Auction-Based Efficient Online Incentive Mechanism Designs in Wireless Networks

Recently, wide use of mobile devices and applications, such as YouTube and Twitter, has facilitated every aspect of our daily lives. Meanwhile, it has also posed great challenges to enable resource-demanding users to successfully access networks. Thus, in order to enlarge network capacity and fully make use of vacant resources, new communication architectures emerge, such as D2D communications, edge computing, and crowdsourcing, all of which ask for involvement of end mobile users in assisting transmission, computation, or network management. However, end mobile users are not always willing to actively provide such sharing services if no reimbursements are provided as they need to consume their own computation and communication resources. Besides, since mobile users are not always stationary, they can opt-in and opt-out the network for their own convenience. Thus, an important practical characteristic of wireless networks, i.e., the mobility of mobile users cannot be ignored, which means that the demands of mobile users span over a period of time. As one of promising solutions, the online incentive mechanism design has been introduced in wireless networks in order to motivate the participation of more mobile users under a dynamic environment. In this thesis, with the analyses of each stakeholder's economic payoffs in wireless networks, the auction-based online incentive mechanisms are proposed to achieve resource allocations, participant selections, and payment determinations in two wireless networks, i.e., Crowdsensing and mobile edge computing. In particular, i) an online incentive mechanism is designed to guarantee Quality of Information of each arriving task in mobile crowdsensing networks, followed by an enhanced online strategy which could further improves the competitive ratio; ii) an online incentive mechanism jointly considering communication and computation resource allocations in collaborative edge computing networks is proposed based on the primal-dual theory; iii) to deal with the nonlinear issue in edge computing networks, an nonlinear online incentive mechanism under energy budget constraints of mobile users is designed based on the Maximal-in-Distributional Range framework; and iv) inspired by the recent development of deep learning techniques, a deep incentive mechanism with the budget balance of each mobile user is proposed to maximize the net revenue of service providers by leveraging the multi-task machine learning model. Both theoretical analyses and numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of the designed mechanisms

Incentive Mechanisms in Peer-to-Peer Networks — A Systematic Literature Review

Centralized networks inevitably exhibit single points of failure that malicious actors regularly target. Decentralized networks are more resilient if numerous participants contribute to the network’s functionality. Most decentralized networks employ incentive mechanisms to coordinate the participation and cooperation of peers and thereby ensure the functionality and security of the network. This article systematically reviews incentive mechanisms for decentralized networks and networked systems by covering 165 prior literature reviews and 178 primary research papers published between 1993 and October 2022. Of the considered sources, we analyze 11 literature reviews and 105 primary research papers in detail by categorizing and comparing the distinctive properties of the presented incentive mechanisms. The reviewed incentive mechanisms establish fairness and reward participation and cooperative behavior. We review work that substitutes central authority through independent and subjective mechanisms run in isolation at each participating peer and work that applies multiparty computation. We use monetary, reputation, and service rewards as categories to differentiate the implementations and evaluate each incentive mechanism’s data management, attack resistance, and contribution model. Further, we highlight research gaps and deficiencies in reproducibility and comparability. Finally, we summarize our assessments and provide recommendations to apply incentive mechanisms to decentralized networks that share computational resources

Matching-based Hybrid Service Trading for Task Assignment over Dynamic Mobile Crowdsensing Networks

By opportunistically engaging mobile users (workers), mobile crowdsensing (MCS) networks have emerged as important approach to facilitate sharing of sensed/gathered data of heterogeneous mobile devices. To assign tasks among workers and ensure low overheads, a series of stable matching mechanisms is introduced in this paper, which are integrated into a novel hybrid service trading paradigm consisting of futures trading mode and spot trading mode to ensure seamless MCS service provisioning. In the futures trading mode, we determine a set of long-term workers for each task through an overbooking-enabled in-advance many-to-many matching (OIA3M) mechanism, while characterizing the associated risks under statistical analysis. In the spot trading mode, we investigate the impact of fluctuations in long-term workers' resources on the violation of service quality requirements of tasks, and formalize a spot trading mode for tasks with violated service quality requirements under practical budget constraints, where the task-worker mapping is carried out via onsite many-to-many matching (O3M) and onsite many-to-one matching (OMOM). We theoretically show that our proposed matching mechanisms satisfy stability, individual rationality, fairness and computational efficiency. Comprehensive evaluations also verify the satisfaction of these properties under practical network settings, while revealing commendable performance on running time, participators' interactions, and service quality

