Fuzzy judgment in bargaining games : diverse patterns of price determination and transaction in buyer-seller exchange

game theory;bargaining

The Israel-Palestine Question – A Case for Application of Neutrosophic Game Theory

In our present paper, we have explored the possibilities and developed arguments for an application of principles of neutrosophic game theory as a generalization of the fuzzy game theory model to a better understanding of the Israel-Palestine problem in terms of the goals and governing strategies of either side. We build on an earlier attempted justification of a game theoretic explanation of this problem by Yakir Plessner (2001) and go on to argue in favour of a neutrosophic adaptation of the standard 2x2 zero-sum game theoretic model in order to identify an optimal outcomeIsrael-Palestine conflict, Oslo Agreement, fuzzy games, neutrosophic semantic space

Bilateral Bargaining Game and Fuzzy Logic in a System Handling SLA-Based Workflows

In the business Grid, the owner of a workflow is assumed to ask an SLA Workflow broker to execute the workflow for him. The price for executing a workflow on the Grid is negotiated between the user and the broker. Determining a price that satisfies both, the user and the SLA workflow broker, is a difficult task. This paper proposes a method using bilateral bargaining game model based on fuzzy logic to determine the price that the user and the broker could accept after the first negotiation round. We also analyze many parameters affecting the price determination process. The validation results show that the approach is suitable with business rules

The efficiency of the non-profit enterprise: constitutional ideology, conformist preferences and reputation

According to one thesis the non profit enterprise (in short NPE) is able to attract ideological entrepreneurs and workers (Rose-Ackerman 1996). In fact I prove that without the ideological element, a simple game between the entrepreneur, worker and beneficiary is condemned to an opportunistic equilibrium, beneficial to the internal members of the organization but detrimental to the beneficiary. Thus the NPE does not better than its for profit counterpart. In my model ideologues, both entrepreneurs and workers, share a principle of justice seen as the constitutional ideology of the NPE, agreed upon in an hypothetical ex ante bargaining game. The constitutional principle provides an independent source of motivation (a source of utility) of the players, in so far as they believe in the reciprocity of conformity to the ideology by all the participants. I call this conformity-based utility “ideological”, and I see it as the representation of a preference for expected conformity to the given constitutional principle. The philosophical underpinnings of this reform of the players' utility functions in worked out by distinguishing two concepts of preferences of the Self: consequentialist preferences and conformist preferences. The latter are preferences for those actions that are part of states of affairs described in terms of interdependent actions conforming to an abstract norm or principle, which become effective once the preferences' holder does expect that the other players do they part in that state of affairs and they do expect that himself do his part in the same state of affairs. What result is that a player's ideological utility depends on the expectation of deontological modes of behaviour followed by all the participants, himself included. On this basis it is possible to overcome personal incentives to embrace opportunistic behaviour, so that the proper Non-profit Enterprise emerges. It is proved that in the “social enterprise game” amongst the member of the organisation there exists an organisational equilibrium minimising transaction costs to the beneficiaries. At last, this equilibrium rests on the emergence of an expectations system of reciprocal conformity to the constitutional ideology. As the existence - not even the selection – of the internal organizational equilibrium rests heavily on the existence of the appropriate system of reciprocal expectation, the problem of how we can justify the emergence of the appropriate system of beliefs must be underlined. Here is where the explicit moral codes of the NPE enters the scene. I see the code of ethics as the building block for deriving a reputation equilibrium between the NPE as a whole and its external stakeholders within a repeated game, whose stage-game is the typical game of trust played under incomplete knowledge and unforeseen contingencies. At last the conformist-motivation model and the reputation model under unforeseen contingencies are shown to play together in a mutually supporting explanation of the efficiency of the NPE.

Application of strategic fuzzy games to wage increase negotiation and decision problems

We propose a flexible decision support scheme which could be used in managing the wage negotiation between employers and employees. This scheme uses fuzzy inference systems and game theory concepts in arriving at decisions on future wage increase which could be more mutually agreeable. For example, rather than specifying 5% yearly increase of wages, we propose that the uncertain factors which are mostly difficult to predict and that could affect wage decisions need to be taken into consideration by the wage formula. These include business revenues or (profit), inflation rate, number of competitors, cost of production, and other uncertain factors that may affect business operations. The accuracy of the fuzzy rule base and the game strategies will help to mitigate the adverse effects that a business may suffer from these uncertain factors. Based on our scheme, we propose that employers and employees should calculate their future wage by using a fuzzy rule base and strategies that take into consideration these uncertain variables. The proposed approach is illustrated with a case study and the procedure and methodology may be easily implemented by business organizations in their wage bargaining and decision processes. © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved

An investigation of the trading agent competition : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Computer Science at Massey University, Albany, New Zealand

The Internet has swept over the whole world. It is influencing almost every aspect of society. The blooming of electronic commerce on the back of the Internet further increases globalisation and free trade. However, the Internet will never reach its full potential as a new electronic media or marketplace unless agents are developed. The trading Agent Competition (TAC), which simulates online auctions, was designed to create a standard problem in the complex domain of electronic marketplaces and to inspire researchers from all over the world to develop distinctive software agents to a common exercise. In this thesis, a detailed study of intelligent software agents and a comprehensive investigation of the Trading Agent Competition will be presented. The design of the Risker Wise agent and a fuzzy logic system predicting the bid increase of the hotel auction in the TAC game will be discussed in detail

Fuzzy Logic Based Negotiation in E-Commerce

The evolution of multi-agent system (MAS) presents new challenges in computer science and software engineering. A particularly challenging problem is the design of various forms of interaction among agents. Interaction may be aimed at enabling agents to coordinate their activities, cooperate to reach common objectives, or exchange resources to better achieve their individual objectives. This thesis is dealing with negotiation in e-commerce: a process through which multiple self-interested agents can reach agreement over the exchange of scarce resources. In particular, we present a fuzzy logic-based negotiation approach to automate multi-issue bilateral negotiation in e-marketplaces. In such frameworks issues to negotiate on can be multiple, interrelated, and may not be fixed in advance. Therefore, we use fuzzy inference system to model relations among issues and to allow agents express their preferences on them. We focus on settings where agents have limited or uncertain information, ruling them out from making optimal decisions. Since agents make decisions based on particular underlying reasons, namely their interests, beliefs then applying logic (by using fuzzy logic) over these reasons can enable agents to refine their decisions and consequently reach better agreements. I refer to this form of negotiation as: Fuzzy logic based negotiation in e-commerce. The contributions of the thesis begin with the use of fuzzy logic to design a reasoning model through which negotiation tactics and strategy are expressed throughout the process of negotiation. Then, an exploration of the differences between this approach and the more traditional bargaining-based approaches is presented. Strategic issues are then explored and a methodology for designing negotiation strategies is developed. Finally, the applicability of the framework is simulated using MATLAB toolbox

An Evolutionary Learning Approach for Adaptive Negotiation Agents

Developing effective and efficient negotiation mechanisms for real-world applications such as e-Business is challenging since negotiations in such a context are characterised by combinatorially complex negotiation spaces, tough deadlines, very limited information about the opponents, and volatile negotiator preferences. Accordingly, practical negotiation systems should be empowered by effective learning mechanisms to acquire dynamic domain knowledge from the possibly changing negotiation contexts. This paper illustrates our adaptive negotiation agents which are underpinned by robust evolutionary learning mechanisms to deal with complex and dynamic negotiation contexts. Our experimental results show that GA-based adaptive negotiation agents outperform a theoretically optimal negotiation mechanism which guarantees Pareto optimal. Our research work opens the door to the development of practical negotiation systems for real-world applications