16 research outputs found
Labor Conflicts and Inefficiency of Relationship-Specific Investments: What is the Judge's Role?
This paper presents a model of litigation in the context of a labor contract. The main objective of our analysis is to determine whether and under which conditions it is efficient that the judiciary arbiters a labor conflict and how the judge's decision should be made in order to be optimal. We embed this idea by considering a relationship between an employer and his worker, in which they can make (non contractible) relationship-specific investments. The optimality here refers to the best investment incentives of the parties allowing to maximize the generated surplus. We derive conclusions about the judge's behavior giving right investment incentives and determine how the division of the surplus should vary depending on several economic and social parameters.Labor Law, Litigation, Investment Incentives, Bargaining.
L'analyse Ă©conomique des litiges individuels du travail
Employment protection refers both to regulations governing hiring and firing rules and finds its sources in legislation, collectively bargained conditions or customary practice. For about fifteen years, a large macroeconomic literature has studied the impact of employment protection on the labor market?s performances, or more precisely the effects of firing rules on the employment rate, the unemployment duration and rate. More recent works begin to emphasize other consequences of employment protection, i.e. its effects in terms of incentives on the behavior of individuals : facing a given legislation in terms of dismissal, economic agents adapt themselves, react and tend to adopt a strategic behavior. This thesis is related to this literature by exploring the individual incentives generated by labor law. Indeed, labor law related to firing and its enforcement by the courts have consequences on the behavior of parties to a labor relationship at several levels. On one hand, dismissal laws have an impact ex ante on the respective investment levels of employers and workers within their relationship : indeed, the way courts adjudicate a dispute due to a dismissal and notably the elements which are taken into account in their decisions have an impact on the incentives of parties to make specific investments. Thus, the theoretical analysis which is displayed shows what economic and social elements judges should take into account if their objective is the maximization of investment levels chosen by both parties. On the other hand, the design of judicial procedures also has an impact of the behavior of agents once the conflict has begun between the parties. By leading comparisons between several disputes? resolution systems thanks to theoretical tools and an experimental analysis, this thesis participates to current legal debates over the ability of procedures to generate as many agreements as possible, allowing for the reduction of judicial costs.La protection de l'emploi se définit comme la réglementation encadrant les rÚgles d'embauche et les modalités de licenciement des salariés et trouve ses sources dans la législation, les négociations collectives ou encore les décisions de justice. Depuis une quinzaine d'années, une vaste littérature macroéconomique a investi les effets de la protection de l'emploi sur les performances du marché du travail, ou plus précisément les effets des modalités de licenciement sur le taux d'emploi, la durée et le taux de chÎmage. Des travaux plus récents commencent à mettre en relief d'autres conséquences de la protection de l'emploi, à savoir ses répercussions en termes d?incitations sur le comportement des individus : confrontés à une certaine réglementation de l?emploi en matiÚre de licenciement, les agents économiques s?'daptent, réagissent et adoptent des comportements stratégiques. Cette thÚse s'inscrit dans l'ensemble de ces travaux en explorant les incitations individuelles générées par la législation du travail. En effet, le droit du travail relatif au licenciement et sa mise en oeuvre par les tribunaux ont des conséquences sur le comportement des parties à la relation de travail et ce, à plusieurs niveaux. D'une part, les modalités de licenciement ont un impact ex ante sur les niveaux d'investissements respectifs de l'employeur et du salarié au sein de leur relation : en effet, la façon dont les tribunaux jugent un litige consécutif à un licenciement et notamment