The Psychology of Workplace Deviant & Criminal Behavior

The 2013 book Deviant and Criminal Behavior in the Workplace addresses the psychological constructs, situations, and environments underlying active counterproductive workplace behaviors. Building on a diverse range of psychological findings, this book highlights that the field of criminology needs to expand outside of the realm of violence and instead look at how deviant workplace behaviors can tie into—and motivate—other types of crime

Retribution Drives Our Decisions to Punish, but Punishment Is Not the Only Moral Choice

When people decide to punish others, their choice is driven almost entirely by retribution. However, the decision not to punish, although often interpreted as self-interested or morally disinterested, may in fact be based on powerful moral self-reflection and considerations.York's Knowledge Mobilization Unit provides services and funding for faculty, graduate students, and community organizations seeking to maximize the impact of academic research and expertise on public policy, social programming, and professional practice. It is supported by SSHRC and CIHR grants, and by the Office of the Vice-President Research & Innovation. [email protected] www.researchimpact.c

Can Soft Regulation Prevent Financial Crises?: The Dutch Central Bank\u27s Supervision of Behavior and Culture

Financial regulation has traditionally been hard : national legislatures and regulators (and sometimes international bodies) require certain kinds of behavior and forbid others, on pain of business sanctions, fines, or even criminal penalties. When a financial crisis happens, the usual after-the-fact response is more hard regulation-new laws, stricter regulations, and often entirely new regulatory agencies.That pattern goes back at least to the 1929 market crash that precipitated the Great Depression. But the fact that financial crises still occur is leading many observers to wonder if more hard regulation is the best way to prevent the next one. However elaborate the regulatory structure, there always seem to be people in the industry willing to take the risk of getting caught to benefit themselves and their institutions. There is a growing body of opinion that what the financial world needs is a way to identify those pathological risktakers in advance and, perhaps more importantly, to make sure that the financial institutions that employ them discover and control them. Such an approach to financial governance might be characterized as soft supervision: rather than relying on prescribing, proscribing, and punishing specific actions, it would focus on education and persuasion (still backed up by the threat of sanctions) to encourage financial institutions to head off excessive risk-taking before it occurs. In this Article, we report on an in-depth study of the first major effort to put this theory into practice: De Nederlansche Bank\u27s (DNB; the central bank of the Netherlands) novel initiative to promote a healthy corporate culture in the large banks that it supervises. Despite its radical originality, this initiative has been almost entirely unreported in the U.S. legal and business literatures. As with all central banks, DNB\u27s traditional mandate has been to ensure the stability and integrity of the national financial system by promulgating and enforcing regulations and supervising individual banks. The financial crisis of 2007-2008 prompted DNB to reassess the adequacy of that model. In response, it has expanded its supervision to include the evaluation of both individual behavior and group-level culture- Behaviour & Culture (B&C) -supervision. We have investigated the history and theoretical roots of B&C supervision; interviewed a large number of participants, both regulators and regulated, to understand their practical perspectives; explored the connections between B&C supervision and relevant themes in law and the social sciences; and considered the implications of B&C supervision for banking regulation elsewhere. We conclude that, while the response to B&C supervision has been generally positive, the tangible effect of its supervision remains unproven. Moreover, its relative positive reception may depend on the specific business culture of the Netherlands, which casts doubt on whether it can be exported to larger banking systems

Can Soft Regulation Prevent Financial Crises?: The Dutch Central Bank\u27s Supervision of Behavior and Culture

Financial regulation has traditionally been hard : national legislatures and regulators (and sometimes international bodies) require certain kinds of behavior and forbid others, on pain of business sanctions, fines, or even criminal penalties. When a financial crisis happens, the usual after-the-fact response is more hard regulation-new laws, stricter regulations, and often entirely new regulatory agencies.That pattern goes back at least to the 1929 market crash that precipitated the Great Depression. But the fact that financial crises still occur is leading many observers to wonder if more hard regulation is the best way to prevent the next one. However elaborate the regulatory structure, there always seem to be people in the industry willing to take the risk of getting caught to benefit themselves and their institutions. There is a growing body of opinion that what the financial world needs is a way to identify those pathological risktakers in advance and, perhaps more importantly, to make sure that the financial institutions that employ them discover and control them. Such an approach to financial governance might be characterized as soft supervision: rather than relying on prescribing, proscribing, and punishing specific actions, it would focus on education and persuasion (still backed up by the threat of sanctions) to encourage financial institutions to head off excessive risk-taking before it occurs. In this Article, we report on an in-depth study of the first major effort to put this theory into practice: De Nederlansche Bank\u27s (DNB; the central bank of the Netherlands) novel initiative to promote a healthy corporate culture in the large banks that it supervises. Despite its radical originality, this initiative has been almost entirely unreported in the U.S. legal and business literatures. As with all central banks, DNB\u27s traditional mandate has been to ensure the stability and integrity of the national financial system by promulgating and enforcing regulations and supervising individual banks. The financial crisis of 2007-2008 prompted DNB to reassess the adequacy of that model. In response, it has expanded its supervision to include the evaluation of both individual behavior and group-level culture- Behaviour & Culture (B&C) -supervision. We have investigated the history and theoretical roots of B&C supervision; interviewed a large number of participants, both regulators and regulated, to understand their practical perspectives; explored the connections between B&C supervision and relevant themes in law and the social sciences; and considered the implications of B&C supervision for banking regulation elsewhere. We conclude that, while the response to B&C supervision has been generally positive, the tangible effect of its supervision remains unproven. Moreover, its relative positive reception may depend on the specific business culture of the Netherlands, which casts doubt on whether it can be exported to larger banking systems

News from the SIOP-United Nations team: Exploring work experiences of informal workers and promoting decent work for all

For the first time, the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology (SIOP) has funded a humanitarian work psychology research project under the SIOP Foundation’s Grants and Awards program this year. The project is led by Mahima Saxena from the Illinois Institute of Technology and John Scott from APTMetrics, and is titled, “I-O Psychology and ILO: Exploring Work Experiences of Informal Workers and Promoting Decent Work for All.

The Role of Organizational Control Systems in Employees’ Organizational Trust and Performance Outcomes

This study examined how organizational control is related to employees’ organizational trust. We specifically focus on how different forms of control (process, outcome, and normative) relate to employees’ trust in their employing organizations and examine whether such trust in turn relates positively to employee job performance (task performance and organizational citizenship behavior). In addition, and in response to the recommendations of past research, we examined these relationships in a high control and compliance-based cultural context. Using data from 105 employee–supervisor dyads from professional services firms in Singapore, we find support for our hypothesized model. The implications of the results for theory and practice, and directions for future research, are discussed.Economics of Technology and Innovatio