88 research outputs found

    Similar operation template attack on RSA-CRT as a case study

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    A template attack, the most powerful side-channel attack methods, usually first builds the leakage profiles from a controlled profiling device, and then uses these profiles to recover the secret of the target device. It is based on the fact that the profiling device shares similar leakage characteristics with the target device. In this study, we focus on the similar operations in a single device and propose a new variant of the template attack, called the similar operation template attack (SOTA). SOTA builds the models on public variables (e.g., input/output) and recovers the values of the secret variables that leak similar to the public variables. SOTA’s advantage is that it can avoid the requirement of an additional profiling device. In this study, the proposed SOTA method is applied to a straightforward RSA-CRT implementation. Because the leakage is (almost) the same in similar operations, we reduce the security of RSA-CRT to a hidden multiplier problem (HMP) over GF(q), which can be solved byte-wise using our proposed heuristic algorithm. The effectiveness of our proposed method is verified as an entire prime recovery procedure in a practical leakage scenario

    A DPA Attack against Asymmetric Encryption: RSA Attacks and Countermeasures

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    Abstract This paper discusses side-channel attacks based on Power Analysis. This approach utilizes physical side effects of using cryptographic functions in the real world. A side channel is a source of information that is inherent to a physical implementation of cryptographic functions. Research done in the last half of the 1990s has shown that the information transmitted by side channels, such as execution time, computational faults and power consumption, can be disadvantageous to the security of cryptosystem like RSA or AES. This paper surveys the techniques of Differential Power Analysis presented i

    Parallel FPGA Implementation of RSA with Residue Number Systems - Can side-channel threats be avoided? - Extended version

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    In this paper, we present a new parallel architecture to avoid side-channel analyses such as: timing attack, simple/differential power analysis, fault induction attack and simple/differential electromagnetic analysis. We use a Montgomery Multiplication based on Residue Number Systems. Thanks to RNS, we develop a design able to perform an RSA signature in parallel on a set of identical and independent coprocessors. Of independent interest, we propose a new DPA countermeasure in the framework of RNS. It is only (slightly) memory consuming (1.5 KBytes). Finally, we synthesized our new architecture on FPGA and it presents promising performance results. Even if our aim is to sketch a secure architecture, the RSA signature is performed in less than 160 ms, with competitive hardware resources. To our knowledge, this is the first proposal of an architecture counteracting electromagnetic analysis apart from hardware countermeasures reducing electromagnetic radiations

    SPA-based attack against the modular reduction within a partially secured RSA-CRT implementation

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    This note describes an SPA-based side channel attack against a CRT implementation of an RSA function. In contrast with Novak’s attack [8], it concentrates on the initial modular reduction. With the help of lattice reduction it applies even to implementations which use a common randomising technique to ensure resistance against certain side channel attacks

    Secure Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation on Embedded Platforms

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    Sensitive systems that are based on smart cards use well-studied and well-developed cryptosystems. Generally these cryptosystems have been subject to rigorous mathematical analysis in an effort to uncover cryptographic weaknesses in the system. The cryptosystems used in smart cards are, therefore, not usually vulnerable to these types of attacks. Since smart cards are small objects that can be easily placed in an environment where physical vulnerabilities can be exploited, adversaries have turned to different avenues of attack. This thesis describes the current state-of-the-art in side channel and fault analysis against smart cards, and the countermeasures necessary to provide a secure implementation. Both attack techniques need to be taken into consideration when implementing cryptographic algorithms in smart cards. In the domain of side-channel analysis a new application of using cache accesses to attack an implementation of AES by observing the power consumption is described, including an unpublished extension. Several new fault attacks are proposed based on finding collisions between a correct and a fault-induced execution of a secure secret algorithm. Other new fault attacks include reducing the number of rounds of an algorithm to make a differential cryptanalysis trivial, and fixing portions of the random value used in DSA to allow key recovery. Countermeasures are proposed for all the attacks described. The use of random delays, a simple countermeasure, is improved to render it more secure and less costly to implement. Several new countermeasures are proposed to counteract the particular fault attacks proposed in this thesis. A new method of calculating a modular exponentiation that is secure against side channel analysis is described, based on ideas which have been proposed previously or are known within the smart card industry. A novel method for protecting RSA against fault attacks is also proposed based on securing the underlying Montgomery multiplication. The majority of the fault attacks detailed have been implemented against actual chips to demonstrate the feasibility of these attacks. Details of these experiments are given in appendices. The experiments conducted to optimise the performance of random delays are also described in an appendix

    Fault attacks on RSA and elliptic curve cryptosystems

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    This thesis answered how a fault attack targeting software used to program EEPROM can threaten hardware devices, for instance IoT devices. The successful fault attacks proposed in this thesis will certainly warn designers of hardware devices of the security risks their devices may face on the programming leve

    Compromising emissions from a high speed cryptographic embedded system

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    Specific hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms have been subject to a number of “side channel” attacks of late. A side channel is any information bearing emission that results from the physical implementation of a cryptographic algorithm. Smartcard realisations have been shown to be particularly vulnerable to these attacks. Other more complex embedded cryptographic systems may also be vulnerable, and each new design needs to be tested. The vulnerability of a recently developed high speed cryptographic accelerator is examined. The purpose of this examination is not only to verify the integrity of the device, but also to allow its designers to make a determination of its level of conformance with any standard that they may wish to comply with. A number of attacks were reviewed initially and two were chosen for examination and implementation - Power Analysis and Electromagnetic Analysis. These particular attacks appeared to offer the greatest threat to this particular system. Experimental techniques were devised to implement these attacks and a simulation and micrcontroller emulation were setup to ensure these techniques were sound. Each experimental setup was successful in attacking the simulated data and the micrcontroller circuit. The significance of this was twofold in that it verified the integrity of the setup and proved that a real threat existed. However, the attacks on the cryptographic accelerator failed in all cases to reveal any significant information. Although this is considered a positive result, it does not prove the integrity of the device as it may be possible for an adversary with more resources to successfully attack the board. It does however increase the level of confidence in this particular product and acts as a stepping stone towards conformance of cryptographic standards. The experimental procedures developed can also be used by designers wishing to test the vulnerability of their own products to these attacks

