83 research outputs found

    The future of the CDM: same same, but differentiated?

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    Policy-makers and scientists have raised concerns about the functioning of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), in particular regarding its low contribution to sustainable development, unbalanced regional and sectoral distribution of projects, and its limited contribution to global emission reductions. Differentiation between countries or project types has been proposed as a possible way forward to address these problems. An overview is provided of the different ways in which CDM differentiation could be implemented. The implications for the actors involved in the CDM are analysed, along with a quantitative assessment of the impacts on the carbon market, using bottom-up marginal abatement cost curves. The discounting of CDM credits, quota systems, or differentiated eligibility of countries could help to address several of the concerns raised. Preferential treatment may also make a limited contribution to achieving the aims of CDM differentiation by increasing opportunities for under-represented host countries. The impact on the carbon market appears to be limited for most options

    Al Qaeda at the bar: coordinating ideologues and mercenaries in terrorist organizations

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    Most terrorist groups have limited lifespans. A number of scholars and casual observers have noted that terrorist organizations often are comprised of two types of participants: ideologues or "true believers" dedicated to the group's cause, and mercenaries, who are adept at raising money through illegal means. The latter are interested primarily in their personal gains and have relatively little ideological commitment. Terrorist groups need both participants in order to function effectively. The purpose of the study is to understand the impact of communication on the compositions of terrorist groups. Three experimental treatments consider a coordination problem, and focus on the behavior of the mercenaries. Participants choose whether or not to participate in a terrorist attack. Payoffs are U-shaped in the number of participants, and increase with the number of successful attacks. The treatments allow communication between a leader and frontline fighters ("leader" treatment) or among the frontline fighters themselves ("communication" treatment). In the first treatment, a group leader can post messages to the members, which has a 19 % coordination success rate. For the communication treatment, all participants can post messages anonymously to each other, which yields a 27 % coordination success rate. By contrast, the baseline ("no communication" treatment) shows a success rate of 11 %. We conclude from our experimental evidence that disrupting communications among the frontline fighters is more effective in terminating terrorist organizations

    Foreign aid, instability and governance in Africa

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    This study contributes to the attendant literature by bundling governance dynamics and focusing on foreign aid instability instead of foreign aid. We assess the role of foreign aid instability on governance dynamics in fifty three African countries for the period 1996-2010. An autoregressive endogeneity-robust Generalized Method of Moments is employed. Instabilities are measured in terms of variance of the errors and standard deviations. Three main aid indicators are used, namely: total aid, aid from multilateral donors and bilateral aid. Principal Component Analysis is used to bundle governance indicators, namely: political governance (voice & accountability and political stability/no violence), economic governance (regulation quality and government effectiveness), institutional governance (rule of law and corruption-control) and general governance (political, economic and institutional governance). Our findings show that foreign aid instability increases governance standards, especially political and general governance. Policy implications are discussed

    Technology Transfers and the Clean Development Mechanism in a North-South General Equilibrium Model

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    Increasing Foreign Aid for Inclusive Human Development in Africa

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    In the light of evidence that poverty has been decreasing in all regions of the world with the exception of Africa, where about 45% of countries in sub-Saharan Africa did not achieve the Millennium development goal extreme poverty target, this study assesses whether increasing foreign aid improves inclusive human development. The investigation is on 53 African countries for the period 2005–2012. The empirical analysis is based on (1) the generalised method of moments (GMM) to control for persistence in inclusive human development, simultaneity and time-invariant omitted variables and (2) Instrumental Variable Tobit Regressions to control for simultaneity and the limited range in the dependent variable. The adopted foreign aid variables are: ‘humanitarian assistance’, ‘action on debt’ ‘aid for social infrastructure’, ‘aid to the productive sector’, ‘aid to the multi sector’, ‘aid for economic infrastructure’ and ‘programme assistance’. The following findings are established. From the GMM specifications, there are (1) synergy effects from ‘aid to the productive sector’ and a positive net effect from ‘programme assistance’ and (2) negative net impacts from ‘aid to social infrastructure’ and human assistance, albeit with positive marginal effects. From Instrumental Variable Tobit regressions (1) there is a synergy effect from ‘aid for economic infrastructure’ and (2) there are negative net impacts from ‘aid for social infrastructure’, ‘aid to the productive sector’ and human assistance, albeit with positive marginal effects. Policy implications are discussed

    Serving the Public Interest in Several Ways: Theory and Empirics

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    We develop a model where people differ in their altruistic preferences and can serve the public interest in two ways: by making donations to charity and by taking a public service job and exerting effort on the job. Our theory predicts that people who are more altruistic are more likely to take a public service job and, for a given job, make higher donations to charity. Comparing equally altruistic workers, those with a regular job make higher donations to charity than those with a public service job by a simple substitution argument. We subsequently test these predictions using cross-sectional data from Germany on self-reported altruism, sector of employment, and donations to charity. In addition, we use panel data from the Netherlands on volunteering and sector of employment. We find support for most of our predictions.Hervorming Sociale Regelgevin
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