Intertemporal Choice of Fuzzy Soft Sets

This paper first merges two noteworthy aspects of choice. On the one hand, soft sets and fuzzy soft sets are popular models that have been largely applied to decision making problems, such as real estate valuation, medical diagnosis (glaucoma, prostate cancer, etc.), data mining, or international trade. They provide crisp or fuzzy parameterized descriptions of the universe of alternatives. On the other hand, in many decisions, costs and benefits occur at different points in time. This brings about intertemporal choices, which may involve an indefinitely large number of periods. However, the literature does not provide a model, let alone a solution, to the intertemporal problem when the alternatives are described by (fuzzy) parameterizations. In this paper, we propose a novel soft set inspired model that applies to the intertemporal framework, hence it fills an important gap in the development of fuzzy soft set theory. An algorithm allows the selection of the optimal option in intertemporal choice problems with an infinite time horizon. We illustrate its application with a numerical example involving alternative portfolios of projects that a public administration may undertake. This allows us to establish a pioneering intertemporal model of choice in the framework of extended fuzzy set theorie

Game Theory: The Language of Social Science?

The present paper tries in a largely non-technical way to discuss the aim, the basic notions and methods as well as the limits of game theory under the aspect of providing a general modelling method or language for social sciences.

An Adversarial Interpretation of Information-Theoretic Bounded Rationality

Recently, there has been a growing interest in modeling planning with information constraints. Accordingly, an agent maximizes a regularized expected utility known as the free energy, where the regularizer is given by the information divergence from a prior to a posterior policy. While this approach can be justified in various ways, including from statistical mechanics and information theory, it is still unclear how it relates to decision-making against adversarial environments. This connection has previously been suggested in work relating the free energy to risk-sensitive control and to extensive form games. Here, we show that a single-agent free energy optimization is equivalent to a game between the agent and an imaginary adversary. The adversary can, by paying an exponential penalty, generate costs that diminish the decision maker's payoffs. It turns out that the optimal strategy of the adversary consists in choosing costs so as to render the decision maker indifferent among its choices, which is a definining property of a Nash equilibrium, thus tightening the connection between free energy optimization and game theory.Comment: 7 pages, 4 figures. Proceedings of AAAI-1

General self-motivation and strategy identification : Case studies based on Sokoban and Pac-Man

(c) 2014 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other users, including reprinting/ republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted components of this work in other works.In this paper, we use empowerment, a recently introduced biologically inspired measure, to allow an AI player to assign utility values to potential future states within a previously unencountered game without requiring explicit specification of goal states. We further introduce strategic affinity, a method of grouping action sequences together to form "strategies," by examining the overlap in the sets of potential future states following each such action sequence. We also demonstrate an information-theoretic method of predicting future utility. Combining these methods, we extend empowerment to soft-horizon empowerment which enables the player to select a repertoire of action sequences that aim to maintain anticipated utility. We show how this method provides a proto-heuristic for nonterminal states prior to specifying concrete game goals, and propose it as a principled candidate model for "intuitive" strategy selection, in line with other recent work on "self-motivated agent behavior." We demonstrate that the technique, despite being generically defined independently of scenario, performs quite well in relatively disparate scenarios, such as a Sokoban-inspired box-pushing scenario and in a Pac-Man-inspired predator game, suggesting novel and principle-based candidate routes toward more general game-playing algorithms.Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio