In this way, “human rights, activities, labour unions, and environmentalists kept President Clinton from wining authority to negotiate new trade deals that would receive

privileged consideration on Capitol Hill” (Lindsay, 2005d: 52). Conservative groups also “turned US participation in UN peacekeeping missions into political poison” (Lindsay, 2005d: 52).

It is not easy to demonstrate and measure NGOs’ direct influence on AFP-making; however, their lobbyists target policy-makers, and they conduct their campaigns on Internet websites and via the mass media to influence the public’s mood and choices (McCormick, 2000; Strobel, 2000; Cameron, 2002; Lindsay, 2005d; Wiarda & Skelley, 2006). Thus, President Bush’s decision to send US troops to Somalia in 1992 was essentially made because of the efforts of “a loose coalition of relief groups such as CARE, members of Congress, and mid-level US officials helped direct Bush’s attention to the starvation in Somalia by encouraging and facilitating media coverage there” (Strobel, 2000: 39).

The problem with the influence of these groups is that, as Wiarda & Skelley argue, “the existence of so many groups, which frequently clash with each other over policy goals and choices, has often led to paralysis as decision makers fear offending groups that, collectively, represent a sizeable segment of the voting public” (2006: 51). Furthermore, Lindsay states that “when politicians did address foreign policy issues, they often had to satisfy interest groups demands,” adding that most interest groups (ethnic, commercial, and ideological) “were willing to reward, or punish politicians when the broader public was not” (2005d: 52).

The outcome was that the president could “no longer consult with only the leadership in congress and be assured of the congressional support for presidential initiatives” (Hamilton, 2000: 24), but also he must respond to business interest groups, which exerted great influence on his choices. Furthermore, from the 1990s Congress was also “more responsive ... to the hyper pluralism of well-organised groups and associations” (Thurber, 1996: 72). As a result of the overlapping political environment in Washington, David McKay observes that (2001: 238):

It is difficult to distinguish between the ‘insider’ (elected and officials) and the ‘outsiders’ (lobbyists, media consultants, interest group leaders). Indeed, the presence of policy networks with fluid memberships and constantly shifting agendas means that there are really only ‘insiders’.

Hamilton describes the influence of such groups over Congressmen by saying that “too many people place constituent interests above national interests. They don’t see much difference between lobbying for highway funds and slanting foreign policy toward a particular interest group” (2000: 24). Lindsay continues this theme by remarking that “the-not-too-surprising result was that American foreign policy in the 1990s was often inconsistent and short-sighted” (2005d: 52). However, in the light of the previous chapter’s debate, Lindsay’s observation is not truly correct, because, even with such diversity, AFP pursued a comprehensive agenda. True, AFP conducted its affairs under very difficult domestic bipartisanship, but what is not in doubt is that AFP did not lose its strategic way.

#### **4.2.2.4. Grand Strategy And Domestic Debate**

Not only have post-CW’s agenda items, such as trade, the US military intervention, and environmental issues “fissured both political parties” and societal actors (McCormick, 1998: 172), but without "monolithic Communism", both Republicans and Democrats tended to change their CW intellectual positions and the debate around the state's role in the new era was not yet sorted out (Hewson & Sinclair, 1999; Dumbrell, 1999). It seems apparent, therefore, that the pre-1989 rational basis of AFP was eventually transformed by the EoCW, and the post-CW era initiated an intense and stifling debate to redefine AFP’s new priorities and strategy (Minkenberg & Dittgen, 1996; Lindsay & Ripley, 1997a; Hurst, 1999). In this way, Grew McGrew identified three main dominant positions in the national debate on the post-CW’s security strategy: “the preponderants; the neo-isolationists; and the globalists” (1994: 243). Such a dispute represents several alternative strategies to the CW’s containment: a neo-isolationist, or disengagement strategy; a strategy of selective engagement; a strategy of balance of power; a primacy strategy; a liberal internationalism strategy (Posen and Ross, 1996/1997 & Dueck, 2004).

These perspectives contested each other within American domestic discourse along the 1990s. At the eve of the EoCW, the neo-isolationists called for an inward look, arguing that the US should pay its attention to domestic and economic problems, and turn its back on the external chaotic world. The end of the prolonged internationalism, from their viewpoint, should lead to a phase of "nostalgia for a more normal FP" (Gergen, 1992; Lösche, 1996; Kull & Ramsay, 2000; Buchanan, 2007). Several critics argue that

the manifestation of this tendency or at least the rise of this sort of debate came to the surface with the election of President Clinton, who prioritised domestic issues over foreign policy during his presidential campaign (Rockman, 1996; Destler, 1998 & Dunn 2005). The 1992 presidential election found willingness amongst the public to support the state's FP reform after the CW. The isolationist appetite might "be founded on the radical left, amongst presidential candidates Jerry Brown, Jesse Jackson and Douglas Wilder and on the right from Republican presidential candidate Pat Buchanan and Independent presidential candidate Rose Perot" (Dunn 2005: 238). Therefore, the neo-isolationist propensity has appeared in the post-CW FP through their strict bias against any sort of internationalist perspective. For instance, during the 1992 presidential campaign, both Pat Buchanan and Jerry Brown stood against foreign aid, opposed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and believed that the US should keep itself out of the Gulf War. Furthermore, Buchanan criticised the deployment of the US military forces to Bosnia and Clinton's 1995 plan for Mexico (Lindsay & Ripley, 1997a; Nincic, 1997; McCormick, 1998; Dumbrell, 1999). Jeane Kirkpatrick also wrote that the EoCW "frees time, attention and resources to American ends" (Cited in Buchanan, 2007: 132).

However, even though the "isolationist minority has not grown substantially during the post Cold War era" (Brewer & Steenbergen, 2002: 43), it was a target of a harsh criticism across the country, because, according to James Baker, "isolationism and disengagement are simply not options. We are too integrated into the world, in economic and security terms, to walk away from it. If the United States does not exercise power, others will" (2007: 15). The economic nationalists criticized the neo-isolationists' protectionism (Schlesinger, 1995, 1996; Kull; Ramsay, 2000). Both Presidents Bush I and Bill Clinton warned against the flourishing of the isolationist tendency after the CW. Bush, for example, advised Americans to resist "that faulted siren" after the 1994 midterm elections. Clinton, in May 1995, also blamed the congressional leadership for its most isolationist plans in the last half-century. Moreover, he argued that America's withdrawal from international affairs today would be very harmful for its future. His National Security Advisor – Anthony Lake – saw the 1994 Republican victory in the congressional elections as a new rise of isolationism. However, President Clinton himself, who was very suspicious of the resurgence of the isolationist tendency during 1995, has been accused by several critics and politicians

alike (for example, Muravchik and Caspar Weinberger) of echoing domestic concern with the post-CW neo-isolationist viewpoint. The *Los Angeles Times*, likewise, in February 1995, expressed such worries of the isolationist propensity across the new Republican congress (Nincic, 1997; Hurst, 1999; Dumbrell, 1999; Kull & Ramsay, 2000; McKay, 2001).

In a similar way to what happened during previous phases of the state's history, advocates of the "homebound" standpoint clashed with the interventionists, or internationalists, who saw the post-CW era as a unilateralist moment leading to the American unrivalled global leadership in the 21st century. This cleavage over AFP strategy is another source of fragmentation affecting the performance of the US 1990s administrations (Krauthammer, 1990/91, Cheney, 1993; Mastanduno, 1997; Rosati & Creed, 1997; Scott & Crothers, 1998; Hook & Spanier, 2000).

### **4.3. Post-11 September: Rally-Round-The-Flag**

The aftermath of 9/11 offered AFP a unique opportunity to rejuvenate the domestic political bipartisanship, and generate a new rally-round-the-flag mentality that was lost with the EoCW. In addition, it removed the vacuum created by the lack of an external enemy, which came about after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

#### **4.3.1. AFP's Missing North Pole Rediscovered**

The EoCW removed the US' global peer and left America as the sole hegemon, and also created a strategic vacuum that affected the FP-making process for more than a decade (Cakmak, 2003 & Sklenka, 2007). It has been argued by the likes of Chollet that the absence of "a broad narrative like the War on Terror" was the main reason behind the indecisiveness of AFP during the post-CW epoch (2007: 5). Terrorism "was no longer one among a number of assorted dangers to the United States ... [but a] fundamental threat to America" (Lieber, 2002: 6). In effect, the "core question raised by the fall of the Berlin Wall on 11/9 – what to do with American power absent global adversary – had been answered. The country was now at war" (Chollet & Goldgeier, 2008: 313). In consequence, 11 September 2001 created "a sense of international purpose" and united "the nation around some fairly powerful themes" (Cox, 2002a: 273). According to Chollet (2007: 5):



After years in which American leaders seemed to career from crisis to crisis, none of which quite rose to the level of grave threats to national security, the United States now faced a moral enemy and a generational struggle. Foreign policy in the post Cold-War era finally had an overriding purpose: to defeat Islamic extremism. If history ended in 1989, for many it seemed to begin in 2001.<sup>1</sup>

Since then, anti-terrorism replaced the CW's anti-communism (Barry, 2002; Colás & Saull, 2006; Leffler & Legro, 2008), and has become "a major focus of policy-making attention and commands enormous intellectual and material investment from the security establishment, the emergency services, industry and commerce, the academy and the media" (Jackson, 2007: 394). In consequence, the War on Terror (WoT) remedied the problem of a threat deficit from which the US suffered during the 1990s (Barry, 2003a; Buzan, 2006; Wittkopf & McCormick, 2008) and "marked the return of an adversarial world, with detestable bad guys out to kill us, and the first opportunity since the Cold War to restore foreign policy" (Crocker, 2005: 51). Therefore, the debate over US grand strategy that was ever-present during the 1990s came to an end on 11 September 2001, at least for some time ahead (Lieber, 2005).

As a result, the domestic consensus that had been fragmented in the 1990s and limited US policymakers' ability to respond to the new international environment ended. The country reunited under the new conditions. As Vasques (1985) highlights, crises usually generates domestic consensus and bipartisanship, while Dumbrell (2002) states foreign policy strategy explicitly emerges in the heat of events. In fact, the 'rally-round-the-flag-effect' sparked by 9/11 was unprecedented, uniting elites, the political parties in Congress in which Democrats rallied behind the president, the mass media, governmental institutions, interest groups, and even the international community (Kupchan, 2002; Hetherington & Nelson, 2003; Sloan, 2003; Wittkopf & McCormick, 2004; Smith, 2005a; Covington, 2005; Thurber, 2006; Falk, 2007). Therefore, political "bipartisanship returned to be the central organizing principle in US foreign policy for the first time" since the EoCW (Singh, 2006: 17). This was an ideal environment to carry on pursuing AFP of hegemony. In the following section some aspects of the new bipartisanship will be discussed.

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<sup>1</sup> This phenomenon was apparent even during the first few months of the George W. Bush's presidency prior to 9/11. One journalist argues that, "one day China was a strategic competitor and a threat to all Asia: the next, the US had to engage with China and deepen its involvement in the world. Even more confusion existed towards North Korea – initially it was an unfit negotiating partner, and then moving to be a posture of talking without preconditions" (Cameron, 2002: 30).

### **4.3.2. 9/11 And US Political System Efficiency: Aspects Of Presidential /Congressional Relations**

The attacks of 9/11 brought new uncertainties to the US and that shift redistributed power within the US political system. In contrast to the 1990s which saw greater congressional and societal involvement in AFP agenda-setting, the new uncertainty reconsolidated AFP's CW model in which authority shifted back to the president, the armed forces and the law enforcement community (Hayden, et. al, 2003; Allen, 2003; Fisher, 2003; Daalder & Lindsay, 2005a; Vanderbush, et. al, 2008). In the following sections more light is shed on how 9/11 revitalized the model of the Imperial presidency with Congress following the presidential leadership.

#### **4.3.2.1. The Imperial Presidency Reappeared**

9/11 and its aftermath "once again tilted the pendulum back toward an empowered presidency and executive branch" (Hamilton, 2006: 267) and gave "more power than ever to the Imperial Presidency and place[d] the separation of powers ordained by the constitution under unprecedented, and at time unbearable, strain" (Schlesinger, 2004: xxiv). President George W. Bush found it easy to reclaim the supreme role in the domain of FP-making as the attacks "provided a rare clarifying moment in the nation's collective consciousness," not only because "a national focus and sense of mission, absent since the end of the Cold War, re-emerged," but also because of "both American national identity and US foreign policy were reinvigorated—separately and in relation to each other" (McCartney, 2004: 400).

Therefore, 9/11 served Bush in several ways and offered him numerous advantages, strengthening his political leadership. First, the events effectively closed the discussion over Bush's controversial election, which saw disputes over the votes in Florida and the unparalleled involvement of the US Supreme Court. Prior to the attacks, 40% of Americans regarded his presidency as illegitimate and a number of the House of Representatives expressed their dissatisfaction at his election. Following the strikes the nation rallied around Bush's presidency. Furthermore, the pre-9/11 belief that Bush was inexperienced in the field of FP evaporated. Since then a legislative window opened to put much of the decision-making in his hands (Brenner, et al, 2002; Strategic Comments, 2002a; Cox, 2002a; Crocker, 2005; Hamilton, 2006).

Even before the attacks of 9/11, Bush saw himself as “a different kind of president” and as a “man of big ideas” (Bolton, 2008: 140). 9/11 allowed this belief to come true. The events of 9/11 transformed President Bush into the most popular American president ever and focused attention on his leadership. Immediately after 11 September 2001, Bush’s public approval rating leapt to 86% and in the next polls of 21 and 22 September, it increased to over 90% (the highest level of public approval ever witnessed by Gallup) (Young, 2003; Yetiv & Dziubinski, 2003; Covington, 2005; Parmar, 2005; Smith, 2005a; Lindsay, 2005d; Daalder & Lindsay, 2005a, 2005b). According to Sara Binder, Bush II used his high post-9/11 support to mobilise both Congress and the media (Brookings, 2002). However, the high popularity was exceptional and short-lasting: within one year Bush’s approval declined to 70%, and by July 2003 it fell further, to 61% (Parmar, 2005). However, the fall in support did not reduce his ability to lead and to formulate the FP agenda. For instance, in 2002, 71% of Americans believed that Bush’s personality and ability were sufficiently strong and well-equipped to lead the nation. Prior to the 2004 elections, 61% of Americans also favoured Bush’s performance in the WoT compared to 34% who preferred John Kerry’s (Parmar, 2005). In 2004, Americans re-elected Bush, and gave support to his plan of anti-terrorism (Jackson, 2005).

9/11 gave Bush II the opportunity to exercise his presidential power and to justify his unilateral tendencies in the eyes of Americans and abroad. With the nation rallying around the flag and mood of nationalism high, the president was able to gain support from Congress and convince the legislative entity to authorise his administration’s actions. At the same time, it was difficult to criticise the president’s policy. Such unprecedented domestic consensus following 9/11 created a new political hegemony over domestic entrants (May, 2003b; Covington, 2005).<sup>1</sup> As a result, 9/11 enabled the

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<sup>1</sup> In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, President George W. Bush represented a new way to run the American presidency. According to one scholar, since then, there was “no move to the centre that you normally see in presidencies” (Denison, 2006: 3). On the other hand, Republicans “were quick to brand anyone who criticized the administration as giving aid and comfort to ... America’s enemies” (May, 2003b: 35). In this vein, Senator Tom Daschle had been compared, by the Family Research Council, to Saddam Hussein because; he just refused “drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge” (cited in Rich, 2002). Trent Lott also reprimanded him when he disapproved of the US military operation saying that “how dare Senator Daschle criticize President Bush while we are fighting our war against terrorism” (cited in Lindsay, 2003b: 536). In a press conference held on 9/11, Donald Rumsfeld rebuked Senator Carl Levin, the chair of the Senate Service Committee, who was attending, by saying that “you and other Democrats in Congress have fear that you simply don’t have enough money for the large increase in defence that the Pentagon is seeking, especially for missile defence ... Does this sort of thing convince

President to initiate a hegemonic FP approach without the worries of domestic confrontation. In addition, the events played a crucial role in shifting the public's concern from internal issues (low politics) towards foreign and security policy (high politics). As a result, Bush's controversial domestic proposals, such as the tax-cuts initiative, took a backseat. Fighting against terrorism and national security concerns were brought back to the forefront (Darius, 2002; Hayden, et. al, 2003; & Allen, 2003; Covington, 2005;; Daalder & Lindsay, 2005a, 2005b; Lindsay, 2005d; Melanson, 2005; Wedeman & McMahon, 2006; Tuathail, 2006 & McMurtry, 2007).

This tactic of pushing FP issues to the forefront of policy was used by the president and his administration a few years later, by invoking Iraq as a potential threat to US security, Bush not only blocked the Democrat attempts to redirect American attention to the economic matters, but also helped Republicans win the 2002 elections. Bush also renewed his popularity with the Iraq invasion; on 22 March 2003, just three days after the war started, his approval increased from 58% to 71% (Melanson, 2005; Smith, 2005a).

In sum, Bush, through 9/11, gained "what he had not been able to generate for himself: public acceptance of and even trust in his leadership" (Covington, 2005: 86). It was an opportunity for him to seize control of the national agenda and shape the country's grand strategy in FP (McCartney, 2004: 408). These ideas are given greater consideration in the following sections.

#### **4.3.2.2. 9/11: Reproduces The CW's Model Of Congress As A Follower**

9/11 changed the short post-CW status of Congress as assertive in FP-making and reproduced the CW's form of congress merely following the presidential line. In this context, Sara Binder and Bill Frenzel, the congressional experts in the Brookings Institution, argue that the impact of 9/11 on Congress was comparable to that of the Pearl Harbour attacks of 7 December 1941. However, Binder suggests that the political

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you than an emergency exists in this country to increase defence spending?" (Griffin, 2007: 15; Reynolds, 2007: 106). In turn, congress immediately responded and "appropriated an additional \$40 billion for the Pentagon and much more later" (Griffin, 2007: 16). In a similar way, on December 6, 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft "told the Senate Judiciary Committee that those who criticize the post-9/11 curtailment of civil liberties aid terrorists ... erode our national unity and diminish our resolve" (May, 2003b: 49).

environment of each was not entirely similar. In 1941, the president's party held a significant majority in both houses. However, on 9/11 the Republicans had only a small majority in Congress, whereas the Senate was controlled by the Democrats. Binder argues that the 1941 legislature handled the issue more smoothly than did the 2001 legislature. However, Frenzel argues that in 2001 both the Republicans and Democrats reflected the wishes of the populace and interpreted it in a series of bipartisan policies (Brookings, 2002). As Richard Falk argues, there was an overall consensus in Congress to follow the president's path to war (2007). The consensus enabled the WoT to be fought explicitly in Afghanistan and Iraq "with no questions arising in congress, or the press" (McMurtry, 2007: 141).

This congressional response according to Robert J. McKeever and Philip Davis "confirmed a familiar pattern: for all re-assertiveness of congresses in recent decades, when a major crisis occurs, the president takes the lead and congress follow" (2006: 185). Major national debacles, such as Vietnam and Watergate, or profound shifts in the environment, such as the EoCW, led Congress to assert its authorities over AFP. 9/11, the WoT and the Iraq war, not only reproduced the domestic consensus over AFP and empowered the president, but also deterred Congress from challenging presidential FP initiatives (May, 2003b; Melanson, 2005; & Lindsay, 2005b; Wiarda & Skelley, 2006; Hamilton, 2006).

Congress responded to 9/11 by changing its 1990s way of operating. More precisely, Congress "deferred to the president on national security issues to a degree not seen since before Vietnam and Watergate" (Melanson, 2005: 33). Both Republicans and Democrats put aside their political disputes, rallying around the president, and supporting his FP initiatives. Most Republican officeholders were hawkish, pursuing American primacy in world politics, while the return of the national security agenda to the forefront concerns of Americans in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 undermined the Democrats' resistance to the president's military proposals (Brookings, 2002; Lindsay, 2005b; Singh, 2006). As a result, a blank cheque was given to the president, authorising him to use all available and necessary force against the organisers of 9/11. On 14 September, Congress passed a resolution virtually unopposed that granted Bush unlimited war powers. The resolution passed in the lower house with only one vote against (420-1), while the Senate passed it 98-0. Republican and Democratic leaders in

Congress worked closely with the White House to offer the necessary funds. The two houses of Congress also worked harmoniously, a phenomenon rarely seen in Washington.

