Discretion

Este trabajo reproduce un borrador que Hart (1907-1992) distribuyó entre los miembros del Grupo de Debate de Filosofía del Derecho de la Facultad de Derecho de Harvard en 1956 y que fue publicado originalmente en inglés en Harvard Law Review en 2013. En él, Hart se plantea responder a las siguientes cuestiones: ¿Qué es la discrecionalidad o en qué consiste el ejercicio de la discrecionalidad?; ¿en qué condiciones y por qué aceptamos o toleramos de hecho la discrecionalidad en un sistema jurídico?; ¿debemos aceptar o tolerar la discrecionalidad? Y de ser así, ¿por qué?; ¿qué valores amenaza el ejercicio de la discrecionalidad y cuáles preserva o promueve?; y por último ¿qué puede hacerse para maximizar los beneficios del ejercicio de la discrecionalidad y minimizar cualquier daño que genere?.This paper reproduces the draft version that Hart handed out among the members of the Legal Philosophy Discussion Group at Harvard in the year 1956. Originally published in English in the Harvard Law Review in 2013, he author addresses the following questions in it: 1. What is discretion, or what is the exercise of discretion? 2. Under what conditions and why do we in fact accept or tolerate discretion in a legal system? 3. Must we accept discretion or tolerate discretion, and if so, why? 4. What values does the use of discretion menace, and what values does it maintain or promote? 5. What can be done to maximize the beneficial operation of the use of discretion and to minimize any harm that it does?

American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream

11 Ga. L. Rev. 969 The article was initially presented as the spring Sibley Lecture on April 14, 1977. Through literary and historical references Professor Hart discusses basic principles of American law and judicial tradition. The supplementary document is the original typed manuscript with text revisions by Professor Hart

On the source, site and modes of domination

This article seeks to examine how domination manifests in social relationships and institutions. It does this by examining two debates in republican literature. The first of which is whether domination requires institutionalisation? This addresses the source of domination. The second debate is on the nature of arbitrary power. This raises questions about the site of domination. It will be argued that the source of domination can be personally or socially constituted and that the site can be interactional or systemic. This yields four modes of domination that can be used to examine social institutions and relationships

Neuroimaging and Responsibility Assessments

Could neuroimaging evidence help us to assess the degree of a person’s responsibility for a crime which we know that they committed? This essay defends an affirmative answer to this question. A range of standard objections to this high-tech approach to assessing people’s responsibility is considered and then set aside, but I also bring to light and then reject a novel objection—an objection which is only encountered when functional (rather than structural) neuroimaging is used to assess people’s responsibility

Zuzenbidea, askatasuna eta moralitatea

Traducción de un pequeño libro de H.L.A. Hart titulado "Law, Liberty and Morality", que aunque no es su trabajo más conocido representa muy bien las teorías e interpretaciones de este pensador

Zuzenbidea, askatasuna eta moralitatea

Traducción de un pequeño libro de H.L.A. Hart titulado "Law, Liberty and Morality", que aunque no es su trabajo más conocido representa muy bien las teorías e interpretaciones de este pensador

Konsep hukum

ix.; 266 hal.; ill.; 19 c