Is Avoiding an Aversive Outcome Rewarding? Neural Substrates of Avoidance Learning in the Human Brain

Avoidance learning poses a challenge for reinforcement-based theories of instrumental conditioning, because once an aversive outcome is successfully avoided an individual may no longer experience extrinsic reinforcement for their behavior. One possible account for this is to propose that avoiding an aversive outcome is in itself a reward, and thus avoidance behavior is positively reinforced on each trial when the aversive outcome is successfully avoided. In the present study we aimed to test this possibility by determining whether avoidance of an aversive outcome recruits the same neural circuitry as that elicited by a reward itself. We scanned 16 human participants with functional MRI while they performed an instrumental choice task, in which on each trial they chose from one of two actions in order to either win money or else avoid losing money. Neural activity in a region previously implicated in encoding stimulus reward value, the medial orbitofrontal cortex, was found to increase, not only following receipt of reward, but also following successful avoidance of an aversive outcome. This neural signal may itself act as an intrinsic reward, thereby serving to reinforce actions during instrumental avoidance

The Ship of Theseus Puzzle

Does the Ship of Theseus present a genuine puzzle about persistence due to conflicting intuitions based on “continuity of form” and “continuity of matter” pulling in opposite directions? Philosophers are divided. Some claim that it presents a genuine puzzle but disagree over whether there is a solution. Others claim that there is no puzzle at all since the case has an obvious solution. To assess these proposals, we conducted a cross-cultural study involving nearly 3,000 people across twenty-two countries, speaking eighteen different languages. Our results speak against the proposal that there is no puzzle at all and against the proposal that there is a puzzle but one that has no solution. Our results suggest that there are two criteria—“continuity of form” and “continuity of matter”— that constitute our concept of persistence and these two criteria receive different weightings in settling matters concerning persistence

EEG Beta Oscillations in the Temporoparietal Area Related to the Accuracy in Estimating Others' Preference

Humans often attempt to predict what others prefer based on a narrow slice of experience, called thin-slicing. According to the theoretical bases for how humans can predict the preference of others, one tends to estimate the other's preference using a perceived difference between the other and self. Previous neuroimaging studies have revealed that the network of dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) is related to the ability of predicting others' preference. However, it still remains unknown about the temporal patterns of neural activities for others' preference prediction through thin-slicing. To investigate such temporal aspects of neural activities, we investigated human electroencephalography (EEG) recorded during the task of predicting the preference of others while only a facial picture of others was provided. Twenty participants (all female, average age: 21.86) participated in the study. In each trial of the task, participants were shown a picture of either a target person or self for 3 s, followed by the presentation of a movie poster over which participants predicted the target person's preference as liking or disliking. The time-frequency EEG analysis was employed to analyze temporal changes in the amplitudes of brain oscillations. Participants could predict others' preference for movies with accuracy of 56.89 ?? 3.16% and 10 out of 20 participants exhibited prediction accuracy higher than a chance level (95% interval). There was a significant difference in the power of the parietal alpha (10~13 Hz) oscillation 0.6~0.8 s after the onset of poster presentation between the cases when participants predicted others' preference and when they reported self-preference (p < 0.05). The power of brain oscillations at any frequency band and time period during the trial did not show a significant correlation with individual prediction accuracy. However, when we measured differences of the power between the trials of predicting other's preference and reporting self-preference, the right temporal beta oscillations 1.6~1.8 s after the onset of facial picture presentation exhibited a significant correlation with individual accuracy. Our results suggest that right temporoparietal beta oscillations may be correlated with one's ability to predict what others prefer with minimal information

De Pulchritudine non est Disputandum? A cross-cultural investigation of the alleged intersubjective validity of aesthetic judgment

Since at least Hume and Kant, philosophers working on the nature of aesthetic judgment have generally agreed that common sense does not treat aesthetic judgments in the same way as typical expressions of subjective preferences—rather, it endows them with intersubjective validity, the property of being right or wrong regardless of disagreement. Moreover, this apparent intersubjective validity has been taken to constitute one of the main explananda for philosophical accounts of aesthetic judgment. But is it really the case that most people spontaneously treat aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity? In this paper, we report the results of a cross-cultural study with over 2,000 respondents spanning 19 countries. Despite significant geographical variations, these results suggest that most people do not treat their own aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for theories of aesthetic judgment and the purpose of aesthetics in general.info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersio

