Can't touch this: the first-person perspective provides privileged access to predictions of sensory action outcomes.

RCUK Open Access funded. ESRC ES/J019178/1Previous studies have shown that viewing others in pain activates cortical somatosensory processing areas and facilitates the detection of tactile targets. It has been suggested that such shared representations have evolved to enable us to better understand the actions and intentions of others. If this is the case, the effects of observing others in pain should be obtained from a range of viewing perspectives. Therefore, the current study examined the behavioral effects of observed grasps of painful and nonpainful objects from both a first- and third-person perspective. In the first-person perspective, a participant was faster to detect a tactile target delivered to their own hand when viewing painful grasping actions, compared with all nonpainful actions. However, this effect was not revealed in the third-person perspective. The combination of action and object information to predict the painful consequences of another person's actions when viewed from the first-person perspective, but not the third-person perspective, argues against a mechanism ostensibly evolved to understand the actions of others

Do third-person perceptions amplify exemplification effects?

The presumed underlying mechanism of exemplification effects is that people generalize single-case media depictions and overestimate their position of social relevance, while at the same time neglecting more valid base-rate information. A 2 × 2 between-subjects experiment with n = 112 participants explored whether these exemplification effects can be explained by presumptions of strong media influences on others. Participants were shown a “rate my professor”-type website stimulus in which a single user had commented on a university course. Results show that fundamental assumptions of exemplification research interact with presumed media influences: exemplification effects can be amplified by third-person perceptions, particularly when people assess public opinion

The Representation of Third Person and Its Consequences for Person-Case Effects

In modeling the effects of the Person-Case Constraint (PCC), a common claim is that 3rd person “is not a person”. However, while this claim does work in the syntax, it creates problems in the morphology. For example, characterizing the well-known “spurious se effect” in Spanish simply cannot be done without reference to 3rd person. Inspired by alternatives to underspecification that have emerged in phonology (e.g., Calabrese, 1995), a revised featural system is proposed, whereby syntactic agreement may be relativized to certain values of a feature, in particular, the contrastive and marked values. The range of variation in PCC effects is shown to emerge as a consequence of the parametric options allowed on a Probing head, whereas the representation of person remains constant across modules of the grammar and across languages.Linguistic

On the scope of the referential hierarchy in the typology of grammatical relations

In the late seventies, Bernard Comrie was one of the first linguists to explore the effects of the referential hierarchy (RH) on the distribution of grammatical relations (GRs). The referential hierarchy is also known in the literature as the animacy, empathy or indexibability hierarchy and ranks speech act participants (i.e. first and second person) above third persons, animates above inanimates, or more topical referents above less topical referents. Depending on the language, the hierarchy is sometimes extended by analogy to rankings of possessors above possessees, singulars above plurals, or other notions. In his 1981 textbook, Comrie analyzed RH effects as explaining (a) differential case (or adposition) marking of transitive subject ("A") noun phrases in low RH positions (e.g. inanimate or third person) and of object ("P") noun phrases in high RH positions (e.g. animate or first or second person), and (b) hierarchical verb agreement coupled with a direct vs. inverse distinction, as in Algonquian (Comrie 1981: Chapter 6)

Perceived self-other differences in persuasibility: the effects of interpersonal and group-based similarity

Two experiments examined the effects of interpersonal and group-based similarity on perceived self-other differences in persuasibility (i.e. on third-person effects, Davison, 1983). Results of Experiment 1 (N=121), based on experimentally-created groups, indicated that third-person perceptions with respect to the impact of televised product ads were accentuated when the comparison was made with interpersonally different others. Contrary to predictions, third-person perceptions were not affected by group-based similarity (i.e. ingroup or outgroup other). Results of Experiment 2 (N = 102), based an an enduring social identity, indicated that both interpersonal and group-based similarity moderated perceptions of the impact on self and other of least-liked product ads. Overall, third-person effects were more pronounced with respect to interpersonally dissimilar others. However, when social identity was salient, information about interpersonal similarity of the target did not affect perceived self-other differences with respect to ingroup targets. Results also highlighted significant differences in third-person perceptions according to the perceiver's affective evaluation of the persuasive message. (C) 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd

Media Schemas, Perceived Effects, and Person Perceptions

Media schemas about the power of the media are widely thought to influence perceived media effects and third-person perception, but only one study has shown this, and it did not consider desirable messages. The current research finds focus group evidence for the existence of additional media schemas relevant to estimating effects of pro-social messages, then examines the relationships between media schemas, perceived media effects of desirable and undesirable messages on self and others, and first-, second-, and third-person perceptions. Results indicate that some media schemas can be applied to perceived media effects of self and others, although not exclusively to desirable or undesirable messages. There was no evidence that these schemas are related to first- or third-person perception, but they seem to be better suited to predict the mutual perceived effects of second-person perception.Yeshttps://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/manuscript-submission-guideline

Vicarious experiences and detection accuracy while observing pain and touch: the effect of perspective taking