les éléments pris en compte dans leurs décisions exercent une influence sur les incitations des parties à réaliser des investissements spécifiques. Ainsi, l'analyse présentée montre notamment de quels éléments d'ordre économique et social les juges devraient tenir compte si l'objectif recherché est la maximisation des niveaux des investissements choisis par les parties. D'autre part, la structure des procédures judiciaires a également une incidence sur le comportement des individus une fois le litige déclenché entre les deux parties. En effectuant des comparaisons entre plusieurs systÚmes de résolution des litiges au moyen d'outils théoriques et d'une analyse expérimentale, cette thÚse participe aux débats juridiques actuels portant sur la capacité des procédures à générer le maximum d'accords, permettant la réduction des dépenses de justice
Economic analysis of individual labor disputes
La protection de lâemploi se dĂ©finit comme la rĂ©glementation encadrant les rĂšgles dâembauche et les modalitĂ©s de licenciement des salariĂ©s et trouve ses sources dans la lĂ©gislation, les nĂ©gociations collectives ou encore les dĂ©cisions de justice. Depuis une quinzaine dâannĂ©es, une vaste littĂ©rature macroĂ©conomique a investi les effets de la protection de lâemploi sur les performances du marchĂ© du travail, ou plus prĂ©cisĂ©ment les effets des modalitĂ©s de licenciement sur le taux dâemploi, la durĂ©e et le taux de chĂŽmage. Des travaux plus rĂ©cents commencent Ă mettre en relief dâautres consĂ©quences de la protection de lâemploi, Ă savoir ses rĂ©percussions en termes dâincitations sur le comportement des individus : confrontĂ©s Ă une certaine rĂ©glementation de lâemploi en matiĂšre de licenciement, les agents Ă©conomiques sâadaptent, rĂ©agissent et adoptent des comportements stratĂ©giques. Cette thĂšse sâinscrit dans lâensemble de ces travaux en explorant les incitations individuelles gĂ©nĂ©rĂ©es par la lĂ©gislation du travail. En effet, le droit du travail relatif au licenciement et sa mise en uvre par les tribunaux ont des consĂ©quences sur le comportement des parties Ă la relation de travail et ce, Ă plusieurs niveaux. Dâune part, les modalitĂ©s de licenciement ont un impact ex ante sur les niveaux dâinvestissements respectifs de lâemployeur et du salariĂ© au sein de leur relation : en effet, la façon dont les tribunaux jugent un litige consĂ©cutif Ă un licenciement et notamment les Ă©lĂ©ments pris en compte dans leurs dĂ©cisions exercent une influence sur les incitations des parties Ă rĂ©aliser des investissements spĂ©cifiques. Ainsi, lâanalyse prĂ©sentĂ©e montre notamment de quels Ă©lĂ©ments dâordre Ă©conomique et social les juges devraient tenir compte si lâobjectif recherchĂ© est la maximisation des niveaux des investissements choisis par les parties. Dâautre part, la structure des procĂ©dures judiciaires a Ă©galement une incidence sur le comportement des individus une fois le litige dĂ©clenchĂ© entre les deux parties. En effectuant des comparaisons entre plusieurs systĂšmes de rĂ©solution des litiges au moyen dâoutils thĂ©oriques et dâune analyse expĂ©rimentale, cette thĂšse participe aux dĂ©bats juridiques actuels portant sur la capacitĂ© des procĂ©dures Ă gĂ©nĂ©rer le maximum dâaccords, permettant la rĂ©duction des dĂ©penses de justice.Employment protection refers both to regulations governing hiring and firing rules and finds its sources in legislation, collectively bargained conditions or customary practice. For about fifteen years, a large macroeconomic literature has studied the impact of employment protection on the labor marketâs performances, or more precisely the effects of firing rules on the employment rate, the unemployment duration and rate. More recent works begin to emphasize other consequences of employment protection, i.e. its effects in terms of incentives on the behavior of individuals : facing a given legislation in terms of dismissal, economic agents adapt themselves, react and tend to adopt a strategic behavior. This thesis is related to this literature by exploring the individual incentives generated by labor law. Indeed, labor law related to firing and its enforcement by the courts have consequences on the behavior of parties to a labor relationship at several levels. On one hand, dismissal laws have an impact ex ante on the respective investment levels of employers and workers within their relationship : indeed, the way courts adjudicate a dispute due to