In Vivo Transcription Dynamics of the Galactose Operon: A Study on the Promoter Transition from P1 to P2 at Onset of Stationary Phase

Quantitative analyses of the 5′ end of gal transcripts indicate that transcription from the galactose operon P1 promoter is higher during cell division. When cells are no longer dividing, however, transcription is initiated more often from the P2 promoter. Escherichia coli cells divide six times before the onset of the stationary phase when grown in LB containing 0.5% galactose at 37°C. Transcription from the two promoters increases, although at different rates, during early exponential phase (until the third cell division, OD600 0.4), and then reaches a plateau. The steady-state transcription from P1 continues in late exponential phase (the next three cell divisions, OD600 3.0), after which transcription from this promoter decreases. However, steady-state transcription from P2 continues 1 h longer into the stationary phase, before decreasing. This longer steady-state P2 transcription constitutes the promoter transition from P1 to P2 at the onset of the stationary phase. The intracellular cAMP concentration dictates P1 transcription dynamics; therefore, promoter transition may result from a lack of cAMP-CRP complex binding to the gal operon. The decay rate of gal-specific transcripts is constant through the six consecutive cell divisions that comprise the exponential growth phase, increases at the onset of the stationary phase, and is too low to be measured during the stationary phase. These data suggest that a regulatory mechanism coordinates the synthesis and decay of gal mRNAs to maintain the observed gal transcription. Our analysis indicates that the increase in P1 transcription is the result of cAMP-CRP binding to increasing numbers of galactose operons in the cell population

Nothing at Stake in Knowledge

Many philosophers hold that stakes affect ordinary knowledge ascriptions. Here’s a version of a pair of cases aimed at supporting this: Bob and his wife are driving home on Friday and considering whether to stop at the bank to deposit a check. The lines at the bank are very long and so Bob considers coming back on Saturday. In the low stakes version, nothing of importance hinges on whether the check is deposited; in the high stakes version, it is very important that the check be deposited. Bob’s wife asks whether the bank will be open on Saturday. Bob says he drove past the bank last Saturday, and it was open. However, his wife points out that banks sometimes change their hours. Bob says “I know the bank will be open tomorrow”. In the low stakes case, many philosophers maintain that Bob does indeed know that the bank will be open; in the high stakes case, these philosophers maintain that Bob is ignorant – his statement that he knows the bank will be open tomorrow is false. These philosophers also maintain that this pattern of judgments is what we would expect from competent speakers confronted with this and similar cases (e.g., Cohen, 1999, 2013; DeRose, 1992, 2009; Fantl and McGrath, 2002; Nagel, 2008; Rysiew, 2001; Stanley, 2005). Though many philosophers agree that stakes play a role in ordinary knowledge ascriptions, there is disagreement about what explains this. One view, epistemic contextualism, holds that “to know” is a context sensitive verb and that the truth conditions for knowledge ascriptions can vary across conversational contexts (e.g., DeRose, 2009). For instance, Bob’s statement “I know the bank will be open tomorrow” can be true in low stakes contexts and false in high stakes contexts. Another view, interest-relative invariantism, denies that “to know” is a context sensitive verb and that the truth conditions for knowledge ascriptions vary according to conversational contexts. Instead, cases like the Bank cases show that practical factors—i.e., stakes—play a distinctive role in determining whether the knowledge relation obtains (e.g., Stanley, 2005). Yet another alternative, which we’ll call classical invariantism, denies that “to know” is a context sensitive verb and that practical factors, such as stakes, play a direct role in determining whether the knowledge relation obtains. Instead, stakes affect knowledge ascriptions only by affecting our assessment of factors that have traditionally been taken to constitute or be necessary for knowledge, such as e.g., belief, quality of evidence, etc. (e.g., Bach, 2005; Weatherson, 2005; Ganson, 2007; Nagel, 2008). If this is right, then the role of stakes in knowledge ascriptions fails to motivate such surprising views as epistemic contextualism or interest-relative invariantism. Naturally, epistemic contextualists and interest-relative invariantists deny this, claiming that even when the factors that have traditionally been taken to constitute or be necessary for knowledge are held fixed, stakes continue to play a role in ordinary knowledge ascriptions (e.g., DeRose, 2009; Lawlor, 2013). So we see a dispute over what best explains the role of stakes in ordinary knowledge ascriptions. It is thus extremely surprising that a wide range of empirical evidence suggests that ordinary knowledge ascriptions fail to display any sensitivity to stakes (e.g., Buckwalter, 2010; Buckwalter and Schaffer, 2015; Feltz and Zarpentine, 2010; May, Sinnott-Armstrong, Hull, and Zimmerman, 2010; Turri, forthcoming; though see e.g., Pinillos, 2012; Pinillos and Simpson, 2014; Sripada and Stanley, 2012). If stakes really do not play any role in ordinary knowledge ascriptions, one of the main motivations for epistemic contextualism and interest relative invariantism would be undermined. Perhaps these different explanations of the role of stakes in ordinary knowledge ascription are born out of nothing more than a myth (Schaffer and Knobe, 2009). If so, classical invariantism about knowledge might be best supported—not because it provides the best explanation of the role of stakes in ordinary knowledge ascriptions, but rather because the failure of stakes to play a role in ordinary knowledge ascription would undercut an important motivation for its two competitors, epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. These radical alternatives to classical invariantism, lacking evidence in support of one of their important motivations, should perhaps then fall. Classical invariantism would stand. In the remainder of this article, we’ll disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We’ll accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism

Interoceptive ability predicts moral intuition aligned with group consensus

Aligning one’s decisions with the prevailing norms and expectations of those around us constitutes a fundamental facet of moral decision-making. When faced with conflicting moral values, one adaptive approach is to rely on intuition. While there has been theoretical speculation about the connection between moral decision-making and an individual’s awareness of introspective interoceptive signals, it has not been empirically examined. This study examines this link in the context of decision-making in moral dilemma of university students. Our research demonstrates a correlation between an individual’s moral intuition towards group consensus and their interoceptive abilities. Study 1 found that interoceptive awareness and the intrinsic functional connectivity of anterior insula are associated with individuals’ moral intuition. Study 2 showed that interoceptive accuracy is associated with moral intuition toward the group consensus. These findings provide empirical evidence of the link between interoceptive abilities and moral intuition towards group consensus

Ultrafast dynamics in complex molecular solids: Ultrafast imaging of laser ablation of PMMA and theory of mechanical energy flow in ultrahot crystalline naphthalene

In a molecular solid, there is an ultrafast transfer of energy between the internal molecular vibrations and the external modes or lattice vibrations. Two interesting examples involving this energy transfer are presented in this thesis. First, an ultrafast imaging apparatus is constructed and used to investigate spatially inhomogeneous dynamics in laser surface ablation of polymers. Second, time dependent mechanical energy redistribution in ultrahot anharmonic solids composed of organic molecules is studied theoretically.Using the ultrafast imaging apparatus, computer-digitized images are acquired over the time range 10\sp{-12}-10\sp0 s. The images are analyzed to obtain the time dependent behavior of the ablated polymer. Near the peak of the ablation pulse, self-focusing begins and produces a small diameter filament lasting for 20 ps. The polymer irradiated by the filament then undergoes explosive thermal decomposition, ejecting fragments from a conical volume into the atmosphere above the surface. These ablated materials generate a hemispherical, supersonic shock wave called a blast wave. A mechanism for the ablation process involving nonlinear absorption is proposed.Vibrational cooling and multiphonon up pumping are simulated using model parameters for crystalline naphthalene. In vibrational cooling, the redistribution of large excitation energy localized in a high frequency vibration is investigated in two limiting cases. In the weak excitation case, a single molecule is excited in a large crystal where the effect of emitted phonons during the vibrational cooling is ignored. In the strong excitation case, every molecule of the crystal system is excited so that the emitted phonons affect subsequent dynamics. In multiphonon up pumping, the redistribution of thermal energy of a 40 kbar shock wave is studied using a supercomputer. The thermal effect of the shock wave is simulated by exciting an enormous number of acoustic phonons. In both vibrational cooling and up pumping processes, the phonons achieve an internal equilibrium in a few ps through efficient intraphonon scattering. New thermal equilibrium is reached within 1 ns for both cases.U of I OnlyETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permissio