In contrast to the conventional aphorism that Congress is unable to respond with the necessary speed to FP issues, Congress demonstrated decisiveness rather than deliberation. Congress changed its traditional legislative process and passed resolutions swiftly with little opposition. For example, in October 2001, the USA Patriot Act was passed in the Senate 98-1, while in the House the vote was 357-66. Therefore, it can be argued that, at certain times, Congress can respond rapidly and effectively. 9/11 also changed the daily concerns of Congress from domestic politics to dealing with foreign policy issues. Questions of defence and homeland security were permanent subjects, whereas the federal budget was put on hold (Teixeira, 2001, Parenti, 2002; Brookings, 2002 & Lindsay, 2005b, 2005d; Squire, 2005; Melanson, 2005; Phillips, et. al, 2007; Wittkopf & McCormick, 2008).

As stated previously, Congress followed the presidential initiatives. It authorised him to use military force against terrorism and it also toughened the country's anti-terrorism rules. In addition, Congress agreed to raise financial support for the wider WoT and homeland security (Cox, 2002a; Sloan, 2003 & Melanson, 2005). In contrast to the early 1990s' constraint on military expenditure, defence spending increased dramatically in the post-9/11 environment. It increased from US\$332 billion in 2002 to approximately US\$436 billion in 2004, while funds for "homeland security almost doubled during the first three George W. Bush years" (Melanson, 2005: 33). In October 2002, Congress also provided support to the president over the question of Iraq "by passing a joint resolution authorising the president to use force as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq" (Wittkopf & McCormick, 2008: 18).

During the three years that followed 9/11, congressional criticism was practically muted and its oversight virtually collapsed, particularly between 2000 and 2006. As a result, Congress failed to terminate its necessary foreign policy responsibilities (May, 2003b; Haydon, et. al, 2003; Fisher, 2003; Covington, 2005; Lindsay, 2005a; 2005d; Daalder &

Lindsay, 2005b; Ornstein & Mann, 2006; Howell & Pevehouse, 2007).<sup>1</sup> Therefore, Congress, as some scholars suggest “had become a rubber stamp for White House initiatives” (Lindsay, 2005b: 79), which is why “President Bush retains extraordinary institutional advantages over congress” (Howell & Pevehouse, 2007: 106).

#### **4.3.2.3. US Public Concern: From Post-CW Ambivalence To The Post-9/11 Unity**

In contrast to public apathy over AFP in the 1990s, the events of 9/11 brought FP issues back to the top of the lists of concerns for the public (Betts, 2005; Lindsay, 2005d; Ornstein & Mann, 2006). On 10 September 2001, for instance, the public’s main concern was the US economy: 39% of Americans believed that economic issues were the main challenge, while 1% believed that terrorism was the most important. However, two days later, around 64% of Americans ranked terrorism as the top challenge to the nation compared with 20% who believed economic issues were the most important (Melanson, 2005; Lindsay, 2005d & Wittkopf & McCormick, 2008). A poll carried by the CCFR in 2002 also found that 36% of Americans believed that terrorism was the biggest problem facing the US and FP issues were considered by 41% of respondents to be the most important threats to the US (Deibel, 2007). Gallup also found that issues such as terrorism, national security, or war were named by two out of three Americans as the most crucial problem facing the US in the immediate post-9/11 environment (Lindsay, 2005d). This profound shift in the US public mood was the first since the CCFR poll was established in 1974. It was also the first time that foreign policy issues overrode domestic concerns (Deibel, 2007). The placing of the public’s importance on FP had been reflected previously only in the early stages of Vietnam and Korean Wars (Lindsay, 2005d; Mueller, 2008).

In contrast to the ambivalent American public mood during the 1990s, post 9/11 the public mood reflected a shift toward internationalism. In November 2001, for instance,

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<sup>1</sup> In consequence, Congresses failed to examine the government’s policies in the defence and domestic security area. Congressional oversight failed to determine if American laws were implemented; if government agencies exceeded their constitutional limits; and if American resources were used properly. For example, Congress did not scrutinize the functions and performance of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the House’s Committee of Homeland Security had no control over the DHS’ budget. Moreover, Congress appears to have forgotten its authority in limiting the government’s action on issues such the NSA surveillance of telephone calls or the torture at Abu Ghraib in 2004. Therefore Ornstein and Mann (2006) emphasise that since Bush II came to the office congressional oversight dramatically declined. In sum, it is fair to suggest that the events of 9/11 returned the control of AFP-making to the president. President Bush “highlighted the magnitude of the task before the nation and so justified his leadership role in responding to the attacks” (Covington, 2005: 86).

81% of Americans (the highest number ever) supported the US's active role in international affairs. A few months later, this percentage had dropped slightly to 71% (Lindsay, 2005d; Deibel, 2007; Wittkopf & McCormick, 2008).<sup>1</sup> In consequence, "more spending on defence, intelligence gathering, and homeland security" was more acceptable (Wittkopf & McCormick, 2008: 17).

Polls show that US citizens enthusiastically supported Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2002. For example, a Pew Research Centre's poll carried in October 2002 found that 66% of US citizens believed that Saddam Hussein was involved in the attacks of 9/11 and 79% of the American population believed that "Iraq possessed or was close to possessing, nuclear weapons" (Kellner, 2006: 152). However, in a mid-March 2003 Gallup poll, 88% of the respondents were convinced that Iraq had conspired with al-Qaeda to attack the US and about 51% believed that Saddam Hussein was personally implicated in the attacks of 9/11 (Schlesinger, 2003; Malik, 2003; Dumbrell, 2005). Such convictions still existed in 2003. In a news survey conducted by the *New York Times*/CBS, 42% of Americans still believed that Saddam Hussein was directly responsible for the attacks of 9/11, while, according to a NBC news poll, 55% of the US public were still persuaded by the belief that Saddam Hussein supported al-Qaeda in conducting its attack against America in 9/11 (Roy, 2004). In turn, "three-quarters of the American public supported the war" because the Bush administration "successfully convinced them that a link existed between Saddam Hussein and terrorism generally, and between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda specifically" (Gershkoff & Kushner, 2005: 525). However, in general, the public's support for the Iraq War declined when its moral justifications had dissipated: there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the claim that Iraq had links with Al-Qaeda had collapsed.

#### **5.3.2.4. The Role Of Media and public discourse**

Such a public mood would be expected, particularly at such an important historical point. However, what is not in doubt is that, through extensive political coverage, the

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<sup>1</sup> By 9/11, the defeatist experience of the Vietnam War was successfully and finally pushed into the past: "The images of commercial airliners slamming into the World Trade Centre have replaced the memory of US soldiers stuck in the mire of Vietnam". These images had "dramatically altered public thinking about national security and the need to sacrifice American lives overseas". This new change led to the idea that the US had to act pre-emptively "to deal with threats before they manifested on American soil—a threat Bush referred to when justifying the invasion on Iraq" (McCarthy, 2006).



media led the public to give a green light to the Bush administration to activate its unilateralist and hegemonic plans. Therefore, it would be reasonable to say that the public's large support for the post-9/11 controversial FP, especially the Iraq invasion, was in large degree because of the lack of information, if not the manipulation or misleading nature of it (Schlesinger, 2003). Typically, when discussion occurred between elites, particularly from the opposition, about FP, media will convey this debate to the public. However, if such a debate "is muted on nonexistent, a one-sided information flow emerges, even if citizens or foreign critics hold other viewpoints" (Gershkoff & Kushner, 2005: 526).

The success of the Bush administration in rallying the nation around its WoT was in part due to "the power of the pro-government think tanks and also to the difficulty that the opposition had in accessing the mainstream media" (Benn, 2007: 970). The mainstream media therefore followed the narrative of the administration's WoT, while it largely ignored the strong and thoughtful speeches of Democratic Senators, Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts and Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, who were strongly opposed to the US quick rush to war. William Powers wrote in March 2003: "turn on CNN one recent Sunday, and you could catch Bianca Jagger earnestly debating actor Ron Silver on the merits of war" against Iraq (cited in Dumbrell, 2005: 35, 36). In this context, needless to say, conservative media such as "Fox TV and other US cable networks play stories of Iraqi arms programs and their threat to the United States and its allies all day to beat the war drums" (Kellner, 2006: 152). Islamophobia was the most important instrument to rally public around the new American mission: war against evil.<sup>1</sup> Mass media supported the administration's agenda by an unprecedented

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<sup>1</sup> The Islam-terrorism linkage was a very common circulating idea in-and-outside the administration at the time. Kenneth Adelman – from the Pentagon's Defence Policy board staff – and Paul Weyrich, who was very influential in the White House for instance, found it very hard to see Islam as a peaceful religion. In difference to Jesus, who was a peace promoter, Mohammed, the Islamic founder was a worrier according to Kenneth Adelman. Paul Weyrich went on to deny the Administration's separation between the Islam and terrorism. Jerry Falwell, frankly declared that Mohamed was a terrorist. Franklin Graham, also described the Islam as an evil and violence backer religion. John Ashcroft, the Attorney General at the time, also said that the Islam is a faith that advocates violence and death. The most obvious difference between Islam and Christianity as he argued is that in the Christianity God sent his Son to die for the humankind while in Islam God demands people to send their sons to sacrifice their own lives for him (Malik, 2003). This tone has also been found in the Bush's (2002) speech when he said "our enemies send other people's children on missions of suicide and murder ... We stand for a different choice ... We choose freedom and the dignity of every life." Daniel Pipes, the famous analyst was also a hyper-supporter to the "Islamophobia" and he saw the Islamic threat as a counterpart to the Fascism and Communism (Malik, 2003). It could also be argued that this kind of views was not separated from the

exploitative use of the politics of fear. By buffering such a politics and exaggerating the threat's nature, solid domestic unity and national sacrifice that are required in such junctures will be available (McKeever & Davis, 2006: 185). A deliberated strategy of fear and tension, in fact, allows the US government terminating its project of hegemony without being resisted or questioned (Ganser, 2007). After 9/11, one scholar observed that (Jackson, 2005: 1):

The public language of American government has been used to construct a whole new world for its citizens. Through a carefully constructed public discourse officials have created a new social reality where terrorism threatens to destroy everything that ordinary people hold – their lives, their democracy, their freedom, their way of life, their civilisation.<sup>1</sup>

Therefore, it could be argued that the exaggerated image framed by the media and governmental discourse was dominant among the US public to a degree that led Mark Bowden to say that “housewives in Iowa...watching TV [were] afraid that al-Qaeda's going to charge in their front door” (Mueller, 2005: 26).

After all, the influence of the 9/11 frame as an ‘existential threat’ to the US, and the role of media as fear buffer were quite obvious in the lead-up to the Iraq invasion.

#### **4.3.2.4. AFP Institutions, Bureaucrats, And US Hegemonic Agenda After 9/11**

In sharp contrast to what has been said regarding the post-CW unprecedented fragmentation within and between AFP organizations because of the absence of any external threat to the US, the struggle against global terrorism since the attacks of 9/11 renewed the consistency and increased the power of the institutions associated with AFP (Daadler & Destler, 2004). On the security front, 9/11 and the WoT led to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (Cox, 2002a). This was created to “bring about central operational coordination and to put an end to overlapping duties”

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government's agenda. It could be understood from President Bush's (2002) declaration that “we seek a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror”.

<sup>1</sup> In this way, official statements and government policy that made by the Bush administration and the Homeland Security Office heightened public's fear by recommending “the American people to buy duct tape and plastic sheeting as a barrier to terrorism. This advisory had little to do with “chemical protection” and much to do with the politics of fear” (Altheide, 2003: 38). Furthermore, there was also “dramatic change in homeland security and transportation policy that directly affected hundreds of thousands of Americans.” The US also issued “a serious of yellow and orange warnings of terrorist dangers –which have not materialised” (Kern et al, 2003: 283). Politics of fear essentially depended not only on the exaggeration of the terrorist's conventional power, but also exceeded to include the fear of (WMD).

(Jackson, 2005: 15). The passage of the USA Patriot Act in the immediacy of 9/11 gave the US government unlimited new powers that empowered US bureaucracy in the expense of other political bodies. New legal authority was also given to the FBI to arrest alleged terrorists (Jackson, 2005).

Again, in contrast to the 1990s, in which geo-economic, environmental and other issues rivalled security concerns in AFP institutions, 9/11 returned security issues and geopolitics as the main focus of AFP and security organisations (Wiarada & Skelley, 2006). However, the post-9/11 political environment enhanced the longstanding rivalry between Defence and State departments. The movement towards the WoT, including the Iraq war, gave the DOD extra power in framing the AFP agenda at the expense of the DOS. The cabinet divisions between Dick Cheney/Donald Rumsfeld and Colin Powell/Condoleezza Rice can be seen as part of this institutional competition (Cameron, 2002); however, importantly, this did not affect the political consistency of the governmental institutions and its strategy to respond to 9/11.

If “continuity of staff almost always means continuity of policy” (Frum & Perle, 2004: 188), it is plausible to argue that there has been a basic continuity of national strategy since the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century (Gowan, 2002; Halper & Clarke, 2004; McMurtry, 2007). On the basis of this view, it can be argued that most of President George W. Bush’s foreign and security team not only served together for dozens of years, but also shared common beliefs and ideologies and possessed extraordinary close relationships. For instance, Cheney and Rumsfeld worked together for more than three decades. During the Nixon administration, Rumsfeld worked as a Director to the United States Office of Economic Opportunity and Cheney was an administrative assistant under his leadership. Powell also served for three years as a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Defense Secretary Cheney during the George H. W. Bush administration. Richard Armitage, appointed Deputy Secretary of State in March 2001, worked with Powell in the Pentagon during the Reagan administration. In a similar way, Armitage and Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense 2001-2005, worked together when they were responsible for US-Asia relations in the Reagan administration. Wolfowitz also worked under the chief of Richard Pipes in the Team B committee, established during the Ford administration to reassess the CIA’s raw data regarding the USSR. Moreover, Wolfowitz had worked as a top aide to Cheney in the Pentagon during the 1990s. Lewis

Scooter Libby, who worked as Chief of Staff to Vice-President Cheney, was an undergraduate of Wolfowitz at Yale University and then worked as his assistant during the Reagan and first Bush administrations (Moens, 2004; Mann, 2004). Owing to their closer relationship, some called Libby 'Wolfowitz's Wolfowitz' (Moens, 2004: 31). The roots of the Bush-Rice relationship can be traced back to before the Bush I presidency (Moens, 2004; Mann, 2004). Cliffe and Ramsay point out that "the group around Vice-President Cheney, Defence Secretary Rumsfeld and his Deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, plus Richard Perle have been involved in articulating quite explicitly a coherent, aggressive strategy for the USA for many years" (2003: 353).

In order to pursue American hegemony, it would be argued that both Wolfowitz and Libby, the main authors of the Pentagon's offensive strategy in the early 1990s and promoters of the invasion of Iraq, returned to office following the 2000 election (Gowan, 2002; Cliffe & Ramsay, 2003). On the other hand, Cheney "offered something Bush lacked: an intimate knowledge of how the executive and legislative branches in Washington work" (Moens, 2004: 31).

Overall, Lindsay argues that the "main beneficiary of the change in politics of US foreign policy [after 9/11] was the White House, not Congress" (2005d: 53). As he suggests, the reason for this was two-fold: the US public was not "split on what the government should do in response to the terrorist attacks ... and congressional Democrats, who would normally have the greatest political incentive to criticize a Republican president, lacked the ability to do so" (Lindsay, 2005d: 53). Therefore, a very unusual political landscape was established. On the one hand, as well as congressional criticism of the president's FP became muted after 9/11, public enthusiasm for his FP initiatives became blossomed (Wittkopf & McCormick, 2008). On the other hand, with the US public "firmly behind the president, members of congress who might have preferred to be elsewhere on policy grounds, quickly decided they had to be there as well" (Lindsay, 2005d: 53). Moreover, the influence of several interest groups over AFP, which had strengthened in the 1990s, was sharply eroded post-9/11 (Lindsay, 2005d; Wittkopf & McCormick, 2008).<sup>1</sup> Therefore, 9/11, the WoT

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<sup>1</sup> However, some interest groups maintained their political influence after 9/11. According to Mearshiemer & Waltz (2006), one of these groups was AIPAC and its influence over the Bush administration's decision to go to Iraq was observable. Similarly, the Project for the New American Century's (PNAC) proposal of "Rebuilding America's Defence" in 2000 called for increasing the Pentagon budget to equal 3.8% of GNP. When Bush took office, the

and the nation's rally around his leadership gave President Bush a unique opportunity to pass any political agenda he or his FP team preferred without fear of being resisted.

Accordingly, in contrast to the 1990s, in which a US hegemonic agenda was pursued under very difficult political circumstances, 9/11 provided an opportunity to promote America's post-CW hegemonic agenda, owing to a combination of political circumstances, both inside and outside American government. First, there was a team of Republicans who believed in remaking world order occupying key positions in the executive branch. These can be identified as American nationalists or traditional conservatives (Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Rice and Powell) or neo-conservatives and democrat imperialists (Wolfowitz, Libby, Perle and Abrams). Second, 9/11 itself offered a political environment that allowed any agenda to be put into practice (Singh, 2006).

#### **4.4. Conclusion**

This chapter's aim is to bridge the gap between the 1990s and the post-9/11 period. In contrast to those who argue that AFP suffered from a strategic blindness and confusion during the 1990s, this chapter shows that AFP represented continuity rather than change, in order to consolidate its global leadership and hegemony. However, it was influenced by the EoCW. By closely assessing AFP during the 1990s, the chapter reveals the causes that hindered the state from implementing its agenda. This chapter argues that the EoCW affected AFP performance, but the problem was not a lack of strategic plans or strategic short-sightedness. It was an unprecedented interplay between domestic and foreign policy, in which Congress no longer blindly followed the presidential leadership in the FP and security domain. Congress started challenging the president and blocking his initiatives during the decade. Congress also showed inconsistent behaviour and was open to the influence of different interest groups. The conflict between the president and Congress was also seen within the AFP institutions. The AFP machinery was not reformed to deal with the new international environment, but still operated as it did during the CW. The rivalry between bureaucrats and policy-makers also intensified and the competition within and between institutions over FP

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Defence budget was increased to US\$379 billion (3.8% of American GNP). PNAC also demanded permanent American military bases in Iraq. Rice told congress that US intervention in the region is a matter of "generational commitment" (George, 2007).

authority increased. The external enemy that had united such huge organisations dissipated with the EoCW, and the Congress's failure to reform those institutions clearly confused the direction of AFP.

The EoCW and the collapse of the external enemy also fragmented AFP's domestic context, as several societal sources of AFP changed. For instance, the US public automatically followed the US presidential leadership in the pre-Vietnam era and, even with the emerging influence of the Vietnam debacle in the 1970s and 1980s, AFP had stayed controlled by US presidents and the public showed reasonable support for their initiatives. However, since the EoCW US public opinion was no longer virtually monolithic towards AFP. While it supported an activist role abroad, and a contribution to the UN's humanitarian missions, it simultaneously showed great sensitivity to the price that America paid. In this way, the public encouraged the intervention in Somalia but then pressurized policy-makers to withdraw after the deaths of some US soldiers. In addition, it accepted the US intervention in Bosnia, but rejected the deployment of US ground troops there. Such conflicting attitudes tied Clinton's hand when dealing with issues such as the Bosnia crisis and the Kosovo crisis.

There was also the issue of the growing influence of interest groups (business and ethnic). While the unanimity of the CW limited the influence of such groups, the EoCW changed the status quo and gave an extra influence to these groups. Because of this, the 1990s showed unprecedented domesticization of AFP. For the first time, AFP was influenced by the agenda of these groups. Such intervention, coupled with other societal and governmental divisions, confused the AFP strategy, because it limited the ability of policy-makers to formulate a fully-fledged strategy.

The same was not true after 9/11, with the re-appearance of an external enemy. The attacks on the Twin Towers brought an end to the domestic divisions and reasserted the presidential leadership in foreign and security policy, allowing President George W. Bush to drive AFP strategy without opposition. After more than a decade of presidential effort to put the US hegemonic agenda into practice, the terrorist attacks allowed Bush to succeed in doing so without facing resistance. The congress, US public, AFP institutions, and the media followed his agenda and showed unprecedented support. 9/11, therefore, overcame AFP's domestic fragmentation that had previously undermined American performance in international affairs.

It would be fair to remember here what was argued in the first chapter. George W. Bush was not a strategy designer, and his political skills were no better than those of his father, (George H. W. Bush), or his predecessor, President Clinton. Therefore, why did he succeed in leading the state towards a hegemony format at a time of several other difficulties? The reason was 9/11, or, more accurately, because 9/11 united the domestic context of AFP around a new mission, the WoT. In this context, President Bush's strategy was not unprecedented, as many have argued, and its steps were available since the foundations were laid in the early 1990s. 9/11 and US domestic bipartisanship allowed him to implement them, whereas the collapse of the USSR and the US domestic fragmentation undermined his predecessors' attempts. In the next chapter, the objective is to show that 9/11 and WoT did not initiate a new course in AFP conduct, but were a continuity of the old agenda.

