Economic model predictive control for optimal operation of combined heat and power systems

© 2019. ElsevierThe use of decentralized Combined Heat and Power (CHP) plants is increasing since the high levels of efficiency they can achieve. Hence, to determine the optimal operation of these systems in the changing energy market, the time-varying price profiles for both electricity as well as the required resources and the energy-market constraints should be considered into the design of the control strategies. To solve these issues and maximize the profit during the operation of the CHP plant, this paper proposes an optimization-based controller, which will be designed according to the Economic Model Predictive Control (EMPC) approach. The proposed controller is designed considering a non-constant time step to get a high sampling frequency for the near instants and a lower resolution for the far instants. Besides, a soft constraint to met the market constraints for the sale of electric power is proposed. The proposed controller is developed based on a real CHP plant installed in the ETA research factory in Darmstadt, Germany. Simulation results show that lower computational time can be achieved if a non-constant step time is implemented while the market constraints are satisfied.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Single-layer economic model predictive control for periodic operation

In this paper we consider periodic optimal operation of constrained periodic linear systems. We propose an economic model predictive controller based on a single layer that unites dynamic real time optimization and control. The proposed controller guarantees closed-loop convergence to the optimal periodic trajectory that minimizes the average operation cost for a given economic criterion. A priori calculation of the optimal trajectory is not required and if the economic cost function is changed, recursive feasibility and convergence to the new periodic optimal trajectory is guaranteed. The results are demonstrated with two simulation examples, a four tank system, and a simplified model of a section of Barcelona's water distribution network.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author’s final draft

An Economic Model of Fair Use

The doctrine of fair use allows limited copying of creative works based on the rationale that copyright holders would consent to such uses if bargaining were possible. This paper develops a formal model of fair use in an effort to derive the efficient legal standard for applying the doctrine. The model interprets copies and originals as differentiated products and defines fair use as a threshold separating permissible copying from infringement. The analysis highlights the role of technology in shaping the efficient standard. Discussion of several key cases illustrates the applicability of the model.Fair use, Copyright law, Technological improvement

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC MODEL: QUE VADIS UE?

Recent evolutions in Europe raise questions on the viability of the actual economic and social model that defines the European construction project. In this paper, I will try to explain the viability of institutional European model that stick between free market mechanisms and protectionism. The main challenge for the EU is about the possibility to bring together the institutional convergence and the wellbeing for all Europeans. If „development through integration” seems to be harmonization through „institutional transplant”, how could then be the European model one sufficiently wide open to market which creates the prosperity so long waited for by new member countries?economic model, institutions, economic integration, competition

Condensation in an Economic Model with Brand Competition

We present a linear agent based model on brand competition. Each agent belongs to one of the two brands and interacts with its nearest neighbors. In the process the agent can decide to change to the other brand if the move is beneficial. The numerical simulations show that the systems always condenses into a state when all agents belong to a single brand. We study the condensation times for different parameters of the model and the influence of different mechanisms to avoid condensation, like anti monopoly rules and brand fidelity.Comment: Accepted in: International Journal of Modern Physics

An Economic Model for Bioprospecting Contracts

This paper explores the use of a micro-economic model to analyse the provisions and parties of bioprospecting contracts. It focuses on the pharmaceutical industry as the representative biodiversity buyer, presenting an original theoretical framework that explains the main contract characteristics or stylised facts. Against this background, it considers the main contractors involved in these private contracts, i.e. biodiversity sellers and biodiversity buyers, analysing both the magnitude and distribution of the respective payoffs. Particular attention is devoted to the different, mixed impacts of bioprospecting contracts and patenting on social welfare. The positive welfare impacts delivered by bioprospecting contracts are associated with the potential discovery of a new drug product, i.e. productivity gains, non-monetary benefit-sharing or transfers and royalty revenues. The negative welfare impact results from the legal creation of a monopoly and the related well-known effect on the consumer surplus. Finally, the potential redistribution effects are limited, and a potential enforcement of this objective may jeopardise the desirability of the contracts since this action would lead to a significant increase in the transaction costs.Bioprospecting Contract, Genetic Resource, Biodiversity Buyer, Biodiversity Seller, Patenting, Welfare Analysis, Benefit Sharing

An Economic Model of Child Custody

This paper develops a model of child custody based on an incomplete-contract approach to the allocation of property rights. Because of the presence of transaction costs in marriage, altruistic parents cannot contract upon the investments they make into their children, but can reduce the resulting inefficiencies by determining ex ante the parent who would be allocated custody in case they divorce. We show that: (i) the optimal allocation of custodial rights depends on both preferences and technological factors; (ii) custodial rights can be allocated either to the parent who values the benefits from child welfare more or, vice-versa, to the parent with the lowest valuation; (iii) if one parent�s investment is significantly more important than the other parent�s investment, then sole custody is preferred to joint custody and it should be allocated to the parent whose investment is relatively more important; and (iv) if the importance of the parents� investments is sufficiently similar and if the differences in parents� valuations of child quality are large, then joint custody is optimal with the low-valuation parent receiving a relatively greater share, because the other parent would invest in the child anyway while the low-valuation parent would be endowed with greater bargaining power. The implications of these results are then interpreted in the context of current custody laws, discussed in relation to empirical estimates of some of the parameters underlying the optimal custody rule, and used to question the skepticism surrounding prenuptial contracts.

Boom and bust in continuous time evolving economic model

We show that a simple model of a spatially resolved evolving economic system, which has a steady state under simultaneous updating, shows stable oscillations in price when updated asynchronously. The oscillations arise from a gradual decline of the mean price due to competition among sellers competing for the same resource. This lowers profitability and hence population but is followed by a sharp rise as speculative sellers invade the large un-inhabited areas. This cycle then begins again.Comment: 7 pages, 9 figures, epjb style. New references. Section on avoiding boom and bust. Fix bibliograph

Inequality and the Anglo-American Economic Model

The rollback of the state and the redistribution initiated during the Reagan-Thatcher period in the US and Britain has resulted in these countries being the least egalitarian in the OECD, with wages increasingly de-coupled from productivity growth and gains accruing to top CEOs. The view that inequality is attributable solely to the new premium on human capital is challenged; it is argued that inequality has resulted from mainly from personal tax breaks and the corporate drive for ‘shareholder value’. The social costs are evident from the sociological and epidemiological evidence. Equally, inequality has helped fuel US consumer spending, facilitated by low interest rates, holding gains and credit deregulation. The result is a ‘triple deficit’. The risk is that by relying exclusively on market-led devaluation, a crisis of confidence will result; righting financial imbalances requires not merely a Plaza-type solution, but a major reversal in the growth of inequality.