333 research outputs found
Russell-names: an introduction to Millian descriptivism
This essay studies the semantic properties of what I call Russell-names. Russell-names bear intimate semantic relations with descriptive conditions, in consonance with the main tenets of descriptivism. Yet, they are endowed with the semantic properties attributed to ordinary proper names by Millianism: they are rigid and non-indexical devices of direct reference. This is not an essay in natural language semantics, and remains deliberately neutral with respect to the question whether any among the expressions we ordinarily classify as proper names behave as Russell-names. Its aim is rather that of casting a new light on the traditional debate about descriptivism on the one hand, and, on the other, what is commonly understood as a radically anti-descriptivist approach. From the viewpoint of descriptivism, the conceivability of Russell-names provides welcome relief from the pressure exerted by considerations at odds with a flaccid and/or indexical treatment of proper names. Conversely, from a Millian standpoint, the conceivability of Russell-names indicates that the Millian stance, far from providing a meagre picture of names as âmere tagsâ, is at least in principle consistent with the recognition of their semantic bonds with richer descriptive material. The Appendix provides a formal treatment of Russell-names within a model theoretic semantics for indexical intensional languages, developed within an original âdouble-contextâ framework
Can Modal Skepticism Defeat Humean Skepticism?
My topic is moderate modal skepticism in the spirit of Peter van Inwagen. Here understood, this is a conservative version of modal empiricism that severely limits the extent to which an ordinary agent can reasonably believe âexoticâ possibility claims. I offer a novel argument in support of this brand of skepticism: modal skepticism grounds an attractive (and novel) reply to Humean skepticism. Thus, I propose that modal skepticism be accepted on the basis of its theoretical utility as a tool for dissolving philosophical paradox
Unity through truth
Renewed worries about the unity of the proposition have been taken as a crucial stumbling block for any traditional conception of propositions. These worries are often framed in terms of how entities independent of mind and language can have truth conditions: why is the proposition that Desdemona loves Cassio true if and only if she loves him? I argue that the best understanding of these worries shows that they should be solved by our theory of truth and not our theory of content. Specifically, I propose a version of the redundancy theory according to which âit is true that Desdemona loves Cassioâ expresses the same proposition as âDesdemona loves Cassioâ. Surprisingly, this variant of the redundancy theory treats âis trueâ as an ordinary predicate of the language, thereby defusing many standard criticisms of the redundancy theory
Naming and Non-necessity
Kripkeâs examples of allegedly contingent a priori sentences include
âStick S is exactly one meter longâ, where the reference of âmeterâ is fixed by the
description âthe length of stick Sâ. In response to skepticism concerning apriority
Kripke replaced the meter sentence with a more sophisticated variant, arguing that
the modified example is more immune to such skepticism. The case for apriority is
examined. A distinction is drawn between apriority and a broader notion, âqua-
priority,â of a truth whose epistemic justification is dependent on no experience
other than that required to justify belief of the deliverances of pure semantics. It is
argued that Kripkeâs examples are neither a priori nor qua-priori
Theories of Reference: What Was the Question?
The new theory of reference has won popularity. However, a number of noted philosophers have also attempted to reply to the critical arguments of Kripke and others, and aimed to vindicate the description theory of reference. Such responses are often based on ingenious novel kinds of descriptions, such as rigidified descriptions, causal descriptions, and metalinguistic descriptions. This prolonged debate raises the doubt whether different parties really have any shared understanding of what the central question of the philosophical theory of reference is: what is the main question to which descriptivism and the causal-historical theory have presented competing answers. One aim of the paper is to clarify this issue. The most influential objections to the new theory of reference are critically reviewed. Special attention is also paid to certain important later advances in the new theory of reference, due to Devitt and others
The Prenective View of Propositional Content
Beliefs have what I will call âpropositional contentâ. A belief is always a belief that so-and-so: a belief that grass is green, or a belief that snow is white, or whatever. Other things have propositional content too, such as sentences, judgments and assertions. The Standard View amongst philosophers is that what it is to have a propositional content is to stand in an appropriate relation to a proposition. Moreover, on this view, propositions are objects, i.e. the kind of thing you can refer to with singular terms. For example, on the Standard View, we should parse the sentence âSimon believes that Sharon is funnyâ as: [Simon] believes [that Sharon is funny]; âSimonâ is a term referring to a thinking subject, âthat Sharon is funnyâ is a term referring to a proposition, and âx believes yâ is a dyadic predicate expressing the believing relation. In this paper, I argue against the Standard View. This is how I think we should parse âSimon believes that Sharon is funnyâ: [Simon] believes that [Sharon is funny]; here we have a singular term, âSimonâ, a sentence âSharon is funnyâ, and a âprenectiveâ joining them together, âx believes that pâ. On this Prenective View, we do not get at the propositional content of someoneâs belief by referring to a reified proposition with a singular term; we simply use the sentence âSharon is funnyâ to express that content for ourselves. I argue for the Prenective View in large part by showing that an initially attractive version of the Standard View is actually vulnerable to the same objection that Wittgenstein used against Russellâs multiple-relation theory of judgment
Propositions on the cheap
According to the classical account, propositions are sui generis, abstract, intrinsically-representational entities and our cognitive attitudes, and the token states within us that realize those attitudes, represent as they do in virtue of their propositional objects. In light of a desire to explain how it could be that propositions represent, much of the recent literature on propositions has pressured various aspects of this account. In place of the classical account, revisionists have aimed to understand propositions in terms of more familiar entities such as facts, types of mental or linguistic acts, and even properties. But we think that the metaphysical story about propositions is much simpler than either the classical theorist or the revisionist would have you believe. In what follows, we argue that a proper understanding of the nature of our cognitive relations to propositions shows that the question of whether propositions themselves represent is, at best, a distraction. We will argue that once this distraction is removed, the possibility of a very pleasing, minimalist story of propositions emerges; a story that appeals only to assumptions that are (or, at least ought to be) shared by all theorists in the relevant debate
Three-dimensional analysis of the proximal humeral and glenoid geometry using MicroScribe 3D digitizer
Whoâs afraid of the predicate theory of names?
This essay is devoted to an analysis of the semantic significance of a fashionable view of proper names, the Predicate Theory of names (PT), typically developed in the direction of the Metalinguistic Theory of names (MT). According to MT, âsyntactic evidence supports the conclusion that a name such as âKennedyâ is analyzable in terms of the predicate (general term) âindividual named âKennedyââ. This analysis is in turn alleged to support a descriptivist treatment of proper names in designative position, presumably in contrast with theories of names as âdirectly referring rigid designatorsâ. The main aim of this essay is that of questioning the significance of PT and MT as theories of designation: even granting for the argumentâs sake that names are analyzable as (metalinguistic) predicates, their designative occurrences may be interpreted in consonance with the dictates of Direct Referenceâindeed, in consonance with the radically anti-descriptivist version of Direct Reference I call Millianism
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