It is the US government that is manipulating the September 11 events to enforce its own political agenda. What has changed in the past months is not the world but the political tenor of the US itself. Just think, for example, where Bush would have been without September 11?.

(Zizek, 2002)

[A new phase of American aggressive hegemony] merely made acceptable by 9/11, not made by 9/11 itself.

(Parmar, 2005: 1)

Just as the struggle against communism led ... to an expansion of American influence after 1947, the war against the new global enemy known as terrorism helped extend American power after 11 September.

(Cox, 2002a: 272)

## **Chapter Five**

### **9/11, The War On Terror And The Continuation Of US Global Hegemony Strategy**

#### **5.1. Introduction**

As Layne argues, “US hegemony is the bridge connecting the pre-September 11 world to the post-September 11 world” (2002: 233). As explained in the last chapter, America’s attempts to establish hegemony and supremacy did not stop in the 1990s, but the efforts of the US administrations to establish a new hegemonic world order were constrained by domestic political divisions. However, since 9/11 this impediment was removed and terrorism remedied the long-standing threat deficit that AFP suffered from the end of the Cold War (EoCW) to 9/11. The attacks of 9/11 gave the pretext to US policy-makers to legitimate and realise their hegemonic agenda. Thus, 9/11 was the bridge linking pre-and post-9/11 America. In contrast to the environment of the 1990s, America was now able to carry out its hegemonic agenda without fear of domestic or international opposition. The nature of the terrorist attack was deliberately changed to a ‘war on America’, and was also massively exaggerated to serve the US hegemonic strategy in the post-Cold War (CW) era.

Based on this epistemological foundation, this chapter contradicts three sets of American foreign policy (AFP) literature. The first set argues that 9/11 changed everything including AFP strategy. The second set describes the Bush doctrine as a revolutionary change in AFP conduct, and the third set understands the US response to 9/11 merely as a global war on terror (WoT). However, this chapter argues that 9/11 changed nothing and its aftermath demonstrates continuity rather discontinuity in



America's post-CW hegemonic strategy. Post 9/11 policy is seen as a new phase in a long chain of struggle to expand American hegemony worldwide. To evaluate this argument, this chapter, following the same technique used in the third chapter, aims to put the terrorist attacks and the US response, the WoT, in its fullest theoretical and geo-strategic context. The chapter is divided into two parts: the first highlights the continuity of AFP strategy in pre-and post-9/11; and the second puts the WoT in a wider geo-political context to establish its hidden agenda.

## **5.2. 9/11: The Day That Changed America?**

As previously stated, a large body of AFP literature deals with 9/11 and its aftermath as a turning point in AFP's post-WWII strategic trajectory. This contradicts with the current study's main argument that America has not experienced a break in its FP strategy of hegemony from the mid-1940s until the fall of Baghdad in early April 2003. Therefore, it is important that 9/11 and the US reaction to it is not be seen as a separate AFP historical geo-political struggle. The subsequent sections will cast more light on these issues.

### **5.2.1. The Exaggeration: 9/11 As An Existential Threat And The WoT As The Only Possible Response**

Since terrorism is not an unprecedented political tool (Nye, 2003), the attacks of 9/11 have been seen as "the worst not the first" (May, 2003b: 38). Accordingly, it is unsurprising that the terrorist attacks have been classified as criminal acts "under the ordinary criminal law of the United States" (Greenwood, 2002: 302) as well as under international law. However, the Bush administration and its supporters tended to portray the attacks as unparalleled in world history; this was reflected and made fashionable in the immediate post-9/11 discourse which posits that 9/11 changed everything (Layne, 2002; Brunn, 2004). Condoleezza Rice (2002), for instance, describes 9/11 as an existential threat greater than any challenge the state had faced during the CW or before, and Secretary of State Colin Powell argues that after 9/11 "not only is the Cold War over, the post-Cold War period is also over" (cited in Litwak, 2002: 76).

In a speech to Congress on 20 September 2001 that has been seen by some as the "most important statement of American grand strategy since President Harry Truman's Greece and Turkey speech of 12 March 1947" (Ikenberry, 2001b: 19), President Bush II framed

9/11 as an “act of war against” the US committed by “enemies of freedom” (Bush, 2001a emphasis added). The US response to these acts was also framed as a “war on global terror” not only for self defence, but also to protect and sustain global liberty and freedom (Hume, 2001; May, 2003b; Ryan, 2004; Covington, 2005; McKeever & Davis, 2006; Owens & Dumbrell, 2006; Simpson, 2006; Maggio, 2007; Boyle, 2008). Since then, the ‘war on terror’ has become “the most often used term” (Record, 2003: 1).

According to Alejandro Colás & Richard Saull, “the naturalisation of the war on terror as the only possible response to 9/11 was an initial achievement of the Bush administration and its allies in congress, the mainstream media and civil society” (2006: 5). The description of the terrorists as evil and the strike against America as an attack on freedom justified the US response as a ‘good war’ or a ‘just war’; such terminology is comparable to that used in the struggle against Nazism during WWII (Kellner, 2003; Watson, 2003; McCartney, 2004; Boggs, 2006; McKeever & Davis, 2006; Jackson, 2007). Therefore, the WoT as a ‘good war’ was not for revenge or punishment but to defend freedom and democracy that were under attack and to create a new world without evil (Watson, 2003; McKeever & Davis, 2006). President Bush II in his speech to Congress said: “Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom” (2001a).

The Bush administration intentionally drew upon the experience of Pearl Harbour, the CW, and the War of Independence to help create the “frame of acceptance” (Kern et al, 2003:) that was needed to persuade Americans and prepare them to accept and support the military reaction to 9/11. Amongst these events, Pearl Harbour was the most used reference point to contextualise 9/11 (for example, see McCartney, 2004; Jackson, 2005; Simpson, 2006; Ryan, 2007). However, according to some scholars, such as Gaddis (2004) these attacks cannot be easily compared because “the cases are [not] similar enough across variables” (Schaefer, 2003: 94).<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, what is important

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<sup>1</sup> It is true that both attacks were sudden and achieved total surprise because of the failure of US agencies in predicting such aggressive plans. Moreover, both attacks employed “familiar technologies in unfamiliar ways: the Japanese by launching fighter-bombers from aircraft carriers; the terrorists by turning civilian airlines into cruise missiles” (Gaddis, 2004: 35). The attackers also targeted American soil and produced multiple casualties, which led to an immediate declaration of war. However, there are crucial differences between the two attacks. 9/11 was an attack carried out by a terrorist group whereas the attack on Pearl Harbour was conducted by a sovereign state that was a great power at the time. Also, while 9/11 attacks targeted innocent civilians and cities, the Pearl Harbour’s target was a military and naval base (May, 2003b; Gaddis, 2004; Owens & Dumbrell, 2006).

is that the Bush administration had selectively derived its stance from history. These moves were merely intended to prepare the US public for the next step: the long war against terror.<sup>1</sup> In sum, the US exaggerated the nature of the terrorist attacks and the media immediately picked up the ‘war metaphor’ and sold 9/11 as a war on America (Kellner, 2003). Such an adaptation of the reality could lead one to reasonably ask: were the attacks of 9/11 really a devastating war on America that changed everything?

### **5.2.2. The Reality: Nothing Changed**

In contrast to the above discussion, scholars such as Goh (2002), Saravanamuttu (2006), Chollet (2007, 2008) and Goldgeier and Chollet (2008) argue that nothing profound changed in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. In sharp contrast to the EoCW, the terrorist attacks did not “produce structural change, which is to say a fundamental change in the relationship between the units of the international system” (Crockatt, 2007: 129). The US, according to Mick Hume, was not under attack from an adversarial power “seeking to defeat it on the global stage”. The strikes of 9/11 “did not move the centre of world power one inch away from Washington” (2001). However, according to David Skidmore (2005), the change in the US’s unilateral and hegemonic FP post-9/11 was not only due to the neo-conservatives’ (neo-cons) influence over President George W. Bush, but also due to the structural effects of the EoCW at home and abroad. In fact, in addition to the demise of the USSR that left America as the unipolar power, the institutional bargaining that once steered the relations between America and its closest allies was also undermined by the disappearance of the Soviet challenge. As a result, the US disengaged itself from the CW’s multi-lateral constraints (Skidmore, 2005). In reality, the EoCW freed the US from such restrictions as discussed in the first chapter, and gave it room to manoeuvre and impose its will (Waltz, 1999; Ikenberry, 2001c; McCarthy, 2007; Brzezinski, 2008). Ikenberry explains this advantage when he argues “for the first time in the modern era, the world’s most powerful state can operate on the global stage without the counterbalancing constraints of other great powers” (2004b: 609). This transformation, as stated in the second chapter, gave the US an overdose of

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<sup>1</sup> According to David Simpson (2006), no one used the Hiroshima or Nagasaki destruction, for example, as a reference point to describe the destruction in Lower Manhattan. And, in terms of mass death, no one compared the 3,000 innocent civilian victims who were killed in a few hours with a quarter million innocent people also killed in minutes when the US dropped two atomic bombs on Japan and targeted civilian cities (Pauly & Landsfor, 2005). These examples show that the US intended to politically utilise 9/11 to frame public knowledge and advance another set of objectives.

confidence and energized its hegemonic ambition at the turn of the new millennium (Crawford, 2005; Chollet, 2007).

However, it is not entirely true that the post-9/11 world affairs have witnessed deep changes that “no one could have foreseen” (Rockmore & Margolis, 2005: 3). As Cakmak argues, post-9/11 US policy “is only a slightly new version of the former American foreign policy” (2003: 5). This is because “whatever the new shape of American foreign policy, the basic characteristics of American politics will continuously affect the whole output. Political decisions are set so as to obtain the maximum benefit and satisfaction” to the US (Cakmak, 2003: 5). On the basis of such analysis, 9/11 only focused public and world attention on the traditional concerns that have guided AFP throughout its history (Bose, 2002; Wittkopf & McCormick, 2004). The attack did not initiate a new course of militarism or imperialism within AFP, but those characteristics have been present since the nation’s inception; the only thing that changed after 9/11 was the nakedness of those features (Foster, 2005). In this context, Robert Kagan in *Of Paradise and Power* put it succinctly: “America did not change on September 11, it only became more itself” (cited in Harries, 2005: 229).

In this context, critics, such as Allen (2003), Cox (2002a), Daalder and Lindsay (2005a), and Wedeman and McMahon (2006), argue that America’s post-9/11 reaction is no more than a re-ranking of the priorities of its FP strategy in which the WoT doctrine was given priority instead of the 1990s rhetoric of new world order (NWO) and globalisation. However, this discussion does not mean that 9/11 did not affect the geo-political status quo. Rather, it “had a profound impact for the geo-political restructuring of the world. The United States asserted its hegemony, declared the existence of an ‘axis of evil’ and set out to combat terror throughout the world” (Brunn, 2004: 307). It was for this reason that the US claimed that 9/11 changed everything and exaggerated its nature to that of an existential threat. This phenomenon was similar to that adopted during the CW period when the US deliberately magnified the danger of the USSR in order to increase its military spending, rally domestic public opinion and preserve its hegemony over its allies and elsewhere (Vasquez, 1985; Larison, 1998; Farrell, 2000; Borosage, 2000). In brief, if it is true that nothing changed in the morning of 9/11, why, and for what reasons, did the US policymakers intentionally exaggerate the nature of these terrorist attacks?

### 5.2.3. The Exploitation: 9/11 As A Pretext To Legitimate US Hegemony

It is important to study the PNAC's document which admitted that without a "catastrophic and catalyzing event-like a new Pearl Harbour" (2000: 51), a clear hegemonic change in American foreign and defence policy might not be possible. Accordingly, 9/11 was the catalytic event, missing since the EoCW, needed to push America towards a unilateral phase of hegemony. Thus, President Bush II used a metaphor of war and located 9/11 within well known historical events "for practical political reasons: to rally the public; to gain support for appropriations without regard for the reality the word is supposed to reflect" (Bobbitt, 2008: 174). For these reasons, the fear of terrorism, as it had appeared after 9/11 was "powerfully fuelled by creative alarmists and the terrorism industry" (Benn, 2007: 971). Since then, and along the following years, fears shaped policy (Leffler, 2003).

In turn, if 9/11 changed the world because it was an unparalleled attack, the US response was an unprecedented global war. In this context, the WoT is considered to be a global war against an unspecified enemy extended "over an indefinite time frame" (Parenti, 2002: 2). Such a description has been drawn by the President himself. Bush II declared that "our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated" (2001a). The National Security Strategy (NNS) of 2002 also asserted that "the war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration" (White House, 2002: 4). The WoT, as Bush II reaffirmed "is not over, yet it is not endless. We do not know the day of final victory, but we have seen the turning of the tide" (2003b).<sup>1</sup> This type of war was needed to expand Pax-Americana to every corner of the world, which is why critics, such as George Soros, were surprised: "how could a single event ... have such a far-reaching effects?" (2004: 2).

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<sup>1</sup> It is important to stress that President Bush's term the 'good war' did not emerge as a response to 9/11 but during his election campaign in 1999 when he "consistently referenced World War II not simply to justify his own policy aims, but more importantly as a cultural project as well as an ongoing gesture of self-making" (Noon, 2004: 340). As a consequence, 9/11 consolidated and backed his already formed agenda and, by framing 9/11 in this way, he pushed the nation towards the New American Century. In coincidence, with such conviction, George W. Bush's "language and metaphors conjured up those of his Cold War predecessors as he sought to prepare the nation for another long, twilight struggle" (Melanson, 2005: 42).

However, Cox offers a reasonable approach to this matter when he said that “every crisis represents an opportunity as well as a challenge, and how the United States responded to this particular challenge was going to be crucial” (2002a: 271). In this way, Halper & Clark are not convinced that the 9/11 attacks required a “decisive and sustained response” (2004: 4). They argue that the US response was in fact “grounded in an ideology that existed well before the terror attacks and that in a stroke of opportunistic daring by its progenitor, [it] has emerged as the new orthodoxy” (2004: 4). This analysis can be linked to the previous chapters’ discussion that the American unilateralist and hegemonic tendency was consistent from the CW period (Pfaff, 2001; Bose, 2002; Bremmer, 2002; Ali, 2003; Brunn, 2004; Parmar, 2005; Western, 2006; Griffin, 2007). In this context, after the “US intervention in Kosovo that crystallized fears of US hegemony ... if any doubt remained that US hegemony would trigger a nasty geopolitical ‘blowback’, it surely was erased on September 11” (Layne, 2002: 240).

Equally, if not more important, Gowan argues that 9/11 was evidently “just the kind of shock needed to pull the American people around to a new dose of militarism” (2007: 8). In this context, the attack “reinforced US credibility, power projection, and military involvement abroad” (Goh, 2002: 1). As a result, according to Chalmers A. Johnson, political leaders “began to see our Republic as a genuine empire, a new Rome, the greatest colossus in history, no longer bound by international law, the concerns of allies, or any constraints on its use of military force” (2004: 3). In this way, the NSS of 2002, for instance clearly states that 11 September 2001 “opened vast, new opportunities” (cited in Griffin, 2007: 13). President Bush II declared that “we’ve been offered a unique opportunity, and we must not let this moment pass” (2002). Therefore, as Gowan argues, “9/11 gave the US an opportunity in the field of grand strategy” (2006: 132). It was an opportunity to reorganise American priorities and remedy the domestic divisions that affected FP-making process prior to 9/11 (Wittkopf et al, 2003).

Therefore, building on the discussion in previous chapters, the already present hegemonic and unilateralist foreign agendas gained both moral justification and political encouragement from the events of 9/11 (Kellner, 2003; Cakmak, 2003). In this context, Carl Boggs argues that 9/11 “has given new impetus, and to some degree new legitimacy, to the US long-standing pursuit of global dominance” (2005). Thus, the

terrorist event was exploited “to provide the justification, the fear, and the funding for the so-called war on terror, which would be used as a pretext for enlarging the US hegemony in the post Soviet era” (Griffin, 2007: 15). US policymakers saw 9/11 “not merely as a disaster to be avenged, but an opportunity to reawaken America and redirect it to its historical mission” (Harries, 2005: 229). On the basis of such analysis, 9/11 triggered, accelerated and legitimated, but did not originate, assertive foreign policy (Parmar, 2005).<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, Neack argues “just as the terrorists seem to have rewritten global politics, the lone superpower is also rewriting its interests and behaviour in this new world order” (2003: 153). America would not let such an opportunity go. The US response to 9/11 was massive, dramatic and unpredictable. Not only militarily in which two countries were invaded, but also politically when a hegemonic language and unilateral set of thinking and tactics were also applied (Colás & Saull, 2006; Fukuyama, 2006a; Kennedy-Pipe & Rengger, 2006). Therefore, it can be argued that the missing element in the 1990s to justify the US’ post-CW agenda was found on the morning of 11 September 2001 and just as Pearl Harbour offered the US an opportunity to move into an internationalist FP phase, 9/11 provided policy-makers with the pretext to put the unilateralist and hegemonic FP agenda into practice (Parmar, 2005; Gordon, 2007; Griffin, 2007).

In summary, it is true that the unipolar moment was initiated in the early 1990s when the USSR collapsed, but “the materialisation of US hegemony was only partial until 9/11” (Miller, 2007: 248). After 9/11, US hegemony “reached its zenith” (Cox, 2007: 648), and served US unilateralist and hegemonic agenda that was formulated long before the terrorist attacks.

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<sup>1</sup> In this regard, it is of crucial importance to go back to the early hours after 9/11 when the President and his closest assistants expressed their intention to take this opportunity to remake the world in line with American interests and values (Soros, 2004; Held & Koenig-Archibugi, 2004; De Zoysa, 2005; Ondaatje, 2006). Bob Woodward, among others, argues that the first 36 hours after 9/11 demonstrated that the US administration intended to use the attacks to advance American global agenda of the post-CW world. In a cabinet meeting held on 14 September 2001, Bush and Powell argued that the attacks were an opportunity to restructure world affairs. Bush also believed that strikes will “strengthen America”. Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Advisor (NSA) at the time, said, just few days after the attacks, that 9/11 was an opportunity for creating opportunities for the US to change world politics. Donald Rumsfeld shared the same idea that 9/11 offered the US a chance to restructure the world just as WWII done. Dick Cheney, on 12 September 2001 wanted to targeting the terrorists as well as any states sponsoring them (Gowan, 2002; Lechelt, 2003; Lemann, 2002; Parenti, 2002; Malik, 2003; Dumbrell, 2005; Gershkoff & Kushner, 2005; Melanson, 2005; Gowan, 2006; Griffin, 2007). For this reason, President George W. Bush, just nine days after the attacks declared that America’s war on terror would not be stopped until every terrorist and state-sponsored terrorism was defeated (Lynch & Singh, 2008).

#### **5.2.4. The Bush II Strategy: Continuity Or Change?**

If 9/11 changed nothing and AFP represented the same agenda, is it possible to divorce Bush II's policy from his predecessor's? According to Desmond King, the Bush Doctrine "is not inconsistent with an increased emphasis, since 1989, on the pursuit of self-interest (both security and economic) presented concurrently with a defence of human rights and promotion of democracy" (2006: 166-67). Similarly, Walden Bello argues that scholars and politicians who "exaggerate the break between Bush and his predecessors" have failed to "acknowledge that many of Bush's initiatives found precedents in the actions of earlier presidents including Clinton" (2005: 15). In fact, Clinton's enlargement and engagement (En-En) strategy and Bush II's strategy are similar in that: (Posen, 2007: 563):

The United States faces no peer competitor and that it is difficult, for many reasons, for the other consequential powers to coordinate a coalition to truly 'balance' American power—especially American military power. Both strategies are committed to maintaining this preeminent power position for as long as possible.

Therefore, as David N. Gibbs (2006: 28) states,

While there is little doubt that the Bush administration was deeply shocked by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, there can be equally little doubt that the attacks were manipulatively used to justify a massive expansion of US power in the Middle East/Central Asia region, combined with an augmentation in the military budget. And in addition, there have been numerous sub-pretexts, which have followed the attacks, and have further served to justify policy.

