Competition Law and Regulation Law From an EC Perspective

These comments look at the subject from a legal viewpoint, in contrast to the Essay by Professor Dr. Günter Knieps, which uses an economic approach. His Essay raises several issues concerning access: (1) who should be obliged to give it; (2) to whom; (3) in what circumstances; and (4) on what terms? In practice, the precise answers will depend on whether European Community (“Community” or “EC”) competition law, national competition law, or national telecommunications law based on Community directives, are being applied. As far as possible, the same answer should be given in all cases

Competition Law and Regulation Law From an EC Perspective

These comments look at the subject from a legal viewpoint, in contrast to the Essay by Professor Dr. Günter Knieps, which uses an economic approach. His Essay raises several issues concerning access: (1) who should be obliged to give it; (2) to whom; (3) in what circumstances; and (4) on what terms? In practice, the precise answers will depend on whether European Community (“Community” or “EC”) competition law, national competition law, or national telecommunications law based on Community directives, are being applied. As far as possible, the same answer should be given in all cases

The Commission: The Key to the Constitutional Treaty for Europe

Political inventions are so rare that when they do arise they are not recognized--we try to fit them into traditional classifications, or criticize them for not being something that they were never intended to be. The European Commission (“Commission”) was a genuinely new political invention, created to solve a problem. The problem was that the European Community (“EC”) had to have majority voting. That meant that from time to time minorities would be out-voted. Majority voting--an old idea, but never before used in an international organization--had to be made acceptable

Three Possibilities for Reform of the Procedure of the European Commission in Competition Cases under Regulation 1/2003. CEPS Special Report, 18 November 2011

Following an examination of the present procedures of the European Commission in competition cases under Regulation 1/2003, this paper finds that the existing safeguards for due process are not sufficient and explains why reform is urgently needed. Three possible radical solutions are outlined: 1) setting up a decision-making body within the Commission, 2) setting up a separate European competition authority and 3) making the Commission a “prosecutor” bringing competition cases before the General Court, which would adopt the first legally binding decisions

Article 82 EC – The Problems and The Solution

The Commission's Guidance paper on exclusionary abuse under Article 82 EC is open to three fundamental criticisms. First, it leads to less legal certainty, because the rules suggested are vague and imprecise, because dominant companies will not have the information needed to apply them, and because the Commission is trying to change the law, which it has no power to do. Second, it would lead to some anticompetitive effects, because in practice it discourages price competition, by discouraging individualised price negotiations and retroactive rebates, and by suggesting that the Commission will protect not-yet-as-efficient competitors from price competition. Third, it leads to too many "false positives", i.e., findings of exclusionary abuse that are not justified in economics or law. The solution is to return to the test in the Treaty as interpreted by the Court of Justice: an exclusionary abuse must involve limiting the production, marketing or technical development of competitors of the dominant company, if harm is caused to consumers.Article 82EC, Competition, Abuse

The Commission, the Community Method, and the Smaller Member States

This Article discusses several developments concerning the position of the Commission in the institutional structures of the European Union ( EU ) that have occurred since then. It does not touch on the many other matters that influenced the debate on the draft Constitutional Treaty, leading to its failure at referendum in France and the Netherlands; these matters include the scope of the draft Treaty, questions concerning its economic, social, and political benefits or disadvantages, the working of the Stability Pact in the Eurozone and the ongoing debate on freedom of services legislation, the purposes for which the EU was originally created and their modification, further enlargement of the EU, and so on. These subjects require separate treatment

Dualism and cross-country growth regressions

This paper examines whether growth regressions should incorporate dualism and structural change. If there is a differential across sectors in the marginal product of labour, changes in the structure of employment can raise aggregate total factor productivity. The paper develops empirical growth models that allow for this effect in a more flexible way than previous work. Estimates of the models imply sizeable marginal product differentials, and reveal that the reallocation of labour can explain a significant fraction of the international variation in TFP growth.growth, dualism, structural change

Business ethics: boardroom pressures in an age of moral relativism

Company law requires boardroom decision making to be parochial but boardrooms are pluralist by nature. It is argued that the way business is done, business contexts and strategic decision making do change over time. Factors bearing upon boardroom behaviour include inter alia preferences for the firm to act or to be seen to be acting in a socially and environmentally responsible manner: that is, to act ethically. It is argued that conditions are favourable for the emergence of a more widespread pursuit of social and responsible business within a safe and civil society. Forces driving this emergence are discussed and barriers to its progress are outlined. Challenges for the theory of the firm are raised also