190 research outputs found

    Industrial tourism as a chance for the diversification of the tourism of the Pécs-Mecsek region

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    The present article intends to reveal the industrial tourism potential of the Pécs-Mecsek region in Hungary where we believe there is an adequate potential of the present industrial heritage but only a limited or rather poor utilisation is realised in the research area in this respect. The possible utilisation of the industrial heritage would be useful since the area is facing a stagnating tourism industry and position losses in the latter period so the authors believe that the chance for the renewal of tourism product development could also be provided by the industrial heritage tourism in the analysed region

    Structural Topology Optimization with Stress Constraint Considering Loading Uncertainties

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    This paper deals with the consideration of loading uncertainties in topology optimization via a fundamental optimization problem setting. Variability of loading in engineering design is realized e.g. in the action of various load combinations. In this study this phenomenon is modelled by the application of two mutually excluding (i.e. alternating) forces such that the magnitudes and directions are varied parametrically in a range. The optimization problem is stated as to find the minimum volume (i.e. the minimum weight) load-bearing elastic truss structure that transfers such loads acting at a fix point of application to a given line of support provided that stress limits are set. The aim of this paper is to numerically determine the layout, size, and volume of the optimal truss and to support the numerical results by appropriate analytical derivations. We also show that the optimum solution is non-unique, which aects the static determinacy of the structure as well. In this paper we also create a truss-like structure with rigid connections based on the results of the truss optimization and analyse it both as a bar structure (frame model) and a planar continuum (disk) structure to compare with the truss model. The comparative investigation assesses the validity of computational models and proves that the choice aects design negatively since rigidity of connections resulted by usual construction technologies involve extra stresses leading to significant undersizing

    Parametric Study on the Element Size Effect for Optimal Topologies

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    Topology optimization is complex engineering design tool. It needs intensive mathematical, mechanical and computing tools to perform the required design. During its hundred years of history it has become clear that the non-unique solution property of the method is affected by the material parameters (Poisson ratio) and the ways of the discretization. The aim of the paper is to investigate the influence of parameter changes to optimal design property in tasks with great number of degrees of freedom. The parametric study includes influence of material parameter (Poisson ratio) as well as the size of the ground elements which are commonly applied during the discretization. Increasing the size of the ground elements while the total number of the finite elements is constant, the computational time is significantly reduced. Therefore the study on changing accuracy versus ground element resolution may be important factor in choosing ground element size. In addition to it the effective properties of arrangements of the strong and weak materials (black and white elements) in a checkerboard fashion are also investigated. The Michell-type problem is investigated by the minimization of the weight of the structure subjected to a compliance constraint

    Would depositors pay to show that they do not withdraw? Theory and experiment

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    In a Diamond–Dybvig type model of fnancial intermediation, we allow depositors to announce at a positive cost to subsequent depositors that they keep their funds deposited in the bank. Theoretically, the mere availability of public announcements (and not its use) ensures that no bank run is the unique equilibrium outcome. Multiple equilibria—including bank run—exist without such public announcements. We test the theoretical results in the lab and fnd a widespread use of announcements, which we interpret as an attempt to coordinate on the no bank run outcome. Withdrawal rates in general are lower in information sets that contain announcement

    Would depositors like to show others that they do not withdraw?

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    Does payoff equity facilitate coordination?

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    Abstract Starting from Schelling (1960), several game theorists have conjectured that payoff equity might facilitate coordination in normal-form games with multiple equilibria – the more equitable equilibrium might be selected either because fairness makes it focal or because many individuals dislike payoff inequities, as abundant experimental evidence suggests. In this line, we propose a selection principle called Equity (EQ), which selects the equilibrium in pure strategies minimizing the difference between the highest and smallest money payoff, if only one such equilibrium exists. Using a within-subjects experimental design, furthermore, we study the relative performance of EQ in twelve simple 2 × 2 coordination games. In many of these games, we find that EQ explains individual behavior better than a large range of alternative theories, including theories of bounded rationality and several other equilibrium selection principles. Yet we also observe that the frequency of EQ play depends on the payoff structure of the game. For instance, EQ play diminishes when the alternative equilibrium is socially efficient and not very unfair (compared with the EQ equilibrium). Our data suggests that equilibrium selection is affected by several factors and that subjects are heterogeneous in this respect, but also that equity is often a crucial factor to understand coordination

    Does payoff equity facilitate coordination? : a test of schelling’s conjecture

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    Starting from Schelling (1960), several game theorists have conjectured that payoff equity might facilitate coordination in normal-form games with multiple equilibria ‒the more equitable equilibrium might be selected either because fairness makes it focal or because many individuals dislike payoff inequities, as abundant experimental evidence suggests. In this line, we propose a selection principle called Equity (EQ), which selects the equilibrium in pure strategies minimizing the difference between the highest and smallest payoff, if only one such equilibrium exists. Using a within-subjects experimental design, furthermore, we study the relative performance of the equity principle in six simple 2x2 coordination games. Overall, we find that Equity explains individual behavior better than a large range of alternative theories, including theories of bounded rationality and several other equilibrium selection principles. Further, a classification analysis suggests the existence of two main groups of players: (i) players who tend to play as Equity predicts, and (ii) a miscellaneous group of players who either go for the risk dominant equilibrium or act in a boundedly rational manner. This heterogeneity seems to be behind most of the coordination failures that we observe
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