On the basis of such analysis, Daalder and Lindsay argue that the US response to 9/11 "did more to reaffirm Bush's view of the world than to transform it" (2005a: 78). Likewise, May contends that 9/11 did not bring about crucial change but "enabled the Bush administration to pursue, with less opposition and greater violence, policies that might otherwise have appeared too aggressive" (2003a: 18). The diplomatic historian Marilyn Young, in the same vein, says that 9/11 became "a site for reinforcing a preexisting US unilateralism" (cited in Dudziak, 2003: 3). Accordingly, Bush's famous reference to the axis of evil in early 2002 "rhetorically lumped together the separate challenges posed by North Korea to the stability of Northeast Asia, by Iran's longer-range ambitions in the Persian Gulf region, and by the unfinished legacy of the 1991 campaign against Iraq's Saddam Hussein" (Tomiak, 2006). These issues were not related to 9/11.



### **5.2.5. The Bush Doctrine: The Institutionalisation Of US Hegemony**

If it is true that US hegemony became institutionalised, were there new characteristics of the Bush doctrine? In contrast to those who saw the Bush FP as a revolutionary change in the AFP strategic trajectory, it can be argued that the Bush policy was not new. 9/11 was merely used as a pretext to expand US hegemony and to institutionalise the US hegemonic policy.

Those who argue for the newness of the Bush Doctrine define a number of pillars and principles as unprecedented characteristics of AFP. These include the sustaining and maintenance of American military superiority; the use of pre-emptive or preventive war instead of the traditional containment or deterrence policy; the spread of democracy including regime change even if by force; and the dependence on unilateralism and acting globally without approval of the UN or its NATO partners (Marqusee, 2007).<sup>1</sup> Even with these divergent elements, as Leffler (2004: 23) argues, “the differences between Bush and his predecessors have more to do with style than substance, more to do with the balance between competing strategies than with goals, with the exercise of good judgment than with the definition of a worldview”. This view confirms that nothing had changed and AFP has represented continuity rather than discontinuity after 9/11. In the following sections, light will be cast on various aspects of the Bush doctrine and its historical pedigree.

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<sup>1</sup> In fact, Bello argues that America’s “unilateralism has always been a central, if not the central feature of US policy” (2005: 15). While in the 1990s, as discussed previously, the distinction between multi-lateralism and unilateralism was blurred, the post-9/11 policy demonstrated that the US turned deliberately to implement unilateralist agenda. In actuality, unilateralism offered several advantages to US policy-makers at the time. By acting unilaterally, the US not only kept its allies from involvement in crisis management decision-making, but also offered itself a large margin of manoeuvre for formulating its own agenda to reconstruct global system. To guarantee its supremacy in the unilateralist moment, America not only needed to defeat its enemies, but also to contain its allies, or potential rivals. Indeed, arguably allies/likely rivals such as China, Russia, and France need to be militarily under control rather than enemies. By restricting control, no one will be able to be a real competitor (Cox, 2002a; Leffler, 2004; Anderson, 2003). It is true that unilateralism is not unprecedented in AFP legacy: the EoCW revived this tendency when harsh rivalry became an ‘ash heap of history’ and reappeared clearly in the 1992 defence document. Unilateralism was also stated in the 1997 project for the New American Century. Such agendas constituted a guideline to the US foreign policy-makers post-9/11 and the political environment allowed them to pursue such policies under the claim of fighting against global terrorism (Soros, 2004; Lind, 2007).

### 5.2.5.1. The NSS Of 2002

The NSS of 2002 is the main official document that informs the Bush Doctrine. It has been described as the most important document since NSC-68 of the late 1940s (Gleek, 2003). This conviction was built on the assumption that the document introduced an unprecedented set of thinking and implementation and marked a discontinuity in mainstream thinking (Bose, 2002). However, in contrast to such a viewpoint, the NSS of 2002 was no more than a repetition of AFP's official literature from earlier periods, and its main objective was to maximize the US interests in the post-CW world. President Bush, in his West Point address on 1 June 2002, said: "different circumstances require different methods, but not different moralities" (White House, 2002: 3). Accordingly, it can be argued that the strategy was based on American internationalism that combined both American morals and national interests and this marriage, as mentioned in previous chapters, has driven AFP at least since WWII, if not earlier (White House, 2002; Leffler, 2003). Since WWII, liberalism and idealism have guided AFP in a unique combination with power politics (Coll, 1995; Wittkopf et al., 2003; Ikenberry, 2004b).

NSS's (2002) main objective is to "help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity" (White House, 2002: 1). Such justifications have also been repeatedly stated in AFP literature since its very foundation. The US has, in fact, fought all its wars to preserve and sustain its power and interests worldwide but, as mentioned previously, its geo-strategic policies have always been galvanized by moral justifications (Coll, 1995).<sup>1</sup>

According to Leffler, the importance of this NSS resided on such a combination of idealism and pragmatism; however, its most striking idea is in its "marriage of democratic idealism with the exercise of pre-emptive power" (2003: 1047). However

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<sup>1</sup> As mentioned in previous chapters, lessons drawn from several historical events have led scholars and policymakers alike to suggest that on the practical level, America's performance in international affairs could be faced by numerous obstacles unless those two trends (idealism and realism) work hand in hand in the right combination (Rice, 2002; Leffler, 2003; Isaacson, 2006b; Stengel, 2006). In this spirit, Condoleezza Rice saw that the academic debate that separates the two perspectives could no longer stand, and told her audience: "as a professor, I recognize that this debate has won tenure for and sustained the careers of many generations of scholars. As a policymaker, I can tell you that these categories obscure reality" (2002).

this mixture is not surprising because such a tendency in AFP thinking was clear from the collapse of the USSR. The NSS of 2002 did not show any shift in policy, but just several components of both the Defense Planning Guidance of 1992 and the PANC's 2000 document/strategy were integrated into formal AFP. Therefore, it can be argued that the Bush doctrine "does follow a pattern in American foreign policy, one that brings together American exceptionalism and American unilateralism" (Bose, 2002: 620). The strategy demonstrated that the US policy-makers believed that America "has the natural right to be above the law" (McCarthy, 2007: 129). This might be the most important view as the document clearly announced the US unilateral hegemonic project ignoring America's closest allies. This shift started during the 1990s, but it became very clear after 9/11.

#### **5.2.5.2. The Pre-Emptive Doctrine: The US Iron-Fist Hegemonic Strategy**

The other element that has aroused controversy in the Bush Doctrine was and still remains the pre-emptive war strategy; however, this was not entirely new in American military strategy. Unsurprisingly, the use of military power "has been a staple in US national security policy and a card played by presidents since Thomas Jefferson sent marines to liberate the crew of the ship *Philadelphia* and deal with pirates off Tripoli in 1806" (Watson, 2003: 9).<sup>1</sup> What changed at the turn of the new millennium was that "the military dimension has taken on new significance" (Boggs, 2006: 4). As discussed previously, the unipolar hegemonic movement that started at the EoCW gave the US an unchallengeable and unrivalled position and the capability to do whatever it wanted. Peter Anderson argues that due to this advantage and more obviously since 9/11, the US

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<sup>1</sup> In this context, it would be plausible to say that since the Monroe Doctrine formulated in 1823 by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, the use of force has systematically been used as a tool to achieve US political interests. The US had frequently intervened in Latin America to preserve its interest, promote trade, and prevent Europeans from involvement in the continent. The Roosevelt Doctrine (1904) not only developed the main idea of the Monroe Doctrine of limiting European presence in Latin America, but also clearly stated that the US would reserve the right to use force, if needed, to defend its interest in the Western Hemisphere. This doctrine stayed in operation throughout the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In addition to the US engagement in two world wars, the use of force was still a dominant choice in AFP strategy during the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Even with the containment strategy, the US fought two major wars during the CW. In the post-CW era, the US fought in four wars and in the post-9/11 era the US has engaged in two major wars in Afghanistan and Iraq under the title of WoT in addition to several other small-scale-wars (Watson, 2003; Watson et al, 2003; Gaddis, 2004).

“has increasingly opted for the threat and use of military power to enforce its will, rather than the force of economics, diplomacy, ideology and law” (2003: 38).<sup>1</sup>

When President George W. Bush proclaimed that the US would strike first against its enemies in his speech to West Point cadets on 1 June 2002, it was quickly regarded as signifying a profound shift in the US military policy and that a new doctrine had replaced the CW’s long-standing “doctrine of containment and deterrence with a new policy of pre-emptive strikes” (Kellner, 2006: 149). According to Arthur M. Schlesinger, this changed the long-standing “self-defence doctrine” of AFP to adopt a new policy of “anticipatory self-defence” (2003). In this regard, the US presented its Nuclear Posture Review in December 2001 which “expressly considered the deployment of nuclear weapons” not only against nuclear powers such as Russia and China but also against non-nuclear powers such as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, and Syria (Tokatlian, 2006: 240). Officials close to Secretary of Defense (SOD) Rumsfeld argued that the US “should not be very sensitive about the political feelings of others when it decides it has to use its power” (cited in Cox, 2002a: 276).

However, these changes did not alter the US doctrine of using military power to achieve political ends; it was merely a shift in tactics rather than strategy. According to one observer, “after 9/11, Bush and his team had stumbled across—possibly even discovered—a new doctrine for the projection of American power into the indefinite future” (Cox, 2007: 648). In this context, US Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith said in an interview with the Los Angeles Times on 29 May 2003: “everything is going to move everywhere ... there is no place in the world where [US military presence] is

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<sup>1</sup> In addition to what has been said previously, it may be added that the US defence spending increased dramatically since 9/11 to unparalleled levels. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the US was “representing half of the world military expenditures, no countervailing coalition can create a traditional military balance of power” (Nye, 2003: 60). For example, the increase in the defence budget in 2002 alone was “more than the entire annual defence budget of Great Britain” (Hall, 2002: 2). Since then, American power and influence have been unexpectedly intensified (Wittkopf et al., 2003; McMurtry, 2007), and the world has dealt with “a superpower that has been willing to flex its military muscle without diplomatic consensus or the backing of key allies” (McCarthy, 2006). According to the pre-2004 figures, the US military budget was “more than that of the next 14 countries put together” (Held & Koenig-Archibugi, 2004). The US military budget of 2004-2005 “amounts to \$536 billion, including Homeland security ... this amounts to higher military expenditure than the next sixteen countries combined” (Smith, 2005b: 198). Gibbs argues that the US now “spent as much on military power as the next 27 largest military powers combined” (2006: 28). However, according to Ruggie (2006), the US military budget equalled the total defence spending of the rest of the world, and that huge number only consumed about 5% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It is not surprising that “the US military budget exceeds the annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of India or Brazil, the Netherlands or Russia ... [and] the US military is the world’s eleventh largest economy” (Smith, 2005b: 199).

going to be the same as it was” (cited in Cornell, 2004: 241). Of relevance here is that the shift was not exactly because of 9/11 but, as has been argued previously, Bush II revealed his desire to change military affairs in his presidential campaign in 2000 (Hartung, 2003; Melanson, 2005). SOD Rumsfeld argued that prior to 9/11, the US had started to revise its post-CW defence strategies and tended to move away from the “two major-threat wars” of the early post-CW (2002). Rumsfeld’s revolution in military affairs, according to Kurth (2007), aimed to terminate the Weinberger-Powell doctrine that had coupled the US traditional way of war, particularly in WWII, and the significant usable lessons of the Vietnam and Korean wars.<sup>1</sup> However, Rumsfeld’s manoeuvre to change the old military doctrine cannot be seen as a shift from previous military doctrines because the Weinberger-Powell doctrine did not deny the use of power; it only conditioned it.

Even during the CW the US used the pre-emptive war doctrine and its wars in Vietnam and Korea—among others—were in this category. However, this shift was a response to the unipolar moment that did not exist previously. The Bush administration moved from the previous military tactical strategies when it rejected the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and opened the way for modernizing new generations of long-range nuclear missiles in addition to the militarization of space. These efforts to guarantee US supremacy, however, had started prior to the EoCW when the Reagan administration started the largest military build-up ever. In this context, 9/11 and its aftermath were regarded as an opportunity to the military-industrial complex to reassert its supreme role in AFP-making process after the CW (Hartung, 2003).

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<sup>1</sup> This doctrine includes the ideas of Caspar Weinberger (Secretary of Defence during the Reagan administration) and Colin Powell (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of State in George H. W. Bush’s administration). The central idea in this doctrine emphasizes that the US should use its military power as a last resort and with a commitment to preserve its national vital interests when they are at risk. Weinberger’s viewpoint denied the coupling between threats of force and diplomacy, but the use of force must occur only after US diplomacy failed to achieve its objectives. Under all circumstances, military force should not be used unless Congress and the US public show great support. Drawing upon lessons learnt from Vietnam, Powell also warned against engagement in long and undefined wars but contended that the US military should be applied against a military power of another hostile nation to achieve US objectives within a very limited timeframe and with great concern to minimize the risk to US soldiers (Blechman & Wittes, 1999; Watson, 2003; Kurth, 2007). This perspective of using US military force was also repeated by President George H. W. Bush at the close of his presidency. At West Point Military Academy in January 1993, he argued that the use of force must be constrained: “Where its application can be limited in space and time, and where the potential benefits justify the potential costs and sacrifices” (cited in Dumbrell, 2008: 93).

Several critics such as Gaddis (2004) and Layne (2006) argue that the pre-emptive doctrine and the preventive war are also found in other periods throughout US history. Since the early 1800s, when the US alliance with France ended, meaning that the younger nation had to be self-dependent to preserve its independence and defend its territory, the debate over pre-emptive war started (Chace, 2004; Gaddis, 2004). In this context, according to Gaddis, “Adams, Jackson, Polk, McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson would all have understood ... [the pre-emptive strategy] perfectly” (2004: 22). Such a tendency is clear when the NSS of 2002 states the US “has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security”, but at this time, the need to apply such a strategy was greater: “The greater the threat the greater is the risk of inaction” (White House, 2002: 15).

Although Ronald Schaffer states “the ideas of preventive and pre-emptive war had long been a part of strategic thought” (1985: 200), its modern roots lie in the post-WWII era. During the CW, even with the official strategy of deterrence and containment in Europe, the US “took anticipatory action to deal with real and imagined threats from Central America, the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East” (Leffler, 2004: 23). After the USSR’s atomic test in 1949, some US officials used the term ‘pre-emptive’ interchangeably with ‘preventive’ and ‘preventative’ war in their proposals to head off the Soviet threat (Schaffer, 1985; Pauly & Lansford, 2005). The term meant “initiating an attack when an enemy seemed about to strike” (Schaffer, 1985, 200)<sup>1</sup> and this is repeated exactly in the NSS of 2002. Terrorism’s threat is unpredictable, and “if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively” (White House, 2002: 15).

In the absence of any real competitor to its power in the post-9/11 era, this military doctrine was chosen not only to defeat enemies but also to serve America’s hegemonic agenda. The NSS of 2002 made a commitment that the US would neither use military

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<sup>1</sup> For example, less than two months after the Hiroshima bomb dropped, the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared that “when it became evident that the force of aggression was being arrayed against the United States, America could not afford, through any misguided and perilous idea of avoiding an aggressive attitude, to permit the first blow to be struck against us” (Schaffer, 1985: 200). In a similar way, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also recommended President Eisenhower to “conduct a preemptive nuclear strike against the Soviet Unions”. At the time, they suggested that “the Strategic Air Command could have delivered a devastating blow against Soviet bomber bases and largely prevented the Soviets from launching a major retaliatory strike in their infancy as a nuclear power” (Martzel, 1998: 224).

force pre-emptively against all threatening cases that faced it nor would it use pre-emption “as a pretext for aggression” (White House, 2002: 15). However, America failed to meet this commitment when it invaded Iraq on the basis of a pre-emptive war. William D. Hartung concludes that “while the United States has engaged in military first strikes in the past, from the 1989 invasion of Panama to the invasion of Iraq, the Bush doctrine seeks to elevate this approach from an occasional tactic to a guiding principle of American foreign policy” (2003: 66). In sum, as has been argued here, the Bush doctrine that materialized in the NSS of 2002 was not in fact a new turn in AFP strategy; instead, its main ideas were borrowed from the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) document of the early 1990s and the neo-cons’ proposal of 2000.

In brief, in contrast to those who argue that 9/11 changed everything, this discussion shows nothing profound changed. 9/11 was a terrorist attack on America, and the US response to it was designed to be a global war. If the US was really concerned with the defeat of global terrorism, it would have been able to do that in several other ways. As it will be shown in the next section, the WoT was not really about terror but about geo-political calculations in the post-CW era.

### **5.3. America’s Response To 9/11: The WoT And The Continuity Between The Pre-And Post-9/11 Hegemony**

On the ground of what has been said above, it can be argued that the US response to 9/11 was not the only possible alternative, but was also a continuation of the pre-9/11 policy to create a NWO suitable to the US unipolar moment. Consequently, this section aims to examine the US response to 9/11 (the WoT) within its geo-political context to discover the characteristics of the US hegemonic project that was accelerated and legitimated by response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In other words, contrary to US officials’ claim that the WoT was a struggle against global terrorism, this section argues that the overall objective was and still remains in harmony with the objectives of all of America’s previous wars. Therefore, as stated previously, the US’ WoT has a two-fold structure and its explicit objective (or surface structure) conceals a hidden agenda (or deep structure). While the explicit objective of the WoT was to defeat al-Qaeda and global terrorism, the trajectory of this war has shown its hidden agenda that used 9/11 and global terrorism as a pretext to advance America’s hegemonic project from the CW era.

### **5.3.1. Afghanistan And AFP Strategy Prior To 9/11: An Historical Overview**

The US concern about Afghanistan started several decades prior to 9/11. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was seen by President Carter and his administration as an attempt to build a geo-strategic bridge towards the Gulf region, to fulfil the USSR's long-term objective of a warm water port. In reaction, Carter released his doctrine on 23 January 1981 which emphasized America's intention to defend its interests in the region by force if necessary (Sanders, 1983; Dixon, 2001; Parenti, 2002; Gibbs, 2006; Fraser, 2009). However, as Norm Dixon confirms, "the opening of the archives of the former Soviet Union and the published reminiscences of former US power brokers have proven these US claims to be outright lies" (2001: 14).

In fact, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan gave US policy-makers the excuse to become involved in the region. One Carter advisor whose "hardline viewpoint had been on the ascendance well in advance of the Russian invasion is quoted as saying: 'Afghanistan is finally shaking people into shape ... I think the Soviets have done us a big favour'". This mirrors the delight of the Truman administration officials who exclaimed in a similar fashion at the breakout of the Korean War, "we were sweating over it (NSC-68), and then thank God Korea came along" (Sanders, 1983: 240). On the basis of such views, it could be argued that as well as the Korean War which legitimated military spending at the time, the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan also energized President Reagan's assertive FP and military build-up (Sanders, 1983). Carter began aiding the mujahedeen against the USSR and Reagan continued this effort to defeat the enemy (Hoff, 2008).

Yet, the US economic, political and military interests in the Central Asia have gradually increased since the early 1990s (Blank, 2001). Cakmak argues that "the starting point of the American military response to Afghanistan is rooted in the changed international environment created by the end of the Cold War" (2003: 11). The Middle East and Central Asia took a backseat in the US strategy after the 1991 Gulf War because of the US engagement in central Europe. However, after managing European affairs in the late 1990s and whilst seeking the best way to move effectively towards the Middle East and Central Asia, the terrorist attacks offered the US the pretext it needed to put these areas under its direct military control (Kuniholm, 2002). In this way, the US followed in the steps of its imperial predecessors, Britain and France, and "consistently manoeuvred to



control the Middle-East and Central Asia” as an integral part to its post-CW hegemonic strategy (Ralph, 2006: 263).

### **5.3.2. The Rush To The Afghanistan War: Do Not Miss The Opportunity**

In order to highlight the importance of the US’ occupation of Afghanistan, it is necessary to assess the Bush administration’s rapid response and its attempts to legalise the WoT as the only possible response to 9/11. From a retrospective view, it is clear that the US needed to invade Afghanistan as quickly as it could; in doing so, America used a number of justifications to legitimate its response to 9/11. However, such a legal framework casts suspicions over the US’ real agenda that lay behind its reaction. America was in fact trying not to legalise a global WoT; rather it was manoeuvring to enlarge its hegemonic position using an unexpected moral excuse.

