Accrual persistence and accrual anomaly

The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file.Title from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on September 28, 2007)Vita.Thesis (Ph. D.) University of Missouri-Columbia 2007.The first essay, "Inter-temporal accrual persistence and accrual anomaly" investigates whether accrual persistence and accrual anomaly vary with the state of economy. Prior accounting research argues that diminishing marginal returns on new investments drive lower persistence of accruals relative to cash flows. Macroeconomic research documents that marginal profitability is counter-cyclical, which implies that diminishing marginal returns on new investments are more pronounced during periods of expansions than recessions. Linking the cyclicality of diminishing returns on investments with the argument that diminishing returns to investments contribute to lower persistence of accruals relative to cash flows, this paper predicts that the differential persistence of accruals is greater during expansionary periods than recessionary periods. Using a U.S. sample from 1972 to 2003, I find that the differential persistence of accruals is greater during economic expansions than recessions. When I focus on the components of accruals, I find that depreciation, change in accounts receivable, change in raw materials,and change in finished goods are the main drivers of cyclical differential accrual persistence. These findings are robust to alternative conditioning sets, estimation procedures, and measures of the business cycle. I also find that investors are unable to assess the cyclical differential persistence of accruals, leading to higher returns (both raw and abnormal returns) from an accrual-based trading strategy during expansionary periods. The second essay "Can cyclical property of accrual persistence explain the accrual anomaly?" examines whether cyclical accrual persistence documented in the first essay can provide an explanation to accrual anomaly based on consumption based assets pricing theory. Specifically, I posit that accruals decrease in consumption risk because of cyclical property of accrual persistence (i.e., accruals are less persistent during economic expansions than during recessions). The implication is that the observed abnormal returns from accrual-trading strategy represent compensation for the underlying consumption risk. Using a U.S. sample from 1972 to 2003, I find that consumption risk decreases in the level of accruals. I also show that after controlling for other known risk factors, pricing kernel (a proxy for the state of economy) can explain about 11 percent of abnormal returns from accrual-based trading strategy. These findings are robust to alternative conditioning set and estimation procedures.Includes bibliographical reference

Do Firms Adjust Their Timely Loss Recognition in Response to Changes in the Banking Industry?

This paper investigates the impact of changes in the banking sector on firms’ timely recognition of economic losses. In particular, we focus on the entry of foreign banks into India during the 1990s, which likely causes an exogenous increase in lender demand for timely loss recognition. Analyzing variation in both the timing and the location of the new foreign banks’ entries, we find that foreign bank entry is associated with more timely loss recognition and this increase is positively related to a firm\u27s subsequent debt levels. The change appears driven by a shift in firms’ incentives to supply additional information to lenders and lenders seem to value this information. The increase in timely loss recognition is also concentrated among firms more dependent on external financing: private firms, smaller firms, and nongroup firms. Overall, our evidence suggests that a firm\u27s accounting choices respond to changes in the banking industry

Buying Products from Whom You Know: Personal Connections and Information Asymmetry in Supply Chain Relationships

This study investigates the role personal connections play in a crucial element of the supply chain—supplier selection. We find that the likelihood that a potential supplier (hereafter, a vendor) is selected to be an actual supplier (hereafter, supplier) increases when personal connections between executives of the vendor and the customer exist. The magnitude of the effect varies predictably across management ranks and positions and is stronger when information asymmetries between a vendor and a customer are high. Conditioning on the existence of a supply-chain partnership, a departure of a personally connected executive prompts the termination of the supply-chain relationship more often than a departure of an unconnected executive. Additional analyses show personal connections are associated with less restrictive procurement contracts and with improved customer performance after the formation of a supply-chain relationship. Overall, our study highlights the role of personal connections in reducing information asymmetry and improving operating efficiency in the supply chain

Executive Compensation and the Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt

Executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives’ portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices (delta) and stock return volatility (vega). Large deltas discourage managerial risk-taking, while large vegas encourage risk-taking. Theory suggests that short-maturity debt mitigates agency costs of debt by constraining managerial risk preferences. We posit and find evidence of a negative (positive) relation between CEO portfolio deltas (vegas) and short-maturity debt. We also find that shortmaturity debt mitigates the influence of vega- and delta-related incentives on bond yields. Overall, our empirical evidence shows that short-term debt mitigates agency costs of debt arising from compensation risk

What If borrowers were Informed about Credit Reporting? Two Randomized Field Experiments

