Disobeying Courts’ Orders—A Comparative Analysis of the Civil Contempt of Court Doctrine and of the Imageof the Common Law Judge

The aim of this article is to briefly tackle, from a comparative viewpoint, an academically quite overlooked topic: techniques of enforcement of lawful judgments. Despite a gradual convergence in many fields of law, common and civil law jurisdictions still maintain a striking diversity in the ways in which they react to non-compliance with court judgments. Whilst in common law tradition, failure to comply with a judicial order is considered civil contempt of court, in civil law countries this legal institution is simply unknown. Furthermore, it is only in civil law systems that failure to comply with a court judgment cannot be punished by imprisonment. My key question is: what are, if any, the “cultural” reasons that could explain this divergence of approach? First, discussing Mauro Cappelletti’s comparative methodology, I explore whether, and to what extent, civil contempt of court and its civilian counterparts are comparable. Then, focusing my attention on the common law model, I argue that many contemporary features of civil contempt can only be fully understood by looking at the particular image and unique social perception of the judge within the common law legal tradition

Realismo estadounidense en la resolución de conflictos. La resolución alternativa de conflictos como un proyecto “realista”

American Legal Realism is alive and well. As a normative (and not only descriptive) theory, it has shaped the legal world we are living in and has influenced current legal practices at a global level. This article looks at the influence Realists’ ideas (and specifically Charles Edward Clark’s ones) have had ‘unconsciously’ over the phenomenon of the privatisation of civil justice and the Alternative Dispute Resolution revolution. It is suggested that many key concepts of Pragmatism and American Legal Realism form part of today’s repertoire of Alternative Dispute Resolution supporters and that the privatisation of civil justice is to be understood as an “unintended” Realist project, in the sense that it is inspired by, and reflects, a Realist view about law, conflict-resolution and justice without openly recognizing it.El realismo jurídico estadounidense está vivo y robusto. Como teoría normativa (y no solo descriptiva), ha dado forma al mundo legal en el que estamos viviendo y ha influido en las prácticas legales actuales a nivel global. Este artículo analiza la influencia que las ideas de autores realistas (específicamente las de Charles Edward Clark) han tenido “inconscientemente” sobre el fenómeno de la privatización de la justicia civil y sobre la revolución que implicó la resolución alternativa de conflictos. El texto sugiere que muchos conceptos clave del pragmatismo y del realismo jurídico estadounidense forman parte del repertorio actual departidarios de la resolución alternativa de conflictos. Asimismo, que la privatización de la justicia civil debe entenderse como un proyecto “no intencionado” del realismo, pues está inspirado por y refleja una visión realista del derecho, la resolución de conflictos y la justicia, aunque sin reconocerlo abiertamente

Brevi riflessioni su alcuni aspetti della teoria del diritto e dell’interpretazione di Friedrich Müller

Il presente contributoprende in considerazione alcuni aspetti centrali della teoria del diritto e dell’interpretazione giuridica del filosofo del diritto e costituzionalista Friedrich Müller, a partire dalla recente opera collettiva (a cura di N. Stamile, N. Castilho Gomes, D. J. Almanza Torres) che ne analizza il pensiero e l’opera, in molte delle sue angolature. In particolare, si insiste su alcuni caposaldi della cd. “Teoria Strutturante del Diritto”, e cioè (a) l’approccio post-positivista, (b) la distinzione tra testo e norma, (c) le radici ermeneutiche del pensiero di Müller (soprattutto nell’ambito dell’interpretazione del testo costituzionale) e (d) il rapporto con le teorie realistiche del diritt

ANCORA SU “IL GIUDICE E L’ALGORITMO”. RIFLESSIONI CRITICHE SU INTELLIGENZA ARTIFICIALE E GIUSTIZIA PREDITTIVA (OCCASIONATE DA UN CONTRIBUTO DI MICHELE TARUFFO

A partire da un risalente, ma significativo, contributo di Michele Taruffo sull’applicazione delle tecnologie dell’intelligenza artificiale al diritto processuale, e, in particolare, circa i limiti (e le speranze) dei tentativi di formalizzare in linguaggio logico il ragionamento giudiziale (anche, ma non solo, al fine di operare predizioni), si prenderà in considerazione l’attuale insistenza sul concetto di “giustizia predittiva”. L’occasione - quasi di “storia” dei rapporti tra intelligenza artificiale e processo - ci consentirà poi di andare oltre e riflettere in maniera critica sulla tendenza, attuale e futura, ad automatizzare la decisione giudiziale (o parti di essa), in un’ottica ancora più ampia di valorizzazione dell’elemento umano insito nell’atto del giudicare

The public value of private litigation: a critical approach to civil justice privatization

Este artículo examina, desde un punto de vista crítico-teórico, las implicaciones de la creciente pérdida de relevancia del proceso civil público a favor de medios privados e informales de resolución de las disputas (la llamada “privatización de la justicia civil”). Subrayando la revolución ideológica en el concebir la disputa, y en la forma de resolverla, como un fenómeno esencialmente privado, el propósito del artículo es reafirmar y argumentar el necesario valor público del proceso civil como componente esencial de la Rule of Law. En particular, reelaborando algunas críticas a la tendencia a la privatización que se han hecho recientemente en el contexto del common law, se destacarán las conexiones entre proceso civil público y democracia, la evolución social del sistema jurídico y los valores de la seguridad jurídica y de la igualdad de trato.Aim of the article is to analyse -from a critical standpoint- the theoretical implications caused by the loss of centrality of public civil adjudication in favour of private and informal alternative means of dispute resolution (so-called “privatisation of civil justice”). By highlighting how looking at controversies and their modes of resolution as essentially private phenomena entails a genuine ideological revolution, this article will re-state and argue for the public value of adjudication as an essential and crucial component of the Rule of Law. Specifically, by reflecting upon some recent critical views advanced in the common law legal literature on the privatisation of dispute resolution, it will stress the deep connections between public adjudication and democracy, the social evolution of legal systems, and the values of legal certainty and equality of treatment.Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociale