Why do Mothers Breastfeed Girls Less Than Boys? Evidence and Implications for Child Health in India.” Quarterly

Abstract Breastfeeding is negatively correlated with future fertility because nursing temporarily reduces fecundity and because mothers usually wean upon becoming pregnant again. We model breastfeeding under son-biased fertility preferences and show that breastfeeding duration increases with birth order, especially near target family size; is lowest for daughters and children without older brothers because their parents try again for a son; and exhibits the largest gender gap near target family size, when gender is most predictive of subsequent fertility. Data from India confirm each prediction. Moreover, child survival exhibits similar patterns, especially in settings where the alternatives to breastmilk are unsanitary

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES TEACHER PERFORMANCE PAY: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM INDIA

ABSTRACT Performance pay for teachers is frequently suggested as a way of improving education outcomes in schools, but the theoretical predictions regarding its effectiveness are ambiguous and the empirical evidence to date is limited and mixed. We present results from a randomized evaluation of a teacher incentive program implemented across a large representative sample of government-run rural primary schools in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. The program provided bonus payments to teachers based on the average improvement of their students' test scores in independently administered learning assessments (with a mean bonus of 3% of annual pay). At the end of two years of the program, students in incentive schools performed significantly better than those in control schools by 0.28 and 0.16 standard deviations in math and language tests respectively. They scored significantly higher on "conceptual" as well as "mechanical" components of the tests, suggesting that the gains in test scores represented an actual increase in learning outcomes. Incentive schools also performed better on subjects for which there were no incentives, suggesting positive spillovers. Group and individual incentive schools performed equally well in the first year of the program, but the individual incentive schools outperformed in the second year. Incentive schools performed significantly better than other randomly-chosen schools that received additional schooling inputs of a similar value

Accounting for the Transitions after Entrepreneurial Business Failure: An Emerging Market Perspective

This study builds on prior scholarly works on institutions and entrepreneurship by examining the process of transitions and institutional obstacles that force serial entrepreneurs’ shift to operate in the formal or informal sector after entrepreneurial business failures. Using insights from 32 serial entrepreneurs in Ghana, a framework was developed and utilized to explicate how the pull and push motivations for the transition into or persisting with formality or informality after business failure unfolds over time. Our analysis sheds light on the processes and effects of the motivations on the persistently high level of entrepreneurial activities in the informal sector for many emerging economies

Teacher Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from India

We present results from a randomized evaluation of a teacher performance pay program implemented across a large representative sample of government-run rural primary schools in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. At the end of 2 years of the program, students in incentive schools performed significantly better than those in control schools by 0.27 and 0.17 standard deviations in math and language tests, respectively. We find no evidence of any adverse consequences of the program. The program was highly cost effective, and incentive schools performed significantly better than other randomly chosen schools that received additional schooling inputs of a similar value.

EZ-Tax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates

This paper examines whether the salience of a tax system affects equilibrium tax rates. I analyze how tolls change after toll facilities adopt electronic toll collection (ETC); drivers are substantially less aware of tolls paid electronically. I estimate that, in steady state, tolls are 20 to 40 percent higher than they would have been without ETC. Consistent with a salience-based explanation for this toll increase, I find that under ETC, driving becomes less elastic with respect to the toll and toll setting becomes less sensitive to the electoral calendar. Alternative explanations appear unlikely to be able to explain the findings