Depression is related to an absence of optimistically biased belief updating about future life events

BACKGROUND: When challenged with information about the future, healthy participants show an optimistically biased updating pattern, taking desirable information more into account than undesirable information. However, it is unknown how patients suffering from major depressive disorder (MDD), who express pervasive pessimistic beliefs, update their beliefs when receiving information about their future. Here we tested whether an optimistically biased information processing pattern found in healthy individuals is absent in MDD patients. Method MDD patients (n = 18; 13 medicated; eight with co-morbid anxiety disorder) and healthy controls (n = 19) estimated their personal probability of experiencing 70 adverse life events. After each estimate participants were presented with the average probability of the event occurring to a person living in the same sociocultural environment. This information could be desirable (i.e. average probability better than expected) or undesirable (i.e. average probability worse than expected). To assess how desirable versus undesirable information influenced beliefs, participants estimated their personal probability of experiencing the 70 events a second time. RESULTS: Healthy controls showed an optimistic bias in updating, that is they changed their beliefs more toward desirable versus undesirable information. Overall, this optimistic bias was absent in MDD patients. Symptom severity correlated with biased updating: more severely depressed individuals showed a more pessimistic updating pattern. Furthermore, MDD patients estimated the probability of experiencing adverse life events as higher than healthy controls. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings raise the intriguing possibility that optimistically biased updating of expectations about one's personal future is associated with mental health

EEG-fMRI Based Information Theoretic Characterization of the Human Perceptual Decision System

The modern metaphor of the brain is that of a dynamic information processing device. In the current study we investigate how a core cognitive network of the human brain, the perceptual decision system, can be characterized regarding its spatiotemporal representation of task-relevant information. We capitalize on a recently developed information theoretic framework for the analysis of simultaneously acquired electroencephalography (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging data (fMRI) (Ostwald et al. (2010), NeuroImage 49: 498–516). We show how this framework naturally extends from previous validations in the sensory to the cognitive domain and how it enables the economic description of neural spatiotemporal information encoding. Specifically, based on simultaneous EEG-fMRI data features from n = 13 observers performing a visual perceptual decision task, we demonstrate how the information theoretic framework is able to reproduce earlier findings on the neurobiological underpinnings of perceptual decisions from the response signal features' marginal distributions. Furthermore, using the joint EEG-fMRI feature distribution, we provide novel evidence for a highly distributed and dynamic encoding of task-relevant information in the human brain

Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements

The psychological and neurobiological processes underlying moral judgement have been the focus of many recent empirical studies1–11. Of central interest is whether emotions play a causal role in moral judgement, and, in parallel, how emotion-related areas of the brain contribute to moral judgement. Here we show that six patients with focal bilateral damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC), a brain region necessary for the normal generation of emotions and, in particular, social emotions12–14, produce an abnor- mally ‘utilitarian’ pattern of judgements on moral dilemmas that pit compelling considerations of aggregate welfare against highly emotionally aversive behaviours (for example, having to sacrifice one person’s life to save a number of other lives)7,8. In contrast, the VMPC patients’ judgements were normal in other classes of moral dilemmas. These findings indicate that, for a selective set of moral dilemmas, the VMPC is critical for normal judgements of right and wrong. The findings support a necessary role for emotion in the generation of those judgements

What Happens in Between? Human Oscillatory Brain Activity Related to Crossmodal Spatial Cueing

