Naïve Realism and Phenomenal Intentionality

This paper argues for the conjunctive thesis of naive realism and phenomenal intentionalism about perceptual experiences. Naive realism holds that the phenomenology of veridical perceptual experience is (at least in part) constituted by environmental objects that the subject perceives. Phenomenal intentionalism about perceptual experience states that perceptual experience has intentionality in virtue of its phenomenology. I first argue that naive realism is not incompatible with phenomenal intentionalism. I then argue that phenomenal intentionalists can handle two objections to it by adopting naive realism: the first objection is that phenomenal intentionalism cannot explain how a veridical perceptual experience is directed at a particular object rather than any other object of the same kind. The second objection is that phenomenal intentionalism cannot explain how a perceptual experience is directed at a type of external object rather than other types of objects without appealing to a resemblance relation between a perceptual experience and an external object, which is considered to be problematic

Human Brain Organoids and Consciousness

ヒト脳オルガノイドがもちうる意識の問題を検討し、研究上の倫理的枠組みを提案. 京都大学プレスリリース. 2022-02-17.The ethics of research on conscious artificial brains. 京都大学プレスリリース. 2022-02-18.This article proposes a methodological schema for engaging in a productive discussion of ethical issues regarding human brain organoids (HBOs), which are three-dimensional cortical neural tissues created using human pluripotent stem cells. Although moral consideration of HBOs significantly involves the possibility that they have consciousness, there is no widely accepted procedure to determine whether HBOs are conscious. Given that this is the case, it has been argued that we should adopt a precautionary principle about consciousness according to which, if we are not certain whether HBOs have consciousness—and where treating HBOs as not having consciousness may cause harm to them—we should proceed as if they do have consciousness. This article emphasizes a methodological advantage of adopting the precautionary principle: it enables us to sidestep the question of whether HBOs have consciousness (the whether-question) and, instead, directly address the question of what kinds of conscious experiences HBOs can have (the what-kind-question), where the what-kind-question is more tractable than the whether-question. By addressing the what-kind-question (and, in particular, the question of what kinds of valenced experiences HBOs can have), we will be able to examine how much moral consideration HBOs deserve. With this in mind, this article confronts the what-kind-question with the assistance of experimental studies of consciousness and suggests an ethical framework which supports restricting the creation and use of HBOs in bioscience

Consciousness is Sublime

Does consciousness have non-instrumental aesthetic value? This paper answers this question affirmatively by arguing that consciousness is sublime. The argument consists of three premises. (1) An awe experience of an object provides prima facie justification to believe that the object is sublime. (2) I have an awe experience about consciousness through introspecting three features of consciousness, namely the mystery of consciousness, the connection between consciousness and well-being, and the phenomenological complexity of consciousness. (3) There is no good defeater of the justificatory force of my feeling of awe for the sublime of consciousness. To defend the third premise, I argue against two potential defeaters: The first is that most people do not regard consciousness as sublime. The second is that there do not seem to be physical properties that can ground the sublimity of consciousness. I conclude by emphasizing an important ethical implication of the thesis that consciousness is sublime, namely that it explains why even conscious subjects who cannot have valenced experiences deserve moral consideration

A strong association of axillary osmidrosis with the wet earwax type determined by genotyping of the ABCC11 gene

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Two types of cerumen occur in humans: the wet type with brownish, sticky earwax, and the dry type with a lack of or reduced ceruminous secretion. The wet type is common in populations of European and African origin, while the dry type is frequently seen in Eastern Asian populations. An association between axillary odor and the wet-type earwax was first identified approximately 70 years ago. The data were based on a phenotypical analysis of the two phenotypes among the Japanese by a researcher or by self-declaration of the subjects examined, and were not obtained using definite diagnostic methods. Recently, we identified a single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP; rs17822931) of the <it>ABCC11 </it>gene as the determinant of the earwax types. In the present study, to determine whether the SNP can serve as a diagnostic marker for axillary osmidrosis (AO), we examined genotypes at rs17822931 in 79 Japanese AO individuals. AO was defined here as a clinical condition of individuals with a deep anxiety regarding axillary odor and had undergone the removal of bilateral axillary apocrine glands.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>A comparison of the frequencies of genotypes at rs17822931 in the 79 AO individuals and in 161 Japanese from the general population showed that AO was strongly associated with the wet earwax genotype. A total of 78 (98.7%) of 79 AO patients had either the GG or GA genotype, while these genotypes were observed in 35.4% (57/161) of the subjects from the general population (<it>p </it>< 1.1 × 10^-24, by Fisher's exact test).</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>The strong association between the wet-earwax associated <it>ABCC11-</it>genotypes (GG and GA) and AO identified in this study indicates that the genotypes are good markers for the diagnosis of AO. In addition, these results suggest that having the allele G is a prerequisite for the axillary odor expression. In other words, the ABCC11 protein may play a role in the excretory function of the axillary apocrine gland. Together, these results suggest that when an AO individual visiting a hospital is diagnosed with dry-type earwax by <it>ABCC11</it>-genotyping, surgical removal of their axillary glands may not be indicated.</p

都市部地域在住高齢者における多剤併用と認知機能障害との関連

学位の種別: 課程博士審査委員会委員 : （主査）東京大学教授 秋下 雅弘, 東京大学准教授 清水 潤, 東京大学講師 岩田 淳, 東京大学准教授 江頭 正人, 東京大学特任准教授 山中 崇University of Tokyo(東京大学

The Sublime of Consciousness

The aesthetic tradition has identified as paradigmatically sublime such objects as imposing mountains and intense storms, as well as monumental art. But the tradition also acknowledges less paradigmatic cases, including sometimes mathematical structures or abstract concepts. In this paper, we argue that there is also a case for considering phenomenal consciousness – the experiential quality of subjective awareness – as a sublime phenomenon. One appreciates this, we argue, when one is struck by (fitting) awe upon contemplating (a) the perplexing existence of something like phenomenal consciousness in an otherwise completely material universe and (b) the role of consciousness in injecting meaning and value in an otherwise brutally factual reality