A Causal Role for Primary Motor Cortex in Perception of Observed Actions.

It has been proposed that motor system activity during action observation may be modulated by the kinematics of observed actions. One purpose of this activity during action observation may be to predict the visual consequence of another person’s action based on their movement kinematics. Here, we tested the hypothesis that the primary motor cortex (M1) may have a causal role in inferring information that is present in the kinematics of observed actions. Healthy participants completed an action perception task before and after applying continuous theta burst stimulation (cTBS) over left M1. A neurophysiological marker was used to quantify the extent of M1 disruption following cTBS and stratify our sample a priori to provide an internal control. We found that a disruption to M1 caused a reduction in an individual’s sensitivity to interpret the kinematics of observed actions; the magnitude of suppression of motor excitability predicted this change in sensitivity

Attribution of intentional causation influences the perception of observed movements: behavioral evidence and neural correlates

Recent research on human agency suggests that intentional causation is associated with a subjective compression in the temporal interval between actions and their effects. That is, intentional movements and their causal effects are perceived as closer together in time than equivalent unintentional movements and their causal effects. This so-called intentional binding effect is consistently found for one's own self-generated actions. It has also been suggested that intentional binding occurs when observing intentional movements of others. However, this evidence is undermined by limitations of the paradigm used. In the current study we aimed to overcome these limitations using a more rigorous design in combination with functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to explore the neural underpinnings of intentional binding of observed movements. In particular, we aimed to identify brain areas sensitive to the interaction between intentionality and causality attributed to the observed action. Our behavioral results confirmed the occurrence of intentional binding for observed movements using this more rigorous paradigm. Our fMRI results highlighted a collection of brain regions whose activity was sensitive to the interaction between intentionality and causation. Intriguingly, these brain regions have previously been implicated in the sense of agency over one's own movements. We discuss the implications of these results for intentional binding specifically, and the sense of agency more generally

The very same thing: Extending the object token concept to incorporate causal constraints on individual identity

The contributions of feature recognition, object categorization, and recollection of episodic memories to the re-identification of a perceived object as the very same thing encountered in a previous perceptual episode are well understood in terms of both cognitive-behavioral phenomenology and neurofunctional implementation. Human beings do not, however, rely solely on features and context to re-identify individuals; in the presence of featural change and similarly-featured distractors, people routinely employ causal constraints to establish object identities. Based on available cognitive and neurofunctional data, the standard object-token based model of individual re-identification is extended to incorporate the construction of unobserved and hence fictive causal histories (FCHs) of observed objects by the pre-motor action planning system. Cognitive-behavioral and implementation-level predictions of this extended model and methods for testing them are outlined. It is suggested that functional deficits in the construction of FCHs are associated with clinical outcomes in both Autism Spectrum Disorders and later-stage stage Alzheimer's disease.\u

Six challenges for embodiment research

20 years after Barsalou's seminal perceptual symbols paper (Barsalou, 1999), embodied cognition, the notion that cognition involves simulations of sensory, motor, or affective states, has moved in status from an outlandish proposal advanced by a fringe movement in psychology to a mainstream position adopted by large numbers of researchers in the psychological and cognitive (neuro)sciences. While it has generated highly productive work in the cognitive sciences as a whole, it had a particularly strong impact on research into language comprehension. The view of a mental lexicon based on symbolic word representations, which are arbitrarily linked to sensory aspects of their referents, for example, was generally accepted since the cognitive revolution in the 1950s. This has radically changed. Given the current status of embodiment as a main theory of cognition, it is somewhat surprising that a close look at the state of the affairs in the literature reveals that the debate about the nature of the processes involved in language comprehension is far from settled and key questions remain unanswered. We present several suggestions for a productive way forward

Inhibition of left anterior intraparietal sulcus shows that mutual adjustment marks dyadic joint-actions in humans

Creating real-life dynamic contexts to study interactive behaviors is a fundamental challenge for the social neuroscience of interpersonal relations. Real synchronic interpersonal motor interactions involve online, inter-individual mutual adaptation (the ability to adapt one's movements to those of another in order to achieve a shared goal). In order to study the contribution of the left anterior Intra Parietal Sulcus (aIPS) (i.e. a region supporting motor functions) to mutual adaptation, here, we combined a behavioral grasping task where pairs of participants synchronized their actions when performing mutually adaptive imitative and complementary movements, with the inhibition of activity of aIPS via non-invasive brain stimulation. This approach allowed us to investigate whether aIPS supports online complementary and imitative interactions. Behavioral results showed that inhibition of aIPS selectively impairs pair performance during complementary compared to imitative interactions. Notably, this effect depended on pairs' mutual adaptation skills and was higher for pairs composed of participants who were less capable of adapting to each other. Thus, we provide the first causative evidence for a role of the left aIPS in supporting mutually adaptive interactions and show that the inhibition of the neural resources of one individual of a pair is compensated at the dyadic level