Previous studies investigated the effects of crossmodal spatial attention by comparing the responses to validly versus invalidly cued target stimuli. Dynamics of cortical rhythms in the time interval between cue and target might contribute to cue effects on performance. Here, we studied the influence of spatial attention on ongoing oscillatory brain activity in the interval between cue and target onset. In a first experiment, subjects underwent periods of tactile stimulation (cue) followed by visual stimulation (target) in a spatial cueing task as well as tactile stimulation as a control. In a second experiment, cue validity was modified to be 50%, 75%, or else 25%, to separate effects of exogenous shifts of attention caused by tactile stimuli from that of endogenous shifts. Tactile stimuli produced: 1) a stronger lateralization of the sensorimotor beta-rhythm rebound (15–22 Hz) after tactile stimuli serving as cues versus not serving as cues; 2) a suppression of the occipital alpha-rhythm (7–13 Hz) appearing only in the cueing task (this suppression was stronger contralateral to the endogenously attended side and was predictive of behavioral success); 3) an increase of prefrontal gamma-activity (25–35 Hz) specifically in the cueing task. We measured cue-related modulations of cortical rhythms which may accompany crossmodal spatial attention, expectation or decision, and therefore contribute to cue validity effects. The clearly lateralized alpha suppression after tactile cues in our data indicates its dependence on endogenous rather than exogenous shifts of visuo-spatial attention following a cue independent of its modality

Temporal dynamics of selective attention and conflict resolution during cross-dimensional go-nogo decisions

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Decision-making is a fundamental capacity which is crucial to many higher-order psychological functions. We recorded event-related potentials (ERPs) during a visual target-identification task that required go-nogo choices. Targets were identified on the basis of cross-dimensional conjunctions of particular colors and forms. Color discriminability was manipulated in three conditions to determine the effects of color distinctiveness on component processes of decision-making.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Target identification was accompanied by the emergence of prefrontal P2a and P3b. Selection negativity (SN) revealed that target-compatible features captured attention more than target-incompatible features, suggesting that intra-dimensional attentional capture was goal-contingent. No changes of cross-dimensional selection priorities were measurable when color discriminability was altered. Peak latencies of the color-related SN provided a chronometric measure of the duration of attention-related neural processing. ERPs recorded over the frontocentral scalp (N2c, P3a) revealed that color-overlap distractors, more than form-overlap distractors, required additional late selection. The need for additional response selection induced by color-overlap distractors was severely reduced when color discriminability decreased.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>We propose a simple model of cross-dimensional perceptual decision-making. The temporal synchrony of separate color-related and form-related choices determines whether or not distractor processing includes post-perceptual stages. ERP measures contribute to a comprehensive explanation of the temporal dynamics of component processes of perceptual decision-making.</p

Neural correlates of evidence accumulation during value-based decisions revealed via simultaneous EEG-fMRI

Current computational accounts posit that, in simple binary choices, humans accumulate evidence in favour of the different alternatives before committing to a decision. Neural correlates of this accumulating activity have been found during perceptual decisions in parietal and prefrontal cortex; however the source of such activity in value-based choices remains unknown. Here we use simultaneous EEG–fMRI and computational modelling to identify EEG signals reflecting an accumulation process and demonstrate that the within- and across-trial variability in these signals explains fMRI responses in posterior-medial frontal cortex. Consistent with its role in integrating the evidence prior to reaching a decision, this region also exhibits task-dependent coupling with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the striatum, brain areas known to encode the subjective value of the decision alternatives. These results further endorse the proposition of an evidence accumulation process during value-based decisions in humans and implicate the posterior-medial frontal cortex in this process

Valence-Specific Modulation in the Accumulation of Perceptual Evidence Prior to Visual Scene Recognition

Visual scene recognition is a dynamic process through which incoming sensory information is iteratively compared with predictions regarding the most likely identity of the input stimulus. In this study, we used a novel progressive unfolding task to characterize the accumulation of perceptual evidence prior to scene recognition, and its potential modulation by the emotional valence of these scenes. Our results show that emotional (pleasant and unpleasant) scenes led to slower accumulation of evidence compared to neutral scenes. In addition, when controlling for the potential contribution of non-emotional factors (i.e., familiarity and complexity of the pictures), our results confirm a reliable shift in the accumulation of evidence for pleasant relative to neutral and unpleasant scenes, suggesting a valence-specific effect. These findings indicate that proactive iterations between sensory processing and top-down predictions during scene recognition are reliably influenced by the rapidly extracted (positive) emotional valence of the visual stimuli. We interpret these findings in accordance with the notion of a genuine positivity offset during emotional scene recognition

