The End of the Third Wave and the Global Future of Democracy. IHS Political Science Series No. 45, July 1997

The “Third Wave” of global democratization, which began in 1974, now appears to be drawing to a close. While the number of “electoral democracies” has tripled since 1974, the rate of increase has slowed every year since 1991 (when the number jumped by almost 20 percent) and is now near zero. Moreover, if we examine the more demanding standard of “liberal democracy” – in which there is substantial individual and associational freedom, civic pluralism, civi lian supremacy over the military, a secure rule of law, and “horizontal accountability” of office-holders to one another – we observe today the same proportion of liberal democracies in the world as existed in 1991. If a “third reverse wave” of democratic erosion or breakdowns is to be avoided, the new democracies of the third wave will need to become consolidated. Elites and citizens of every major party, interest, and ethnicity must accept the legitimacy of democracy and of the specific constitutional rules and practices in place in their country. In many new democracies, this requires a sweeping agenda of institutional reform to widen citizen access to power, control corruption, and improve the depth and quality of democracy. Elsewhere – as in China and Indonesia – rapid economic development and the gradual emergence of stronger, more autonomous civil associations and legal and representative institutions may be laying the foundations for a “fourth wave” of democratization at some point in the early twenty-first century

The end of the third wave and the global future of democracy

"The “Third Wave” of global democratization, which began in 1974, now appears to be drawing to a close. While the number of “electoral democracies” has tripled since 1974, the rate of increase has slowed every year since 1991 (when the number jumped by almost 20 percent) and is now near zero. Moreover, if we examine the more demanding standard of “liberal democracy” – in which there is substantial individual and associational freedom, civic pluralism, civi lian supremacy over the military, a secure rule of law, and “horizontal accountability” of office-holders to one another – we observe today the same proportion of liberal democracies in the world as existed in 1991. If a “third reverse wave” of democratic erosion or breakdowns is to be avoided, the new democracies of the third wave will need to become consolidated. Elites and citizens of every major party, interest, and ethnicity must accept the legitimacy of democracy and of the specific constitutional rules and practices in place in their country. In many new democracies, this requires a sweeping agenda of institutional reform to widen citizen access to power, control corruption, and improve the depth and quality of democracy. Elsewhere – as in China and Indonesia – rapid economic development and the gradual emergence of stronger, more autonomous civil associations and legal and representative institutions may be laying the foundations for a “fourth wave” of democratization at some point in the early twenty-first century." [author's abstract

The Flow and Ebb of Democracy’s Third Wave

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5564/mjia.v0i18.72 Mongolian Journal of International Affairs No.18 2013: 94-10

PEMBANGUNAN DEMOKRASI DAN PEMBANGUNAN EKONOMI – HUBUNGAN DAN PENGARUHNYA*

Over the years the relationship between democracy and development has been comprehensively contested, and recent cross-national statistics as well as comparativehistorical data show that the relationship is not causal as conventionally perceived. Successful development has, for example, been achieved in both democracies andauthoritarian regimes, and similarly democracy has been sustained in countries with lower GNP than the traditional minimum threshold of 300 USD per capita per year. The relationship is also complicated by conceptual challenges in different regions of the world: different cultures delineate democracy and development differently and there no exact definitions of the two concepts

PEMBANGUNAN DEMOKRASI DAN PEMBANGUNAN EKONOMI – HUBUNGAN DAN PENGARUHNYA*

Over the years the relationship between democracy and development has been comprehensively contested, and recent cross-national statistics as well as comparativehistorical data show that the relationship is not causal as conventionally perceived. Successful development has, for example, been achieved in both democracies andauthoritarian regimes, and similarly democracy has been sustained in countries with lower GNP than the traditional minimum threshold of 300 USD per capita per year. The relationship is also complicated by conceptual challenges in different regions of the world: different cultures delineate democracy and development differently and there no exact definitions of the two concepts

¿Puede el mundo entero ser democrático? Democracia, desarrollo y factores internacionales