Using two randomized field experiments, we examine how warning borrowers that their loan performance will be reported to a public credit registry affects their loan take-up and repayment decisions. We show that credit warnings increase loan take-up rates. The main drivers appear to be anticipation of reduction in incumbent lenders’ informational rents and improvement in access to informal or formal credit. Moreover, credit warnings reduce default rates by 3.7–5.9 percentage points. This reduction is comparable for borrowers who receive the credit warning before and after the loan take-up, which suggests that credit warnings have little net effect on borrowers’ credit-risk composition due to selection

Acquisition profitability and timely loss recognition

We investigate if timely loss recognition is associated with acquisition-investment decisions. Using a Basu (1997) piece-wise linear regression model, we find that firms with more timely incorporation of economic losses into earnings make more profitable acquisitions, measured by the bidder's announcement returns and by changes in post-acquisition operating performance. These firms are also less likely to make post-acquisition divestitures (consistent with better ex ante investment decisions), but act more quickly to divest. We also find that the positive association between timely loss recognition and acquisition profitability is more pronounced for firms with higher ex ante agency costs.Timely loss recognition Agency costs Accounting conservatism Corporate governance Acquisitions Divestitures

Panacea, Pandora’s Box, or Placebo: Feedback in Bank Holdings of Mortgage‐Backed Securities and Fair Value Accounting

We examine the relation between bank holdings of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and MBS prices. Theory suggests feedback between MBS holdings and underlying asset markets can be aggravated by mark-to-market accounting. We measure feedback by the relation between asset returns and the changes in bank MBS holdings. Consistent with the existence of feedback effects related to mark-to-market, we find that for banks with high MBS, more nonperforming loans, and lower total capital ratio, changes in bank MBS positions are positively associated with changes in MBS prices and that this relation is reduced after the April 2009 mark-to-market rule clarification. To assess the effect of feedback on shareholder value, we test whether the stockprice response of banks to the announcement of the mark-to-market accounting rule clarification is associated with the intensity of feedback behavior. We find that the stock market reaction to the rule change is more positive for banks with more MBS, higher nonperforming loans and higher pre-rule-change feedback. We also find positive bond-price reactions to the rule change. Overall, our results suggest feedback related to mark-to-market accounting had a measurable effect on shareholder value

Voluntary disclosures and the exercise of CEO stock options

We examine voluntary disclosures around the exercise of CEO stock options. Previous research shows that managerial incentives depend on the intended disposition of the exercised options' underlying shares. When CEOs intend to sell the underlying shares of exercised options, they have an incentive to increase stock prices in the pre-exercise period. In contrast, when CEOs intend to hold the underlying shares, they have a tax incentive to decrease stock prices in the pre-exercise period. Consistent with these private incentives, we find a significant increase in the frequency and magnitude of good (bad) news announcements in the pre-exercise period when CEOs implement exercise-and-sell (exercise-and-hold) strategies. We provide some evidence that CEOs' propensities for opportunistic disclosures are positively related to the value of their exercised stock options. Lastly, we find that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) generally reduces, but does not eliminate, this type of managerial opportunism.Voluntary disclosures Management forecasts Executive stock options

The Role of Firm-Specific Incentives and Country Factors in Explaining Voluntary IAS Adoptions: Evidence from Private Firms

This paper investigates voluntary adoptions of International Accounting Standards (IAS) by private enterprises, and builds on prior research which posits that higher quality financial reports through IAS adoption can reduce information asymmetry and facilitate contracting with external parties. Specifically, we pursue the following questions. First, do firm-specific incentives matter in the IAS adoption decision after controlling for country-level institutional factors? Second, does the relative importance of firm vs. country factors vary across institutional settings? Using a sample of 3,722 small and medium-sized private enterprises from 56 countries, we report two primary findings. First, both firm and country factors matter in the voluntary IAS adoption decision. Second, when we focus on sub-samples of countries partitioned by the level of economic development, we find that firm factors dominate country factors in more developed countries, while in less developed countries, country factors dominate firm factors in explaining IAS adoptions. This result is consistent with the argument in Doidge et al. (Journal of Financial Economics, 86(1), pp. 1-39, 2007) that firm incentives are more important in explaining governance choices (including accounting) in more developed countries where the benefits from better governance are more likely to exceed the attendant costs. Collectively, our results suggest that less developed countries can enhance the benefits from IAS adoptions by developing institutions which facilitate private contracting.