As stated previously, the attacks of 9/11 were classified as criminal acts because they were conducted by a terrorist organisation (Greenwood, 2002). Due to this, the US faced a legal problem in responding militarily to the terrorist attacks: how could it justify its military response? By using several possible legal justifications for the employment of military force against Afghanistan, the US relied merely on the right of self defence (Byers, 2002). According to the UN Charter, “without Security Council authorisation ... force is restricted only to self defence against armed attack” (cited in Chomsky, 2007: 113). However, to be valid for the justification of war, self defence requires that the US should “be able to point to the existence of an armed attack” on its own territory (Greenwood, 2002: 307). In this case, there was no armed attack or a declaration of war against the US by any sovereign state. Instead, the attack came from a terrorist network. Therefore, when the US military took action, it “violat[e] the territorial integrity of a state that is not itself directly responsible” (Byers, 2002: 406).

To overcome these legal problems and to regulate its action within the framework of international law, the US utilised two complementary strategies. First, it enlarged the war’s stated objectives and instead of targeting Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, it included the Taleban, “the then de facto government of Afghanistan” because it was “giving refuge to Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda and refusing to hand them over” (Byers, 2002: 408). According to this argument, Al-Qaeda organised the attacks and the Taleban regime facilitated them (Mingst, 2006). If, as Michael Byers argues, the US “singled out Bin

Laden and Al-Qaeda as its targets, it would have run up against the widely held view that terrorist attacks, in and of themselves, do not constitute armed attacks justifying military responses against sovereign states” (2002: 408).

Second, the US intended to secure political support for its military response to 9/11. These efforts were clear when the members of NATO regarded the attacks of 9/11 as an armed attack on all 19 countries as did the members of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. The UNSC resolutions adopted on 12 and 28 September 2001 also affirmed the right of self defence in their deliberate wording (Byers, 2002; Greenwood, 2002; Mann, 2003; Byers, 2005). While such a framework of legalisation was controversial, for many observers, these actions were sufficient to legalise the US response to 9/11 attacks. For example, according to scholars such as Byers (2002; 2005), the US had merely employed the principle of ‘necessity and proportionality’ to carry on its agenda.

It is true that the US demanded the Taleban regime hand Bin Laden over and the de facto government in Kabul requested the US show evidence that demonstrated his involvement in the attacks. However, shortly prior to the beginning of the war, the Taleban “offered to turn Bin Laden over to a neutral third country, even without hearing the evidence—even to allow him to be tried under Islamic law in the United States”. A few days after the beginning of the war, the offers were repeated but “Bush’s response was: there’s no need to negotiate. There’s no discussion. I told them exactly what they need to do. And there is no need to discuss innocence or guilt” (Mahajan, 2003: 34).

However, such the dispute over the legality of the war was constrained to academia because the US reaction was acceptable to the rest of the world. The US rush to war was not viewed as suspicious because American citizens had been killed and injured and all the world, including Arabs and Muslims, showed sympathy to the innocent victims and to Americans (Schuller & Grant, 2003; Thurber, 2006). In this context, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Europeans forgot the 1990s tensions with the US over issues such as the Kyoto Protocol, the future of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, and the role of the (ICC). Romani Prodi, the then President of the European Commission, pledged to support the US in its war. He said: “[I]n the darkest hours of European history, the Americans stood with us. We stand by them now” (cited in May, 2003a: 10). This sympathetic attitude was echoed in *Le Monde*: “[W]e are all Americans now” (cited in

May, 2003a: 10). The Bush administration accordingly secured “a blank cheque from the UN, support from Russia and China, and extended its influence in West and Central Asia” (Ali, 2003: 316). As a result of this, Carl Boggs argues that “the horrific events of 9/11 brought unprecedented levels of worldwide sympathy for what was already a global hegemon” (2005: 35).

In the light of such global support, the US hegemonic project appeared to be in line with the US consensual hegemonic model that was discussed in the first chapter. However, the US, practically, went on to invade Afghanistan alone. About 98% of the military operations were carried out by its own troops, while the UK’s contribution was around 2%. Americans did not even allow NATO allies to join the effort until early 2003 when President Bush II made some policy concessions to engage other countries (NATO and non-NATO). NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) took over in August 2003 only because of the US’ new battle in Iraq (Cox, 2002a; Judt, 2002; Mingst, 2006).

The feverish efforts to legalise the war against Afghanistan raises the question: was it true that America’s rush to war was solely motivated by its announced objectives? This will be discussed later. The next section’s concern is to show how the US hegemonic project developed in the post-9/11 era.

### **5.3.3. The Easy Victory In Afghanistan Motivates The Rush To Baghdad**

The war in Afghanistan was the first step towards hegemony. The rapid collapse of the Taleban regime and the easy victory in the first frontline of the WoT motivated US policy-makers to expand the goals and targets to Iraq and Saddam Hussein. Scholars such as Cox (2002a), Pauly and Lansford (2005), Gardner (2005), Apodaca (2006) and Goldstein (2006) argue that this shift was primarily because of the US’ failure in finding key terrorist leaders such as Bin Laden. The administration was in danger of losing public support for the war since it listed bringing the terrorists to justice as a prime objective. However, this analysis does not convey the full story. The WoT is described as unlimited war, and President Bush, in his State of the Union address on 29 January 2002, made it clear that the second step in the WoT would focus on rogue states that sponsored terrorism and proliferated weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (Apodaca, 2006; Goldstein, 2006).

The Afghan War also sent a clear message to its allies as well as potential enemies. If the Gulf War of 1991, and the air campaign on Kosovo in 1999 showed the remaining powers that the US, in terms of military capabilities could not be challenged, the war in Afghanistan showed them that balancing against the US was impossible. In this context, one leading scholar says that (Cox, 2002a: 272):

[The successful US air power campaign in Afghanistan] had uncomfortable and important consequences for its allies as well as its enemies. US predominance was not just quantitative either; it was qualitative too. To take one example, whereas only 6 per cent of the bombs dropped during the Gulf War were precision weapons, some 95 per cent of those dropped by the United States in Afghanistan were in that category—a huge step forward in a relatively short space of time.

In this context, once the victory in the Afghanistan war had been accomplished, Kenneth Pollack who served as a staff member of NSC under the Clinton administration, wrote (Pollack, 2002):

Today the shock of the September 11 attacks is still fresh and the US government and public are ready to make sacrifices—while the rest of the world recognizes American anger and may be leery of getting on the wrong side of it. The longer the wait before an invasion [of Iraq], the harder it will be to muster domestic and international support for it, even though the reason for invading would have little or nothing to do with Iraq's connection to terrorism.

Accordingly, “Bush’s policy choices in regard to Iraq all bore the imprint of both the administration’s recent experience in Afghanistan and the broader trends toward unilateral (or perhaps selectively multilateral) actions that were manifested during the Clinton years” (Pauly & Lansford, 2005: 6).

#### **5.3.4. The Unilateral Turn To Iraq: The Mission Determines The Allies Instead Of The Allies Determine The Mission**

As discussed in the second chapter, the US depended on its partners to secure its hegemony during the CW. However, since the EoCW the US began to separate itself from the old constraints of multi-lateralism. This approach became clearer during the 1990s; however, from 9/11 onwards, it became the dominant approach in AFP strategy.

As highlighted in the third chapter, the US saw the UN as an AFP tool during the 1990s (Bennis, 2000: Falk, 2007). However, this approach faced a crucial challenge in the run-up to the war on Iraq. The US attempted, as it had usually done, to get UNSC approval for legitimating its decision to use military force against Iraq. This attempt unexpectedly

failed, and the US, for the first time since the EoCW, was unable to secure its allies' support for an international resolution to carry out its own agenda. The UNSC's disapproval was not only because of the opposition of three permanent members (France, China, and Russia), but also due to its failure to enforce any of the middle six—Angola, Cameroon, Guinea, Chile, Mexico, Pakistan—to vote in its favour, despite enormous diplomatic pressure and outright bribery (Du Boff, 2003; Gardner, 2005; Mingst, 2006; Western, 2006). In line with the UNSC's attitude, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General at the time, said that the Iraq war "was not in conformity with the UN Charter from our point of view, from the charter point of view, it was illegal" (cited in Reynolds, 2004). This caused liberal commentators such as Ikenberry and Nye to remark that the "potential cost of the US pursuit of unilateralism is in undermining the consensual order between great powers which provided legitimacy to the exercise of US leadership and hegemony during the Cold War" (Dannreuther, 2007: 30).

The lack of support also affected the long-standing trans-Atlantic partnership. In this context, Nye (2000) was correct when he predicted that the US's post-CW unilateral actions would inevitably affect the strong historical relationship with Europe. It is true that several disputes between the US and its European partners were lurking beneath the surface in the 1990s. However, post-9/11 these disagreements reached a level not previously seen.

In contrast to its position in the UNSC in 2001, France, with Russia and Germany, refused to pass an international resolution from the Council to legalise the US military operation against Iraq. In this context, the EU High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Javier Solana argued that "the Iraq crisis produced a sense of real crisis in transatlantic relations. It divided the EU, NATO and the UN" (2003: 2). Within Europe, in contrast to Germany, France and Belgium, the UK, Italy, Spain, and the eastern European countries supported the US position (Gardner, 2005; Tokatlian, 2006). These divisions led Javier Solana to argue that: "the Alliance should determine the mission and not vice versa. The alternative is to pick partners, like tools from a box. Most of us would prefer to be considered an 'ally' or a 'partner' rather than a tool in a box" (2003: 3). German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer agreed with Solana that "allies are not satellites" (cited in Rhodes, 2004: 426). However, Solana's approach did not fit with the US unipolar moment. Thus in sharp contrast, Donald Rumsfeld

emphasized that the mission should determine the allies, not the other way around (Litwak, 2002; Ayoob, 2003).

The American unilateral approach cannot be separated from the domestic political environment that was dominant at the time when the neo-cons occupied many high ranking positions in the US political system and AFP bureaucracy. In this vein, the former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt argues that “this nationalist-egocentric influence of imperialistic-minded intellectuals on US strategy is greater than at any time since the Second World War” (cited in Szabo, 2004: 60). Therefore, as it did in Afghanistan, the US intended to wage the war in Iraq alone or with a few selected allies. Drawing lessons from the debate in the run up to the Kosovo war, Bush’s key advisers convinced him that little multi-lateral constraints will not challenge American global leadership, and discussion in the lead up to the Iraq war was worthless. The UN, from their viewpoint, “is nothing more than a debating society while NATO still suffers from the fact that postmodern French and German elites want to slow or keep American power in check” (Western, 2006: 113). After the military victory in Afghanistan, US strategic planners were convinced that Europeans would add nothing to the US military capabilities. The war “illustrated the extent to which the United States no longer seemed to require the active military support of its allies, except as bases or cheerleaders” (Cox, 2002a: 272). Just four months after the US sought to build a coalition and work with allies, European-American tensions over a number of issues started to come to light. Therefore Krauthammer angrily argued that the WoT was not a war for America alone, but it “is also a war for Western civilization. If the Europeans refuse to see themselves as part of this struggle, fine. If they wish to abdicate, fine. We will let them hold our coats, but not tie our hands” (Judt, 2002). As a further indicator of the US unilateralist perspective and its tensions with the EU over Iraq, Secretary of State Colin Powell travelled to Europe only twice, and he did not go to the Middle East at all during the six months run up to the Iraq war. In contrast, James Baker, the Secretary of State during the Gulf War in 1991 “made six trips to Europe and four to the Middle East and also travelled to Russia before the beginning of the military actions” (Western, 2006: 118).

Finally, if the UNSC refused to legitimate the war, and the US’ closest allies were against this step in the WoT, what were the justifications that led the US to go it alone?

The Bush administration failed to offer any reasonable answer to this question. The following section, deals with American justifications to launch the Iraq War.

### **5.3.5. Justifying The Unjustifiable War: US Claims Between Rhetoric And Reality**

Given the premise that the Afghanistan war was a justified response to the attacks of 9/11 and the world supported the US in its search to bring the terrorists to justice, the questions that require to be answered are: what were the justifications for extending the WoT to the war on Iraq? and, how did the US administration defend its decision to go it alone after its diplomatic failure in the UNSC? In fact, the post-9/11 honeymoon between the US and the world—including the UN and a number of its closest allies—was short-lived due to its decision to invade Iraq without UNSC approval. This unilateral action led to a reduction in international support and raised several crucial questions regarding its post-CW hidden agenda (Judt, 2002; Schuller & Grant, 2003; Thurber, 2006; Carter, 2008).

In this context, and in line with what has said in the last chapter, terrorism and 9/11 were used by the US government as the justification for this unjustified war and “fear has become ... [the Bush administration’s] favourite weapon of choice” (Füredi, 2005: 124), while Iraqi’s alleged WMD programme was exaggerated (Malik, 2003; Mian, 2007). UK officials, for instance, claimed that Iraq posed an imminent threat to the West as its WMD could reach Europe within 45 minutes (Malik, 2003; Katzman, 2003; Cliffe & Ramsay, 2003; Leaman, 2005; Dumbrell, 2005). In his State of the Union address on 28 January 2003, Bush also claimed that Saddam’s regime could “produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard, and VX nerve agent” , and quoted a US intelligence reports that said Iraq “had upwards of 30.000 munitions capable of delivering chemical and biological materials” (cited in Malik, 2003: xxxiv). Similarly, Rumsfeld assured that a new 9/11 using WMD to kill countless thousands of Americans was possible (Malik, 2003; Paterson et al., 2010). Another US official warned that “we don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud” (cited in Paterson et al., 2010: 490). On the basis of such logic, Paul Wolfowitz put it clearly that “we cannot afford to wait until we have a visceral understanding of what terrorists can do with weapons of mass destruction” (cited in Leffler, 2003: 1049).

The justification of the threat from Iraq's WMD was an important influence on the US public. However, the divisions over support for the war in the UNSC, along with the resistance of the US' closest allies to the invasion of Iraq under the claim of WMD, left the US public unsure about the administration's policy. Therefore, a second step was taken to make the war more acceptable to US citizens; Iraq was linked to al-Qaeda and 9/11. The existence of this link was mentioned in the immediate 9/11 attacks when President Bush was asked about the attacks on September 17, 2001, and replied, "I believe Iraq was involved" (cited in Gershkoff & Kushner, 2005: 526). Furthermore, as mentioned previously, from the first hours of the attack the Bush administration strove to find any links to Iraq in the events of 9/11 (Cliffe & Ramsay, 2003; Leaman, 2005; Dumbrell, 2005). However, on 6 March 2003, Washington claimed it possessed bulletproof evidence which not only demonstrated links between Iraq and al-Qaeda, but also an undeniable connection between 9/11 and the Iraqi regime (Dumbrell, 2005; Gershkoff & Kushner, 2005; Paterson et al, 2006; Simpson, 2006; Daniel & Alexander, 2007).

However, according to Jay Bookman, these justifications seemed to be "contrived and artificial" (2002). Thus, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Executive Director Mohammed El-Baradei declared that his agency had examined several claims about Iraqi nuclear programmes, such as Iraq's attempts to purchase uranium from Niger and the aluminium tubes which could be used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons but did not find any evidence proving these claims. Similarly, the former Chief UN Weapons Inspectors Scott Ritter (1991-1998) and Hans Blix, UNMOVIC chief, did not accept the US allegation that Iraq still possessed any WMD programmes (Bidwai, 2003; Malik, 2003). Blix's report to the UNSC certified that "Iraq has undertaken a substantial measure of disarmament and that Baghdad's recent cooperation can be seen as active or even proactive" (cited in Bidwai, 2003). According to Praful Bidwai (2003), this report removed America's key moral justification for the war on Iraq. Nonetheless, despite the lack of evidence and opposition from the international community, the US continued with its project to invade Iraq using the claim of destroying of its WMD before the UN inspection team had finished its job. This led Aftab A. Malik to suggest that by depriving the UN team at the time, one could suggest that "perhaps the hawks [in the US administration] feared that the inspectors were doing their work too well. Perhaps with even a little more time, they would have robbed them of their excuse for



going to war” (2003: xxxv). Because of this, Pollack (2002) argues that it would be mistaken to understand the Iraq invasion as a component of the WoT because it would jeopardize that war. What was striking was that the Reagan administration supplied Iraq with chemical materials when it was sure that the Iraqi regime would employ these weapons in its war against Iran, as well as against its own citizens. “Now, however, Iraq’s use of gas in that conflict is repeatedly cited by President George W. Bush as justification for ‘regime change’ in Iraq” (Zizek, 2002).

After the administration’s failure to find any WMD or to discover any evidence linking al-Qaeda and Saddam (Daalder & Lindsay, 2005b; Putzel, 2006; Fukuyama, 2006b; Mueller, 2008), the justifications for the war turned to democracy, liberation of Iraq, and a war to reform the Middle East (Rice, 2002; Katzman, 2003; Apodaca, 2006; Nye, 2006). However, “this excuse led Fukuyama to say: a request to spend several hundred billion dollars and several thousand American lives in order to bring democracy to ... Iraq would have been laughed out of court” (Mueller, 2008: 115). In fact, this plan to use military force to establish democracy, or democratic imperialism was designed and supported by hardliner neo-cons as a central element of their strategy of regime change (Clark, 2005).

Thus, international liberalists, nationalists and neo-cons who were in the office after 2001 depending on US exceptionalism “believe[d] that legitimacy matters less than material power ... legitimacy is nice to have, but not necessary” (Posen, 2007: 564). Iraq was seen as a rogue state and the US intended to use power to remove its undemocratic regime. The proponents of US primacy strategy found this excuse sufficient to carry out their hegemonic agenda (Posen, 2007).

### **5.3.6. The War On Iraq In The Context Of US Hegemonic Strategy**

#### **5.3.6.1. The War: Necessity Or Choice?**

Thus, the US offered several different justifications for its plan to invade Iraq; however, none of these justifications was proven to be true. Therefore, the war cannot be seen as a war of necessity, but as a war for geo-strategic ends. The invasion was conducted outside of the international community’s legal framework, and soon after the invasion started, political developments showed that the US allegations about Iraq were a “noble lie in neoconservative circles” (Gardner, 2005: 12). Iraq was neither connected to the attacks

of 9/11 nor did it have any WMD (Bremmer, 2002; Bookman, 2002; Roy, 2004; Rockmore & Margolis, 2005; Mingst, 2006; Vanaik, 2007). This led Malik (2003) to reconceptualise the meaning of WMD to “words of mass deception”. The deception was an instrument to persuade the US public that the pre-emptive war on Iraq was a necessity not only to protect America, but also to maintain world peace and security (Cliffe & Ramsay, 2003; Leaman, 2005; Dumbrell, 2005).

Accordingly, in contrast to those, such as, who denied the Bush administration’s deception, scholars such as Chomsky and Herman emphasize that “deception and propaganda play even in formally democratic countries” (Gibbs, 2006: 26). The use of deception for political ends is not unlikable in mainstream realist theory. It is sometimes needed “for elite manipulation of public opinion” because a wide spectrum of realists believe that “the government must realize that it is not the slave of public opinion” (Gibbs, 2006: 26). In this way, one can understand President Bush’s Executive Order 13.233 that gave “indefinite authority to hold up release of White House records” (Gendzier, 2006: 181). So the failure to release the records heightens the suspicion that the real agenda behind the Iraq war is hidden and that the war was consistent with American grand strategy since the CW.

Iraq was portrayed as a challenger to US interests from the early 1990s, and this perception was exaggerated after 9/11. However, Iraq did not pose any real challenge and there was no urgency to act pre-emptively against the regime. If Iraq was posing a real challenge to the US, then “containment and deterrence remain to manage this threat”. Therefore, “dealing with Iraq should be a lower priority than dealing with North Korea” (Dunn, 2003: 297). Kim Jong II was known to be processing uranium to produce WMD in 2003, as was Iran. However, the Bush administration was unable to provide a “rational answer as to why Saddam’s seemingly dormant WMD program possesses a more imminent threat than Korea’s active program” (Clark, 2003). If it is true, Iraq was one of the “evil powers at par with North Korea, what prevented ... [the US] to pass legislation for regime change in North Korea” (Dhar, 2010) or Iran. What “separates America’s approach to Iraq from its approach to North Korea” Dunn (2003: 286) asks. Leffler answers, saying that the US “has hesitated to act preventively in Iran and North Korea, calculating that the risks are too great” (2003: 23).

However, this is not the entire story, Iraq was chosen for a number of reasons. First, its lack of military capabilities. Second, Iraq was portrayed as a pariah state in the region because of Saddam's aggression towards his neighbouring countries. This portrayal served the agenda of US officials towards Iraq particularly inside the US. Third, Washington was also sure that no Arab government had the ability or inclination to say no, to the invasion. Fourth, Iraq's location was geo-strategically important to the projection of US power worldwide. Fifth, Iraq, and the wider region, was an important source of hydrocarbon reserves. These advantages were not present in North Korea. The US had already maintained significant military presence in the southern part of the Korean peninsula. Equally if not more important, China, North Korea's closest ally, would not allow the US to operate in its backyard. In the Middle East, there was no other important regional power such as China to make the US rethink its agenda (Everest, 2004). Iran, a possible candidate as a regional power, facilitated the removal of the Saddam regime in 2003, for its own national interest.

