Determinantes del gasto público local: ¿necesidades de gasto o capacidad fiscal?

En este trabajo se cuantifica la importancia relativa de las necesidades de gasto y de la capacidad fiscal como factores explicativos de la desigualdad observada en los niveles de gasto público local por habitante con datos de los municipios de la provincia de Barcelona con más de 5.000 habitantes para 1996. La metodología utilizada consiste en la estimación de ecuaciones de demanda para siete categorías de gasto. Las necesidades de gasto son introducidas en el modelo a partir de una especificación detallada de la relación entre actividad y resultados de los servicios, en la que se incluyen distintos grupos de usuarios y variables de coste. Además de los determinantes clásicos del gasto –precio, renta y subvenciones–, se introducen también como variables de control un índice de capacidad fiscal, factores políticos e institucionales, y los efectos de la actividad realizada por gobiernos cercanos. Los resultados indican que las necesidades de gasto explican un porcentaje sustancial de la variación en el gasto por habitante (44%), superior al porcentaje explicado por la capacidad fiscal (38%), por factores políticos e institucionales (9%), o por las interdependencias existentes entre gobiernos cercanos (9%). Los resultados obtenidos ponen en relieve también la importancia de diversas variables de necesidades, además de la población, como por ejemplo: dispersión de la población, niveles de pobreza, visitantes diarios, población estacional, ocupación comercial, etc

Does Partisan Alignment Affect the Electoral Reward of Intergovernmental Transfers?

In this paper we test the hypothesis that intergovernmental grants allocated to co-partisans buy more political support than grants allocated to local governments controlled by opposition parties. We use a rich Spanish database containing information about the grants received by 617 municipalities during the period 1993-2003 from two different upper-tier governments (Regional and Upper-local), as well as data of municipal voting behaviour at three electoral contests held at the different layers of government during this period. Therefore, we are able to estimate two different vote equations, analysing the effects of grants given to aligned and unaligned municipalities on the vote share of the incumbent party/parties at the regional and local elections. We account for the endogeneity of grants by instrumenting them with the average amount of grants distributed by upper-layer governments. The results suggest that grants given to co-partisans buy some political support, but that grants given to opposition parties do not bring any votes, suggesting that the grantee reaps as much political credit from intergovernmental grants as the grantor.voting, parties, grants

Does urban sprawl increase the costs of providing local public services? Evidence from Spanish municipalities

This paper examines the impact of urban sprawl, a phenomenon of particular interest in Spain, which is currently experiencing this process of rapid, low-density urban expansion. Many adverse consequences are attributed to urban sprawl (e.g., traffic congestion, air pollution and social segregation), though here we are concerned primarily with the rising costs of providing local public services. Our initial aim is to develop an accurate measure of urban sprawl so that we might empirically test its impact on municipal budgets. Then, we undertake an empirical analysis using a cross-sectional data set of 2,500 Spanish municipalities for the year 2003 and a piecewise linear function to account for the potentially nonlinear relationship between sprawl and local costs. The estimations derived from the expenditure equations for both aggregate and six disaggregated spending categories indicate that low-density development patterns lead to greater provision costs of local public services.Urban sprawl, local public spending.

Inter-regional redistribution through infrastructure investment: tactical or programmatic?

In this paper we analyze the effects of both tactical and programmatic politics on the inter-regional allocation of infrastructure investment. We use a panel of data for the Spanish electoral districts during the period 1964-2004 to estimate an equation where investment depends both on economic and political variables. The results show that tactical politics do matter since, after controlling for economic traits, the districts with more ‘Political power’ still receive more investment. These districts are those where the incumbents’ Vote margin of victory/ defeat in the past election is low, where the Marginal seat price is low, where there is Partisan alignment between the executives at the central and regional layers of government, and where there are Pivotal regional parties which are influential in the formation of the central executive. However, the results also show that programmatic politics matter, since inter-regional redistribution (measured as the elasticity of investment to per capita income) is shown to increase with the arrival of the Democracy and EU Funds, with Left governments, and to decrease the higher is the correlation between a measure of ‘Political power’ and per capita income.Infrastructures, Political Economy, Redistribution

The Effects of Partisan Alignment on the Allocation of Intergovernmental Transfers. Differences-in-Differences Estimates for Spain

In this paper we test the hypothesis that municipalities aligned with upper-tier grantor governments (i.e., controlled by the same party) will receive more grants than those that are unaligned. We use a rich Spanish database, which provides information on grants received by nearly 900 municipalities during the period 1993-2003 from three different upper-tier governments (i.e., Central, Regional and Upper-local). Since three elections were held at each tier during this period, we have enough within-municipality variation in partisan alignment to provide differences-in-differences estimates of the effects of alignment on the amount of grants coming from each source. Moreover, the fact that a municipality may simultaneously receive grants from aligned and unaligned grantors allows us to use a triple-differences estimator, which consists of estimating the effects of changing alignment status on the change in grants coming from the aligned grantors relative to the change in grants coming from the unaligned ones. The results suggest that partisan alignment has a sizeable positive effect on the amount of grants received by municipalities.grant allocation, alignment, electoral competition

Tax differentials and agglomeration economies in intraregional firm location

This paper analyses empirically how differences in local taxes affect the intraregional location of new manufacturing plants. These effects are examined within the random profit maximization framework while accounting for the presence of different types of agglomeration economies (localization/ urbanization/ Jacobs’ economies) at the municipal level. We look at the location decision of more than 10,000 establishments locating between 1996 and 2003 across more than 400 municipalities in Catalonia, a Spanish region. It is necessary to restrict the choice set to the local labor market and, above all, to control for agglomeration economies so as to identify the effects of taxes on the location of new establishments.Local taxes, Agglomeration economies, Firm location.

