Training Command and Control in Search & Rescue-Adaptive Behaviors in Uncertain Conditions

In any situation where there are shifting goals, there is a need for real-time adaptation. In critical situation in military or emergency operations time is of essence. It is crucial for success to get on top of the problem as quick as possible and start acting faster than the situation develops, to seize and keep the initiative. By reaching such a state proactive, rather than reactive, measures must be taken. Shifting goals require a radically different approach than stable goals when it comes to the rationale for action. There is a known gap between work as done and work as imagined. Managers often have a too simplified model of how work is performed and thus many simulator training programs are not living up to their potential. In this theoretical paper, the Cynefin Framework is being used to argue for different approaches to simulation design depending on the character of the situation depicted. Four situations are considered: simple, complicated, complex and chaotic. Simulation is a powerful training tool if used with thought. A thorough understanding of the area and system character of application is of crucial essence to be able to successfully develop simulator training. Complex system implies the need for adaption. Linear systems imply rule-based operations. If the solutions fit for linear systems are imposed on complex systems the ability to adapt is lost and in some cases to great risk to the operators on the field. To be able to tailor training to the task and to use simulation close to its full potential, it is of essence to understand the character of the real-life situation the simulation is aimed to prepare the trainee for. Complex (uncertain) situations require adaptation which simulation can afford but too often is lost and forgotten in bureaucratic fulfilment of training curriculums

Eye Tracking during High Speed Navigation at Sea

Purpose: Professional high speed sea navigational procedures are based on turn points, courses, dangers and steering cues in the environment. Since navigational aids have become less expensive and due to the fact that electronic sea charts can be integrated with both radar and transponder information, it may be assumed that traditional navigation by using paper based charts and radar will play a less significant role in the future, especially among less experienced navigators. Possible navigational differences between experienced and non-experienced boat drivers is thus of interest with regards to their use of navigational aids. It may be assumed that less experienced navigators rely too much on the information given by the electronic sea chart, despite the fact that it is based on GPS information that can be questioned, especially in littoral waters close to land.Method: This eye tracking study investigates gaze behaviour from 16 experienced and novice boat drivers during high speed navigation at sea.Results: The results show that the novice drivers look at objects that are close to themselves, like instrumentation, while the experienced look more at objects far away from the boat. This is in accordance with previous research on car drivers. Further, novice boat drivers used the electronic navigational aids to a larger extent than the experienced, especially during high speed conditions. The experienced drivers focused much of their attention on objects outside the boat.Conclusions: The findings verify that novice boat drivers tend to rely on electronic navigational aids. Experienced drivers presumably use the navigational aids to verify what they have observed in the surrounding environment and further use the paper based sea chart to a larger extent than the novice drivers

INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE FOR FAST RESPONSE CRAFT – COMMAND & CONTROL & HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION

Command and Control (C2) is required for safe and effective maritime operations. To facilitate effective decision-making and C2, it is essential that the crew can access the required information. It is therefore essential that the appropriate information architecture is used. Navigation, being an essential aspect of C2, has seen a radical change from paper charts and individual instruments to computer systems capable of sophisticated data fusion to provide enhanced situational awareness. The development of the required information architecture is not a software/engineering issue, but rather lies within the human factors domain as it requires an understanding of how humans perceive information, how they use mental model(s), and subsequently make safe and effective decisions

INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE FOR FAST RESPONSE CRAFT – COMMAND & CONTROL & HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION

Command and Control (C2) is required for safe and effective maritime operations. To facilitate effective decision-making and C2, it is essential that the crew can access the required information. It is therefore essential that the appropriate information architecture is used. Navigation, being an essential aspect of C2, has seen a radical change from paper charts and individual instruments to computer systems capable of sophisticated data fusion to provide enhanced situational awareness. The development of the required information architecture is not a software/engineering issue, but rather lies within the human factors domain as it requires an understanding of how humans perceive information, how they use mental model(s), and subsequently make safe and effective decisions

Navigation Methodology and Teamwork in High Tempo Operations

Maritime navigation of small vessels at high speed can be very hazardous. Vessels are becoming more potent with greater speed capabilities. The demand of deliverance is also manifesting itself within organizations and there are fewer possibilities for slowing down the overall pace. The methodology to cope with the new challenges the speed imposes is not keeping up. Accidents occur due to this situation and their consequences are potentially fatal. The topic of high speed navigation has been elucidated from different perspectives in five papers. The papers present an understanding of high speed navigation looking at the contemporary literature as well as the author’s own experiences. The theories used to describe navigation are coming mostly from the Human Factors domain. The results from the papers I-V that are presented in this thesis are reinterpreted from a new theoretical standpoint than the one introduced in the original papers.Navigation at high speed is a team effort that requires effective collective actions. The navigation methodology studied, Dynamic navigation (DYNAV) is mainly constructed of four phases used to coordinate activities within the crew in relation to a mission objective or a goal. Five pieces of key information have been identified and constitute the backbone of the communication between crew members. Mechanisms are incorporated in the navigation methodology to catch unwanted variability in the collective understanding of the situation. It is suggested from the concepts of complexity, variability and epistemic actions that DYNAV is a methodology to choreograph joint activities, that re-planning is an essential part of effective teamwork and driven partly from the need of aiding understanding of the situation

Perceived Motion Sickness and Effects on Performance Following Naval Transportation

The present study focused on the relationship between previous experiences of, and rated susceptibility to, motion sickness and its correlation to subjective measurements and actual performance. Performance was measured in terms of shooting precision among 23 participants from the Swedish amphibious corps after transportation in a small amphibious boat, while sealed off with no reference to the outside world. Self-rating questionnaires were collected regarding perceived performance and presence of motion sickness. The physiological status perceived by each participant was related to factors that generally indicate early stages of motion sickness, which also were correlated to deficits in performance. It was further shown that participants who believed that their performance could be affected by motion sickness also performed less well

Preparing to be unprepared – training for Mass Rescue Operations

“Preparing to be unprepared” might be considered as a contradiction in terms, but is in the case of maritime mass rescue operations (MRO) vital to be able to save lives. The international Maritime Organization defines MRO as “…the need for immediate response to large numbers of persons in distress, such that the capabilities normally available to the search and rescue authorities are inadequate”. This paper recognizes the work on MRO carried out by the International Maritime Rescue Federation (IMRF) and provides a theoretical framework on how to understand the complexity of such an operation. The IMRF has over the last decade within their MRO project produced guidance papers, conferences, workshops and courses with the objective to increase awareness and knowledge about, probably the most challenging Search And Rescue (SAR) operation in order to be able to save lives. One of the steps was the creation of a course (MRO – Subject Matter Expert course) for personnel having responsibility for complex incident planning and training at a national or on a major organizational level. The learning objectives for the course which is described in detail in this paper includes an enhanced ability to identify, analyse and understand the problems, and to propose solutions. The scale, complexity and rarity of a MRO calls for a thorough understanding of the preparatory needs. In this paper we discuss preparedness using the Cynefin framework as a theoretical backdrop looking at different decision making processes present during MRO planning and execution

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