Some Remarks on the Notion of Paradox

[eng] This paper argues that the traditional characterization of the notion of paradox — an apparently valid argument with apparently true premises and an apparently false conclusion — is too narrow; there are paradoxes that do not satisfy it. After discussing, and discarding, some alternatives, an outline of a new characterization of the notion of paradox is presented. A paradox is found to be an apparently valid argument such that, apparently, it does not present the kind of commitment to the conclusion that should be implied by an acceptance of the truth of the premises and the validity of the argument

A Remark on Probabilistic Measures of Coherence

[eng In recent years, some authors have proposed quantitative measures of the coherence of sets of propositions. Such Probabilistic Measures of Coherence (PMCs) are, in general terms, functions that take as their argument a set of propositions (along with some probability distribution) and yield as their value a number that is supposed to represent the degree of coherence of the set. In this paper, I introduce a minimal constraint on PMC theories, called ‘the weak stability principle’ (WWSP) and show that any correct, coherent and complete PMC cannot satisfy WWSP. As a matter of fact, the argument offered in this paper can be applied to any coherence theory that uses a priori procedures. I briefly explore some consequences of this fact

Conceivability, Minimalism and the Generalization Problem

[eng] One of the main problems that Paul Horwich’s Minimalist theory of truth must face is the generalization problem, which shows that Minimalism is too weak to have the fundamental explanatory role Horwich claims it has. In this paper, I defend Horwich’s response to the generalization problem from an objection raised by Bradley Armour-Garb. I also argue that, given my response to Armour-Garb, Horwich’s proposal to cope with the generalization problem can be simplified. [fre] : L’un des principaux problèmes auxquels la théorie minimaliste de la vérité de Paul Horwich doit faire face est le problème de la généralisation. Horwich soutient que le minimalisme a un rôle explicatif fondamental, mais le problème de la généralisation montre que cette théorie est trop faible pour tenir ce rôle. Dans cet article, je défends la réponse d’Horwich au problème de la généralisation à partir d’une objection soulevée par Bradley Armour-Garb. Je prétends également que ma réponse à Armour-Grab nous permet de formuler d’une manière plus simple la réponse d’Horwich au problème de la généralisation

Minimalism, Supervaluations and Fixed Points

In this paper I introduce Horwich's deflationary theory of truth, called 'Minimalism', and I present his proposal of how to cope with the Liar Paradox. The proposal proceeds by restricting the T-schema and, as a consequence of that, it needs a constructive specification of which instances of the T-schema are to be excluded from Minimalism. Horwich has presented, in an informal way, one construction that specifies the Minimalist theory. The main aim of the paper is to present and scrutinize some formal versions of Horwich's construction

Deixem mai de ser joves? Perspectives sobre la vaguetat

Moltes de les expressions de les llengües que fem servir cada dia són vagues. Això implica que alguns principis lògics o de sentit comú que semblen obvis i perfectament establerts són, en realitat, falsos. Altrament, ens veuríem obligats a acceptar afirmacions tan absurdes com ara que una persona de 90 anys és jove, o que algú que només té un euro és ric. Això és el que es coneix com la paradoxa Sorites. En aquest treball mirarem d'esbrinar què vol dir que una expressió sigui vague i quina relació hi ha entre la vaguetat i la paradoxa Sorites. Presentarem dues perspectives respecte a l'origen de la vaguetat, el Superavaluacionisme i l'Epistemicisme. Veurem com donen resposta a la paradoxa Sorites, quin és l'origen de la vaguetat segons cadascuna d'elles i com determinen quin ha de ser el valor de veritat d'enunciats que atribueixen predicats vagues al que anomenarem casos dubtosos; casos davant dels quals no sabem dir si el predicat en qüestió s'aplica o no.Most of the expressions in our everyday languages are vague. This fact implies that some of the principles of logic or of common sense that we regard as obvious and very well established are, in fact, false. Otherwise, we would be forced to accept such absurd claims as that anyone who is 90 years old is young, or that someone who has just one euro is rich. This is known as the Sorites paradox. In this essay we will try to clarify what it means that some expression is vague, and what is the relationship between vagueness and the Sorites paradox. We will present two different perspectives about the source of vagueness, Supervaluationism and Epistemicism. We will describe how each of these theories try to deal with Sorites paradox, and what each of them has to say about what the origin or source of vagueness is. We will also see what each of these theories has to say regarding the truth value of a sentence where we attribute a vague predicate to an individual that is a borderline case; that is, an individual regarding whom we are unable to say whether it falls under the predicate or not

