Bridging the Two Plans in the Semantics for Relevant Logic

Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 418)This paper considers how the two plans in the semantics for relevant logic are related to each other. The so-called American plan, classical-style four-valued semantics, is intuitive, but weak. The so-called Australian plan, two-valued frame semantics, is very powerful, but the semantic devices employed need some explanation. Examining R. Routley’s 1984 paper ‘American plan completed, ’ this paper argues that the American plan provides an explanatory and ontological basis for the Australian plan, and that the latter is just a developed form of the former

Theories of truth based on four-valued infectious logics

Infectious logics are systems that have a truth-value that is assigned to a compound formula whenever it is assigned to one of its components. This paper studies four-valued infectious logics as the basis of transparent theories of truth. This take is motivated as a way to treat different pathological sentences differently, namely, by allowing some of them to be truth-value gluts and some others to be truth-value gaps and as a way to treat the semantic pathology suffered by at least some of these sentences as infectious. This leads us to consider four distinct four-valued logics: one where truth-value gaps are infectious, but gluts are not; one where truth-value gluts are infectious, but gaps are not; and two logics where both gluts and gaps are infectious, in some sense. Additionally, we focus on the proof theory of these systems, by offering a discussion of two related topics. On the one hand, we prove some limitations regarding the possibility of providing standard Gentzen sequent calculi for these systems, by dualizing and extending some recent results for infectious logics. On the other hand, we provide sound and complete four-sided sequent calculi, arguing that the most important technical and philosophical features taken into account to usually prefer standard calculi are, indeed, enjoyed by the four-sided systems

A Four-Valued Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Epistemic logic is usually employed to model two aspects of a situation: the factual and the epistemic aspects. Truth, however, is not always attainable, and in many cases we are forced to reason only with whatever information is available to us. In this paper, we will explore a four-valued epistemic logic designed to deal with these situations, where agents have only knowledge about the available information (or evidence), which can be incomplete or conflicting, but not explicitly about facts. This layer of available information or evidence, which is the object of the agents' knowledge, can be seen as a database. By adopting this sceptical posture in our semantics, we prepare the ground for logics where the notion of knowledge-or more appropriately, belief-is entirely based on evidence. The technical results include a set of reduction axioms for public announcements, correspondence proofs, and a complete tableau system. In summary, our contributions are twofold: on the one hand we present an intuition and possible application for many-valued modal logics, and on the other hand we develop a logic that models the dynamics of evidence in a simple and intuitively clear fashion

EF4, EF4-M and EF4-Ł: A companion to BN4 and two modal four-valued systems without strong Łukasiewicz-type modal paradoxes

The logic BN4 was defined by R.T. Brady as a four-valued extension of Routley and Meyer’s basic logic B. The system EF4 is defined as a companion to BN4 to represent the four-valued system of (relevant) implication. The system Ł was defined by J. Łukasiewicz and it is a four-valued modal logic that validates what is known as strong Łukasiewicz-type modal paradoxes. The systems EF4-M and EF4-Ł are defined as alternatives to Ł without modal paradoxes. This paper aims to define a Belnap-Dunn semantics for EF4, EF4-M and EF4-Ł. It is shown that EF4, EF4-M and EF4-Ł are strongly sound and complete w.r.t. their respective semantics and that EF4-M and EF4-Ł are free from strong Łukasiewicz-type modal paradoxes

A Four-Valued Logical Framework for Reasoning About Fiction

In view of the limitations of classical, free, and modal logics to deal with fictional names, we develop in this paper a four-valued logical framework that we see as a promising strategy for modeling contexts of reasoning in which those names occur. Specifically, we propose to evaluate statements in terms of factual and fictional truth values in such a way that, say, declaring ‘Socrates is a man’ to be true does not come down to the same thing as declaring ‘Sherlock Holmes is a man’ to be so. As a result, our framework is capable of representing reasoning involving fictional characters that avoids evaluating statements according to the same semantic standards. The framework encompasses two logics that differ according to alternative ways one may interpret the relationships among the factual and fictional truth values

