Employee share ownership in a unionised duopoly

Profit sharing schemes have been analysed assuming Cournot competition and decentralised wage negotiations, and it has been found that firms share profits in equilibrium. This paper analyses a different remuneration system: employee share ownership. We find that whether firms choose to share ownership or not depends on both the type of competition in the product market and the way in which workers organise to negotiate wages. If wage setting is decentralised, under duopolistic Cournot competition both firms share ownership. If wage setting is centralised, only one firm shares ownership if the degree to which goods are substitutes takes an intermediate value; otherwise, the two firms share ownership. In this case, if the union sets the same wage for all workers neither firm shares ownership. Therefore, centralised wage setting discourages share ownership. Fi- nally, under Bertrand competition neither firm shares ownership regardless of how workers are organised to negotiate wages.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Actualización de la batería estándar y batería ampliada de pruebas alérgicas de contacto por el Grupo Español de Investigación en Dermatitis de Contacto y Alergia Cutánea (GEIDAC)

After the meeting held by the Spanish Contact Dermatitis and Skin Allergy Research Group (GEIDAC) back in October 2021, changes were suggested to the Spanish Standard Series patch testing. Hydroxyethyl methacrylate (2% pet.), textile dye mixt (6.6% pet.), linalool hydroperoxide (1% pet.), and limonene hydroperoxide (0.3% pet.) were, then, added to the series that agreed upon in 2016. Ethyldiamine and phenoxyethanol were excluded. Methyldibromoglutaronitrile, the mixture of sesquiterpene lactones, and hydroxyisohexyl 3-cyclohexene (Lyral) were also added to the extended Spanish series of 2022. (c) 2024 AEDV. Published by Elsevier Espana, S.L.U. This is an open access article under the CC BY -NC -ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)