a dismissal and notably the elements which are taken into account in their decisions have an impact on the incentives of parties to make specific investments. Thus, the theoretical analysis which is displayed shows what economic and social elements judges should take into account if their objective is the maximization of investment levels chosen by both parties. On the other hand, the design of judicial procedures also has an impact of the behavior of agents once the conflict has begun between the parties. By leading comparisons between several disputesâ resolution systems thanks to theoretical tools and an experimental analysis, this thesis participates to current legal debates over the ability of procedures to generate as many agreements as possible, allowing for the reduction of judicial costs
Optimal Resort to Court-Appointed Experts
International audienceDeparting from the observation that neutral experts are increasingly appointed by courts, this paper investigates the incentives of courts to appoint experts, and the interactions between the judgeâs and the expertâs efforts to discover the truth about a given case. Judges seek to make correct decisions and may choose to appoint experts in order to do so. Experts are assumed to be guided by both reputational and truth-finding motives. We highlight the determinants of the judgeâs and the expertâs effort levels and of the judgeâs decision whether to appoint an expert. We find that the expertâs effort is decreasing in the judgeâs effort, which implies potential freeriding from the judge. Moreover, we find that (i) the judgeâs effort is generally suboptimal, and (ii) they might resort to an expert appraisal too frequently, thereby contributing to increased court congestion and higher costs for society. Our results therefore suggest that, under conditions that we discuss, it may be socially beneficial to apply a principle of proportionality to the use of expert testimony, depending on the complexity of the case
Enseigner les structures de marché et stratégies de concurrence avec les jeux pédagogiques
National audienceWhile teaching in economics at the university is mainly based on passive pedagogy, this paper argues in favor of active pedagogical methods, using experimental classroom games. The issue is illustrated by focusing the article on the analysis of the firmsâ competitive strategies in different market structures (i.e. perfect competition, monopoly and oligopoly). We first explain the bases of experimental methods and then present some protocols allowing to implement classroom games corresponding to the market structures which are considered. A survey of the literature is exposed to provide an exhaustive view of the different games that can be used by teachers.Partant du constat dâun enseignement de lâĂ©conomie Ă lâuniversitĂ© fondĂ© sur des mĂ©thodes principalement passives, cet article plaide en faveur dâune pĂ©dagogie active fondĂ©e sur les jeux pĂ©dagogiques expĂ©rimentaux avec une application Ă la thĂ©matique des structures de marchĂ©. Il fournit les clĂ©s pour lâutilisation de tels jeux en exposant les bases de lâĂ©conomie expĂ©rimentale et les Ă©lĂ©ments pratiques de la mise en Ćuvre dâun jeu pĂ©dagogique. Lâenseignement des trois principales structures de marchĂ© (concurrence pure et parfaite, monopole et oligopole) est proposĂ© Ă travers la prĂ©sentation dâun jeu dĂ©taillĂ© par structure, complĂ©tĂ© par une revue de la littĂ©rature liĂ©e aux expĂ©riences pĂ©dagogiques existant sur chacune dâentre elles
English Rule and Frivolous Suits: Conditional versus Hourly Fees
Under the conditional fee arrangement, a lawyer receives an upscale premium if a case is won. In this article, we develop an asymmetric information game of settlement and litigation in order to compare hourly and conditional fees with regard to their effects on the number of frivolous suits being filed, the settlement rate of cases, and the total costs of litigation. The main result shows that a conditional fee schedule improves the efficiency of the litigation process under the English fee-shifting rule by undermining frivolous plaintiffs' incentives to file suit and then reducing total expenditures. It hence provides an additional theoretical foundation for the recent switchover from hourly fees to conditional fees in the United Kingdom.
Formation d'une entente dans un appel d'offres au premier prix et risque de détection exogÚne
International audienc