Contributions of cortical feedback to sensory processing in primary visual cortex

Closing the structure-function divide is more challenging in the brain than in any other organ (Lichtman and Denk, 2011). For example, in early visual cortex, feedback projections to V1 can be quantified (e.g., Budd, 1998) but the understanding of feedback function is comparatively rudimentary (Muckli and Petro, 2013). Focusing on the function of feedback, we discuss how textbook descriptions mask the complexity of V1 responses, and how feedback and local activity reflects not only sensory processing but internal brain states

Backwards is the way forward: feedback in the cortical hierarchy predicts the expected future

Clark offers a powerful description of the brain as a prediction machine, which offers progress on two distinct levels. First, on an abstract conceptual level, it provides a unifying framework for perception, action, and cognition (including subdivisions such as attention, expectation, and imagination). Second, hierarchical prediction offers progress on a concrete descriptive level for testing and constraining conceptual elements and mechanisms of predictive coding models (estimation of predictions, prediction errors, and internal models)

Inside the brain of an elite athlete: The neural processes that support high achievement in sports

Events like the World Championships in athletics and the Olympic Games raise the public profile of competitive sports. They may also leave us wondering what sets the competitors in these events apart from those of us who simply watch. Here we attempt to link neural and cognitive processes that have been found to be important for elite performance with computational and physiological theories inspired by much simpler laboratory tasks. In this way we hope to inspire neuroscientists to consider how their basic research might help to explain sporting skill at the highest levels of performance

Prefrontal control over motor cortex cycles at beta-frequency during movement inhibition

A fully adapted behavior requires maximum efficiency to inhibit processes in the motor domain [ 1 ]. Although a number of cortical and subcortical brain regions have been implicated, converging evidence suggests that activation of right inferior frontal gyrus (r-IFG) and right presupplementary motor area (r-preSMA) is crucial for successful response inhibition [ 2, 3 ]. However, it is still unknown how these prefrontal areas convey the necessary signal to the primary motor cortex (M1), the cortical site where the final motor plan eventually has to be inhibited or executed. On the basis of the widely accepted view that brain oscillations are fundamental for communication between neuronal network elements [ 4–6 ], one would predict that the transmission of these inhibitory signals within the prefrontal-central networks (i.e., r-IFG/M1 and/or r-preSMA/M1) is realized in rapid, periodic bursts coinciding with oscillatory brain activity at a distinct frequency. However, the dynamics of corticocortical effective connectivity has never been directly tested on such timescales. By using double-coil transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and electroencephalography (EEG) [ 7, 8 ], we assessed instantaneous prefrontal-to-motor cortex connectivity in a Go/NoGo paradigm as a function of delay from (Go/NoGo) cue onset. In NoGo trials only, the effects of a conditioning prefrontal TMS pulse on motor cortex excitability cycled at beta frequency, coinciding with a frontocentral beta signature in EEG. This establishes, for the first time, a tight link between effective cortical connectivity and related cortical oscillatory activity, leading to the conclusion that endogenous (top-down) inhibitory motor signals are transmitted in beta bursts in large-scale cortical networks for inhibitory motor control

Human Conscious Experience is Four-Dimensional and has a Neural Correlate Modeled by Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity

In humans, knowing the world occurs through spatial-temporal experiences and interpretations. Conscious experience is the direct observation of conscious events. It makes up the content of consciousness. Conscious experience is organized in four dimensions. It is an orientation in space and time, an understanding of the position of the observer in space and time. A neural correlate for four-dimensional conscious experience has been found in the human brain which is modeled by Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity. Spacetime intervals are fundamentally involved in the organization of coherent conscious experiences. They account for why conscious experience appears to us the way it does. They also account for assessment of causality and past-future relationships, the integration of higher cognitive functions, and the implementation of goal-directed behaviors. Spacetime intervals in effect compose and direct our conscious life. The relativistic concept closes the explanatory gap and solves the hard problem of consciousness (how something subjective like conscious experience can arise in something physical like the brain). There is a place in physics for consciousness. We describe all physical phenomena through conscious experience, whether they be described at the quantum level or classical level. Since spacetime intervals direct the formation of all conscious experiences and all physical phenomena are described through conscious experience, the equation formulating spacetime intervals contains the information from which all observable phenomena may be deduced. It might therefore be considered expression of a theory of everything