You May Have to Do it Again, Rocky! An Experimental Analysis of Bargaining with Risky Joint Profits

We present an experimental study of a risky sequential bargaining to model negotiations in risky joint ventures that proceed through multiple stages.Our example is the production of a movie that may give rise to a sequel, so actors and producers negitiate sequentially.We compare the predictions of alternative theoretical approaches to understanding such a game.The game theoretic solution predicts (assuming risk neutrality) that actors are willing to accept wages below their outside option for first films in order to capture the gains from winning lucrative sequel contracts.This prediction is strongly rejected by the data.The data are better explained by either equity theory (equal splits) or by a game theoretic model where actors have uncertain risk aversion.The parameters of the game are calibrated to match data on 99 movies for 1989 available from a case study.

How Preussag became TUI : kissing too many toads can make you a toad

In the period 1997-2004, Preussag, a diversified German conglomerate of old economy businesses, changed itself into TUI, a company focused almost entirely on tourism and logistics. This paper analyzes how this strategy was executed and how it contributed to Preussag’s underperformance of the stock market. We collect 417 announcements of acquisitions, financial disclosures and other news and disentangle the impact of different parts of the company’s strategy. We find that only the divestitures created value, that the strategy to invest in tourism destroyed value, and that the acquisition premiums Preussag paid were mostly unjustified. Bad luck like the events of September 11, 2001 cannot account for the poor performance of the stock. Poor management resulted from poor governance, combining a state-owned bank as the largest shareholder, board interlocks, and insufficient managerial incentives. The case shows how divestiture programs increase the liquid resources available to management beyond free operating cash flows and casts doubt on the positive governance role of institutional blockholders

Shareholder activism in the UK: types of activists, forms of activism, and their impact on a target’s performance

Considering the recent rapid expansion of shareholder activism phenomenon in the United Kingdom (UK) and the vast amount of resources committed to it by corporations, government and investors, its effectiveness has become a crucial subject for investigation. This article analyzes organizational outcomes of shareholder activism in the UK. This research is based on a unique comprehensive database of shareholder activism events during the period of 1998–2008. We provide a detailed account of different types of activists, activism strategies and shareholder demands associated with the events of activism. Our findings show that the effectiveness of shareholder activism in terms of abnormal stock-market returns varies dramatically depending on its form, type of investor and the nature of investor proposals

Institutional investors and corporate governance

We provide a comprehensive overview of the role of institutional investors in corporate governance with three main components. First, we establish new stylized facts documenting the evolution and importance of institutional ownership. Second, we provide a detailed characterization of key aspects of the legal and regulatory setting within which institutional investors govern portfolio firms. Third, we synthesize the evolving response of the recent theoretical and empirical academic literature in finance to the emergence of institutional investors in corporate governance. We highlight how the defining aspect of institutional investors – the fact that they are financial intermediaries – differentiates them in their governance role from standard principal blockholders. Further, not all institutional investors are identical, and we pay close attention to heterogeneity amongst institutional investors as blockholders

International equity portfolio investment and enforcement of insider trading laws: a cross-country analysis

In this study, we examine the effects of stringent insider trading laws’ enforcement, institutions and stock market development on international equity portfolio allocation using data from 44 countries over the period 2001-2015. Our results suggest that stringent insider trading laws and their enforcement exert a positive and significant impact on international portfolio investment allocation. Further analysis indicates that the interaction between a country’s institutional quality, stock market development and enforcement of insider trading laws have a positive and significant effect on international equity portfolio allocation. The findings of this study have implications for the design of portfolio investment trading strategies and contribute to the literature on foreign equity investment decisions