La mejor versión de nosotros mismos

Una cuestión importante que ha sido discutida en los últimos años es la de en base a qué podemos decir que estamos justificados a afirmar la verdad de un enunciado. Tanto los pragmatistas americanos como los wittgeusteinianos han sembrado dudas sobre la existencia de criterios trascendentes para determinar cuándo un enunciado está garantizado. En este artículo desarrollaré la polémica que en la última década han protagonizado Putnam y Rorty. Presentaré dudas y razones para cuestionar las soluciones propuestas por ambos autores

Las prácticas de hablar, nombrar e interpretar: Observaciones sobre el interpretacionismo de Alberto Moretti

In this paper I argue that the notion of interpretation presented by Alberto Moretti in “La unidad proposicional” (and other texts) poses some philosophical and metaphilosophical problems. After presenting the key ideas that characterize the interpretative practice as Moretti describes it, I criticize its incompatibility with naturalism —one that understands interpretational practices in terms of natural capacities with phylogenetic and ontogenetic histories— and Moretti’s commitment to ineffabilism regarding the foundations of interpretative practices. I argue that if we abandon the idea that intentional capacities always involve conceptual content, a central commitment of Moretti’s interpretationist strategy, we can make room for a soft naturalistic understanding of interpretational capacities that is also pluralistic about the conditions for a practice to be linguistic and non-ineffabilist about its origins.En este texto se argumenta que la noción de interpretación desarrollada por Alberto Moretti en “La unidad proposicional” (y otros textos) presenta algunos problemas filosóficos y metafilosóficos. Después de presentar las ideas centrales de la práctica interpretativa que defiende Moretti, se cuestionan en particular su incompatibilidad con un tratamiento naturalista de las capacidades de hablar e interpretar, que las entiende como capacidades naturales con historias filo y ontogenéticas, y el hecho de que se compromete con una posición inefabilista acerca de los fundamentos de dicha práctica. Se argumenta que el abandono de la idea de que las capacidades intencionales siempre presuponen la manipulación de contenidos conceptuales, como postula la estrategia interpretativa, abre las puertas para un naturalismo acerca de las capacidades de hablar, nombrar e interpretar. Este naturalismo es además, pluralista respecto de los rasgos necesarios y/o suficientes que hacen de una práctica una práctica lingüística, y no inefabilista acerca de su fundamento

McDowell v. Kripke: Práctica comunitaria y semántica de condiciones De verdad

This paper explores McDowell's criticisms to Kripke's argumentation in his Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language, and analyses his positive proposal, that is, the offering of a primitive semantic fact. His idea is that the skeptical result reached by Kripke depends on not having discarded the identification between meaning and interpretation. On the contrary, the ITamework to explain the notion of meaning is the practice: the primitive semantic facts - that may be established by truth-values semantics - are constituted by the communitarian practice, and we get an individual insight of them. In my view, not only the criticism of McDowell to Kripke is erroneous, but also his positive proposal presents fundamental problems, in his conception ofnormativity as well as in his epistemic aspects. The conclusion of this paper will be to show how the real problem for a semantic theory is the identification ofmeaning with any kind of fact and not only the identification of meaning and interpretation.Este trabajo explora las críticas de McDowell a la argumentación de Kripke en Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language y analiza su propuesta positiva, el ofrecimiento de un hecho semántico primitivo. Su idea es que el resultado escéptico alcanzado por Kripke resulta de no haber desechado la identificación entre significado e interpretación. Al contrario, el marco para dar cuenta de la noción de significado es la práctica: los hechos semánticos primitivos -elaborables a través de una semántica de condiciones de verdad- son constituidos en la práctica comunitaria, y de ellos tenemos una captación individual. En mi opinión no sólo la crítica de McDowell a Kripke es errada, sino que su propuesta positiva presenta problemas fundamentales, tanto en su concepción de la normatividad como en sus aspectos epistémicos. El corolario de este trabajo será mostrar que el verdadero problema para una teoría semántica es la identificación del significado con cualquier tipo de hecho y no meramente la identificación del significado con la interpretación

