95 research outputs found
Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the core
[cat] En aquest treball introduĂŻm la classe de "multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games", que generalitza la coneguda classe de jocs dâassignaciĂł de Böhm-Bawerk bilaterals a situacions amb un nombre arbitrari de sectors. Trobem els extrems del core de qualsevol multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game a partir dâun joc convex definit en el conjunt de sectors enlloc del conjunt de venedors i compradors. Addicionalment estudiem quan el core dâaquests jocs dâassignaciĂł Ă©s estable en el sentit de von Neumann-Morgenstern.[eng] We introduce the class of multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games, which generalizes the well-kown two-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games to situations with an arbitrary number of sectors. We reach the extreme core allocations of any multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game by means of an associated convex game defined on the set of sectors instead of the set of sellers and buyers. We also study when the core of these games is stable in the sense of von Neumann-Morgenstern
Multi-sided Bohm-Bawerk assignment markets: the core
We introduce the class of multi-sided B ohm-Bawerk assignment games, which generalizes the well-kown two-sided B ohm-Bawerk assignment games to situations with an arbitrary number of sectors. We reach the extreme core allocations of any multi-sided B ohm- Bawerk assignment game by means of an associated convex game defined on the set of sectors instead of the set of sellers and buyers. We also study when the core of these games is stable in the sense of von Neumann-Morgenstern.homogeneous goods, core, assignment games, multi-sided markets, extreme points
Complements and substitutes in multilateral assignment markets
I prove that, in assignment markets with more than two sides, agents of different sides (or sectors) need not be complements, whereas agents of the same side need not be substitutes. Shapley (1962) showed that this cannot happen when assignment markets are bilateral. Nevertheless, I found sufficient conditions, that always hold for bilateral markets, that guarantee substitutability and a extended notion of complementarity among agents in arbitrary multilateral assignment markets. I also prove that Shapleys (1962) result always holds regardless the number of sectors of the market when goods in the market are homogeneous.complementarity, homogeneous goods, substitutability, assignment problem, multi-sided assignment markets
A note on competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets
A multilateral assignment market with buyers and a number of different types of firms can be modeled by a multi-sided assignment game. We prove that core allocations of the latter are in a one-to-one correspondence with competitive prices of the former, where the notion of competitive price extends that of Roth and Sotomayor (1990). This result generalizes to multi-sided assignment markets the characterization of competitive prices known for the two-sided case.Assignment games, multi-sided markets, competitive prices, core
A theoretical and practical study on linear reforms of dual taxes
We extend the linear reforms introduced by Pfšahler (1984) to the case of dual taxes. We study the relative effect that linear dual tax cuts have on the inequality of income distribution -a symmetrical study can be made for dual linear tax hikes-. We also introduce measures of the degree of progressivity for dual taxes and show that they can be connected to the Lorenz dominance criterion. Additionally, we study the tax liability elasticity of each of the reforms proposed. Finally, by means of a microsimulation model and a considerably large data set of taxpayers drawn from 2004 Spanish Income Tax Return population, 1) we compare different yield-equivalent tax cuts applied to the Spanish dual income tax and 2) we investigate how much income redistribution the dual tax reform (Act â35/2006â) introduced with respect to the previous tax.Dual taxes, linear reforms, Lorenz domination, lattices
A theoretical and practical study on linear reforms of dual taxes
We extend the linear reforms introduced by Pf ahler (1984) to the case of dual taxes. We study the relative effect that linear dual tax cuts have on the inequality of income distribution -a symmetrical study can be made for dual linear tax hikes-. We also introduce measures of the degree of progressivity for dual taxes and show that they can be connected to the Lorenz dominance criterion. Additionally, we study the tax liability elasticity of each of the reforms proposed. Finally, by means of a microsimulation model and a considerably large data set of taxpayers drawn from 2004 Spanish Income Tax Return population, 1) we compare different yield-equivalent tax cuts applied to the Spanish dual income tax and 2) we investigate how much income redistribution the dual tax reform (Act 35/2006) introduced with respect to the previous tax.lattices, dual taxes, lorenz domination, linear reforms
Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets
We extend Rochfords (1983) notion of symmetrically pairwise-bargained equilibrium to assignment games with more than two sides. A symmetrically multilateral-bargained (SMB) allocation is a core allocation such that any agent is in equilibrium with respect to a negotiation process among all agents based on what every agent could receive -and use as a threat- in her preferred alternative matching to the optimal matching that is formed. We prove that, for balanced multi-sided assignment games, the set of SMB is always nonempty and that, unlike the two-sided case, it does not coincide in general with the kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965). We also give an answer to an open question formulated by Rochford (1983) by introducing a kernel-based set that, together with the core, characterizes the set of SMB.core, bargaining, cooperative games, kernel
A theoretical and practical study on linear reforms of dual taxes
[cat] En aquest treball extenem les reformes lineals introduĂŻdes per PfĂ€hler (1984) al cas dâimpostos duals. Estudiem lâefecte relatiu que els retalls lineals duals dâun impost dual tenen sobre la distribuciĂł de la desigualtat -es pot fer un estudi simĂštric per al cas dâaugments dâimpostos-. Tambe introduĂŻm mesures del grau de progressivitat dâimpostos duals i mostrem que estan connectades amb el criteri de dominaciĂł de Lorenz. Addicionalment, estudiem lâelasticitat de la cĂ rrega fiscal de cadascuna de les reformes proposades. Finalment, grĂ cies a un model de microsimulaciĂł i una gran base de dades que contĂ© informaciĂł sobre lâIRPF espanyol de lâany 2004, 1) comparem lâefecte que diferents reformes tindrien sobre lâimpost dual espanyol i 2) estudiem quina redistribuciĂł de la riquesa va suposar la reforma dual de lâIRPF (Llei â35/2006â) respecte lâanterior impost.[eng] We extend the linear reforms introduced by PfĂ€hler (1984) to the case of dual taxes. We study the relative effect that linear dual tax cuts have on the inequality of income distribution -a symmetrical study can be made for dual linear tax hikes-. We also introduce measures of the degree of progressivity for dual taxes and show that they can be connected to the Lorenz dominance criterion. Additionally, we study the tax liability elasticity of each of the reforms proposed. Finally, by means of a microsimulation model and a considerably large data set of taxpayers drawn from 2004 Spanish Income Tax Return population, 1) we compare different yield-equivalent tax cuts applied to the Spanish dual income tax and 2) we investigate how much income redistribution the dual tax reform (Act â35/2006â) introduced with respect to the previous tax
Sophisticated Attacks on Decoy Ballots: The Devil's Menu and the Market for Lemons
Decoy ballots do not count in election outcomes, but otherwise they are
indistinguishable from real ballots. By means of a game-theoretical model, we
show that decoy ballots may not provide effective protection against a
malevolent adversary trying to buy real ballots. If the citizenry is divided
into subgroups (or districts), the adversary can construct a so-called "Devil's
Menu" consisting of several prices. In equilibrium, the adversary can buy the
real ballots of any strict subset of districts at a price corresponding to the
willingness to sell on the part of the citizens holding such ballots. By
contrast, decoy voters are trapped into selling their ballots at a low, or even
negligible, price. Blowing up the adversary's budget by introducing decoy
ballots may thus turn out to be futile. The Devil's Menu can also be applied to
the well-known "Lemons Problem"
A characterization of a new value and an existing value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation
shapley value, banzhaf value, levels structure of cooperation
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