Therefore, the US, after its military successes of the 1990s, was optimistic that it could "invade a country halfway round the world and bring about a reasonable settlement" (Dunn, 2003: 286). Thus, Arthur Schlesinger argues that "we are at war again—not because of enemy attack, as in World War II, nor because of incremental drift, as in the Vietnam War—but because of the deliberate and premeditated choice of our own government" (2003). Similarly, Leffler argues that the US administration acted "selectively, much as its predecessors did. Vietnam, like Iraq, was a war of choice" (2004: 123).

#### **5.3.6.2. The Occupation Of Iraq: Unfinished Business From 1990/1991**

If the war was a matter of choice, it should therefore be understood in the context of AFP strategy after the CW. As said in the third chapter, the US sought to control the Middle East from the mid-20th century, but this objective was not easily achieved in the bipolar political system of the CW. However, with the EoCW, Iraq offered the pretext to do so following its invasion of Kuwait in 1990; however, although the US eventually engaged in that war, the geo-political map of the post-CW era was not yet entirely clear. As a result, the Bush I administration opted to defeat Saddam Hussein, but not to invade Iraq. However, this decision was criticized by several neo-cons. Robert Pauly argues that Bush's decision to keep Saddam Hussein in power in 1991 "proved short-sighted as

the opening decade of the post-Cold War era unfolded” (2005: 30). Thus, the neo-con Krauthammer argues that Bush I could have avoided the deployment of troops in Saudi Arabia and economic sanctions against Iraq during the 1990s, if Hussein had been overthrown in 1991. Krauthammer concludes that these problems were the main reasons that led Bin Laden to ignite his war against America on 9/11 (Pauly, 2005). Through this understanding, it was possible to indirectly link the Hussein regime to the attacks of 9/11.

However, what was risky in the early 1990s became easier in the early 2000s. The US was able to act independently. Its economic difficulties had been overcome by the end of the decade, and the US was becoming more confident that it could bear the burdens of its global unilateral leadership. Furthermore, the geo-political map of the early 2000s was clearer than that of the early 1990s. On the one hand, America had built its power during the 1990s to unprecedented levels, while on the other hand, no remaining power was able to challenge the US strength and influence. More importantly, the key neo-cons officials who proposed the idea of regime change in Iraq were now in key positions within the Bush II administration. In addition to these reasons, the easy and rapid victory in Afghanistan encouraged US policy-makers to institute their plans to occupy Iraq and topple its regime: the proposals to overthrow Saddam Hussein were ready from the early 1990s and re-emerged after 9/11. However, Bush’s decision to occupy Iraq was carried out between summer 2002 and February 2003 (Ullman, 2006; Bolton, 2008).

In line with this discussion, Iraq was part of the US strategy in the region from the early 1950s. During the 1990s, it was kept under harsh economic sanctions and subject to repeated air strikes (Davis, 2003; Roy, 2004; Putzel, 2006). As a result of these actions, when the WoT started, US policy-makers were sure that Iraq “was brought to its knees, its people starved, half a million of its children killed, its infrastructure severely damaged, after making sure that most of its weapons have been destroyed” (Roy, 2004: 25). The moment was ideal for completing the unfinished business from the 1990-91 Gulf War (Hoff, 1994; Pollack, 2002; Davis, 2003; Roy, 2004; Bolton, 2005; Putzel, 2006; Buchanan, 2007; Fraser, 2009).

The debate in the US cabinet immediately following the terrorist attacks in 9/11 showed that Iraq was the preferred target of a number of key officials. According to David Benn

since the proposal to remove Saddam Hussein was clearly stated prior to 9/11, the “invasion of Iraq to do so in 2003 is not more than a conscious decision to carry out a policy desired for other reasons” (2007: 972). Thus, Vice-President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld advocated war against Iraq rather than Afghanistan at a cabinet meeting held on 12 September 2001 (Gowan, 2002; Lechelt, 2003; Melanson, 2005; Dumbrell, 2005; Mian, 2007). Three days later, Wolfowitz supported the plan without any clear evidence against Iraq (Guyatt, 2003; Buchanan, 2003; Melanson, 2005). Bush did not show any disagreement with his key officials’ attitude, but he suggested that the US need not target Iraq with cruise missiles, rather the aim must be regime change in Baghdad (Mian, 2007). As a result, the president’s “speechwriters were asked at the end of 2001, to make a case for war against Iraq to be included in the forthcoming State of the Union Address” (Mian, 2007: 149). There were also neo-cons officials located in and around the Pentagon, which enabled Cheney to play a significant role in widening the scope of the WoT to include Iraq as a pre-emptive strategy to secure the American people (Lechelt, 2003; Soros, 2004; Tunander, 2007). The British allies were told by U.S. officials in July 2002 that a military operation against Iraq was unavoidable and that policy was now designed around this aim (Danner, 2005).

Bremmer (2002) argues that the 9/11 attack actually delayed the plan to invade Iraq because the US was forced to start with Afghanistan. Hoff recognises that most of the political goals of the 1991 war against Iraq were not achieved at the time. “Saddam remained in power, the free Kuwait remained undemocratic ... and the Middle East was left no more stable than before the war” (1994: 211). What is unsurprising that these issues were taken as justifications to invade Iraq. However, alongside these issues, Bush II also had a personal motivation. Scholars such as Wormer (2002) and Dunn (2003) argue that Bush sought to invade Iraq as revenge against Saddam Hussein who was accused of being involved in a plot to kill his father during his visit to Kuwait .

In summary, would it be possible to see the US post-9/11 policy and particularly the war on Iraq merely as a part of the WoT or as a response to 9/11? In the next section, some potential aspects of the WoT will be discussed.

### **5.3.7. Beneath The Surface: The Real Agenda Behind The WoT**

This section returns to question posited earlier: was the US' rush to the war on Afghanistan really to defeat terrorism? And, if the war on Iraq was not related to the WoT, but was a matter of choice, why Iraq? And why now? (Clark, 2003; Singh, 2004). However, if the Iraq invasion was actually about furthering American hegemony, what would the occupation of Iraq add to the US hegemonic strategy? The next sub-sections will discuss two intertwined perspectives to deal with these questions.

#### **5.3.7.1. A Geo-Economic Approach**

“It is the oil, stupid” Joseph Clifford (2002) asserted. Relevant to this question's answer, history tells us that oil has been a central element in the US strategy to the Middle East since the mid-1950s, with its attempts to gain control over the region's raw material (Watkins, 1997; Cameron, 2002; Bromley, 2005). As explained previously, the control of oil was also amongst the main objectives that led the US to fight in the Gulf in 1990-91. In the draft DPG of 1992, the authors explain that the Persian Gulf is very important to US interests because of its huge oil reserves and the US should take control over it to block other states from becoming competitors to the US in the region (Bromley, 2005; Tunander, 2007; George, 2007). Similarly, since the 1970s, the pursuit of oil has resulted in the US coexisting with both al-Qaeda during the mujahidin war 1979-1989 against USSR troops and “the world-dominating Afghan heroin trade” (Scott, 2007: 74). It has also been one of the driving forces behind US involvement in Central Asia. Four years before 9/11, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor (NSA) during the Carter administration, argued that the US needed to gain unrestricted access to Central Asia's huge oil resources. The vital importance of this region to US interests led Brzezinski to contend that a military operation, or at least locating military bases in the region, would be unavoidable to control Caspian oil. However, he acknowledged that such a policy necessitated a strong domestic consensus that was impossible “except in the circumstances of a truly massive and widely perceived direct external threat” (cited in McMurtry, 2007: 136; Griffin, 2007: 16). However, 9/11 provided the environment for Bush II to put the plan into practice.

In line with its strategy, the US's desire to take control over world oil reserves and its transportation routes from the Gulf and Central Asia became more important in its unipolar moment . On the one hand, without an abundant supply of oil, America would

not be able to project its military power globally (Lobe, 2003). History tells us that “one of the main reasons for Germany’s defeat in WWI was due to its lack of crude oil” (Clark, 2005: 69). On the other hand, the geo-politics of oil changed considerably after the 1990-91 Gulf war: not only did the world consumption of oil increase but (Morse & Richard, 2002: 22):

the increase in the US share of oil market, in terms of trade, was higher than the total oil consumption in any other country, save China and Japan. The US increase in imports accounts for more than a third of the total increase in oil trade and more than half of the total increase in OPEC’s production.

In this light, Pepe Escobar argues: “[a] war against terrorism? Not really. Reminder: it’s all about oil” (2002), while T. V. Paul (2005) suggests that besides terrorism, the US hegemonic strategy in Iraq was pushed by the state’s increasing demand for oil. Neil Smith argues that “the oil is clearly a central calculation in the decision to invade Iraq and toppling Saddam Hussein” (2005b: 24). Once the administration turned to invade Iraq, Dreyfus contended that Bush was continuing the geo-strategy of 1975 that advocated the invasion of the Persian Gulf to control its oil resources (Clark, 2005).

In this milieu, while it might be true that 9/11 legitimated and facilitated the US strategy to go to war in order to control world oil, this strategy was also energized by the inclination of the Bush II administration. There was a close link between the Bush administration’s key officials and the US oil industry sector, including the president himself and Vice President Cheney. For instance, Enron was the largest contributor to the Bush’s presidential campaign of 2000. Furthermore, the oil lobby was, and still is, a very influential actor in AFP-making process and has a large impact on both Congress and the executive. However, as Bromley (2005) argues, the US economic hegemony and the control over oil may also be seen as a counterpart of the project of America’s post-CW military predominance.

Certainly, as shown in the report of the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG) released on 17 May 2001, the Bush administration strategy to secure an oil supply from foreign sources appeared prior to 9/11 (Klare, 2003; Moens, 2004).<sup>1</sup> The

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<sup>1</sup> “One of the first officials to meet with Vice President Cheney’s energy task force (the National Energy Policy Development Group ... [was] James Rouse, the vice president of ExxonMobil and a large financial donor to the Bush-Cheney presidential campaign. Several days later, Kenneth Lay, the CEO of Enron, meets with the group” (History commons, 2001).

main objective of the report, also known as the Cheney report, was to put forward a clear strategy to meet the increasing US demand on petroleum over the next 25 years. The report states that the US demand for oil imports would rapidly increase from 52% of its total energy consumption in 2001 to nearly 66% in 2020. Furthermore, the US' 2001 consumption of 10.4 million barrels per day (b/d) would expand to 16.7 million b/d by 2020 (Callinicos, 2002; Klare, 2003). For this reason, the report "calls on the White House to make the pursuit of increased oil imports a priority of ... [America's] trade and foreign policy" (cited in Klare, 2003: 54). The Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report of September 2001 stated that the US and its "allies and friends will continue to depend on the energy resources of the Middle East" (cited in Klare, 2003: 54). However, as discussed in chapter three, the US, as the unipolar power and the global hegemon, needed to secure its oil supply and also to ensure that other powers were kept out of the area. This was an essential strategy to sustain its hegemony (Volkov, 2003).

As it turned out, the US' need for oil was greater than that predicted in the Cheney report. Contrary to the report's expectation, the US' consumption rose to 20 million b/d in 2004 or around one quarter of the world's total consumption of approximately 82 million b/d (Clark, 2005). Consequently, its dependence on imported oil was set to increase "from about half to two-thirds of its consumption by 2020" (Billon & Khatib, 2004: 115). According to Morse and Richard (2002) and Clark (2005), by 2020 the world's oil consumption would increase by 50% to reach about 120 million b/d. The oil consumption of the Asian economies, including China, was forecast to equal that of the US: 25% of the world's energy. Western Europe will follow with 18%; Eastern Europe's and the former Soviet Union's consumption will remain slightly lower at 13%; and Latin America will consume just 5%. However, Europe's dependence on imported oil will probably increase from 70% to 90% of its consumption by 2030 whereas India, China, Japan and other Asian countries' dependence on Gulf oil "will also rise significantly and the Asian demand in oil is to overtake the European and North American respective demands by 2010" (Billon & Khatib, 2004: 114- 115). That is to say, sooner rather than later the world will not only witness a scarcity in oil supply, but also the demand for oil of potential rivals such as China and the EU will increase to unprecedented levels.



Therefore, if one asks why were Afghanistan and Iraq targeted and at that particular time, the answer does not only lie in defeating terrorism but also in securing oil and deterring potential rivals. The run-up to the WoT “most probably stimulated a jump in precautionary stock-building” (Williams, 2006: 1080). If China’s apparent oil demand rose to an unprecedented monthly average high of 5.52 million daily barrels in January 2003” (Williams, 2006: 1080) the US will not be able to wait. It is another preemptive strike.

Central Asia’s oil and gas were also seen as an additional source of supply for America after the CW. Since 1998, a vice president of Unocal with close ties to the Bush family, was enthusiastic about establishing a 1,040 mile pipeline between Turkmenistan and Pakistan and called on Congress to support regional and world attempts to achieve this proposal. If such a dream was seen impossible in the late 1990s due to geo-political obstacles, the invasion of Afghanistan “has made all Unocal’s wishes accessible” (Young, 2003: 24). Escobar rejoices that “pipelineistan is the golden future: a paradise of opportunity in the form of US\$5 trillion of oil and gas in the Caspian basin and the former Soviet republics of Central Asia” (2002). As Escobar (2002) explains:

In Washington’s global petrostrategy, this is supposed to be the end of America’s oil dependence on the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) ... The Caspian states hold at least 200 billion barrels of oil, and Central Asia has 6.6 trillion cubic meters of natural gas just begging to be exploited. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are two major producers: Turkmenistan is nothing less than a ‘gas republic’.

Certainly, if the US succeeded in this task, Central Asia would guarantee an additional source to its oil supply, and increased its importance in oil politics. In line with Escobar’s view, the NEPDG’s report released on 17 May 2001 asserted that the access to Central Asia’s reserves would actually reduce America’s dependence on Middle Eastern oil (Klare, 2003). At the time, one quarter of the US’s imported oil came from the Middle East (Morse & Richard, 2002). Saudi Arabia alone supplied “around 1.7 mb/d of the roughly 10m b/d imported into the United States” immediately after 9/11 (Morse & Richard, 2002: 21). For this reason, Central Asian oil was very important to the US in order diversify its energy supply and to marginalise the Middle East producers. This is why Simon Tisdall was confident that the US would not leave Afghanistan soon because its “potential benefits ... are enormous: growing military hegemony in one of the few parts of the world not already under Washington’s sway ...

and grail of holy grails—access to the fabulous non-OPEC oil and gas wealth of central Asia” (cited in Young, 2003: 24).

However, those like Escobar (2002) who suggested that the US would depend on Central Asia’s oil as an alternative to the Middle East’s were mistaken. The US invasion of Iraq and its intention to control the region’s natural resources demonstrated that the US did not really intend the pipeline from Afghanistan to be an alternative to its supply from the Gulf, but rather it was seen as a complementary effort to control the whole world oil reserves (Volkov, 2003). The US will not exclude the Middle East from its petroleum strategy, at least, in the near future. Put simply, the Persian Gulf remains the pivotal centre of the world’s petroleum industry as it contains about 65% of the world’s known oil reserves, up to 34% of the world’s natural gas reserves and accounts for nearly 30% of the world’s output of each (Morse & Richard, 2002; Everest, 2004; Billon & Khatib, 2004).

Accordingly, the following provides part of the answer to the question, why Iraq? (Dunn, 2003: 280):

Iraq’s oil reserves are the second largest in the world, with a value of \$3,400 billion (at \$25 per barrel), its actual output is relatively small. Iraq has the lowest yield of any major producer, amounting to 0.8 per cent of its potential output, or 3 per cent of global output, due to the geology of the oil fields and the technology available to exploit the resource.

Accordingly, the US invaded Iraq not only to secure the flow of oil from the region (about 24% of its consumption), but also to gain control of over 65% of the world’s oil reserves (Morse & Richard, 2002). This region with its huge reserves cannot be opened to the US’s rivals. If the oil is regarded to be a geo-strategic commodity to the US, the Middle East is therefore a vital region to its core interests (Clark, 2005).

Oil and gas were not the only potential economic concerns in the WoT; Central Asia’s huge supply of other raw materials was another important aspect. These raw materials include iron, copper, coal, phosphor, tungsten, zinc, uranium, silver and gold (Escobar, 2002; Stahel, 2010). Americans knew that the USSR discovered and exploited large amounts of raw materials in Afghanistan during the occupation of the 1980s. Following its military operation, the US conducted several geological surveys. The results were significant. Apart from Central Asia’s oil and gas, in Afghanistan alone there are

“deposits of raw materials and minerals ... Afghanistan [also] has deposits of rare metals which are vital for electronics and currently only found in China” (Stahel, 2010). The most important resources in Afghanistan are situated in the east and the south east where the US troops are operating and the major military bases are located. The American presence in these parts of Afghanistan is commonly justified by the existence of the Taleban resistance. However, this has aroused several scholars’ suspicions. For example, Stahel (2010) suggests:

Could it be that this is not the true reason for these bases to be built? Is it possible that the bases have enabled the US to take over the mineral deposits so that they can be exploited by American companies later on? If this hypothesis is true, then the European states whose troops are not stationed in the mentioned regions have been deceived by the war and the nation-building rhetoric in Afghanistan. Possibly, some states are confidants of the US and will have their share in the future exploitation! In this case, NATO’s Afghanistan war would mean nothing else than theft on a geo-political scale!

Furthermore, the war was also related to competition between the US dollar and the EU’s euro. According to Clark (2005), when the euro emerged in 1999, numerous EU key policy-makers and bankers tried to convince major US dollar holders such as Russia, China and the OPEC members to change a portion of their reserves to the euro. When the US dollar dropped prior to the war, Iraq and other countries such as Russia and China unloaded dollars and bought euros, resulting in a devaluation of the US dollar. The war on Iraq therefore “was not about Saddam Hussein’s old WMD program or the war on terrorism, it was the threat that other members of OPEC would follow Iraq and shift to a petroeuro system, thereby eroding the dollars’ dominant role in global economy” (Clark, 2005: 38). If this had occurred, it would have affected not only US currency but also its predominant position in the world (economically and politically). Therefore, it is not surprising that the war on Iraq ended the feverish efforts of several OPEC members to turn to the euro instead of the US dollar (Clark, 2005).

#### **5.3.7.2. A Geo-Political Approach: Killing Two Birds With One Stone**

The Bush government was “seeking to carry through a political and economic reorganization of the world in the interests of American ... [hegemony]” (Volkov, 2003). As stated above, oil and economic interests are vital to the US but this is only one aspect of the WoT’s agenda.

It is unnecessary to repeat the discussion that 9/11 offered the US an opportunity it could not miss and gave it the pretext to advance its hegemonic project that started immediately with the end of the CW. However, without doubt, Afghanistan “was the test bed” (Ullman, 2006: 31) in the American strategy of hegemony. As discussed in the third chapter, while the US enjoyed a dominant military, economy and political presence in Western Europe and Japan after WWII, it lacked such a geo-strategic dominion in other vital areas such as the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Central and Southeast Asia. However, as previously stated, the US gained a geo-strategic position in Eastern Europe after the former Yugoslavia crisis. If its presence in Central and Eastern Europe was seen as sufficient to keep other powers in the region in check, its presence in the Middle East and Asia did not serve its hegemonic agenda. Therefore, the US was in an urgent need to directly control the Gulf region and Central Asia for geo-strategic reasons. This objective, as referred to previously, was clearly stated in a number of governmental and non-governmental documents in the 1990s. Building on such analysis, the establishment of the US post-CW hegemonic system at this time required new modifications to the US global strategy to fit the new international environment. Without the projection of unmatched American sources of power highlighted in the second chapter, this modification would not have been possible (Murden, 2002; Callinicos, 2003; Barry, 2003). In this context, if 9/11 was the justification for the US hegemonic project, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were and still are just the practical steps towards such an objective (Parmar, 2005).

If the US intervention in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s gave it a geo-strategic position between Russia to the north, China to the east, and Europe to the west, according to Cakmak, the war on Afghanistan was needed because the region was almost the only missing part of the US post-CW predominance (2003: 5):

Afghanistan occupies a strategic position in the geopolitical landscapes in general, [see figure no. 5.1] and the geopolitics of the oil and natural gas resources in particular. Afghanistan has been in an extremely significant location spanning South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East.



