38 research outputs found
The Proscriptive Principle and Logics of Analytic Implication
The analogy between inference and mereological containment goes at least back to Aristotle, whose discussion in the Prior Analytics motivates the validity of the syllogism by way of talk of parts and wholes. On this picture, the application of syllogistic is merely the analysis of concepts, a term that presupposesâthrough the root áźÎ˝ÎŹ + ÎťĎĎ âa mereological background.
In the 1930s, such considerations led William T. Parry to attempt to codify this notion of logical containment in his system of analytic implication AI. Parryâs original system AI was later expanded to the system PAI. The hallmark of Parryâs systemsâand of what may be thought of as containment logics or Parry systems in generalâis a strong relevance property called the âProscriptive Principleâ (PP) described by Parry as the thesis that: No formula with analytic implication as main relation holds universally if it has a free variable occurring in the consequent but not the antecedent.
This type of proscription is on its face justified, as the presence of a novel parameter in the consequent corresponds to the introduction of new subject matter. The plausibility of the thesis that the content of a statement is related to its subject matter thus appears also to support the validity of the formal principle.
Primarily due to the perception that Parryâs formal systems were intended to accurately model Kantâs notion of an analytic judgment, Parryâs deductive systemsâand the suitability of the Proscriptive Principle in generalâwere met with severe criticism. While Anderson and Belnap argued that Parryâs criterion failed to account for a number of prima facie analytic judgments, othersâsuch as Sylvan and Bradyâargued that the utility of the criterion was impeded by its reliance on a âsyntacticalâ device.
But these arguments are restricted to Parryâs work qua exegesis of Kant and fail to take into account the breadth of applications in which the Proscriptive Principle emerges. It is the goal of the present work to explore themes related to deductive systems satisfying one form of the Proscriptive Principle or other, with a special emphasis placed on the rehabilitation of their study to some degree. The structure of the dissertation is as follows: In Chapter 2, we identify and develop the relationship between Parry-type deductive systems and the field of âlogics of nonsense.â Of particular importance is Dmitri Bochvarâs âinternalâ nonsense logic ÎŁ0, and we observe that two â˘-Parry subsystems of ÎŁ0 (Harry Deutschâs Sfde and Frederick Johnsonâs RC) can be considered to be the products of particular âstrategiesâ of eliminating problematic inferences from Bochvarâs system. The material of Chapter 3 considers Kit Fineâs program of state space semantics in the context of Parry logics. Recently, Fineâwho had already provided the first intuitive semantics for Parryâs PAIâhas offered a formal model of truthmaking (and falsemaking) that provides one of the first natural semantics for Richard B. Angellâs logic of analytic containment AC, itself a â˘-Parry system. After discussing the relationship between state space semantics and nonsense, we observe that Fabrice Correiaâs weaker frameworkâintroduced as a semantics for a containment logic weaker than ACâtacitly endorses an implausible feature of allowing hypernonsensical statements. By modelling Correiaâs containment logic within the stronger setting of Fineâs semantics, we are able to retain Correiaâs intuitions about factual equivalence without such a commitment. As a further application, we observe that Fineâs setting can resolve some ambiguities in Greg Restallâs own truthmaker semantics. In Chapter 4, we consider interpretations of disjunction that accord with the characteristic failure of Addition in which the evaluation of a disjunction A ⨠B requires not only the truth of one disjunct, but also that both disjuncts satisfy some further property. In the setting of computation, such an analysis requires the existence of some procedure tasked with ensuring the satisfaction of this property by both disjuncts. This observation leads to a computational analysis of the relationship between Parry logics and logics of nonsense in which the semantic category of ânonsenseâ is associated with catastrophic faults in computer programs. In this spirit, we examine semantics for several â˘-Parry logics in terms of the successful execution of certain types of programs and the consequences of extending this analysis to dynamic logic and constructive logic. Chapter 5 considers these faults in the particular case in which Nuel Belnapâs âartificial reasonerâ is unable to retrieve the value assigned to a variable. This leads not only to a natural interpretation of Graham Priestâs semantics for the â˘-Parry system Sâfde but also a novel, many-valued semantics for Angellâs AC, completeness of which is proven by establishing a correspondence with Correiaâs semantics for AC. These many-valued semantics have the additional benefit of allowing us to apply the material in Chapter 2 to the case of AC to define intensional extensions of AC in the spirit of Parryâs PAI. One particular instance of the type of disjunction central to Chapter 4 is Melvin Fittingâs cut-down disjunction. Chapter 6 examines cut-down operations in more detail and provides bilattice and trilattice semantics for the â˘-Parry systems Sfde and AC in the style of Ofer Arieli and Arnon Avronâs logical bilattices. The elegant connection between these systems and logical multilattices supports the fundamentality and naturalness of these logics and, additionally, allows us to extend epistemic interpretation of bilattices in the tradition of artificial intelligence to these systems. Finally, the correspondence between the present many-valued semantics for AC and those of Correia is revisited in Chapter 7. The technique that plays an essential role in Chapter 4 is used to characterize a wide class of first-degree calculi intermediate between AC and classical logic in Correiaâs setting. This correspondence allows the correction of an incorrect characterization of classical logic given by Correia and leads to the question of how to characterize hybrid systems extending Angellâs ACâ. Finally, we consider whether this correspondence aids in providing an interpretation to Correiaâs first semantics for AC