In this study, we investigated the effects of observing pain and touch in others on vicarious somatosensory experiences and the detection of subtle somatosensory stimuli. Furthermore, the effect of taking a first- versus a third-person perspective was investigated. Undergraduates (N = 57) viewed videos depicting hands being pricked (pain), hands being touched by a cotton swab (touch), and control scenes (same approaching movement of a hand as in the other video categories, but without the painful/touching object) while experiencing vibrotactile stimuli themselves on the left, on the right, or on both hands. Participants reported the location at which they felt a somatosensory stimulus. The vibrotactile stimuli and visual scenes were applied in a spatially congruent or incongruent way, and other trials were presented without vibrotactile stimuli. The videos were depicted in first-person perspective and third-person perspective (i.e., the videos were shown upside down). We calculated the proportions of correct responses and false alarms (i.e., numbers of trials on which a vicarious somatosensory experience was reported congruent or incongruent to the site of the visual information). Pain-related scenes facilitated the detection of tactile stimuli and augmented the number of vicarious somatosensory experiences, as compared with observing the touch or control videos. Detection accuracy was higher for videos depicted in first-person perspective than for those in third-person perspective. Perspective had no effect on the number of vicarious somatosensory experiences. This study indicates that somatosensory detection is particularly enhanced during the observation of pain-related scenes, as compared to the observation of touch or control videos. These research findings further demonstrate that perspective taking impacts somatosensory detection, but not the report of vicarious experiences

Evolution as Connecting First-Person and Third-Person Perspectives of Consciousness

First-person and third-person perspectives are different items of human consciousness.\ud Feeling the taste of a fruit or being consciously part of a group eating fruits call for different perspectives of\ud consciousness. The latter is about objective reality (third-person data). The former is about subjective\ud experience (first-person data) and cannot be described entirely by objective reality.\ud We propose to look at how these two perspectives could be rooted in an evolutionary origin of human\ud consciousness, and somehow be connected.\ud Our starting point is a scenario describing how evolution could have transformed a non self-conscious\ud auto-representation into a conscious self-representation (Menant 2006). The scenario is based on the\ud performance of inter-subjectivity existing among non human primates (Gardenfors 2006). A key item of the\ud scenario is the identification of the auto-representation of a subject with the representations that the subject\ud has of her conspecifics, the latter feeding the former with the meaning: “existing in the environment”.\ud So during evolution, pre-human primates were brought to perceive their auto-representation as existing in\ud the environment. Such process could have generated the initial elements of a conscious self-representation.\ud We take this scenario as providing a possible rooting of human consciousness in evolution.\ud We develop here a part of this scenario by expliciting the inward and outward components of the non\ud self-conscious auto-representation.\ud Inward components are about proprioception and interoception (thirst, pain, …). Outward components cover\ud the sensory information relative to the perception of the body (seen feet, … ) and of its effects on the\ud environment.\ud We consider that the initial elements of a conscious self-representation have been applied to both inward and\ud outward components of the auto-representation. We propose that the application to inward components made\ud possible some first-person information, and that the application to outward components brought up third-person\ud information. Relations between the two perspectives are highlighted.\ud Such approach can root first-person and third-person perspectives in the same slot of human evolution.\ud We conclude by a summary of the above and introduce a possible application of this approach to the concepts\ud of bodily self and of pre-reflexive self-consciousness (Legrand, 2006)

Third Person References: Forms and Functions in Two Spoken Genres of Spanish

This volume, a case study on the grammar of third person references in two genres of spoken Ecuadorian Spanish, examines from a discourse-analytic perspective how genre affects linguistic patterns and how researchers can look for and interpret genre effects. This marks a timely contribution to corpus linguistics, as many linguists are choosing to work with empirical data. Corpus based approaches have many advantages and are useful in the comparison of different languages as well as varieties of the same language, but what is often overlooked in such comparisons is the genre of language under examination. As this case study shows, genre is an important factor in interpreting patterns and distributions of forms. The book also contributes toward theories of anaphora, referentiality and Preferred Argument Structure. It is relevant for scholars who work with referentiality, genre differences, third person references, and interactional linguistics, as well as those interested in Spanish morphosyntax. [From the Publisher]https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/books/1096/thumbnail.jp

Online Social Networking Has a Greater Effect on Others than on Me: A Third-Person Effect Perspective

To date, much research has been conducted on the positive and negative effects of online social networking (OSN). However, how users perceive others and themselves being subject to these effects and the consequences of users’ perceptions are understudied. Drawing from the third-person effect theory, this study examines the self-other perceptual gap for positive and negative effects of OSN and the consequences of perceptions for negative effects. Findings from our online survey (N=187) and interviews (N=8) suggested a significant difference between the perceived positive and negative effects on self and on others. Furthermore, the link between the third-person perception for usage risks of OSN and support for taking privacy protection actions was confirmed. We also found that the self–other discrepant perceptions were not influenced by age, time spent on OSN, number of OSN friends. However, gender emerged as a key difference in the third-person effects gap for privacy risks