Figure 5.1 The Location of Afghanistan in Central Asia  
<http://www.atimes.com/c-asia/DA25Ag01.html>

Moreover, in contrast to those who argue that regime change in Iraq was due to 9/11, the discussion above shows the invasion of Iraq was part of the US bureaucrats' agenda since the early 1990s. In this vein, the former director for the Persian Gulf Affairs in the NSC during the Clinton administration, Kenneth Pollack, argued that the US "has an interest in maintaining military access to the Persian Gulf because of the region's geostrategically critical location, near the Middle-East, Central Asia, eastern Africa, and South Asia" (cited in Fraser, 2009: 210). Therefore, regime change in Iraq was "a top priority of the Bush administration from its first day" (Peceny, 2006: 230). This was the practical dimension to the neo-cons' proposal of the Project for the New American Century (2000: 14):

The United States has sought for decades to play a more permanent role in Gulf regional security. While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American forces presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of regime change of Saddam Hussein.

Accordingly, the US project in the Middle East "aimed at dominating and controlling this crossroads between Europe, Africa and Asia with 60 percent of the world's oil reserves [see figure no. 5.2]" (Everest, 2004). If this is the case, then Iraq was "the greatest asset" (Murden, 2002: 58) for the US hegemonic agenda in the region. Likewise, in Central Asia the aim was to use 9/11 as a pretext to extend American military presence and direct political influence "where before it had had hardly any influence at all" (Cox, 2002a: 271). In consequence, just as the war on Afghanistan was the first test case of the US unilateral hegemony strategy, "the Iraq war came to be the

test case of the ‘new’ Bush strategy of preventative war (Nye, 2003; Clark, 2006). If this is true, then both Iraq and Afghanistan were the missing parts that would link US presence in Europe to its presence in east and south-east Asia. The invasion of these two countries enabled the US to consolidate its ring around the world.



Figure5.2 The Location of Iraq

Source: <http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/country/asia/iq.htm>

On these grounds, immediately following 9/11, the US acquired new military bases in several ex-Soviet countries and quickly signed treaties with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to “lease military bases and use ... their air space for the military campaign in Afghanistan” (Rashid, 2003: 119). Accordingly, “as early as 5 October 2001, the United States secured permission to establish a military base at Khanabad in southern Uzbekistan ... [that] ultimately housed between 2,000 and 5,000 US troops”. As well as “in December 2001, the United States established the Manas air base outside the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek” (Cornell, 2004: 240). Geo-strategic experts such as Klare (2003) argue that the US would try to make permanent a number of its temporary military bases that were established post-9/11 in the Caucasus and central Asia.

This was a true turning point in the advancement of the US hegemonic strategy because it is the first time that the US “has placed its military forces in such close proximity to the borders of Russia and China, both of which consider central Asia as part of their sphere of influence” (Rashid, 2003: 119). This new position gave the US a unique geo-strategic advantage to keep regional powers in check. In addition to Russia and China, there are also Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia and India and the former Soviet Republics (Cox, 2002a). China, for instance, is suspicious that the US military existence around its borders will affect its security and allow Americans to intervene in its internal affairs (Dhar, 2010). Therefore, the war on Afghanistan not only enabled the US to fight

against terrorism, but also gave it a “setting over [a] strategic landscape” (Cakmak, 2003: 5). The Pentagon, in this context, has gained since 9/11, “military tent cities have sprung up at thirteen locations in nine countries neighbouring Afghanistan; more than sixty thousand US military personnel now live and work at these forward bases” (Jackson, 2005: 11).

Just as the war on Afghanistan was conducted to give the US additional geo-strategic presence, the war on Iraq was also conducted to remake the region geo-politically (Crocker, 2005). As Paterson et al. argue, “to build a new pillar of US power in the Middle-East ... [by] replacing Saudi Arabia with a democratic Iraq that was friendly to Israel, harboured no terrorists, and could pump oil for the world economy at the right price” (2010: 490).

In this context, after 1991 “the Israeli demands for regime change in Baghdad” were another factor that led to the 2003 war (Falk, 2007: 124). “The removal of Iraqi support for the suicide bombers in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict could also pave the way for a settlement there” (Dunn, 2003: 290), which is what Kissinger argues: “the road to Jerusalem goes through Baghdad” (cited in Dunn, 2003: 290). This approach would also support the establishment of Israel as the Jewish home country, which has been part of the US’s long-standing policy in the region (Watkin, 1997; Murdson, 2002). Interestingly, in contrast to the conclusion in the previous chapter that the influence of interest groups over AFP-making process declined in the post-9/11 era, Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) argue that the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) played a crucial role in designing and supporting the war on Iraq. Such a view also found support amongst a wide spectrum of the Arab street and elite. The 2003 war, as they suggested, was a clear message from the neo-cons that whoever attacks Israel, as Saddam had done in 1991, will face the same fate.

Iraq will not be “the final chapter - it’s the opening chapter... defence consultant John Pike says of Richard Perle and his ilk” (Callinicos, 2002). Therefore, preventive war was supposed to be extended to the remaining two axis of evil countries, Iran and North Korea, plus Syria, among others (Thies, 2006). In this context, on 14 April 2003, the then Secretary of State Colin Powell called on Syria to change its behaviour and actions or it “might be subject to measures of a diplomatic, economic, or other nature” (cited in

Theis, 2006: 204). The US presence in Iraq not only put Syria and Iran in check, but also gave the US unprecedented influence in the whole region (Peceny, 2006).

However, this is not the full picture; the effects of the Iraqi occupation exceeded the boundaries of Middle East. It served the US long-term strategic objective of remaking the world order, preserving unipolarity and prohibiting the potential rise of any new rival. Although key European states, such as Germany, France, and Belgium opposed the war, geo-politically, this action served the US strategy. It divided the EU—its most likely mid-term rival—into two camps: new and old Europe (Szabo, 2004; Daalder & Lindsay, 2005b; Gardner, 2005; Western, 2006). This division weakened European efforts to build their own independent political, defence and security body that could have undermined the regional and global role of the US (Chace, 2003). It also raised the importance of Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland to the US geo-strategy vis-à-vis its CW traditional allies, France and Germany. Close military cooperation with these new allies gave the US an important presence near Russia (the other mid-term potential rival to the US unipolarity), a foothold on the Black Sea, a vital transit point for oil and gas, and was operationally significant for the war in Iraq (Rhodes, 2004; Linden, 2007). In this context, “the Graf Ignatievo and Burgas airfields in Bulgaria, together with the Constanza base in Romania, served US needs in both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars” (Cornell, 2004: 241) more than its traditional bases in Germany (see figure 5.3). Thus, the US geo-strategic presence was boosted in Eastern Europe and the significance of old Europe in US grand strategy diminished.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> In this context, Josef Joffe, editor of *Die Zeit*, also understood France and Germany’s opposition to the war in the context of balancing against the US. Their resistance was not actually because of Saddam Hussein or Iraq, but they “feared another swift military victory that would further certify the global primacy of the United States” (Rhodes, 2004: 425). France and Germany’s opposition to the war was also extended to the transatlantic organisations when they blocked the US request to deploy NATO’s AWAC planes and patriot missiles to defend Turkey during the war (Szabo, 2004; Daalder & Lindsay, 2005b; Gardner, 2005; Paul, 2005; Western, 2006). However, Germany did not deny the US “the air bases and other facilities it needs to reinforce and supply American forces in the theatre of operation (Ayoob, 2003: 31). Similar to the 1990s, there was no single power or coalition of powers that was able to counterbalance the US at the time. Seen in this light, France and Germany preferred America to go to war alone as this would undermine the US morally, and erode its military power. Thus, the US’s involvement in Iraq could help other powers to balance against it (Ayoob, 2003).





Figure 5. 3The Black Sea Region

Source: <http://www.google.co.uk/imgres?imgurl>

The Afghanistan war provided an opportunity to limit the influence of Russia and China in central Asia and undermined both China and Russia from becoming rivals to the US. As discussed in the third chapter, the 1990s showed that China was still a developing country and was not ready to become a major pole in the international environment. However, US strategists maintained that China was preparing itself to become a regional hegemon in the Asian-Pacific region, as well as a potential rival to the US (Laliberte, 2006; Ullman, 2006).

The Bush II administration changed the category of China from being a “strategic partner” to that of a “strategic competitor” (Nye, 2003: 61). For American officials, “long-term hegemony may be challenged not only by military force, but also by its changing position in international trade, its growing deficit spending and a challenge to the supremacy of the dollar” (Putzel, 2006: 77). Between 2000 and 9/11, a number of these economic factors began to appear as a consequence of Bush’s policies. The “budget deficit, after having been eliminated in 2000, reached almost \$500 billion with the tax and spending decisions of the Bush administration since it took office in January 2001” (Putzel, 2006: 77). Moreover, “Beijing had a \$124 billion trade surplus with the US in 2003” (Laliberte, 2006: 170). US officials were concerned that rapid economic growth in China would sooner rather than later facilitate its ambition to be a military competitor to the US (see figure 5.4). In this context, “with the emphasis on rebuilding ground forces that are so actively engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, a Chinese threat is the basis for rationalising air and naval forces” (Ullman, 2006: 38).




Figure5.4 Official Chinese Military Budget, Selected years (in billions of US dollar)  
 Data from: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/budget.htm>;  
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/budget-actual.htm>

According to Benjian (2001), the US used the cards of Taiwan and Japan to influence and contain China. Thus, the protection of Taiwan was amongst Washington's top priorities in the region. The figures show that between 2002 and 2003, the US "delivered \$4.5 billion in arms" to Taiwan (Gurtov, 2006: 293). However, more importantly, after 9/11 the US found an opportunity to put China under more direct pressure: first, when US troops gained bases in Central Asia; and second when the US gained control of the Middle East. Central Asia and the Middle East were and remain of great significance to Chinese interests as sources for oil, gas and other raw materials required to fuel its rapid economic growth. The presence of the US in the Gulf means that, for the foreseeable future, China will be reliant on American military forces to protect its oil supply. According to Yiwei Wang, this "will limit China's geo-strategic freedom of choice, especially over the Taiwan issue" (2004: 147). Thus, Chinese access to both regions and its influence especially in the Middle East have been limited. Furthermore, China did not show itself to be a responsible power in the UNSC's vote over the Iraq war. These issues all would not only affect its interests, but will also eclipse its soft power (Wang, 2004). For this reason, Irene L Gendzier argues that the "expanded American presence in Iraq and the eastern Arab world assured Washington of the means to prepare for greater challenges from an eastward direction which explain the reallocation of US forces from Europe to points of the Middle East" (2006: 182).

The war on Iraq also targeted Russia. Although, Russia as a big oil producer (unlike China) was not reliant on the supply oil from the region, its oil companies discussed and signed contracts with Iraq to expand their share in the region's hydrocarbon sector. One such agreement was signed in 1997 by Lukoil to develop the West Qurana field which contained reserves of roughly 15 billion barrels. Furthermore, Russia was a key trade partner with Iraq under the UN Oil for Food plan. Russian companies made huge profits from exporting goods prior to 2003—about \$7.7 billion according to some estimates. Russia also owed Iraq US\$8 billion from the Soviet era (Katz, 2003; Golan, 2004). These factors were undermined by the invasion of Iraq, but this is not the whole story. The Russian economy, as said in the second chapter depends on a single commodity, oil (Nye, 2007), and according to Dumbrell (2005) among the US objectives of its war in Iraq was to offer oil in reasonable prices to the Western consumers, which if implemented would negatively affect the Russian economy. As Katz points out “a \$1 rise or fall in the price of a barrel of oil leads to a corresponding rise or fall of 0.35 percent in the Russian GDP” (2003: 49). Equally if not more important, other Russian interests in the region were at stake. Iraq was one of the largest Arab buyers of Russian military equipment prior to UN sanctions in the early 1990s. The war would change the region's direction to the US and other major weapons producers. Russia not only lost its foothold in the region, but also lost its soft power in the Middle East. America's war on Iraq put Syria to the east and Iran to the west in check, in addition to other historical partners of Russia in the region such as Libya and Sudan.

On a macro-level analysis, while the WoT helped to secure the US oil supply, the most important objective was to weaken potential competitors of the US in Europe and Asia. In the US unipolar moment, these potential competitors should be “subjected to the will of the American corporate and political elite” (Volkov, 2003). In this context, the WoT was about control. If the US controlled the supply of oil that was of major importance to its potential rivals such as China, Japan, and the EU, Washington would be able to undermine the wishes of these potential competitors to be free from its influence. Thus, the war in Iraq was on the surface merely a war on Iraq, but its hidden agenda was a pre-emptive war to maintain America's unipolar moment. “The Iraq war itself, meant as it was to ‘shock and awe’ the world and particularly US adversaries” (Danner, 2003). In this context, it can be understood why powers, such as France and Germany, resisted US plans to invade Iraq (Clark, 2003; Volkov, 2003).

After all, prior to 9/11, “nearly 80% of US forces in Europe remain in Germany, while three-quarters of US troops in Asia are deployed at bases in Japan and South Korea” (Cornell, 2004: 241). 9/11 and the WoT allowed the redeployment of these troops to Central Asia and the Middle East. Therefore, in 2005, about 386,000 troops were stationed and operated in foreign lands (Kane, 2006). This huge number gave the US a unique opportunity to intervene in every corner around the world. The WoT served the US strategy of hegemony in several ways. First, by establishing control in the Middle East, about 60% of the whole world’s certain oil reserves have come under its unilateral control, in addition to central Asia’s huge reserves, while simultaneously depriving other powers, particularly, Russia and China of a similar advantage (Fraser, 2009). The US also bridged the gap between its geo-strategic presence in Europe and in Southeast Asia, which means that no point in today’s world is untouched by the US geo-strategic presence (see figure no. 5.5).



Figure 5. 5 US Military Presence Worldwide (2001-2003)  
Source: <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=5564>

Therefore, it has “become clear the War against Terror is not really about terror, and the war on Iraq not only about oil. It is about superpower’s self-destructive impulse toward supremacy, stranglehold, [and] global hegemony” (Roy, 2004: 34). It “aimed at redrawing the world’s geopolitical map in order to extend, strengthen and solidify US imperial dominance” (Everest, 2004). In other words, it was “the official emergence of the United States as a full-fledged global empire” (Bookman, 2002). It is true that the

US government discourse has entirely avoided using terms such as hegemon, empire, imperialism or even global dominance; however, this does not change the reality of the situation.<sup>1</sup>

If it was not a war for hegemony and predominance, Bookman questions, why did the administration rush into war and “dismissed the option of containing and deterring Iraq” (2002). If the US war was not a hegemonic war, why it was not designed to be a limited war? And “why does the administration seem unconcerned about an exit strategy from Iraq once Saddam is toppled? Equally, if not more important, why is that the US “will create permanent military bases in that country”. The former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, in an interview on 27 September 2002, “brushed aside that suggestion, noting that the United States does not covet other nations’ territory”. However, Bookman remarks: “that may be true, but 57 years after World War II ended, we still have major bases in Germany and Japan. We will do the same in Iraq”. The US turned from containment to pre-emption, “because even if it worked, containment and deterrence would not allow the expansion of American power. Besides, they are beneath us as an empire. Rome did not stoop to containment; it conquered” (Bookman, 2002). In this way, it is needless to recall the Project for the New American Century’s 2000 called for a constant military presence in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq (Griffin, 2007; Tunander, 2007).

#### **5.4. Conclusion**

The previous chapter showed that 9/11 enabled AFP’s to overcome the domestic divisions that had undermined it since the EoCW by rallying the nation round the flag. This chapter shows that 9/11 did not change the fundamental direction of AFP strategy and the post-9/11 policy cannot be separated from the context of AFP since WWII.

9/11 united America allowing AFP bureaucrats to regain their supremacy in policy-making. Some of those who were in the US cabinet in September 2001 had laid out a clear strategy for the post-CW world from the early 1990s, but prior to this date they

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<sup>1</sup> On 28 April 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, for example, reacted angrily when Aljazeera asked him, whether the Iraq invasion was part of an American imperialist project. He answered that America was not imperialistic. This answer was a “fine answer for public consumption. The problem is that it isn’t true” (Boot, 2003:).

lacked the pretext for its full implementation. Therefore, 9/11 was the kind of event they required not only to legitimate their proposals to deal with international affairs, but also to unite America, mobilise the public, increase military spending, and deploy US troops in every single corner of the world. For this reason, 9/11 was portrayed as an unprecedented threat that enabled a change in AFP and international relations.

However, in contrast to this approach, this chapter shows that what happened in 9/11 was a terrorist attack carried out by a terrorist organisation. Yes, it was the worst, but not the first. Furthermore, this terrorist attack was deliberately exaggerated to be a declaration of war. The description was used in order to serve a hidden agenda. This is not a conspiratorial perspective, but it has been said by the US policy-makers themselves during the first 36 hours after the attack as journalist Bob Woodward asserts. This also reveals that America was in urgent need to such action, and such an inspiration was clearly stated in the PNAC's 2000 document. In order to influence public opinion, the attack was framed as a new Pearl Harbour, and the US response to it portrayed as a just war. The objective of remaking the world order that appeared at the EoCW was presented with a unique opportunity to be implemented. Furthermore, America, in contrast to the early 1990s, was now in a position to take advantage of the opportunity. Therefore, the attacks of 9/11 were portrayed as a war on America, creating the conditions for the US response to be designed as a global war against all terrorists. Therefore, the US moved rapidly to war without considering other options, without identifying clear objectives, without determining a suitable time-frame to end the war, and without charting any exit strategy. The open-ended nature of the war suited the establishment of US hegemony. Therefore, 9/11 served US policy-makers because it created a climate of fear that allowed the Bush administration to mobilise American citizens to support the US military operation abroad in order to fulfil the hidden agenda of expanding America's geo-strategic presence.

However, 9/11 changed nothing in international politics and AFP. The American response to 9/11 was unsurprising given the imbalance in international power at the time. A hegemonic power usually works to aggrandize its comprehensive predominance at the expense of other potential challengers when the political conditions allow it to do so. In this context, it would be so difficult to accept the argument that 9/11 changed everything and the post-9/11 hegemonic policy was only a response to the events

themselves. The comparison between 9/11 and 11/9 in terms of facilitating the establishment of the US hegemony is not entirely accurate. This thesis argues that without the EoCW, the US would be unable to respond to 9/11 as it did. From a geopolitical viewpoint, the EoCW removed the main challenger to the US. The world political system became unipolar rather than bipolar, enabling the US to enjoy an unchallengeable position. Thus in this context, 9/11 changed nothing: the US' global position was not affected, while the international structure remained the same as during the 1990s.

However, domestically, 9/11 offered America the necessary shock to overcome the political divisions of the 1990s. Internationally, it gave the US the necessary pretext to pursue its unilateralist and hegemonic agenda without considering its allies or international institutions. Therefore, the post-CW strategy that was initially pursued under difficult domestic political circumstances acquired moral legitimacy and political support after 9/11. Thus, 9/11 was a pretext to initiate the WoT that served the US grand strategy of the post-CW era. However, the real opportunity that allowed the US to do this was the EoCW and the demise of the USSR.

By stating that 9/11 was an unprecedented threat to America, the government legitimated the global war which achieved America's geo-strategic agenda and institutionalised the US hegemony strategy. In this context, the Bush Doctrine that was implemented in post-9/11 policy was no more than a tool for expanding American hegemony. A large number of critics argue that this political perspective was unparalleled and it constituted a revolutionary change in AFP. However, the Bush Doctrine was built on the traditional principles of AFP. The notion that Bush's doctrine was unparalleled is no more than an exaggeration to serve US hegemonic strategy. Such exaggerations were needed to domestically and internationally legitimise the WoT. The Bush Doctrine can be distinguished from previous AFP in its style but not components. For example, the US unilateralism has always been a central, if not the central, element to AFP, while regime change has been an integral ingredient from its earliest days, as has the militarisation of AFP. The only thing that changed was the absence of any real rival or competitor to the US hegemony. This advantage offered the US an unprecedented opportunity to advance its unilateral and militant agenda using 9/11 as a licence.

The US response to 9/11, the WoT, targeted the terrorists and their havens, but did not stop there. If America's objectives were the destruction of al-Qaeda and the Taleban regime, what were the justifications for the invasion of Iraq? Putting aside the US' rhetoric in the lead up to the war, this chapter argues that the hidden agenda behind the WoT was US hegemony, not the struggle against global terrorism. In this context, regime change and the occupation of Iraq in 2003 was the end result of US policy in the region since the early 1990s. In this way, it is clear that all of America's justifications to go to war were founded on false allegations. Moreover, the occupation was conducted without a clear mandate from the UN. This illegal action produced a deep cleavage in the transatlantic partnership because a number of the US' allies understood that war on Iraq was a war of choice based on geo-political interests. The sole aim was to impose its absolute hegemony.