Reward-Aided Sensing Task Execution in Mobile Crowdsensing Enabled by Energy Harvesting

Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is a new sensing framework that empowers normal mobile devices to participate in sensing tasks. The key challenge that degrades the performance of MCS is selfish mobile users who conserve the resources (e.g., CPU, battery, and bandwidth) of their devices. Thus, we introduce energy harvesting (EH) as rewards into MCS, and thus provide more possibilities to improve the quality of service (QoS) of the system. In this paper, we propose a game theoretic approach for achieving sustainable and higher quality sensing task execution in MCS. The proposed solution is implemented as a two-stage game. The first stage of the game is the system reward game, in which the system is the leader, who allocates the task and reward, and the mobile devices are the followers who execute the tasks. The second stage of the game is called the participant decision-making game, in which we consider both the network channel condition and participant's abilities. We analyze the features of the second stage of the game and show that the game admits a Nash equilibrium (NE). Based on the NE of the second stage of the game, the system can admit a Stackelberg equilibrium, at which the utility is maximized. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed mechanism can achieve a better QoS and prolong the system lifetime while also providing a proper incentive mechanism for MCS

A Novel Quality and Reliability-Based Approach for Participants\u27 Selection in Mobile Crowdsensing

© 2013 IEEE. With the advent of mobile crowdsensing, we now have the possibility of tapping into the sensing capabilities of smartphones carried by citizens every day for the collection of information and intelligence about cities and events. Finding the best group of crowdsensing participants that can satisfy a sensing task in terms of data types required, while satisfying the quality, time, and budget constraints is a complex problem. Indeed, the time-constrained and location-based nature of crowdsensing tasks, combined with participants\u27 mobility, render the task of participants\u27 selection, a difficult task. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive and practical mobile crowdsensing recruitment model that offers reliability and quality-based approach for selecting the most reliable group of participants able to provide the best quality possible for the required sensory data. In our model, we adopt a group-based approach for the selection, in which a group of participants (gathered into sites) collaborate to achieve the sensing task using the combined capabilities of their smartphones. Our model was implemented using MATLAB and configured using realistic inputs such as benchmarked sensors\u27 quality scores, most widely used phone brands in different countries, and sensory data types associated with various events. Extensive testing was conducted to study the impact of various parameters on participants\u27 selection and gain an understanding of the compromises involved when deploying such process in practical MCS environments. The results obtained are very promising and provide important insights into the different aspects impacting the quality and reliability of the process of mobile crowdsensing participants\u27 selection

Do Monetary Incentives Influence Users’ Behavior in Participatory Sensing?

Participatory sensing combines the powerful sensing capabilities of current mobile devices with the mobility and intelligence of human beings, and as such has to potential to collect various types of information at a high spatial and temporal resolution. Success, however, entirely relies on the willingness and motivation of the users to carry out sensing tasks, and thus it is essential to incentivize the users’ active participation. In this article, we first present an open, generic participatory sensing framework (Citizense) which aims to make participatory sensing more accessible, flexible and transparent. Within the context of this framework we adopt three monetary incentive mechanisms which prioritize the fairness for the users while maintaining their simplicity and portability: fixed micro-payment, variable micro-payment and lottery. This incentive-enabled framework is then deployed on a large scale, real-world case study, where 230 participants were exposed to 44 different sensing campaigns. By randomly distributing incentive mechanisms among participants and a subset of campaigns, we study the behaviors of the overall population as well as the behaviors of different subgroups divided by demographic information with respect to the various incentive mechanisms. As a result of our study, we can conclude that (1) in general, monetary incentives work to improve participation rate; (2) for the overall population, a general descending order in terms of effectiveness of the incentive mechanisms can be established: fixed micro-payment first, then lottery-style payout and finally variable micro-payment. These two conclusions hold for all the demographic subgroups, even though different different internal distances between the incentive mechanisms are observed for different subgroups. Finally, a negative correlation between age and participation rate was found: older participants contribute less compared to their younger peers