Which Communities should be afraid of Mobility? The Effects of Agglomeration Economies on the Sensitivity of Firm Location to Local Taxes

This paper examines the effects of agglomeration economies (AE) on the sensitivity of firm location to tax differentials. An initial reading of the story suggests that, with AE, when a firm moves into a community attracted by a tax reduction, other firms may decide to move in as well. This suggests that AE increase the sensitivity of firm location to local taxes. However, a second version of the story reads that, if economic activities are highly concentrated in space, AE might offset any tax differential, hence suggesting a reduction in this sensitivity. This paper provides a theoretical model of intraregional firm location with Marshallian AE that is able to generate both hypotheses: AE increase (decrease) the effect of taxes when locations are (are not) of a similar size. We then use Spanish municipal data for the period 1995-2002 to test these hypotheses, analyzing the combined effect of local business taxes and Marshallian AE on the intraregional location of employment. In line with the theory, a municipality with stronger AE experiences lower (higher) tax effects if it is sufficiently dissimilar (similar) to its neighbors in terms of size.local taxes, agglomeration economies, local employment growth, instrumental variables

The effects of partisan alignment on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers. Differences-in-differences estimates for Spain

In this paper we test the hypothesis that municipalities aligned with upper-tier grantor governments (i.e., controlled by the same party) will receive more grants than those that are unaligned. We use a rich Spanish database, which provides information on grants received by nearly 900 municipalities during the period 1993-2003 from three different upper-tier governments (i.e., Central, Regional and Upper-local). Since three elections were held at each tier during this period, we have enough within-municipality variation in partisan alignment to provide differences-in-differences estimates of the effects of alignment on the amount of grants coming from each source. Moreover, the fact that a municipality may simultaneously receive grants from aligned and unaligned grantors allows us to use a triple-differences estimator, which consists of estimating the effects of changing alignment status on the change in grants coming from the aligned grantors relative to the change in grants coming from the unaligned ones. The results suggest that partisan alignment has a sizeable positive effect on the amount of grants received by municipalities. Length: 33 pagesgrant allocation, alignment, electoral competition

Vertical income tax externalities and fiscal interdependence: evidence from the US

Concurrent taxation is a feature of many federal systems. As a consequence of this fact, the tax policy of one level of government affects the tax base of the other. This paper carries out a theoretical analysis of the interdependent tax-setting decisions of federal and regional governments, paying special attention to institutional features that characterise the U.S. federal system in practice and that formally link the taxes employed at various levels of government (i.e.: tax deductibility). The developed hypotheses are tested with data corresponding to the U.S. personal income taxes for the last decade. We find that when the federal government increases taxes, there is a significant positive response of regional taxes. --

The dynamic adjustment of local government budgets : Does Spain behave differently?

[spa] El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar si los municipios españoles se ajustan en presencia de un shock presupuestario y (si es así) qué elementos del presupuesto son los que realizan el ajuste. La metodología utilizada para contestar estas preguntas es un mecanismo de corrección del error, VECM, que estimamos con un panel de datos de los municipios españoles durante el período 1988-2006. Nuestros resultados confirman que, en primer lugar, los municipios se ajustan en presencia de un shock fiscal (es decir, el déficit es estacionario en el largo plazo). En segundo lugar, obtenemos que cuando el shock afecta a los ingresos el ajuste lo soporta principalmente el municipio reduciendo el gasto, las transferencias tienen un papel muy reducido en este proceso de ajuste. Por el contrario, cuando el shock afecta al gasto, el ajuste es compartido en términos similares entre el municipio – incrementado los impuestos – y los gobiernos de niveles superiores – incrementando las transferencias. Estos resultados sugieren que la viabilidad de las finanzas pública locales es factible con diferentes entornos institucionales.[eng] The aim of this paper is to analyze whether Spanish municipalities adjust in response to budget shocks and (if so) which elements of the budget they are more likely to adjust. The methodology we use to answer these questions is a vector error-correction model , VECM, estimated with data from a panel of Spanish municipalities during the period 1988-2006. Our results confirm, first, that municipalities do indeed make adjustments in response to fiscal shocks (i.e., the deficit is stationary in the long run). Second, we find that most of the adjustment to a revenue shock is borne by the municipalities themselves as they proceed to cut expenditures, with a minor role being played by grant financing. By contrast, adjustments to expenditure shocks are shared on largely equal terms by the municipality –through the raising of taxes– and higher tiers of government –through the raising of grants. These results suggest that the viability of the local finance system is feasible with different institutional arrangements