Impaired Feedback Processing for Symbolic Reward in Individuals with Internet Game Overuse

Reward processing, which plays a critical role in adaptive behavior, is impaired in addiction disorders, which are accompanied by functional abnormalities in brain reward circuits. Internet gaming disorder, like substance addiction, is thought to be associated with impaired reward processing, but little is known about how it affects learning, especially when feedback is conveyed by less-salient motivational events. Here, using both monetary (±500 KRW) and symbolic (Chinese characters “right” or “wrong”) rewards and penalties, we investigated whether behavioral performance and feedback-related neural responses are altered in Internet game overuse (IGO) group. Using functional MRI, brain responses for these two types of reward/penalty feedback were compared between young males with problems of IGO (IGOs, n = 18, mean age = 22.2 ± 2.0 years) and age-matched control subjects (Controls, n = 20, mean age = 21.2 ± 2.1) during a visuomotor association task where associations were learned between English letters and one of four responses. No group difference was found in adjustment of error responses following the penalty or in brain responses to penalty, for either monetary or symbolic penalties. The IGO individuals, however, were more likely to fail to choose the response previously reinforced by symbolic (but not monetary) reward. A whole brain two-way ANOVA analysis for reward revealed reduced activations in the IGO group in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex/ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) in response to both reward types, suggesting impaired reward processing. However, the responses to reward in the inferior parietal region and medial orbitofrontal cortex/vmPFC were affected by the types of reward in the IGO group. Unlike the control group, in the IGO group the reward response was reduced only for symbolic reward, suggesting lower attentional and value processing specific to symbolic reward. Furthermore, the more severe the Internet gaming overuse symptoms in the IGO group, the greater the activations of the ventral striatum for monetary relative to symbolic reward. These findings suggest that IGO is associated with bias toward motivationally salient reward, which would lead to poor goal-directed behavior in everyday life

Reappraisal Modulates Attentional Bias to Angry Faces

Heightened attentional bias to emotional information is one of the main characteristics of disorders related to emotion dysregulation such as anxiety, depression, and substance abuse. Although reappraisal, an emotion regulation strategy, is known to effectively modulate subjective experience of emotions, it remains unknown whether reappraisal can alter attentional biases to emotional information. In the current research, we investigated the influence of instruction-induced state reappraisal (Study 1) and trait reappraisal (Study 2) on attentional biases to happy and angry faces. In Study 1, healthy young women were recruited and randomly assigned to one of the three groups: up-, down-, and no-regulation. Participants were instructed to reappraise their emotions to increase and decrease emotional experience while viewing an emotionally negative film clip. Attentional bias was assessed with a dot-probe task with pictures of angry and happy facial expressions. In Study 2, a separate group of healthy young men and women participated. Participants’ trait reappraisal and suppression as well as state and trait anxiety were assessed. A dot-probe task was completed by all participants. Statistical tests in Study 1 revealed that participants who reappraised to decrease negative emotions while viewing an emotionally negative film clip had reduced attentional bias to subsequently presented angry faces compared to participants who reappraised to increase negative emotions. Multiple regression analyses in Study 2 revealed that trait reappraisal predicted slower orienting toward angry faces, whereas state anxiety predicted slower disengagement from angry faces. Interestingly, trait suppression predicted slower disengagement from happy faces. Taken together, these results suggest that both instruction-induced state reappraisal and trait reappraisal are linked to reduced attentional bias to negative information and contribute to better understanding of how everyday emotion regulation styles contribute to attentional processing of emotional information