Perception and Cognition Are Largely Independent, but Still Affect Each Other in Systematic Ways: Arguments from Evolution and the Consciousness-Attention Dissociation

The main thesis of this paper is that two prevailing theories about cognitive penetration are too extreme, namely, the view that cognitive penetration is pervasive and the view that there is a sharp and fundamental distinction between cognition and perception, which precludes any type of cognitive penetration. These opposite views have clear merits and empirical support. To eliminate this puzzling situation, we present an alternative theoretical approach that incorporates the merits of these views into a broader and more nuanced explanatory framework. A key argument we present in favor of this framework concerns the evolution of intentionality and perceptual capacities. An implication of this argument is that cases of cognitive penetration must have evolved more recently and that this is compatible with the cognitive impenetrability of early perceptual stages of processing information. A theoretical approach that explains why this should be the case is the consciousness and attention dissociation framework. The paper discusses why concepts, particularly issues concerning concept acquisition, play an important role in the interaction between perception and cognition

Artificial consciousness and the consciousness-attention dissociation

Artificial Intelligence is at a turning point, with a substantial increase in projects aiming to implement sophisticated forms of human intelligence in machines. This research attempts to model specific forms of intelligence through brute-force search heuristics and also reproduce features of human perception and cognition, including emotions. Such goals have implications for artificial consciousness, with some arguing that it will be achievable once we overcome short-term engineering challenges. We believe, however, that phenomenal consciousness cannot be implemented in machines. This becomes clear when considering emotions and examining the dissociation between consciousness and attention in humans. While we may be able to program ethical behavior based on rules and machine learning, we will never be able to reproduce emotions or empathy by programming such control systems—these will be merely simulations. Arguments in favor of this claim include considerations about evolution, the neuropsychological aspects of emotions, and the dissociation between attention and consciousness found in humans. Ultimately, we are far from achieving artificial consciousness

On the evolution of conscious attention

This paper aims to clarify the relationship between consciousness and attention through theoretical considerations about evolution. Specifically, we will argue that the empirical findings on attention and the basic considerations concerning the evolution of the different forms of attention demonstrate that consciousness and attention must be dissociated regardless of which definition of these terms one uses. To the best of our knowledge, no extant view on the relationship between consciousness and attention has this advantage. Because of this characteristic, this paper presents a principled and neutral way to settle debates concerning the relationship between consciousness and attention, without falling into disputes about the meaning of these terms. A decisive conclusion of this approach is that extreme views on the relationship between consciousness and attention must be rejected, including identity and full dissociation views. There is an overlap between the two within conscious attention, but developing a full understanding of this mechanism requires further empirical investigations

The Role of Information in Consciousness

This article comprehensively examines how information processing relates to attention and consciousness. We argue that no current theoretical framework investigating consciousness has a satisfactory and holistic account of their informational relationship. Our key theoretical contribution is showing how the dissociation between consciousness and attention must be understood in informational terms in order to make the debate scientifically sound. No current theories clarify the difference between attention and consciousness in terms of information. We conclude with two proposals to advance the debate. First, neurobiological homeostatic processes need to be more explicitly associated with conscious information processing, since information processed through attention is algorithmic, rather than being homeostatic. Second, to understand subjectivity in informational terms, we must define information uniqueness in consciousness (e.g., irreproducible information, biologically encrypted information). These approaches could help cognitive scientists better understand conflicting accounts of the neural correlates of consciousness and work toward a more unified theoretical framework

Motion and position shifts induced by the double-drift stimulus are unaffected by attentional load.

The double-drift stimulus produces a strong shift in apparent motion direction that generates large errors of perceived position. In this study, we tested the effect of attentional load on the perceptual estimates of motion direction and position for double-drift stimuli. In each trial, four objects appeared, one in each quadrant of a large screen, and they moved upward or downward on an angled trajectory. The target object whose direction or position was to be judged was either cued with a small arrow prior to object motion (low attentional load condition) or cued after the objects stopped moving and disappeared (high attentional load condition). In Experiment 1, these objects appeared 10° from the central fixation, and participants reported the perceived direction of the target's trajectory after the stimulus disappeared by adjusting the direction of an arrow at the center of the response screen. In Experiment 2, the four double-drift objects could appear between 6 ° and 14° from the central fixation, and participants reported the location of the target object after its disappearance by moving the position of a small circle on the response screen. The errors in direction and position judgments showed little effect of the attentional manipulation-similar errors were seen in both experiments whether or not the participant knew which double-drift object would be tested. This suggests that orienting endogenous attention (i.e., by only attending to one object in the precued trials) does not interact with the strength of the motion or position shifts for the double-drift stimulus

Object-specific priming benefit enhanced during explicit multiple object tracking