On the construction and algebraic semantics of relevance logic

Treballs Finals de Grau de Matemàtiques, Facultat de Matemàtiques, Universitat de Barcelona, Any: 2020, Director: Joan Gispert Brasó[en] The truth-functional interpretation of classical implication gives rise to relevance paradoxes, since it doesn't adequately model our usual understanding of a valid implication, which assumes the antecedent is relevant to the truth of the consequent. This work gives an overview of the system $\mathbf{R}$ of relevance logic, which aims to avoid said paradoxes. We present the logic $\mathbf{R}$ with a Hilbert calculus and then prove the Variable-sharing Theorem. We also give an equivalent algebraic semantics for $\mathbf{R}$ and a semantics for its first-degree entailment fragment

Fixed-point models for paradoxical predicates

This paper introduces a new kind of fixed-point semantics, filling a gap within approaches to Liar-like paradoxes involving fixed-point models à la Kripke (1975). The four-valued models presented below, (i) unlike the three-valued, consistent fixed-point models defined in Kripke (1975), are able to differentiate between paradoxical and pathological-but-unparadoxical sentences, and (ii) unlike the four-valued, paraconsistent fixed-point models first studied in Visser (1984) and Woodruff (1984), preserve consistency and groundedness of truth. Keywords:  Semantic Paradoxes · Fixed-point semantics · Many-valued logic · Kripke’s theory oftrut

Fixed-point models for paradoxical predicates

This paper introduces a new kind of fixed-point semantics, filling a gap within approaches to Liar-like paradoxes involving fixed-point models à la Kripke (1975). The four-valued models presented below, (i) unlike the three-valued, consistent fixed-point models defined in Kripke (1975), are able to differentiate between paradoxical and pathological-but-unparadoxical sentences, and (ii) unlike the four-valued, paraconsistent fixed-point models first studied in Visser (1984) and Woodruff (1984), preserve consistency and groundedness of truth. Keywords:  Semantic Paradoxes · Fixed-point semantics · Many-valued logic · Kripke’s theory oftrut

On six-valued logics of evidence and truth expanding Belnap-Dunn four-valued logic

The main aim of this paper is to introduce the logics of evidence and truth LETK+ and LETF+ together with a sound, complete, and decidable six-valued deterministic semantics for them. These logics extend the logics LETK and LETF- with rules of propagation of classicality, which are inferences that express how the classicality operator o is transmitted from less complex to more complex sentences, and vice-versa. The six-valued semantics here proposed extends the 4 values of Belnap-Dunn logic with 2 more values that intend to represent (positive and negative) reliable information. A six-valued non-deterministic semantics for LETK is obtained by means of Nmatrices based on swap structures, and the six-valued semantics for LETK+ is then obtained by imposing restrictions on the semantics of LETK. These restrictions correspond exactly to the rules of propagation of classicality that extend LETK. The logic LETF+ is obtained as the implication-free fragment of LETK+. We also show that the 6 values of LETK+ and LETF+ define a lattice structure that extends the lattice L4 defined by the Belnap-Dunn four-valued logic with the 2 additional values mentioned above, intuitively interpreted as positive and negative reliable information. Finally, we also show that LETK+ is Blok-Pigozzi algebraizable and that its implication-free fragment LETF+ coincides with the degree-preserving logic of the involutive Stone algebras.Comment: 38 page

An Epistemic Interpretation of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene Logic

This paper extends Fitting's epistemic interpretation of some Kleene logics, to also account for Paraconsistent Weak Kleene logic. To achieve this goal, a dualization of Fitting's "cut-down" operator is discussed, rendering a "track-down" operator later used to represent the idea that no consistent opinion can arise from a set including an inconsistent opinion. It is shown that, if some reasonable assumptions are made, the truth-functions of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene coincide with certain operations defined in this track-down fashion. Finally, further reflections on conjunction and disjunction in the weak Kleene logics accompany this paper, particularly concerning their relation with containment logics. These considerations motivate a special approach to defining sound and complete Gentzen-style sequent calculi for some of their four-valued generalizations