Responsibility for implicit bias

Research programs in empirical psychology from the past two decades have revealed implicit biases. Although implicit processes are pervasive, unavoidable, and often useful aspects of our cognitions, they may also lead us into error. The most problematic forms of implicit cognition are those which target social groups, encoding stereotypes or reflecting prejudicial evaluative hierarchies. Despite intentions to the contrary, implicit biases can influence our behaviours and judgements, contributing to patterns of discriminatory behaviour. These patterns of discrimination are obviously wrong and unjust. But in remedying such wrongs, one question to be addressed concerns responsibility for implicit bias. Unlike some paradigmatic forms of wrongdoing, such discrimination is often unintentional, unendorsed, and perpetrated without awareness; and the harms are particularly damaging because they are cumulative and collectively perpetrated. So, what are we to make of questions of responsibility? In this article, we outline some of the main lines of recent philosophical thought, which address questions of responsibility for implicit bias. We focus on (a) the kind of responsibility at issue; (b) revisionist versus nonrevisionist conceptions of responsibility as applied to implicit bias; and (c) individual, institutional, and collective responsibility for implicit bias

Responsibility for implicit bias

Research programs in empirical psychology from the past two decades have revealed implicit biases. Although implicit processes are pervasive, unavoidable, and often useful aspects of our cognitions, they may also lead us into error. The most problematic forms of implicit cognition are those which target social groups, encoding stereotypes or reflecting prejudicial evaluative hierarchies. Despite intentions to the contrary, implicit biases can influence our behaviours and judgements, contributing to patterns of discriminatory behaviour. These patterns of discrimination are obviously wrong and unjust. But in remedying such wrongs, one question to be addressed concerns responsibility for implicit bias. Unlike some paradigmatic forms of wrongdoing, such discrimination is often unintentional, unendorsed, and perpetrated without awareness; and the harms are particularly damaging because they are cumulative and collectively perpetrated. So, what are we to make of questions of responsibility? In this article, we outline some of the main lines of recent philosophical thought, which address questions of responsibility for implicit bias. We focus on (a) the kind of responsibility at issue; (b) revisionist versus nonrevisionist conceptions of responsibility as applied to implicit bias; and (c) individual, institutional, and collective responsibility for implicit bias

The Heterogeneity of Implicit Bias

The term 'implicit bias' has very swiftly been incorporated into philosophical discourse. Our aim in this paper is to scrutinise the phenomena that fall under the rubric of implicit bias. The term is often used in a rather broad sense, to capture a range of implicit social cognitions, and this is useful for some purposes. However, we here articulate some of the important differences between phenomena identified as instances of implicit bias. We caution against ignoring these differences: it is likely they have considerable significance, not least for the sorts of normative recommendations being made concerning how to mitigate the bad effects of implicit bias

Responsibility for implicit bias

Philosophers who have written about implicit bias have claimed or implied that individuals are not responsible, and therefore not blameworthy, for their implicit biases, and that this is a function of the nature of implicit bias as implicit: below the radar of conscious reflection, out of the control of the deliberating agent, and not rationally revisable in the way many of our reflective beliefs are. I argue that close attention to the findings of empirical psychology, and to the conditions for blameworthiness, does not support these claims. I suggest that the arguments for the claim that individuals are not liable for blame are invalid, and that there is some reason to suppose that individuals are, at least sometimes, liable to blame for the extent to which they are influenced in behaviour and judgment by implicit biases. I also argue against the claim that it is counter-productive to see bias as something for which individuals are blameworthy; rather, understanding implicit bias as something for which we are (sometimes) liable to blame could be constructive

Implicit Bias and Epistemic Oppression in Confronting Racism

Motivating reforms to address discrimination and exclusion is important. But what epistemic practices characterise better or worse ways of doing this? Recently, the phenomena of implicit biases have played a large role in motivating reforms. We argue that this strategy risks perpetuating two kinds of epistemic oppression: the vindication dynamic and contributory injustice. We offer positive proposals for avoiding these forms of epistemic oppression when confronting racism

Epistemic Injustice and Implicit Bias

Because our knowledge-generating abilities are connected to our moral worth, we can wrong other people by treating them in ways that are disrespectful of their knowledge-generating abilities or place unjust epistemic burdens on them. Such wrongs are called “epistemic injustices.” Chapter 6 examines the ways in which implicit biases have been implicated in a range of epistemic injustices, including testimonial injustice, epistemic appropriation, and epistemic exploitation

On the relational conditions for autonomy

This thesis is about the concept of personal autonomy. In particular, it is about how we might understand the claim that social relations are constitutive of autonomy, and whether, appropriately understood, it is true. Personal autonomy, broadly construed, can be understood as an individual's ability to govern herself: to interact with the world, deliberate about what to do, to choose, and execute her choice. We value autonomy not only because we value being self-governing, but also because the concept plays important roles in various theoretical frameworks: in grounding respect, in setting the bounds of legitimate paternalistic intervention, and in identifying the candidates for political participation. Recently, conceptions of autonomy that are 'relational' have been developed. Such conceptions make explicit reference to the social environment of the agent. This thesis assesses the prospects for an adequate relational conception of autonomy

Excluding Evidence for Integrity's Sake

In recent years, the concept of “integrity” has been frequently discussed by scholars, and deployed by courts, in the domain of criminal procedure. In this paper, we are particularly concerned with how the concept has been employed in relation to the problem of the admissibility of evidence obtained improperly. In conceptualising and addressing this problem, the advocates of integrity rely on it as a standard of conduct for the criminal justice authorities and as a necessary condition for the state authority to condemn and punish. We raise a series of challenges that need answering before integrity can perform these roles. Our aim is not to show that integrity is useless in normative theorising about the admissibility of evidence, and about the criminal process in general. Rather, it is to give guidance for the elaboration of a theory of integrity that is cogent, coherent, and has useful implications for the process of proof

Under-Represented Groups in Philosophy

There has been a recent surge in attention to the phenomena of underrepresentation of various groups in academic philosophy. The conference on Under-represented Groups in Philosophy held at Cardiff University on November 26th and 27th 2010 was intended as a forum to enable a better understanding of the problems surrounding under-representation in philosophy, and to examine the philosophical under-pinnings of strategies for overcoming under-representation and its attendant problems. The conference attracted speakers and participants mostly from the Anglophone world including the UK, US, Canada and Australia. All the talks were recorded and podcasts are freely available at: http://www.cf.ac.uk/encap/newsandevents/events/ conferences/groups.ht The conference venue was fully accessible to individuals with mobility impairments; all talks were translated in American and British sign language and interpreters were also present at the conference dinner. Finally, crèche facilities were available upon request to the organisers. One of the outcomes of the conference has been sustained attention to the question of how to organise conferences and workshops so that they are inclusive and accessible