5,632 research outputs found

    Navigating the Topology of 2x2 Games: An Introductory Note on Payoff Families, Normalization, and Natural Order

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    The Robinson-Goforth topology of swaps in adjoining payoffs elegantly arranges 2x2 ordinal games in accordance with important properties including symmetry, number of dominant strategies and Nash Equilibria, and alignment of interests. Adding payoff families based on Nash Equilibria illustrates an additional aspect of this order and aids visualization of the topology. Making ties through half-swaps not only creates simpler games within the topology, but, in reverse, breaking ties shows the evolution of preferences, yielding a natural ordering for the topology of 2x2 games with ties. An ordinal game not only represents an equivalence class of games with real values, but also a discrete equivalent of the normalized version of those games. The topology provides coordinates which could be used to identify related games in a semantic web ontology and facilitate comparative analysis of agent-based simulations and other research in game theory, as well as charting relationships and potential moves between games as a tool for institutional analysis and design.Comment: 8 pages including 4 figures in text and 4 plate

    Game Theory Relaunched

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    The game is on. Do you know how to play? Game theory sets out to explore what can be said about making decisions which go beyond accepting the rules of a game. Since 1942, a well elaborated mathematical apparatus has been developed to do so; but there is more. During the last three decades game theoretic reasoning has popped up in many other fields as well - from engineering to biology and psychology. New simulation tools and network analysis have made game theory omnipresent these days. This book collects recent research papers in game theory, which come from diverse scientific communities all across the world; they combine many different fields like economics, politics, history, engineering, mathematics, physics, and psychology. All of them have as a common denominator some method of game theory. Enjoy

    How to play fair in international environmental agreements? - Bridging psychological and economic methods

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    Global public good provision (e.g. environmental quality) confronts us with problems demanding both national and international co-operation. However among sovereign nations reaching agreement on mutual public good provision is difficult. Slowing down global warming is just one example. Due to the diffusion of greenhouse gases in the earth's atmosphere it is attractive for each individual state that other countries commit themselves to climate protection, whereas one's own state using the free-rider-strategy benefits from the protective measures of the others without making any costly national contribution. On the other hand such a strategic behaviour clashes with moral values, especially concerning motives of justice within society. Should free-riding be preferred from the strategic point of view or rather, out of consideration to justice, national commitments to contribute to climate protection? Therefore, an analysis of how appraisals of justice and strategic considerations interact is a challenge to international (environmental) policy. Taking a game-theoretic point of view, we analyse three psychological-empirical conceptions of justice: need, equality and equity, and point out how these principles are able to determine the type of game nations are expected to play. --

    Perceptually Valid Facial Expressions for Character-Based Applications

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    This paper addresses the problem of creating facial expression of mixed emotions in a perceptually valid way. The research has been done in the context of a “game-like” health and education applications aimed at studying social competency and facial expression awareness in autistic children as well as native language learning, but the results can be applied to many other applications such as games with need for dynamic facial expressions or tools for automating the creation of facial animations. Most existing methods for creating facial expressions of mixed emotions use operations like averaging to create the combined effect of two universal emotions. Such methods may be mathematically justifiable but are not necessarily valid from a perceptual point of view. The research reported here starts by user experiments aiming at understanding how people combine facial actions to express mixed emotions, and how the viewers perceive a set of facial actions in terms of underlying emotions. Using the results of these experiments and a three-dimensional emotion model, we associate facial actions to dimensions and regions in the emotion space, and create a facial expression based on the location of the mixed emotion in the three-dimensional space. We call these regionalized facial actions “facial expression units.

    Status Quo Analysis of the Flathead River Conflict

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    Status quo analysis algorithms developed within the paradigm of the graph model for conflict resolution are applied to an international river basin conflict involving the United States and Canada to assess the likeliness of various compromise resolutions. The conflict arose because the state of Montana feared that further expansion of the Sage Creek Coal Company facilities in Canada would pollute the Flathead River, which flows from British Columbia into Montana. Significant insights not generally available from a static stability analysis are obtained about potential resolutions of the conflict under study and about how decision makers’ interactions may direct the conflict to distinct resolutions. Analyses also show how political considerations may affect a particular decision maker’s choice, thereby influencing the evolution of the conflict

    Nash Equilibrium Strategies in Fuzzy Games

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    Understanding and Managing Behavioural Risks -The Case of Food Risks Caused by Malpractice in Poultry Production

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    The probability that actors in economic relationships break rules increases with the profits they thus expect to earn. It decreases with the probability and level of short- and long-term losses resulting from disclosure. It also decreases with the level of social context factors and intrinsic values which shield actors from yielding to economic temptations. This paper assesses the relative merits of various scientific approaches concerned with risks in economic relationships and outlines their contribution to the study of opportunistic rule-breaking. Since the identification of (misdirected) economic incentives faced by firms and individuals represents the starting point for a systematic analysis of opportunism in any field, we also outline a microeconomic approach that systematically provides this crucial information. The approach is applied to the problem of food quality and safety threatened by opportunistic malpractice of food business operators. Its essentials are illustrated through a study which systematically searches for the temptations to break production-related rules in the poultry industries.asymmetric information, control theories, economic misconduct, game theory, moral hazard, principal-agent model, opportunism, protective factors, relational risks, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, A13, K32, K42,
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