The effects of juvenile stress on anxiety, cognitive bias and decision making in adulthood:a rat model

Stress experienced in childhood is associated with an increased risk of developing psychiatric disorders in adulthood. These disorders are particularly characterized by disturbances to emotional and cognitive processes, which are not currently fully modeled in animals. Assays of cognitive bias have recently been used with animals to give an indication of their emotional/cognitive state. We used a cognitive bias test, alongside a traditional measure of anxiety (elevated plus maze), to investigate the effects of juvenile stress (JS) on adulthood behaviour using a rodent model. During the cognitive bias test, animals were trained to discriminate between two reward bowls based on a stimulus (rough/smooth sandpaper) encountered before they reached the bowls. One stimulus (e.g. rough) was associated with a lower value reward than the other (e.g. smooth). Once rats were trained, their cognitive bias was explored through the presentation of an ambiguous stimulus (intermediate grade sandpaper): a rat was classed as optimistic if it chose the bowl ordinarily associated with the high value reward. JS animals were lighter than controls, exhibited increased anxiety-like behaviour in the elevated plus maze and were more optimistic in the cognitive bias test. This increased optimism may represent an optimal foraging strategy for these underweight animals. JS animals were also faster than controls to make a decision when presented with an ambiguous stimulus, suggesting altered decision making. These results demonstrate that stress in the juvenile phase can increase anxiety-like behaviour and alter cognitive bias and decision making in adulthood in a rat model

Action planning and the timescale of evidence accumulation

Perceptual decisions are based on the temporal integration of sensory evidence for different states of the outside world. The timescale of this integration process varies widely across behavioral contexts and individuals, and it is diagnostic for the underlying neural mechanisms. In many situations, the decision-maker knows the required mapping between perceptual evidence and motor response (henceforth termed “sensory-motor contingency”) before decision formation. Here, the integrated evidence can be directly translated into a motor plan and, indeed, neural signatures of the integration process are evident as build-up activity in premotor brain regions. In other situations, however, the sensory-motor contingencies are unknown at the time of decision formation. We used behavioral psychophysics and computational modeling to test if knowledge about sensory-motor contingencies affects the timescale of perceptual evidence integration. We asked human observers to perform the same motion discrimination task, with or without trial-to-trial variations of the mapping between perceptual choice and motor response. When the mapping varied, it was either instructed before or after the stimulus presentation. We quantified the timescale of evidence integration under these different sensory-motor mapping conditions by means of two approaches. First, we analyzed subjects’ discrimination threshold as a function of stimulus duration. Second, we fitted a dynamical decision-making model to subjects’ choice behavior. The results from both approaches indicated that observers (i) integrated motion information for several hundred ms, (ii) used a shorter than optimal integration timescale, and (iii) used the same integration timescale under all sensory-motor mappings. We conclude that the mechanisms limiting the timescale of perceptual decisions are largely independent from long-term learning (under fixed mapping) or rapid acquisition (under variable mapping) of sensory-motor contingencies. This conclusion has implications for neurophysiological and neuroimaging studies of perceptual decision-making

Paradoxical Evidence Integration in Rapid Decision Processes

Decisions about noisy stimuli require evidence integration over time. Traditionally, evidence integration and decision making are described as a one-stage process: a decision is made when evidence for the presence of a stimulus crosses a threshold. Here, we show that one-stage models cannot explain psychophysical experiments on feature fusion, where two visual stimuli are presented in rapid succession. Paradoxically, the second stimulus biases decisions more strongly than the first one, contrary to predictions of one-stage models and intuition. We present a two-stage model where sensory information is integrated and buffered before it is fed into a drift diffusion process. The model is tested in a series of psychophysical experiments and explains both accuracy and reaction time distributions