¿Puede cualquier Estado convertirse en democrático? ¿Puede el mundo entero ser democrático?Este artículo sostiene que la respuesta a ambos interrogantes es afirmativa, yque el nivel cultural, la historia y la pobreza no son obstáculos insuperables para el avancede la democracia. De hecho, en gran parte de los países que continúan atrapados enla pobreza, un creciente número de evidencias y análisis políticos sugieren que un gobiernodemocrático, transparente y que rinda cuentas es una condición fundamental para eldesarrollo sostenible. No se precisan otros requisitos que la voluntad de las elites nacionalesde intentar gobernar de forma democrática. Esta voluntad de reforma democráticarequiere una fuerte presión desde abajo, en la sociedad civil, y desde fuera, en la comunidadinternacional. Una democracia duradera en un contexto de condiciones culturales,sociales y económicas desfavorables precisa instituciones que fomenten un gobierno efectivoy responsable, además de un compromiso y un apoyo internacional sólidos. La democraciapuede emerger en cualquier lugar, pero sólo puede arraigarse si trae consigo, aunquesea de forma gradual, una sociedad más próspera, justa y ética

Espécies de partidos políticos: uma nova tipologia

Embora a literatura específica já inclua um grande número de tipologias de partidos, é cada vez mais difícil dar conta da grande diversidade de tipos de partido político surgidos em todo o mundo nas últimas décadas, especialmente porque a maioria das tipologias baseou-se em partidos da Europa Ocidental, já existentes entre o final do século XIX e a metade do século XX. Alguns novos tipos evoluíram, mas de maneira fortuita e com base em critérios muito variáveis e frequentemente inconsistentes. Este artigo é uma tentativa de encaixar muitas das concepções de partido comumen­te utilizadas em uma estrutura coerente e de delinear novos tipos de agremiação partidária sempre que os modelos existentes se mostrarem incapazes de apreender aspectos importantes das legendas contemporâneas. De acordo com seu “gênero”, classificamos cada uma das 15 “espécies” de partido com base em três critérios: 1) a natureza da organização partidária (forte/fraca, elitista ou de massa, etc.); 2) a orien­tação programática do partido (ideológica ou particularista-clientelista, etc.); e 3) o caráter tolerante e pluralista (ou democrático) versus o proto-hegemônico (ou antis­sistema). Embora falte parcimônia nesta tipologia, acreditamos que ela indique com maior precisão a diversidade de partidos existentes no mundo democrático contem­porâneo, sendo mais adequada ao teste de hipóteses e à construção de teorias do que outras

Harry L. Goldsmith, Ph.D.

In honor of Dr. Harry L. Goldsmith\u27s 75th birthday, we present a collection of articles from his collaborators and colleagues to commemorate Harry\u27s outstanding contributions to the field of Biorheology. On any particular day, bioengineers around the world may find themselves fortunate enough to peer through a microscope to observe molecular or cellular level phenomena manifested before their eyes. Such observations of single molecule mechanics or blood flows or cellular deformation remind us of the power of clever experimental design and rigorous theoretical constructs as well as the complex beauty of dynamical systems in nature. In this spirit, the investigations reported in this issue of the Annals entitled Cellular Biorheology and Biomechanics have followed down many of the research paths pioneered by Dr. Harry Goldsmith

Does public support help democracy survive?

It is widely believed that democracy requires public support to survive. The empirical evidence for this hypothesis is weak, however, with existing tests resting on small cross‐sectional samples and producing contradictory results. The underlying problem is that survey measures of support for democracy are fragmented across time, space, and different survey questions. In response, this article uses a Bayesian latent variable model to estimate a smooth country‐year panel of democratic support for 135 countries and up to 29 years. The article then demonstrates a positive effect of support on subsequent democratic change, while adjusting for the possible confounding effects of prior levels of democracy and unobservable time‐invariant factors. Support is, moreover, more robustly linked with the endurance of democracy than its emergence in the first place. As Lipset (1959) and Easton (1965) hypothesized over 50 years ago, public support does indeed help democracy survive