Metaphysics and Convention in Dimensional Analysis, 1914-1917

This paper recovers an important, century-old debate regarding the methodological and metaphysical foundations of dimensional analysis. Consideration of Richard Tolman's failed attempt to install the principle of similitude---the relativity of size---as the founding principle of dimensional analysis both clarifies the method of dimensional analysis and articulates two metaphysical positions regarding quantity dimensions. Tolman's position is quantity dimension fundamentalism. This is a commitment to dimensional realism and a set of fundamental dimensions which ground all further dimensions. The opposing position, developed primarily by Bridgman, is quantity dimension conventionalism. Conventionalism is an anti-realism regarding dimensional structure, holding our non-representational dimensional systems have basic quantity dimensions fixed only by convention. This metaphysical dispute was left somewhat unsettled. It is shown here that both of these positions face serious problems: fundamentalists are committed to surplus dimensional structure; conventionalists cannot account for empirical constraints on our dimensional systems nor the empirical success of dimensional analysis. It is shown that an alternative position is available which saves what is right in both: quantity dimension functionalism

Metaphysics and Convention in Dimensional Analysis, 1914-1917

This paper recovers an important, century-old debate regarding the methodological and metaphysical foundations of dimensional analysis. Consideration of Richard Tolman's failed attempt to install the principle of similitude---the relativity of size---as the founding principle of dimensional analysis both clarifies the method of dimensional analysis and articulates two metaphysical positions regarding quantity dimensions. Tolman's position is quantity dimension fundamentalism. This is a commitment to dimensional realism and a set of fundamental dimensions which ground all further dimensions. The opposing position, developed primarily by Bridgman, is quantity dimension conventionalism. Conventionalism is an anti-realism regarding dimensional structure, holding our non-representational dimensional systems have basic quantity dimensions fixed only by convention. This metaphysical dispute was left somewhat unsettled. It is shown here that both of these positions face serious problems: fundamentalists are committed to surplus dimensional structure; conventionalists cannot account for empirical constraints on our dimensional systems nor the empirical success of dimensional analysis. It is shown that an alternative position is available which saves what is right in both: quantity dimension functionalism

Dimensional Analysis: Essays on the Metaphysics and Epistemology of Quantities

This dissertation draws upon historical studies of scientific practice and contemporary issues in the metaphysics and epistemology of science to account for the nature of physical quantities. My dissertation applies this integrated HPS approach to dimensional analysis—a logic for quantitative physical equations which respects the distinct dimensions of quantities (e.g. mass, length, charge). Dimensional analysis and its historical development serve both as subjects of study and as a sources for solutions to contemporary problems. The dissertation consists primarily of three related papers on: (1) the methodological and metaphysical foundations of dimensional analysis, (2) the use of dimensional analysis in determining physical symmetries, (3) the use of dimensional analysis in securing metrological extension

Reconstructing word order in Proto-Germanic: A comparative Branching Direction Theory (BDT) analysis of Old Saxon

286 p.Tesi honen helburua germaniar hizkuntza guztiek amankomunean daukaten arbasoaren hitzordenaberreraikitzea da. Horretarako orain arte egin diren saiakerekin zerikusia duen eta aldiberean berritzailea den hurbilpena egiten du autoreak: Adarkatze Norabide Teorian (BranchingDirection Theory) (Dryer, 1992) oinarritutako ikerketa da. Teoria hau hitz-ordenaren unibertsaltipologikoen inguruan egindako ikerketaren ondorioa da. Gainera, erabiltzen diren datuetatikasko oso gutxi aztertutako germaniar hizkuntza batetik atereak dira, sajoiera zaharretik, hainzuzen ere. Emaitzek orain arteko ikerketaren aurkikuntzak hobetzen dituzte

Teoria emergencji a problemy relacji umysł-ciało

Prezentowana rozprawa jest pracą z zakresu ontologii i filozofii umysłu, choć podejmuje też wątki należące do zakresu filozofii nauki, metodologii nauk oraz epistemologii. Poruszony zostaje w niej problem emergencji zjawisk mentalnych, a w szczególności kwestia relacji pomiędzy tym, co mentalne oraz tym, co fizyczne. Szczególna uwaga poświęcona jest niezależności i autonomii zjawisk mentalnych w stosunku do oddolnych procesów fizycznych, które wyrażają się poprzez emergentny charakter tego, co mentalne oraz tzw. przyczynowość odgórną. Omawiane problemy usytuowane są w ramach dyskusji nad problemem umysłu-ciało w analitycznej filozofii umysłu pomiędzy stanowiskami redukcjonistycznymi i antyredukcjonistycznymi. Celem rozprawy jest analiza relacji psychofizycznej w kontekście teorii emergencji i próba zweryfikowania czy postulat radykalnej wersji emergentyzmu o przyczynowości odgórnej może stanowić realną, na gruncie współczesnych debat i przyjmowanych w nich standardów, propozycję ich rozwiązania

Reconstructing word order in Proto-Germanic: A comparative Branching Direction Theory (BDT) analysis of Old Saxon

286 p.Tesi honen helburua germaniar hizkuntza guztiek amankomunean daukaten arbasoaren hitzordenaberreraikitzea da. Horretarako orain arte egin diren saiakerekin zerikusia duen eta aldiberean berritzailea den hurbilpena egiten du autoreak: Adarkatze Norabide Teorian (BranchingDirection Theory) (Dryer, 1992) oinarritutako ikerketa da. Teoria hau hitz-ordenaren unibertsaltipologikoen inguruan egindako ikerketaren ondorioa da. Gainera, erabiltzen diren datuetatikasko oso gutxi aztertutako germaniar hizkuntza batetik atereak dira, sajoiera zaharretik, hainzuzen ere. Emaitzek orain arteko ikerketaren aurkikuntzak hobetzen dituzte

A Defense of Non-reductive Physicalism

I develop a novel formulation of, and argument for, non-reductive physicalism - roughly, the view that mental properties are natural properties that are realized by, but not identical to, neural and other low-level physical properties. Non-reductive physicalism has long been the dominant view in the philosophy of mind but has recently been challenged from two main directions. The first type of attack, the causal exclusion problem, points out an apparent inconsistency in non-reductive physicalism. The second type of attack focuses on the multiple realizability of mental properties: questioning either its prevalence or its efficacy in blocking reduction. In response to the exclusion problem, I first argue that one of the claims used to formulate the problem, the completeness of physics, has two parts and that there is no single domain of physical entities that is the smallest domain of which both parts are true. The conflation of these two parts has made it appear that non-reductive physicalism is inconsistent. I then show how to use the two completeness claims as part of an argument for a form of physicalism that need not be reductive. In response to the second type of attack, I provide a novel basis for the irreducibility of mental properties. I argue that irreducibility is ultimately grounded in relations between mechanisms, of which multiple realizability is merely one facet. The other facet, multiple determinativity - in which a single physical property realizes several different kinds of high-level properties - is equally effective at blocking property reduction. Thus, even if the doubts about the multiple realizability of mental properties (and its efficacy in blocking reduction) were sound, this would not undermine non-reductive physicalism. Another virtue of this framework is that it provides an adequate metaphysical basis for some of non-reductive physicalism's explanatory claims - e.g., that high-level explanations are sometimes deeper and theoretically more fecund than low-level physical explanations.Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, National Science Foundatio