    Dynamic Polymorphic Reconfiguration to Effectively “CLOAK” a Circuit’s Function

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    Today\u27s society has become more dependent on the integrity and protection of digital information used in daily transactions resulting in an ever increasing need for information security. Additionally, the need for faster and more secure cryptographic algorithms to provide this information security has become paramount. Hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms provide the necessary increase in throughput, but at a cost of leaking critical information. Side Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks allow an attacker to exploit the regular and predictable power signatures leaked by cryptographic functions used in algorithms such as RSA. In this research the focus on a means to counteract this vulnerability by creating a Critically Low Observable Anti-Tamper Keeping Circuit (CLOAK) capable of continuously changing the way it functions in both power and timing. This research has determined that a polymorphic circuit design capable of varying circuit power consumption and timing can protect a cryptographic device from an Electromagnetic Analysis (EMA) attacks. In essence, we are effectively CLOAKing the circuit functions from an attacker

    Méthodes algébriques pour l'analyse de sécurité des implantations d'algorithmes cryptographiques

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    The 10th Hilbert problem, which consists in finding integer solutions to polynomial equations is a crucial problem in cryptanalysis, which has been proven to be undecidable. However, Coppersmith published in 1996 a method based on lattice reduction, which allows to efficiently find all small solutions to some polynomial equations. Many applications of this method have risen in public key cryptanalysis, especially when the cryptosystem is executed on embedded systems and part of the secret key is revealed through physical attacks performed on the device. In this context, we propose in this thesis a physical attack on the RSA signature scheme when the CRT mode is used, where an application of Coppersmith's method allows to complete the information previously obtained by the physical attack. We also propose a new deterministic algorithm based on Coppersmith's method for factoring integers of the form N=p^{r}q^{s} in polynomial time, under the condition that r and/or s are sufficiently large. Finally, if the applications of Coppersmith's method are numerous, in practice, since the lattices to be reduced are huge, the small solutions can only be recovered until a bound which is smaller than the enounced theoretical bound. Thus, another contribution of this thesis lies in the proposition of two methods which allow to speed up the execution time of Coppersmith's algorithm. When both speedups are combined, the new algorithm performs hundreds of times faster for typical parameters, which allows to reach the theoretical bound in many cases.Le 10Ăšme problĂšme de Hilbert, consistant Ă  trouver les solutions entiĂšres d'Ă©quations polynomiales est un problĂšme crucial en cryptanalyse. Si ce dernier a Ă©tĂ© prouvĂ© indĂ©cidable, Coppersmith publia en 1996 une mĂ©thode basĂ©e sur la rĂ©duction de rĂ©seaux permettant de trouver efficacement l'ensemble des petites solutions de certaines Ă©quations polynomiales. De nombreuses applications de cette mĂ©thode ont vu le jour dans le domaine de la cryptanalyse Ă  clĂ© publique, notamment lorsque le cryptosystĂšme est exĂ©cutĂ© sur un systĂšme embarquĂ© et qu'une partie de la clĂ© secrĂšte est dĂ©voilĂ©e par la rĂ©alisation d'attaques physiques sur le dispositif. Dans ce contexte, nous proposons une attaque physique sur le schĂ©ma de signature RSA en mode CRT oĂč une application de la mĂ©thode de Coppersmith permet de complĂ©ter l'information obtenue par l'attaque physique. Nous proposons Ă©galement un nouvel algorithme dĂ©terministe basĂ© sur la mĂ©thode de Coppersmith pour factoriser les entiers de la forme N=p^{r}q^{s} en temps polynomial lorsque r ou s sont suffisamment grands. Enfin, si les applications de la mĂ©thode de Coppersmith sont nombreuses, en pratique, du fait que les rĂ©seaux Ă  rĂ©duire soient gigantesques, les petites solutions ne peuvent ĂȘtre retrouvĂ©es que jusqu'Ă  une borne qui est plus petite que la borne thĂ©orique annoncĂ©e. Aussi, une autre contribution de cette thĂšse consiste en la proposition de deux mĂ©thodes permettant une accĂ©lĂ©ration du temps d'exĂ©cution de l'algorithme de Coppersmith. Lorsque les deux mĂ©thodes sont combinĂ©es, le nouvel algorithme s'effectue des centaines de fois plus rapidement pour des paramĂštres typiques, permettant ainsi dans de nombreux cas d'atteindre la borne thĂ©orique

    Software and Critical Technology Protection Against Side Channel Analysis Through Dynamic Hardware Obfuscation

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    Side Channel Analysis (SCA) is a method by which an adversary can gather information about a processor by examining the activity being done on a microchip though the environment surrounding the chip. Side Channel Analysis attacks use SCA to attack a microcontroller when it is processing cryptographic code, and can allow an attacker to gain secret information, like a crypto-algorithm\u27s key. The purpose of this thesis is to test proposed dynamic hardware methods to increase the hardware security of a microprocessor such that the software code being run on the microprocessor can be made more secure without having to change the code. This thesis uses the Java Optimized Processor (JOP) to identify and _x SCA vulnerabilities to give a processor running RSA or AES code more protection against SCA attacks
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