Dualities for Plonka sums
Plonka sums consist of an algebraic construction similar, in some sense to
direct limits, which allows to represent classes of algebras defined by means
of regular identities (namely those equations where the same set of variables
appears on both sides). Recently, Plonka sums have been connected to logic, as
they provide algebraic semantics to logics obtained by imposing a syntactic
filter to given logics. In this paper, I present a very general topological
duality for classes of algebras admitting a Plonka sum representation in terms
of dualisable algebras.Comment: 12 pages; the paper was awarded with the "SILFS Logic Prize" and is
appearing on "Logica Universalis
Adding 4.0241 to TLP
Tractatus 4.024 inspired the dominant semantics of our time: truth-conditional semantics. Such semantics is focused on possible worlds: the content of p is the set of worlds where p is true. It has become increasingly clear that such an account is, at best, defective: we need an âindependent factor in meaning, constrained but not determined by truth-conditionsâ (Yablo 2014, p. 2), because sentences can be differently true at the same possible worlds. I suggest a missing comment which, had it been included in the Tractatus, would have helped semantics get this right from the start. This is my 4.0241: âKnowing what is the case if a sentence is true is knowing its ways of being trueâ: knowing a sentenceâs truth possibilities and what we now call its topic, or subject matter. I show that the famous âfundamental thoughtâ that âthe âlogical constantsâ do not representâ (4.0312) can be understood in terms of ways-based views of meaning. Such views also help with puzzling claims like 5.122: âIf p follows from q, the sense of âpâ is contained in the that of âqââ, which are compatible with a conception of entailment combining truth-preservation with the preservation of topicality, or of ways of being true
Immune Logics
This article is concerned with an exploration of a family of systemsâcalled immune logicsâthat arise from certain dualizations of the well-known family of infectious logics. The distinctive feature of the semantic of infectious logics is the presence of a certain âinfectiousâ semantic value, by which two different though equivalent things are meant. On the one hand, it is meant that these values are zero elements for all the operations in the underlying algebraic structure. On the other hand, it is meant that these values behave in a value-in-value-out fashion for all the operations in the underlying algebraic structure. Thus, in a rather informal manner, we will refer to immune logics as those systems whose underlying semantics count with a certain âimmuneâ semantic value behaving in a way that is somewhat dual to that of the infectious values. In a more formal manner, carrying out this dualization will prove to be not as straightforward as one could imagine, since the two characterizations of infectiousness discussed above lead to two different outcomes when one tries to conduct them. We explore these alternatives and provide technical results regarding them, and the various logical systems defined using such semantics
Conjunction and Disjunction in Infectious Logics
In this paper we discuss the extent to which conjunction and disjunction can be rightfully regarded as such, in the context of infectious logics. Infectious logics are peculiar many-valued logics whose underlying algebra has an absorbing or infectious element, which is assigned to a compound formula whenever it is assigned to one of its components. To discuss these matters, we review the philosophical motivations for infectious logics due to Bochvar, HalldĂŠn, Fitting, Ferguson and Beall, noticing that none of them discusses our main question. This is why we finally turn to the analysis of the truth-conditions for conjunction and disjunction in infectious logics, employing the framework of plurivalent logics, as discussed by Priest. In doing so, we arrive at the interesting conclusion that âin the context of infectious logicsâ conjunction is conjunction, whereas disjunction is not disjunction
Containment Logics: Algebraic Completeness and Axiomatization
The paper studies the containment companion (or, right variable inclusion companion) of a logic â˘. This consists of the consequence relation ⢠r which satisfies all the inferences of ⢠, where the variables of the conclusion are contained into those of the set of premises, in case this is not inconsistent. In accordance with the work started in [10], we show that a different generalization of the PĹonka sum construction, adapted from algebras to logical matrices, allows to provide a matrix-based semantics for containment logics. In particular, we provide an appropriate completeness theorem for a wide family of containment logics, and we show how to produce a complete Hilbert style axiomatization
Pure Refined Variable Inclusion Logics
In this article, we explore the semantic characterization of the (right) pure refined variable inclusion companion of all logics, which is a further refinement of the nowadays well-studied pure right variable inclusion logics. In particular, we will focus on giving a characterization of these fragments via a single logical matrix, when possible, and via a class of finite matrices, otherwise. In order to achieve this, we will rely on extending the semantics of the logics whose companions we will be discussing with infectious values in direct and in more subtle ways. This further establishes the connection between infectious logics and variable inclusion logics