711 research outputs found
Aspirations, adaptive learning and cooperation in repeated games
Game Theory;Repeated Games
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Community Networks and the Growth of Private Enterprise in China
This paper identifies and quantifies the role played by birth-county-based community networks in the growth of private enterprise in China. We develop a network-based model that generates predictions for the dynamics of firm entry, concentration, and firm size across birth counties with varying social connectedness (measured by population density). These predictions are verified over the 1990-2009 period with administrative data covering the universe of registered firms. Competing non-network-based explanations can explain some, but not all, of the results. Moreover, supplementary evidence indicates that network spillovers occur within the birth county and, going down even further, within clans within the county. Having validated the model, we estimate its structural parameters and conduct counter-factual simulations, which estimate that entry over the 1995-2004 period would have been 40% lower (with a comparable decline in the stock of capital) in the absence of community networks. Additional counter-factual simulations shed light on misallocation and industrial policy in economies where networks are active
Complexity of Strong Implementability
We consider the question of implementability of a social choice function in a
classical setting where the preferences of finitely many selfish individuals
with private information have to be aggregated towards a social choice. This is
one of the central questions in mechanism design. If the concept of weak
implementation is considered, the Revelation Principle states that one can
restrict attention to truthful implementations and direct revelation
mechanisms, which implies that implementability of a social choice function is
easy to check. For the concept of strong implementation, however, the
Revelation Principle becomes invalid, and the complexity of deciding whether a
given social choice function is strongly implementable has been open so far. In
this paper, we show by using methods from polyhedral theory that strong
implementability of a social choice function can be decided in polynomial space
and that each of the payments needed for strong implementation can always be
chosen to be of polynomial encoding length. Moreover, we show that strong
implementability of a social choice function involving only a single selfish
individual can be decided in polynomial time via linear programming
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Declining Clientelism of Welfare Benefits? Targeting and Political Competition based Evidence from an Indian State
It has been argued that since 2014, under the BJP-led central government, welfare benefits in India have become better targeted and less prone to clientelistic control by state and local governments. Arguably this has helped to increase the vote share of the BJP vis-a-vis regional parties. We test these hypotheses using longitudinal data from 3500 rural households in the state of West Bengal. We fail to find evidence that the new “central” programs introduced after 2014 were better targeted than traditional “state” programs, or that the targeting of state programs improved after 2014. Households receiving the new “central” benefits introduced since 2014 were more likely to switch their political support to the BJP. However, changes in the scale, composition or targeting of these programs, in clientelistic effectiveness of traditional state programs or in household incomes, fail to account for the large observed increase in the voters’ support for the BJP. Non-Hindus, especially recent immigrant nonHindus, were much less likely to switch support to the BJP, even after controlling for benefits received and changes in household incomes. Our results suggest that ideology and identity politics were more important factors explaining the rising popularity of the BJP
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Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private versus Political Intermediaries
We conduct a field experiment in India comparing two ways of delegating selection of microcredit clients among smallholder farmers to local intermediaries: a private trader (TRAIL), versus a local-government appointee (GRAIL). Selected beneficiaries in both schemes were equally likely to take up and repay loans, and experienced similar increases in borrowing and farm output. However farm profits increased and unit costs of production decreased significantly only in TRAIL. While there is some evidence of superior selection by ability and landholding in TRAIL, the results are mainly driven by greater reduction of unit production costs for TRAIL treated farmers than GRAIL treated farmers of similar ability or landholding. We develop and test a model where the TRAIL agents’ role as middlemen in the agricultural supply chain enabled and motivated them to offer treated farmers business advice, which helped them lower unit costs
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Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private versus Political Intermediaries
We compare two different methods of appointing a local commission agent as an intermediary for a credit program. In the Trader-Agent Intermediated Lending Scheme (TRAIL), the agent was a randomly selected established private trader, while in the Gram Panchayat-Agent Intermediated-Lending Scheme (GRAIL), he was randomly chosen from nominations by the elected village council. More TRAIL loans were taken up, but repayment rates were similar, and TRAIL loans had larger average impacts on borrowers’ farm incomes. The majority of this difference in impacts is due to differences in treatment effects conditional on farmer productivity, rather than differences in borrower selection patterns. The findings can be explained by a model where TRAIL agents increased their middleman profits by helping more able treated borrowers reduce their unit costs and increase output. In contrast, for political reasons GRAIL agents monitored the less able treated borrowers and reduced their default risk
Low-temperature behaviour of ammonium ion in buddingtonite [N(D/H) 4 AlSi 3 O 8 ] from neutron powder diffraction
The structural response of buddingtonite [N(D/H) 4 AlSi 3 O 8 ] on cooling has been studied by neutron diffraction. Data have been collected from 280 K down to 11 K, and the crystal structure refined using the Rietveld method. Rigid-body constraints were applied to the ammonium ion to explore the structural properties of ammonium in the M-site cavities at low-temperature. Low-temperature saturation is observed for almost all the lattice parameters. From the present in situ low-temperature neutron diffraction studies, there is no strong evidence of orientational order–disorder of the ammonium ions in buddingtonite.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/46909/1/269_2004_Article_425.pd
Taking the detour
Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/115976/1/jhm2424.pdfhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/115976/2/jhm2424-sup-0001-suppinfo.pd
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