Climate change, adaptation, and phenotypic plasticity: the problem and the evidence

Peer reviewe

The evolution of plasticity of dauer larva developmental arrest in the nematode Caenorhabditis elegans.

Organisms can end up in unfavourable conditions and to survive this they have evolved various strategies. Some organisms, including nematodes, survive unfavourable conditions by undergoing developmental arrest. The model nematode Caenorhabditis elegans has a developmental choice between two larval forms, and it chooses to develop into the arrested dauer larva form in unfavourable conditions (specifically, a lack of food and high population density, indicated by the concentration of a pheromone). Wild C. elegans isolates vary extensively in their dauer larva arrest phenotypes, and this prompts the question of what selective pressures maintain such phenotypic diversity? To investigate this we grew C. elegans in four different environments, consisting of different combinations of cues that can induce dauer larva development: two combinations of food concentration (high and low) in the presence or absence of a dauer larva-inducing pheromone. Five generations of artificial selection of dauer larvae resulted in an overall increase in dauer larva formation in most selection regimes. The presence of pheromone in the environment selected for twice the number of dauer larvae, compared with environments not containing pheromone. Further, only a high food concentration environment containing pheromone increased the plasticity of dauer larva formation. These evolutionary responses also affected the timing of the worms' reproduction. Overall, these results give an insight into the environments that can select for different plasticities of C. elegans dauer larva arrest phenotypes, suggesting that different combinations of environmental cues can select for the diversity of phenotypically plastic responses seen in C. elegans.We would like to thank Henrique Teotonio for the gift of the G140.A population, Louise Hughes and Laura Weldon for technical help, two anonymous reviewers for their comments, and NERC for funding.This is the final published version of the article. It was originally published in Ecology and Evolution (Diaz SA, Viney M, Ecology and Evolution 2015, 5(6), 1343–1353, doi:10.1002/ece3.1436) http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ece3.143

Shaping Robust System through Evolution

Biological functions are generated as a result of developmental dynamics that form phenotypes governed by genotypes. The dynamical system for development is shaped through genetic evolution following natural selection based on the fitness of the phenotype. Here we study how this dynamical system is robust to noise during development and to genetic change by mutation. We adopt a simplified transcription regulation network model to govern gene expression, which gives a fitness function. Through simulations of the network that undergoes mutation and selection, we show that a certain level of noise in gene expression is required for the network to acquire both types of robustness. The results reveal how the noise that cells encounter during development shapes any network's robustness, not only to noise but also to mutations. We also establish a relationship between developmental and mutational robustness through phenotypic variances caused by genetic variation and epigenetic noise. A universal relationship between the two variances is derived, akin to the fluctuation-dissipation relationship known in physics

Grounding knowledge and normative valuation in agent-based action and scientific commitment

Philosophical investigation in synthetic biology has focused on the knowledge-seeking questions pursued, the kind of engineering techniques used, and on the ethical impact of the products produced. However, little work has been done to investigate the processes by which these epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical forms of inquiry arise in the course of synthetic biology research. An attempt at this work relying on a particular area of synthetic biology will be the aim of this chapter. I focus on the reengineering of metabolic pathways through the manipulation and construction of small DNA-based devices and systems synthetic biology. Rather than focusing on the engineered products or ethical principles that result, I will investigate the processes by which these arise. As such, the attention will be directed to the activities of practitioners, their manipulation of tools, and the use they make of techniques to construct new metabolic devices. Using a science-in-practice approach, I investigate problems at the intersection of science, philosophy of science, and sociology of science. I consider how practitioners within this area of synthetic biology reconfigure biological understanding and ethical categories through active modelling and manipulation of known functional parts, biological pathways for use in the design of microbial machines to solve problems in medicine, technology, and the environment. We might describe this kind of problem-solving as relying on what Helen Longino referred to as “social cognition” or the type of scientific work done within what Hasok Chang calls “systems of practice”. My aim in this chapter will be to investigate the relationship that holds between systems of practice within metabolic engineering research and social cognition. I will attempt to show how knowledge and normative valuation are generated from this particular network of practitioners. In doing so, I suggest that the social nature of scientific inquiry is ineliminable to both knowledge acquisition and ethical evaluations