The referential link between an external object and its corresponding mental representation has yet to be clearly defined. Visual indexes are primitive mechanisms that act as pointers to objects in a visual scene and can be linked to descriptive mental representations. These representations, or "object files", have been demonstrated by object-specific preview benefits (OSPB), where a priming effect for object identity travels with the object in which information initially appeared. The present study explores OPSB effects during Multiple Object Tracking (MOT) to investigate the formation of object representations in a dynamic environment. All experiments reported used the MOT framework, where four identical circles moved unpredictably and independently on a computer screen. In Experiment 1, either one or two preview letters appeared briefly inside the circles during movement. At the end of the trial, one test letter appeared inside a circle and observers indicated whether or not the test letter matched any of the preview letters. Inter-stimulus intervals (ISI) between the preview and test letters varied at one, two, and four seconds (no tracking was required). Reaction times in the "same-object/same-letter" condition showed significant OSPB effects in both single and dual preview versions, but only during the one-second ISI. This suggests an automatic construction of object files that decay over time. To explore OSPB effects when attention is deployed during tracking, Experiment 2 required observers to track and identify the two objects that displayed preview letters prior to object movement (creating constant four-second ISIs). There was no OSPB effect in the non-tracking condition, which replicated the four-second ISI results in Experiment 1, but there was a significant OSPB effect in the explicit tracking condition. Experiment 3 further tested this effect by using novel symbols from an ancient alphabet (otherwise, the design was identical to Experiment 2). Again, a significant OSPB effect was observed only in the tracking condition. Taken together, these results suggest that feature binding to indexes occurs automatically, but attention is required to extend the persistence of these object representations. Such findings can inform models of referential links between external objects and mental representations.M.S.Includes bibliographical references (p. 33-36)

Recurrent Processing Theory (RPT) v. Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT). A comment on Pitts et al 2018

The relationship between attention and consciousness is one that is crucial for understanding perception and different types of conscious experience, and we commend this analysis of the topic by Pitts, Lutsyshyna, and Hillyard (2018). We have also examined this relationship closely (e.g., Montemayor & Haladjian, 2015) and would like to point out a few potential contradictions in the Pitts et al. paper that require clarification, particularly in the attempt to reconcile aspects of recurrent processing theory (RPT) with global neuronal workspace theory (GNWT). This commentary addresses these points and introduces other considerations important for this topic

Enumerating by pointing to locations: the role of spatial information in counting

The fast and accurate enumeration of a small set of objects, called subitizing, is thought to involve a different mechanism from other numerosity judgments, such as those based on estimation. The underlying mechanism for small-set enumeration was examined by using a novel “pointing” task that also obtains information about the perceived locations of enumerated objects. Observers were shown brief masked displays (50, 200, and 350 ms) of 2-9 small black discs randomly placed on a gray screen. The observers then placed markers on a blank screen to indicate the locations of these discs. The number of these markers provided an estimate of enumeration accuracy. Observers could “enumerate” accurately displays containing up to six items in contrast with the four-item limit typically found. Experiment 2 replicated this lower limit by asking observers to report numerosity using cardinal symbols. Here, enumeration performance was better in the pointing task than the numeral report task. Experiments 3-5 presented alternative control tasks in addition to the pointing task. Results from these experiments indicate overall better enumeration performance in the pointing task, which suggests a non-symbolic response method produces a higher subitizing range. To characterize the mechanism underlying the pointing task, we examined the errors in the memory for object locations. Localization error was measured as the distance between corresponding stimulus discs and response markers. These errors increased in magnitude with larger numerosities and shorter display durations. Responses also indicated a compression of distances around the center of mass. Additionally, stimulus displays with higher regularity in the spacing between discs produced better enumeration and localization performance. Overall, the localization results indicate spatial information can be represented with a rough accuracy that improves when increasing exposure time to the stimulus or reducing the number of items that must be remembered. In contrast, enumeration performance showed few errors in the same range (2-6 items). Together, these results support the possibility that the Visual Indexing mechanism assists small-set enumeration by individuating and selecting discrete objects without necessarily encoding detailed information about these objects.Ph.D.Includes bibliographical referencesIncludes vitaby Harry Haroutioun Haladjia

Unifying Theories of Consciousness, Attention, and Conscious Attention

One of the more challenging research areas in cognitive science is the attempt to understand how the brain supports consciousness. This historically philosophical endeavor is now actively studied in the sciences, with research on visual attention being an especially promising area that can further our understanding of consciousness. A major problem with this cross-disciplinary pursuit, however, is that for philosophers and scientists, the terms consciousness, attention, and conscious attention are ambiguous and used differently even by those within the same academic discipline. The goal of this paper is to begin laying the groundwork for a unified study of consciousness by delineating common terminology for attention and consciousness and by identifying the relationship between the two within the study of conscious attention. This includes categorizing current theories according to a spectrum of theoretical complexity