On Common Solutions to the Liar and the Sorites

[eng] In this dissertation I examine some of the most relevant proposals of common solutions to the Liar and the Sorites paradoxes. In order to do that, I present first a definition of what a paradox is so that, with this at hand, I can characterize in detail what should we expect from a common solution to a given collection of paradoxes. Next, I look into the reasons we might have to endorse a common solution to a group of paradoxes and some consequences are drawn with respect to Vann McGee's and Graham Priest's proposals to cope with both the Liar and the Sorites paradoxes, In the next chapters, three authors are examined in some detail. First, Jamie Tappenden's account is judged inappropriate, specially in the case of the Liar paradox. With respect to the Sorites, it is showed to be at least as problematic as Supervaluational approaches. Second, Paul Horwich's epistemicist proposal is examined with a special focus on the treatment of the Liar paradox. Horwich's account about how to construct his theory of truth is formalized and critically discussed with the use of a fixed-point construction. In the last chapter, I introduce and discuss some logics based on the work of Hartry Field that use two conditionals in a language with a truth predicate and vague predicates[cat] En aquesta tesi examino algunes de les propostes mes importants de solució comuna a les paradoxes del Mentider i la Sorites. Per tal de fer-ho, introdueixo, primer, una definició de la noció de paradoxa i, amb ella, caracteritzo en detall que cal esperar d'una solució comuna a un grup de paradoxes. A continuació, considero quines són les raons que podem tenir per tal d'adoptar una solució comuna a una col·lecció de paradoxes i extrec algunes conclusions respecte les propostes de Vann McGee i Graham Priest per fer front al Mentider i la Sorites. En els tres capítols següents, examino tres autors en detall. Primer, rebutjo la proposta de Jamie Tappenden per inapropiada, especialment en el cas del Mentider. Pel que fa a la Sorites, mostro que la teoria que Tappenden defensa es, al menys, tan problemàtica com les propostes superavaluacionistes. En segon lloc, examino la teoria epistemicista de Paul Horwich, amb especial atenció a la seva aplicació al mentider. A traves d'una construcció de punt fixe, formalitzo i discuteixo críticament la proposta de Horwich sabre com construir la seva teoria de la veritat. En l'últim capítol, introdueixo i discuteixo algunes lògiques, basades en les propostes de Hartry Field, que usen dos condicionals en llenguatges amb un predicat de veritat i predicats vagues

Inclosure and Intolerance

[eng] Graham Priest has influentially claimed that the Sorites paradox is an Inclosure paradox, concluding that his favoured dialetheic solution to the Inclosure paradoxes should be extended to the Sorites paradox. We argue that, given Priest’s dialetheic solution to the Sorites paradox, the argument purporting to show that that paradox is an Inclosure is unsound, and discuss some issues surrounding this fact

Sobre constructivismo y lógica epistémica dinámica

Universidad de Sevilla V Plan Propio de Investigació

Jornada "Experiències d'Aprenentatge Servei a la Universitat de Barcelona". Desenvolupament i experiències presentades.

La Jornada, titulada “Experiències d’Aprenentatge Servei a la Universitat de Barcelona”, te la finalitat de facilitar una reflexió conjunta sobre l’aplicació de l’ApS a la tasca docent i compartir les experiències desenvolupades a la nostra universitat. L'infome presenta el desenvolupament de la jornada i el recull dels pòsters presentats pels participants.ICE-IDP, Grup ApS (UB