Teacher Education Futures: Developing learning and teaching in ITE across the UK

A selection of papers from the Teacher Education Futures conference 2006

Equilibrium Existence in Bipartite Social Games: A Generalization of Stable Matchings

We prove existence of equilibria in bipartite social games, where players choose both a strategy in a game and a partner with whom to play the game. Such social games generalize the well-known marriage problem where players choose partners but do not take actions subsequent to matching.Social Games

On the Formation of Interaction Networks in Social Coordination Games

There are many situations where two interacting individuals can benefit from coordinating their actions. We examine the endogenous choice of partners in such social coordination games and the implications for resulting play. We model the interaction pattern as a network where individuals periodically have the discretion to add or sever links to other players. A player chooses whether to add or sever a link based on the (prospective) partner's past behavior. With such endogenous interaction patterns we see multiple stochastically stable states of play, including some that involve play of equilibria in the coordination game that are neither efficient nor risk dominant.

Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games

We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play. A group of players who are dissatisfied with the play of their current partners can join together and play a new equilibrium. This imposes new refinements on equilibrium play, where play depends on the relative populations of players in different roles, among other things. We also examine finite repetitions of games where players may choose to rematch in any period. Some equilibria of fixed-player repeated games cannot be sustained as equilibria in a repeated social game. Conversely, the set of repeated matching (or social) equilibria also includes some plays that are not part of any subgame perfect equilibrium of the corresponding fixed-player repeated games. We explore existence under different equilibrium definitions, as well as the relationship to renegotiation-proof equilibrium. It is possible for repeated matching equilibria to be completely distinct from renegotiation-proof equilibria, and even to be Pareto inefficient.Social games, Matching, Games, Repeated games, Renegotiation

Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games

We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play. A group of players who are dissatisfied with the play of their current partners can join together and play a new equilibrium. This imposes new refinements on equilibrium play, where play depends on the relative populations of players in different roles, among other things. We also examine finite repetitions of games where players may choose to rematch in any period. Some equilibria of fixed-player repeated games cannot be sustained as equilibria in a repeated social game. Conversely, the set of repeated matching (or social) equilibria also includes some plays that are not part of any subgame perfect equilibrium of the corresponding fixed-player repeated games. We explore existence under different equilibrium definitions, as well as the relationship to renegotiation-proof equilibrium. It is possible for repeated matching equilibria to be completely distinct from renegotiation-proof equilibria, and even to be Pareto inefficient.Social Games, Matching, Games, Repeated Games, Renegotiation

Editorial: Teacher Education Advancement Network Journal, 10 (1)

TEAN presents the 16th issue of the TEAN journal here with a range of papers on very interesting and useful topics. We are as ever highly indebted to our reviewers whose careful and constructive reviews are supportive and helpful as our authors proceed to publication. If you would like to be involved in the journal or have an idea for a paper for the journal, please get in touch with [email protected]. Congratulations to all our authors – we are sure you will find plenty of thought - provoking topics to stimulate your thinking

Editorial: Teacher Education Advancement Network Journal, 9 (2)

A warm welcome to this seventeenth issue of the TEAN journal where we present a thought-provoking range of ten papers to give food for thought to teacher educators in their practice. Many thanks to our excellent team of reviewers whose thorough and helpful response to the papers is so effective in guiding authors to success. Thanks also to our authors whose perseverance and hard work to get their message to you is so very much appreciated. As ever, thanks to Linda Shore, the publishing editor, for her work in producing the issue for us

Perceptions of Masters level PGCE : a pilot investigation : final report

The report sums up findings from research into perceptions of Masters level PGCE provision in 2007-8. Perceptions represented are from students, headteachers, school mentors and teacher educators. Some interesting recommendations are offered. This report presents the findings of a pilot research investigation into perceptions of the provision of Masters level PGCE (Postgraduate Certificate in Education) in England and discusses the questions raised by the research. The research was by the University of Cumbria with nine other participating Higher Education Institutions and was supported by the Universities Council for the Education of Teachers (UCET). The research was linked to the Initial Teacher Education section of the Education Subject Centre of the Higher Education Academy (ESCalate) based at the University of Cumbria. The decision to offer Masters level credits within the PGCE marks a significant step for the teaching profession, and the findings of the research are relevant to the following groups: teacher educators involved in presenting Masters level PGCE courses to student teachers; student teachers embarking on Masters level PGCE courses; teachers and headteachers in schools; government policy makers; and all agencies concerned with teacher trainin

On the Formation of Interaction Networks in Social Coordination Games

There are many situations where two interacting individuals can benefit from coordinating their actions. We examine the endogenous choice of partners in such social coordination games and the implications for resulting play. We model the interaction pattern as a network where individuals periodically have the discretion to add or sever links to other players. With such endogenous interaction patterns we see multiple stochastically stable states of play, including some that involve play of equilibria in the coordination game that are neither efficient nor risk dominant. Thus the endogenous network structure not only has implications for the interaction pattern that emerges, but it also has a significant impact on the play in the coordination game relative to what would arise if the same interaction network were exogenous