No personality without experience? A test on Rana dalmatina tadpoles

While the number of studies reporting the presence of individual behavioral consistency (animal personality, behavioral syndrome) has boomed in the recent years, there is still much controversy about the proximate and ultimate mechanisms resulting in the phenomenon. For instance, direct environmental effects during ontogeny (phenotypic plasticity) as the proximate mechanism behind the emergence of consistent individual differences in behavior are usually overlooked compared to environmental effects operating across generations (genetic adaptation). Here, we tested the effects of sociality and perceived predation risk during ontogeny on the strength of behavioral consistency in agile frog (Rana dalmatina) tadpoles in a factorial common garden experiment. Tadpoles reared alone and without predatory cues showed zero repeatability within (i.e., lack of personality) and zero correlation between (i.e., lack of syndrome) activity and risk‐taking. On the other hand, cues from predators alone induced both activity and risk‐taking personalities, while cues from predators and conspecifics together resulted in an activity – risk‐taking behavioral syndrome. Our results show that individual experience has an unequivocal role in the emergence of behavioral consistency. In this particular case, the development of behavioral consistency was most likely the result of genotype × environment interactions, or with other words, individual variation in behavioral plasticity

Ecosystem size matters: the dimensionality of intralacustrine diversification in Icelandic stickleback is predicted by lake size

Cases of evolutionary diversification can be characterized along a continuum from weak to strong genetic and phenotypic differentiation. Several factors may facilitate or constrain the differentiation process. Comparative analyses of replicates of the same taxon at different stages of differentiation can be useful to identify these factors. We estimated the number of distinct phenotypic groups in three-spine stickleback populations from nine lakes in Iceland and in one marine population. Using the inferred number of phenotypic groups in each lake, genetic divergence from the marine population, and physical lake and landscape variables, we tested whether ecosystem size, approximated by lake size and depth, or isolation from the ancestral marine gene pool predicts the occurrence and the extent of phenotypic and genetic diversification within lakes. We find intralacustrine phenotypic diversification to be the rule rather than the exception, occurring in all but the youngest lake population and being manifest in ecologically important phenotypic traits. Neutral genetic data further indicate nonrandom mating in four of nine studied lakes, and restricted gene flow between sympatric phenotypic groups in two. Although neither the phenotypic variation nor the number of intralacustrine phenotypic groups was associated with any of our environmental variables, the number of phenotypic traits that were differentiated was significantly positively related to lake size, and evidence for restricted gene flow between sympatric phenotypic groups was only found in the largest lakes where trait specific phenotypic differentiation was highest

Intelligence as inference or forcing Occam on the world

We propose to perform the optimization task of Universal Artificial Intelligence (UAI) through learning a reference machine on which good programs are short. Further, we also acknowledge that the choice of reference machine that the UAI objective is based on is arbitrary and, therefore, we learn a suitable machine for the environment we are in. This is based on viewing Occam’s razor as an imperative instead of as a proposition about the world. Since this principle cannot be true for all reference machines, we need to find a machine that makes the principle true. We both want good policies and the environment to have short implementations on the machine. Such a machine is learnt iteratively through a procedure that generalizes the principle underlying the Expectation-Maximization algorithm

Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism and the Evolutionary Objection: Rethinking the Relevance of Empirical Science

Neo-Aristotelian metaethical naturalism is a modern attempt at naturalizing ethics using ideas from Aristotle’s teleological metaphysics. Proponents of this view argue that moral virtue in human beings is an instance of natural goodness, a kind of goodness supposedly also found in the realm of non-human living things. Many critics question whether neo-Aristotelian naturalism is tenable in light of modern evolutionary biology. Two influential lines of objection have appealed to an evolutionary understanding of human nature and natural teleology to argue against this view. In this paper, I offer a reconstruction of these two seemingly different lines of objection as raising instances of the same dilemma, giving neo-Aristotelians a choice between contradicting our considered moral judgment and abandoning metaethical naturalism. I argue that resolving the dilemma requires showing a particular kind of continuity between the norms of moral virtue and norms that are necessary for understanding non-human living things. I also argue that in order to show such a continuity, neo-Aristotelians need to revise the relationship they adopt with empirical science and acknowledge that the latter is relevant to assessing their central commitments regarding living things. Finally, I argue that to move this debate forward, both neo-Aristotelians and their critics should pay attention to recent work on the concept of organism in evolutionary and developmental biology

Conflation and refutation: Book review of T. Uller and K. N. Laland. eds. 2019. Evolutionary causation: biological and philosophical Reflections. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 352: pp. ISBN: 978‐0‐262‐03992‐5. $60.00/£50.00

Evolutionary Causation, the new edited book from Tobias Uller and Kevin Laland (Uller and Laland, 2019) should be seen as a positive contribution to those seeking an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES). The ambition for an EES has emerged most vociferously over the past 15 years, but its antecedents stretch back to the key work in the 1970s of Gould, Lewontin and their colleagues. At root arguments for an EES are arguments about how the Modern Synthesis (MS) in evolutionary biology has been found wanting. Much of this discontent has been to do with theoreticians rethinking concepts of adaptation, inheritance and development (Jablonka and Lamb, 2006; Huneman and Walsh, 2017) as well as variation and macroevolution (Pigliucci and Muller, 2010). This book continues this work, but focuses on analysis of the central concept of causation within evolution