Interactive expertise in solo and joint musical performance

The paper presents two empirical cases of expert musicians-a classical string quartet and a solo, free improvisation saxophonist-to analyze the explanatory power and reach of theories in the field of expertise studies and joint action. We argue that neither the positions stressing top-down capacities of prediction, planning or perspective-taking, nor those emphasizing bottom-up embodied processes of entrainment, motor-responses and emotional sharing can do justice to the empirical material. We then turn to hybrid theories in the expertise debate and interactionist accounts of cognition. Attempting to strengthen and extend them, we offer \u27Arch\u27: an overarching conception of musical interaction as an externalized, cognitive scaffold that encompasses high and low-level cognition, internal and external processes, as well as the shared normative space including the musical materials in which the musicians perform. In other words, \u27Arch\u27 proposes interaction as a multivariate multimodal overarching scaffold necessary to explain not only cases of joint performance, but equally of solo improvisation

Helping Behavior and Joint Action in Young Children

An important idea due to Tomasello and others is that the human capacity as the human capacity for social cooperation is at the heart of the species’ capacity to understand others’ mental states and behavior. Furthermore, they argue that this idea allows for an explanation of how humans came to share thoughts and language. While this is a promising idea, the special attempt to pursue this hypothesis in developmental studies and evolutionary theory developed by Tomasello and his research group faces several problems. This is especially apparent in their attempts to explain helping behavior and joint action in young children. In this paper, we argue that many of these problems result from assuming that the right explanation of joint action and simple forms of shared intentionality is given by Bratman’s theory of shared intentions

Interaction and self-correction

In this paper, I address the question of how to account for the normative dimension involved in conceptual competence in a naturalistic framework. First, I present what I call the naturalist challenge (NC), referring to both the phylogenetic and ontogenetic dimensions of conceptual possession and acquisition. I then criticize two models that have been dominant in thinking about conceptual competence, the interpretationist and the causalist models. Both fail to meet NC, by failing to account for the abilities involved in conceptual self-correction. I then offer an alternative account of self-correction that I develop with the help of the interactionist theory of mutual understanding arising from recent developments in phenomenology and developmental psychology

A two-step theory of the evolution of human thinking Joint and (various) collective forms of intentionality

Social accounts of objective content, like the one advanced by Tomasello(2014), are traditionally challenged by an \u27essential tension\u27 (Hutto and Satne 2015). The tension is the following: while sociality is deemed to be at the basis of thinking, in order to explain sociality, some form of thinking seems to be necessarily presupposed. In this contribution I analyse Tomasello\u27s twostep theory of the evolution of human thinking vis-à-vis this challenge. While his theory is in principle suited to address it, I claim that the specifics of the first step and the notion of perspective that infuse it are problematic in this regard. I end by briefly sketching an alternative

Varieties of collective action: a multidimensional and paradigmatic methodology for their study

Collective intentional actions are intentional actions of more than one individual. These actions come in many forms. Some are pursued spontaneously by strangers in face-to-face situations, others are performed by highly coordinated groups of individuals that know each other very well, others are actions in which the participating individuals, widely spread in space and time, act in organized ways. Current accounts of collective intentional action have privileged one or other kind of case, leaving out the study of other cases. This paper seeks to remedy this situation by offering a methodological framework that allows to study, both conceptually and empirically, all the variety of cases of collective intentional actions. It first presents the standard accounts of collective intentional action and argues that they fail in capturing all the cases that arguably count as cases of this kind. It then puts forward a multidimensional and paradigmatic (MAP) methodology for the study of collective intentional actions. It is shown how this methodology offers a unified, overarching, characterization of collective intentional actions. In conclusion, the paper compares the different methodologies and shows how the MAP methodology can inform the interdisciplinary study of collective intentional action