13,769 research outputs found
A general real-time control approach of intrusion response for industrial automation systems
Intrusion response is a critical part of security protection. Compared with IT systems, industrial automation systems (IASs) have greater timeliness and availability demands. Real-time security policy enforcement of intrusion response is a challenge facing intrusion response for IASs. Inappropriate enforcement of the security policy can influence normal operation of the control system, and the loss caused by this security policy may even exceed that caused by cyberattacks. However, existing research about intrusion response focuses on security policy decisions and ignores security policy execution. This paper proposes a general, real-time control approach based on table-driven scheduling of intrusion response in IASs to address the problem of security policy execution. Security policy consists of a security service group, with each type of security service supported by a realization task set. Realization tasks from several task sets can be combined to form a response task set. In the proposed approach, first, a response task set is generated by a nondominated sorting genetic algorithm (GA) II with joint consideration of security performance and cost. Then, the system is reconfigured through an integrated scheduling scheme where system tasks and response tasks are mapped and scheduled together based on a GA. Furthermore, results from both numerical simulations and a real-application simulation show that the proposed method can implement the security policy in time with little effect on the system
Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: a survey of techniques
SCADA systems monitor and control critical infrastructures of national importance such as power generation and distribution, water supply, transportation networks, and manufacturing facilities. The pervasiveness, miniaturisations and declining costs of internet connectivity have transformed these systems from strictly isolated to highly interconnected networks. The connectivity provides immense benefits such as reliability, scalability and remote connectivity, but at the same time exposes an otherwise isolated and secure system, to global cyber security threats. This inevitable transformation to highly connected systems thus necessitates effective security safeguards to be in place as any compromise or downtime of SCADA systems can have severe economic, safety and security ramifications. One way to ensure vital asset protection is to adopt a viewpoint similar to an attacker to determine weaknesses and loopholes in defences. Such mind sets help to identify and fix potential breaches before their exploitation. This paper surveys tools and techniques to uncover SCADA system vulnerabilities. A comprehensive review of the selected approaches is provided along with their applicability
Autonomic computing architecture for SCADA cyber security
Cognitive computing relates to intelligent computing platforms that are based on the disciplines of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and other innovative technologies. These technologies can be used to design systems that mimic the human brain to learn about their environment and can autonomously predict an impending anomalous situation. IBM first used the term ‘Autonomic Computing’ in 2001 to combat the looming complexity crisis (Ganek and Corbi, 2003). The concept has been inspired by the human biological autonomic system. An autonomic system is self-healing, self-regulating, self-optimising and self-protecting (Ganek and Corbi, 2003). Therefore, the system should be able to protect itself against both malicious attacks and unintended mistakes by the operator
Side-channel based intrusion detection for industrial control systems
Industrial Control Systems are under increased scrutiny. Their security is
historically sub-par, and although measures are being taken by the
manufacturers to remedy this, the large installed base of legacy systems cannot
easily be updated with state-of-the-art security measures. We propose a system
that uses electromagnetic side-channel measurements to detect behavioural
changes of the software running on industrial control systems. To demonstrate
the feasibility of this method, we show it is possible to profile and
distinguish between even small changes in programs on Siemens S7-317 PLCs,
using methods from cryptographic side-channel analysis.Comment: 12 pages, 7 figures. For associated code, see
https://polvanaubel.com/research/em-ics/code
A survey on cyber security for smart grid communications
A smart grid is a new form of electricity network with high fidelity power-flow control, self-healing, and energy reliability and energy security using digital communications and control technology. To upgrade an existing power grid into a smart grid, it requires significant dependence on intelligent and secure communication infrastructures. It requires security frameworks for distributed communications, pervasive computing and sensing technologies in smart grid. However, as many of the communication technologies currently recommended to use by a smart grid is vulnerable in cyber security, it could lead to unreliable system operations, causing unnecessary expenditure, even consequential disaster to both utilities and consumers. In this paper, we summarize the cyber security requirements and the possible vulnerabilities in smart grid communications and survey the current solutions on cyber security for smart grid communications. © 2012 IEEE
A critical review of cyber-physical security for building automation systems
Modern Building Automation Systems (BASs), as the brain that enables the
smartness of a smart building, often require increased connectivity both among
system components as well as with outside entities, such as optimized
automation via outsourced cloud analytics and increased building-grid
integrations. However, increased connectivity and accessibility come with
increased cyber security threats. BASs were historically developed as closed
environments with limited cyber-security considerations. As a result, BASs in
many buildings are vulnerable to cyber-attacks that may cause adverse
consequences, such as occupant discomfort, excessive energy usage, and
unexpected equipment downtime. Therefore, there is a strong need to advance the
state-of-the-art in cyber-physical security for BASs and provide practical
solutions for attack mitigation in buildings. However, an inclusive and
systematic review of BAS vulnerabilities, potential cyber-attacks with impact
assessment, detection & defense approaches, and cyber-secure resilient control
strategies is currently lacking in the literature. This review paper fills the
gap by providing a comprehensive up-to-date review of cyber-physical security
for BASs at three levels in commercial buildings: management level, automation
level, and field level. The general BASs vulnerabilities and protocol-specific
vulnerabilities for the four dominant BAS protocols are reviewed, followed by a
discussion on four attack targets and seven potential attack scenarios. The
impact of cyber-attacks on BASs is summarized as signal corruption, signal
delaying, and signal blocking. The typical cyber-attack detection and defense
approaches are identified at the three levels. Cyber-secure resilient control
strategies for BASs under attack are categorized into passive and active
resilient control schemes. Open challenges and future opportunities are finally
discussed.Comment: 38 pages, 7 figures, 6 tables, submitted to Annual Reviews in Contro
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