Thus, this chapter argues that the US turned from its alleged WoT to a deliberately designed plan to establish US hegemony and global predominance. This raises the important question: why did the US start this project from the Middle East and Central Asia? First, the US, at least since the 1950s, saw the Middle East as an important area for its vital interests: The Middle East was a key battleground in the CW. Furthermore, the region from Central Asia to the Persian Gulf is also very important geo-strategically to the US not only because of its huge energy reserves, but also because of its location between the East and the West. In the third chapter this thesis showed how the US extended its geo-strategic presence in the post-CW era into new areas in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In the post-9/11 era, the US's aim was to expand its presence in the Middle East and Central Asia. This geo-strategic expansion launched American geo-political influence to every corner around the globe. Because of this, 9/11 served the US strategy to an unimaginable extent, and that is why 9/11 was portrayed as war on America, and the US response was designed to be unlimited war. Building on such a discussion, the WoT was not only to defeat enemies, but to prevent other powers from controlling the Middle East and Central Asia, in order to secure the flow of oil and gas, and, to position itself within such a vital geo-strategic location. This policy was clearly adopted during US administrations from Roosevelt to Clinton, but it was legitimated by the attacks of 9/11.



The WoT not only expanded US influence in the Middle East and Asia, but also it divided Europe, weakened its internal unity, and raised the importance of Poland, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic at the expense of traditional allies such as Germany and France. China also was circumvented. Its access to Central Asia restricted, and its interests in the Middle East were also at stake. The US now controlled most of the world's production and reserves of the strategically vital resource, oil. The WoT, in this context, can be seen as a pre-emptive war on the rest of the world, because oil consumption was increasing globally to unprecedented levels. The Cheney report of 2001 recommended that the Bush administration secure America's oil supply. If the US controlled the supply of oil, it automatically undermined the ability of others (foes and allies) to become competitors to its unipolar moment. This was also true for oil-rich Russia, because the politics of oil is very important to the Russian economy. If the US tried to reduce the price of oil, the Russian economy would be deeply affected. Russia also lost its foothold in the region.

Did the attack of 9/11 really change AFP? And was the WoT actually a WoT? In both cases the thesis has shown that the answer to both questions is an unequivocal no. AFP did not any show strategic shift, maintaining its traditional agenda of supremacy and hegemony, including the need to ensure a secure supply of natural resources, including oil. The WoT was not about fighting terrorism but was used as pretext to expand American political and military influence over the world.

Great grand strategies are bounded by time and space, but they also transcend time and space. They all arise ... within particular periods, places, and sets of circumstances.  
(Gaddis, 2005: 380)

## Chapter Six

### Conclusion

#### 6.1. After The End of The Cold War (CW): America Alone

First and foremost, the US hegemonic propensity is not new or just related to the end of the CW (EoCW), but it has been a preponderant characteristic in the AFP conduct, at least, since the end of WWII. Throughout the CW's harsh struggle against the communist geopolitical challenger, the US expanded not only its political influence over the rest, but also its geostrategic presence around the globe. Due to this, the US was seen as a hegemon not only within its sphere of influence, but eventually over wide parts of the world. On the grounds of such understanding, the USSR was no longer a military competitor unable to challenge America's comprehensive hegemony. In turn, the EoCW did not bring the American hegemonic ambition to an end because, if the CW ended in 1991, the US hegemonic project has continued as was during the CW.

On the other extreme, another spectrum of some critics argue that although America was the strongest during the CW compared to its allies and foes alike, the existence of a military competitor, whatsoever its size, was in itself a realistic barrier facing the US absolute hegemonism over the system. This might be true, but this sort of controversy came to a close in the very early 1990s when the EoCW removed the hardest impediment which had hindered America from being a comprehensive global hegemon for decades. This means that the collapse of the Soviet empire has bequeathed the US an unprecedented opportunity to reconstruct the world's new order in its image, not only to preserve, but also to sustain its unipolar moment as much as possible ahead. Since then, America's longstanding ambition to be the world's sole hegemon has become true, and the 21<sup>st</sup> century has inevitably been labelled as a new American century.

On the grounds of such analysis, one could reasonably ask: if America was merely a hegemon within its sphere of influence, what would be the world's political landscape after the collapse of the USSR, its major CW competitor? Simply put: the CW's

hegemon over the West turned out to be an absolute hegemon over the rest in the post-CW world. Arguably, when the USSR – the American CW counter-balancer - collapsed, the gap in the relative material power (military, political, and economic) between America as the only remaining superpower and the lasting big powers in the system increased to an incredible level as was illustrated in the second chapter. Owing to this, the CW's semi-balance of power came to an end, and the US' materialistic capabilities overweighed that possessed by the industrialised nations combined. Additionally, the EoCW itself revitalised the US hegemonic project since it gained America a strong dose of self-confidence that it had nearly lacked, particularly after several outer failures during the 1970s and 1980s. That is why the collapse of the communist global regime was portrayed as an American triumph not only over a geopolitical rival, but also over its aggressive ideology, economic regime, and life style. This victory, therefore, had to be used as an incentive for several intellectual and ideological elites – within and outside the government - such as conservatives, neoconservatives, and American nationalists to push America towards a new phase of preponderance and hegemony. Without any serious “other” looming on the horizon, and with no any real challenger at the US' gates, its hegemonic project flourished and expanded, motivating by a unique collection of both hard and soft power. The US, then, presented itself as an indispensable nation not only to regulate the system, but also to enlarge democracy, liberty and prosperity.

## **6.2. Obstacles Along The Road**

However, one could easily challenge the above viewpoint by arguing that if the AFP conduct had deeply witnessed a long decade of inconsistency and dysfunction, as discussed in the 1990s literature, how we would possibly be speaking about an emerging strategy of hegemony at the eve of the EoCW? In approaching such a question's answer, it is of crucial importance to mention that this study does not claim that the US American strategy of hegemony represented an explicit fully-fledged form or was implemented directly without difficulties prior to 9/11. The reality is that America was operating in a very difficult transitional era in which the old system had become “an ash heap of history” and the new one was emerging. Under such circumstances, not only the world had entirely changed, but also America changed from within as a response to the external transformations. The EoCW, as said once and again,

did not only offer the US an opportunity to lead, but also produced several disadvantages. A crucial difference between them was its influence over the AFP's domestic political consistency. The USSR, as is well-known, had functionally worked as an organising principle for the AFP making process for more than four decades, and when such a North Star dimmed, AFP lacked its long-standing reference point.

Owing to this, the intra-relationships between the AFP's decision-making actors which were consolidated by the long struggle against the USSR entered a new phase of change and transformation. Accordingly, the president was no longer capable to lead the state's FP strategy as he had during the CW, and most of his foreign policy initiatives stayed in the White House. In a similar way, the Congress, in contrast to its CW behaviour, appeared as a challenger to the presidential supreme role in the AFP making process. Besides, several societal actors such as ideological and ethnic groups, business lobbies, epistemic communities, and NGOs, among others, turned from being just peripheral actors during the CW to be significant agenda-setters in the post-CW era. Such a transition blurred the traditional distinction between what is foreign and what is domestic. In other words, the AFP making process became subjugated to the political bargaining that determined the formulation of American domestic politics. Or as some critics put it: the US politics did not end at the water's edge.

The cleavage occurred also within the AFP institutions and bureaucratic body in which the Pentagon, the intelligence community, and the State and the Defense Departments did not witness any crucial reform process that qualified them to meet the reality of the post-CW world. Moreover, the majority of the AFP bureaucrats were still loyal to the only political thinking and heritage they knew, superpower struggle. On the other hand, some other agencies and departments intervened in the AFP making process as discussed in the fourth chapter.

Most of these barriers appeared in the leading up to the Gulf War in 1990/91, but they peaked during the Clinton presidency. Therefore, the formulation of the state's foreign strategy became a matter of disagreement.

### **6.3. The 1990s: The US Hegemony In Progress**

Undoubtedly, the domestic fragmentation impeded the ideal implementation of the strategy of hegemony, but, even with the existence of such barriers, the US did not lose

its bearings, or suffer from a strategic confusion between the EoCW and 9/11 as discussed in the third chapter. This does not mean that the US hegemony emerged as a fully-fledged strategy at the eve of the EoCW, but its characteristics were apparent in the governments' agenda throughout the 1990s. Consequently, it does seem sensible to argue that behind the 1990s' day-to-day fragmented policy, America was operating within the same strategic direction of hegemony and predominance, but with different techniques.

It is no necessary to repeat what has been said about the difficulties that faced the Bush I administration in pursuing the strategy of American hegemony. But it would be of great significance to mention that, in addition to the political uncertainty that the EoCW produced, the early 1990s financial problems and the psychological barriers of the defeatist Vietnam Syndrome, the administration's strategic plans, also, and more importantly, faced the domestic partisanship and fragmentation that had distinguished the political landscape at the time. This is why President Bush I faced many legislative problems during the last two years in office and then lost the presidential elections of 1992.

With all of these problems, the opportunity to serve the US grand strategy of hegemony came with the invasion of Kuwait in 1990/91. Iraq's invasion was taken as a pretext to the establishment of the new world order (NWO) which was needed to replace the CW order. Putting aside the Bush administration's rhetoric of multilateralism and Wilsonian that galvanized its explicit discourse, the implicit objective was to construct a new world system that is suitable to the US' new status as the sole world hegemon in the post-Soviet era. On the basis of such analysis, the 1990-91 war on Iraq enhanced the US strategy of hegemony in several ways: Firstly, it showed the remaining big powers how far ahead America was in terms of military power and how difficult the counterbalancing against it was. As a result of the US military parade in the Gulf, the lasting powers in the system preferred to accommodate not to compete with the new reality, at least for some time ahead. Such a retreat from the competition with the US over the global leadership guaranteed it a semi-consensual hegemonic status over the system and blurred the distinction between its own interests and the interests of international community. That is why this war was the cheapest American war in terms of blood and treasury, but the greatest in terms of advancing its advantages. In this way,

while the war was essentially to serve the American agenda, the big share of its bill had been paid by its allies: Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates.

Secondly, America skilfully grouped more than thirty nations – including the big remaining powers - to fight under its command not only to liberate Kuwait or defeat Iraq, but also to expand its geostrategic presence and consolidate its global leadership by containing other big powers and limiting their abilities to challenge its interests in the unipolar moment. At the end, the US kicked off the defeatist effects of the Vietnam Syndrome, and enjoyed the taste of victory. This was a very important psychological factor allowing the only hegemon to engage militarily outside without fear of domestic dissatisfaction.

Thirdly, the US found the pretext to put its foot in the Middle-East, the region vital to its interests in the post-CW era to secure the flow of oil to its machinery, and to limit the other big powers' involvement in the region's matters. After the war, armies of the other nations came back, while America's geostrategic presence regionally and globally increased.

True, the Bush I administration stayed a very short period in power but even with such time pressure and the changing features of the moment, the administration established the foundations for the continuity of the US strategy of hegemony that the following administration had built on. This should not suggest that the administration succeeded in replacing the CW strategy by a fully-fledged new one. What is important for this research is the conviction that the hegemonic strategy did not disappear at the CW's end, or just start with the attacks of 9/11. Accordingly, the Bush I administration was able to overcome many obstacles which were seen as barriers facing the US hegemony strategy. The management of the status quo and the facilitation of the world's transition from a bipolar system to the new unipolarity was a crucial element in its achievements. The administration's capability to achieve America's objectives was not limited by the state's temporary weaknesses such as the early 1990s' financial problems and economic recession, the remaining psychological effects of the Vietnam Syndrome, and the transformative characteristics of the moment. They were real problems, but they did not bind the US policymakers' search for enhancing the US geostrategic presence. But even with such significant achievements, the whole characteristics of the new US grand

strategy of hegemony were not yet finally formed and the new American world order was waiting for other steps to be workable.

Just as with the Bush I administration, the Clinton administration had also suffered from more difficult constraints. The threat-free environment after the EoCW and the victory of the Gulf war expanded cleavages over AFP agenda-setting. Therefore, it was the first time ever that the US president faced such barriers in terminating his foreign initiatives. The Congress showed a new assertive conduct in the AFP making process challenging the presidential supreme authority over it such as the case in the former Yugoslavian war or over economic issues such as the ratification of the NAFTA and the GATT treaties. The president had been challenged not only by a Congress that was dominated by the opposition party, but also by a Congress which was controlled by his own party. This phenomenon is unprecedented in US history. The Clinton administration faced both budgetary and legislative barriers. The societal actors that were interested in the AFP process were also more interventionist throughout the policymaking process. Groups such as ethnic minorities and economic lobbies were able to influence the administration's foreign agenda to serve their own agenda. The US public mood over foreign and security issues was also fluctuating. Due to these impediments, the Clinton administration's FP was accused of being directionless and disoriented.

But even with such difficulties, the saying that the Clinton administration lacked any clear perspective to deal with the world for enhancing American position in the post-CW era is paradoxical. The real problem was the domestic fragmentation that limited the administration's ability to work as it had planned. In a retrospective assessment, it does seem sensible to argue that the Clinton administration did not only follow the same strategy of hegemony, but also was able to prepare America for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

First of all, the Clinton administration was able to turn course from the geopolitical competition with other remaining big powers to geo-economic approach. As said above, the Gulf War presented America as a hyper-power that no one could compete with or counterbalance against. On the other hand, the Clinton administration was also aware of the weakness that hindered its predecessor from acting freely during the Gulf War. The conviction was that America could not be operating as the world's sole hegemon without a strong and a vital economy which was capable of bearing this. For doing so, the Clinton administration intended to revitalise the US economy by the opening of the

whole world's markets to its goods and removing any remaining barriers to its foreign trade. The Clinton administration pursued this agenda through its influence in the UN as the Bush I administration did, but also through its leading role within other international organisations such as the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank, among others. The turn to the geo-economic approach therefore was not really a sort of confusion as has been repeatedly portrayed, but it was a complementary technique to strengthen American hegemony in the post-CW era.

As shown in chapter three, the Clinton strategy of enlargement and engagement served American hegemony in several ways. First of all, since the mid-1990s the US economy gradually returned to healthiness, and by the late 1990s, the chronic budgetary deficit, the foreign trade deficit with its main partners, and the unemployment rate were all down. And everything that should be up was also up. Due to this, the Clinton administration played a significant role in preparing America to be the real world hegemon. Secondly, in addition to its economic achievements, the administration also continued the same agenda of enlarging the US geopolitical presence throughout the world. If Bush I used the Kuwaiti invasion to enlarge American presence in the Middle-East, the Clinton administration also expanded US influence in central and Eastern Europe with its humanitarian intervention in the former Yugoslavia, and the democratization process in the former communist countries, and the expansion of NATO toward the east. Thirdly, although the administration turned to an economic perspective as a guide to its foreign agenda, it did not discount the politics of power in international affairs. In this context, the administration maintained the military expenditure levels of the early 1990s, and it increased it after 1994. Furthermore, the administration vowed to keep the US army as the best trained, the best equipped, and the most prepared in the world. In practice, the Clinton administration used military power abroad greater than any other administration after Vietnam. On the basis of this understanding, it would be plausible to say that the Clinton era was not absent in AFP history and the whole 1990s was not a confusing decade in the AFP trajectory.

Likewise, Bush II's WoT was used not only to defeat terrorism as has been repeatedly claimed, but it also to maximize hegemonic and geostrategic ends.



#### **6.4. 9/11 And The Continuity Of The US Hegemonic Strategy**

If the US hegemonic strategy has been in continuity since the EoCW, how can 9/11 be located in the context of this strategy? In approaching this question's answer, it would be argued that 9/11 served the US grand strategy of hegemony in very distinctive ways: First of all, if the EoCW deprived the AFP making process from its "magnetic north pole", the terrorist attacks of 9/11 reproduced the environment of uncertainty and returned such a missing pole, but instead of the CW communism, Islamic terrorism became the new enemy

Secondly, if the US administrations of the 1990s lacked the pretext needed for rallying the US public and the international community alike behind their agenda of hegemony, the terrorist attacks offered the US policymakers an unimaginable pretext to pursue any agenda they liked without fear of being criticised or resisted domestically or abroad. Therefore, if America was being forced to use several indirect strategies for expanding its influence over the rest in its unipolar moment and to engage in multilateral actions to accomplish that throughout the 1990s, the terrorist attacks gave it the moral justification to expand its dominion everywhere under the motto of fighting against the global terrorism. It also provided the pretext needed to escape from any multilateral constraints on its power.

Thirdly and more importantly, the attacks rallied once again the nation around a grand objective and ended the domestic cleavage of the 1990s that hindered the administrations of Bush I and Clinton from terminating their complete hegemonic agenda. Therefore, in contrast to troubled relationships between the main participants in the AFP making process (the president, the congress and FP bureaucracy), 9/11 returned the AFP initiatives to the president hands and Congress, once again, took a backseat in the FP making preferring to facilitate with money and legislations, not to challenge the presidential supreme role as a leader of the nation. Due to this, the President was able to carry on the US strategy of hegemony abroad while the nation supported his leadership. The security concern came back as a FP priority whereas issues such as economic globalisation and environment politics receded in importance. In consequence, the domestic fragmentation which had stretched since the early 1990s and deeply affected the efforts to formulate a new grand strategy came to a close after the attack on the twin towers.

On the basis of such understanding, and in contrast to those critics who have regarded 9/11 as a radical shift in the AFP strategy, it could be argued that 9/11 served only as a justifier to the transition from the US' unwilling cooperative hegemonic model to an explicit unilateral hegemonic one - the approach that was promoted by a radical team of the US policy makers in the very early 1990s. On the other hand, the US response to 9/11 attacks was not formulated at that time to merely defeat terrorism as has repeatedly been said. The general idea, in reality, was ready since the early 1990s. 9/11 attack offered only the pretext to start such a plan. The occupation of Iraq was proposed in the very early 1990s and has been repeated throughout the 1990s, and the US' search to put a foot in Central Asia and the Middle East was also scheduled since the later 1970s and consolidated after the collapse of the USSR. Therefore, the strategy behind the WoT pursued by the Bush II administration was not simply a response to 9/11, but was a delayed response to the EoCW that enabled America to gain its unipolar position. To serve this end, 9/11's nature was exaggerated and it was portrayed as an existential threat to the US. This exaggeration legitimated the response that was designed as an unlimited global war. Although America tried several times to establish unilateralism during the 1990s in support of its hegemonic agendas, the US unilateralist and militant age dawned after 9/11 when the US agenda was supported by unconstrained force.

### **6.5. Conclusion**

During the CW the US was not a fully-fledged hegemon, but was a superpower in a bipolar world system. The EoCW, however, saw America adopt the status of a hyperpower. This new status has been reflected in AFP hegemonic strategy since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The ability of Bush I to pursue an explicit hegemonic agenda was actually constrained by the psychological problem of the defeat in Vietnam, the weak economy and the lack of a domestic political consensus. Bush II responded unilaterally and militarily to the terrorist attack of 9/11 because these problems had been overcome in the intervening years. Bush I remedied the psychological effect of the Vietnam Syndrome and oversaw a peaceful transition from the EoCW to the post-CW world. Clinton overcame the economic weaknesses that limited his predecessor's ability to act globally and set the economic foundations for its hegemonic position. This enabled Bush II to initiate the WoT unilaterally. While Bush I and Clinton were constrained by the domestic divisions over AFP strategy in attempting to pursue the

strategy of hegemony, 9/11 resolved the issue of domestic political fragmentation and legitimated the US hegemonic agenda domestically and abroad.

Accordingly, if the war on Afghanistan was really a war of necessity, the Iraq war was absolutely a war of choice. 9/11 was a terrorist attack which served US hegemony, through a deliberate policy of exaggeration. This gave the US the moral legitimacy to launch the global WoT as the only possible response to 9/11 without discussing other alternatives.

Therefore, AFP strategy did not experience any critical shift in the post-CW era, but was in line with American tradition. In this context, the war in Iraq in 1991 and the DPG of 1992 were clear messages to other powers that American hegemony had dawned; the NSS of 2002 institutionalised this hegemonic status. Just as the Iraq war of 1991 was a test case for the American NWO, the war in Afghanistan was the test case for the US strategy of unilateralism in the post-CW era. Finally, in line with this strategy, the war in Iraq in 2003 was the test case for the pre-emptive war doctrine of Bush II.

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